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Abstract
This study is directed towards the problem of conceptual translation across differ-
ent data management systems and formats, with a particular focus on those used in
the emerging world of the Semantic Web. Increasingly, organisations have sought to
connect information sources and services within and beyond their enterprise bound-
aries, building upon existing Internet facilities to offer improved research, planning,
reporting and management capabilities. The Semantic Web is an ambitious response
to this growing demand, offering a standards-based platform for sharing, linking and
reasoning with information. The imagined result, a globalised knowledge network
formed out of mutually referring data structures termed “ontologies”, would make
possible new kinds of queries, inferences and amalgamations of information. Such a
network, though, is premised upon large numbers of manually drawn links between
these ontologies. In practice, establishing these links is a complex translation task
requiring considerable time and expertise; invariably, as ontologies and other struc-
tured information sources are published, many useful connections are neglected. To
combat this, in recent years substantial research has been invested into “ontology
matching”—the exploration of algorithmic approaches for automatically translating
or aligning ontologies. These approaches, which exploit the explicit semantic prop-
erties of individual concepts, have registered impressive precision and recall results
against humanly-engineered translations. However they are unable to make use of
background cultural information about the overall systems in which those concepts
are housed—how those systems are used, for what purpose they were designed, what
methodological or theoretical principles underlined their construction, and so on. The
present study investigates whether paying attention to these sociological dimensions
of electronic knowledge systems could supplement algorithmic approaches in some
circumstances. Specifically, it asks whether a holistic notion of commensurability can
be useful when aligning or translating between such systems.
The first half of the study introduces the problem, surveys the literature, and
outlines the general approach. It then proposes both a theoretical foundation and
a practical framework for assessing commensurability of ontologies and other knowl-
edge systems. Chapter 1 outlines the Semantic Web, ontologies and the problem of
conceptual translation, and poses the key research questions. Conceptual translation
can be treated as, by turns, a social, philosophical, linguistic or technological prob-
lem; Chapter 2 surveys a correspondingly wide range of literature and approaches.
xi
xii ABSTRACT
The methods employed by the study are described in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 criti-
cally examines theories of conceptual schemes and commensurability, while Chapter
5 describes the framework itself, comprising a series of specific dimensions, a broad
methodological approach, and a means for generating both qualitative and quantita-
tive assessments.
The second half of the study then explores the notion of commensurability through
several empirical frames. Chapters 6 to 8 applies the framework to a series of case
studies. Chapter 6 presents a brief history of knowledge systems, and compares two
of these systems—relational databases and Semantic Web ontologies. Chapter 7,
in turn, compares several “upper-level” ontologies—reusable schematisations of ab-
stract concepts like Time and Space. Chapter 8 reviews a recent, widely publicised
controversy over the standardisation of document formats. This analysis in particular
shows how the opaque dry world of technical specifications can reveal the complex
network of social dynamics, interests and beliefs which coordinate and motivate them.
Collectively, these studies demonstrate the framework is useful in making evident as-
sumptions which motivate the design of different knowledge systems, and further, in
assessing the commensurability of those systems. Chapter 9 then presents a further
empirical study; here, the framework is implemented as a software system, and pilot
tested among a small cohort of researchers. Finally, Chapter 10 summarises the ar-
gumentative trajectory of the study as a whole—that, broadly, an elaborated notion
of commensurability can tease out important and salient features of translation in-




An ontology is an explicit specification of a conceptualization (Gruber,
1993, p. 199).
Moreover, I have always disliked the word “ontology” (Hacking, 2002, p.
1).
This study is directed towards the problem of conceptual translation across data
management systems, with a particular focus on those used in the emerging world of
the Semantic Web. These systems are all too frequently characterised in essential-
ist terms—as through, as the etymology of “data” would suggest, they are merely
the housing of neutral empirical givens. This study maintains, on the contrary,
that systems always carry with them the assumptions of cultures who design and
use them—cultures who are, in the very broadest sense, responsible for them. To-
gether such assumptions make for a shared and accultured orientation towards some
slice of the world; one which can be described as being more or less commensurable
with other orientations held by other cultures. This feature of being “more or less
commensurable”—of possessing varying degrees of cultural commensurability—can be
exploited to guide the practical work of translating terms between knowledge systems.
A low degree of commensurability exacerbates both the theoretical problem of seman-
tic translation—how to translate concepts from one cognitive model to another—and
the practical problem of data integration—how to move data from one physical sys-
tem to another. Incommensurability of systems is not, though, taken here to be a
fixed ontological divide which cannot be crossed; rather it is treated as an analytic
category, as a measure of the work required to translate concepts from one system
to another within an identifiable situational context. Two systems can be said to
be incommensurable only when the estimate of this work fails some contextually-
bound cost-benefit analysis or equivalent metric—when it proves to be impractical
or infeasible for some expressly given purpose. Given some task of system transla-
tion, understanding before the fact the extent to which both the systems themselves,
and the cultures responsible for them, are broadly commensurable ought to lead to
better estimates of the scope of work involved in this translation. Principally, then,
this study represents an effort to explore how to assess commensurability in practical
1
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situations; it does so by proposing a framework for that assessment, and applying it
to a series of case studies. In addition, it endeavours to develop a robust theoretical
foundation around the concept of commensurability, via a series of excursions into
contemporary debates in philosophy, social theory and cognitive science.
The question of commensurability is asked here both of knowledge systems in
general, and such systems as they are published on the Semantic Web in particular.
The Semantic Web is an encompassing vision which imagines a network of connected,
federated and integrated databases (Berners-Lee et al., 2001). It is motivated by the
desire to simplify the integration of information from the myriad existing data sources
and formats on the web. In the language of the Semantic Web, these structured data
sets are termed ontologies, a co-opted piece of philosophical jargon describing how a re-
gion of the world is explicitly conceptualised in a series of codified commitments (Gru-
ber, 1993). Semantic web ontologies use formal languages—the Resource Definition
Framework (RDF) and Ontology Web Language (OWL)—to express these commit-
ments (Berners-Lee et al., 2001). Because of the highly formal and explicit nature of
these languages—relative to other approaches of representing knowledge—ontologies
present good objects for studying the question of commensurability. While shared and
standardised ontologies may simplify the job of system integrators connecting various
data services over the Web, without explicit acknowledgement of the commensura-
bility of their background assumptions, there remain significant impediments to the
realisation of even a less ambitious variant of the Semantic Web. Adopting the stand-
point that knowledge in the large is a culturally constructed and negotiated process,
and so systems which codify knowledge can best be understood by interrogating that
process, this study aims to find heuristic guidelines which can help determine, within
a practical context, the extent of commensurability between such systems. This in-
volves necessarily a more holistic orientation towards system design and integration
than is usually applied within specifically computer science approaches to these prob-
lems, and so requires a broader lens, one which encompasses both the strengths and
the complications of other disciplinary approaches.
Ontologies are taken here to be only an exemplary species of the broader genus of
knowledge systems—a genus which can be extended to include other types of database
models, XML schemas, expert systems and electronic classification systems generally.
So while the focus is often directed towards Semantic Web ontologies, since they
are not yet as commonly used in organisations as other types of systems, casting a
broader net aims to extend the generality of the research findings without loss of
semantic specificity. As the argument goes on to show, moreover, even the different
formal properties of rival system types—Semantic Web ontologies compared with
older database information models, for instance—can involve important assumptions
of a philosophical ontological kind as well.
This study, then, argues that a holistic treatment of the commensurability of
knowledge systems—both of the specific concepts, properties and relations they ex-
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press, and of the broader cultural conceptualisations they imply or infer—can provide
a useful heuristic guide to the practical translation and integration of such systems.
Such a treatment, building upon both social and computer science disciplines, has an
intended practical pay-off; it should augment existing, purely technical approaches to
these problems.
The rest of this chapter is structured in three parts. The first part presents
some brief historical context for the interest in knowledge systems—ontologies and
databases—and situate the argument within a social theoretical framework. The sec-
ond part introduces the core concepts and terms of the study, by introducing, in turn,
the Semantic Web, ontologies, knowledge systems and the question of commensurabil-
ity. The third part summarises the guiding research questions, purpose and structure
of the work.
1.1 Putting Things in Order
In The Order of Things, Foucault (1970) writes of the “great tables of the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, when in the disciplines of biology, economics and philology
the raw phenomena of experience was classified, categorised, organised and labeled”.
At the start of the twenty-first century, when the classificatory technologies of the file
system, spreadsheet, database and Internet search engine have superseded those of the
ruler and pencil, these descriptions of “great tables” and their accompanying heroic
taxonomic enterprises can seem quaint and anachronistic. The experience of lists,
tables, hierarchical trees and networks and other informational structures as organi-
sational aids is now unremarkable, quotidian, a tacit quality of a modern sensibility,
reflected in the acquired facility to navigate everything from baroque scientific tax-
onomies and global standards to organisational directories and personalised databases.
Consumers of electronic devices invest heavily in their repositories of music, books,
photos and film, marking individual entries with qualifications of genre, commentary,
ratings, biographical snippets and a host of other conceptual distinctions and demar-
cations. Business, governments and other organisations are necessarily technocratic
taxonomists on a grand scale, investing in and managing large knowledge bases, pro-
cesses, and infrastructure. Such fervent activity has even inspired the emergence of
a dedicated industry and academic discipline—that of knowledge management. One
of the fields of scientific enterprise Foucault himself analyses, biology, features ever-
expanding databases of proteins, genomes, diseases and other biological entities, so
vast in size that any single human attempt to review the data would fail by orders of
magnitude (Arunguren, 2005). It is hard therefore to share Foucault’s wonder at the
ambition and scope of classical scholarship, without making an equally wondrously
empathic leap back into the past. A modern-day reaction might instead regard these
old classificatory systems as historical curiosities; at most, as experimental preludes,
for better or worse, to the immense contemporary and global industries which serve
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an insatiable demand for information.
Yet our current age is also heir to the efforts of those classical scholars. Since Leib-
niz, the development of symbolic systems to represent knowledge has been a recurring
motif of philosophy, and later, of other more applied disciplinary studies. From his
universal symbolism, to Kant’s categories, to Frege’s descriptions of a formal logic, to
the development of logical positivism in the 1920s, to, finally, the recent developments
of the relational database, artificial intelligence and the Semantic Web, it is possible
to trace a distinct and particular epistemological tradition. That tradition has sought
to develop increasingly refined formal languages to represent statements about the
world unambiguously. Rigorous empiricism—recording only observable facts—would,
when coupled with an automatic deductive procedure based on a logical formalism,
simplify the production of all knowledge to a series of mechanical acts. In Leibniz’s
famous dictum, once this point had been reached even philosophers would be able to
settle arguments by appealing to machination: “Let us calculate!” (Lenzen, 2004).
There have been at least two notable impediments to the realisation of this vision
up until the end of the twentieth century. The first is the development of feasible logic
systems and technical implementations systems for representing these concepts. This
has been the subject of considerable research and application in artificial intelligence,
knowledge representation and broader information technology over the last fifty years.
Such research, and the practical consequences of it, have produced in turn a series
of pivotal technologies for the emergence of what Castells (1996) terms the “Network
Society”: the relational database—the current paradigmatic means for storing struc-
tured organisational information; the spreadsheet—a metaphor which pervades the
construction of tabular data in the personal computing era; XML—a near-ubiquitous
format for describing and transmitting data on the Internet; and semantic web on-
tologies, the emerging standardised mechanism for representing knowledge on the
Internet.
The second impediment is development of consensual arrangements of concepts
against which facts can be faithfully recorded. As the many successful cases of techni-
cal standards ratified by the ISO and other bodies show, there has been considerable
success in efforts to develop standards. However, unlike the production of logical sys-
tems and implementations, consensus over such arrangements is frequently a brittle
social dynamic, reliant upon what (Davidson, 2006) terms “the principle of charity”
adopted between heterogenous cultures and actors, as they seek to exchange meaning
with each other.
The development of computational classification systems and standards has expe-
rienced at least partial success because they facilitate a distinctly modern taxonomic
impulse—an apparently unceasing desire to order, organised, catalogue, coordinate
and control. What makes this desire distinctively modern? In response it could be
argued, in a deflationary fashion, that the urge to put things in order is inherent in
human language—nouns, and names particularly, express implicit taxonomies. How-
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ever, natural languages are taxed with many functions other than that of articulating
some state of affairs in the world—they must also issue imperatives, pose interroga-
tives, invoke vocatives and generally perform a host of more esoteric speech acts; and
even in the case of assertoric utterances, they must also permit statement modulation
according to tense, mood, aspect and a range of sociolinguistic inflections. In contrast,
artificial formal languages are deliberately designed with both a minimal syntax—how
statements can be expressed—and rigorous semantics—how those statements must be
interpreted—in order to make electronic taxonomies easily constructible and unam-
biguously interpretable. These features are not coincidentally related to the rising
informational needs of modern institutions, departments, bureaucracies and organi-
sations. Indeed the tendencies of late capitalism suggest a self-reinforcing chain of
multiple factors which stimulate this impulse towards order and categorisation: the
operational benefits of the “network externalities” brought about by global commu-
nication networks; legal directives towards greater transparency and accountability;
competitive pressures towards greater efficiencies; improved control and regulation
both of people and objects, effected through ever more fine-grained classificatory
structures. These factors both motivate and, in turn, are facilitated by the great
affordances of information technology in the post-industrial era.
At the same time, the modernist conception of an organisation as a highly-
regulated machine-like entity has been challenged by new, postmodern metaphors,
which imagine the organisation as open, interconnected, self-reflexive, fluid, relational
and networked (Ashkenas et al., 1995; Castells, 1996). The organisation is tasked with
new, contemporary demands: to be visible, transparent, connected and accountable.
It is to be audited regularly and stringently; it must be open to public inspection and
accountable to numerous stakeholders—not only its direct constituents or sharehold-
ers, but a complex network of those with “stakes” in organisational governance and
performance. It must also deal more directly with its members, constituents, cus-
tomers, partners, employees, suppliers, regulatory bodies and press organisations, via
a host of increasingly immediate, ubiquitous, connected and “on-demand” technolo-
gies. In the language of contemporary management rhetoric, an organisation must be
open, porous, boundary-less (Ashkenas et al., 1995; Castells, 1996). Information is the
pivotal part of this equation, the connection between modernist imperative to control,
order and organise, and the postmodern desire to connect what is controlled, both
within and between organisational boundaries. Accordingly, the desire to organise
large amounts of information has led to interest, funding and prestige to be associ-
ated with information technologies, processes and management. These in turn have
been seen as central to development of more successful organisations—organisations
at any rate capable of greater performativity in a capitalistic environment. The twin
development of the modern organisation and information technologies have been mu-
tually reinforcing, to the extent that neither could any longer be imagined without
the other. They are both features of a distinct phase of modernity.
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Yet, just as these developments show a trend towards ever greater adoption
of common, standardised and homogenised technical artefacts—informational and
otherwise—they do not preclude an inverse tendency towards greater differentiation,
in which various organisational cultures, brought into engagement within a globalised
electronic landscape, both recognise and indeed actively produce perspectival dif-
ferences towards the world they share. Like painters describing a landscape from
different angles, these diverse orientations found both the conditions and limitations
of the kinds of facts and observations which can be asserted about the world. Ac-
cumulating a base of information—a database—enables organisations rapid retrieval
and analysis of data; yet the price of this is a certain rigidity or reification at work
in the deployment of concepts used to structure the database. The record of a per-
son in a database, for instance, captures only some facets, properties, attributes and
variables about the person—those typically deemed salient for the use of the system.
Moreover these properties “slice” the person in pre-defined ways, based on assump-
tions held by the culture responsible for the database. As the system is used over
time, as more records are added, and other systems are adapted to fit the particular
conceptualisation employed by the system, it becomes increasingly difficult to reengi-
neer or “refactor” it. Consequently the conceptualisation becomes reified—appearing
naturalised through the resilience to change of the system it is deployed in. Lost, or
at least obscured, is the potential for other kinds of descriptions of entities to emerge.
Nothing indicates, with the passing of time, that this is only one possible way among
many others of “carving nature at its joints”.
Viewed from the standpoints of either relativism or stark realism, this is either tau-
tologically true or oxymoronically false—true if all expressions of facts are regarded
as at best a partial and fragmentary glimpse of things as they are; false if some objec-
tive measure is accepted for why one concept is used instead of others. The objective
here is to avoid any concomitant commitments along these metaphysical lines, but
rather to recognise that in practice social convention determines a range of interme-
diate possibilities. To take one example, which is examined in further detail in one
of the case studies: electronic documents are cultural objects which are described in
a variety of ways—as official records in records management systems; as collectible
items in bibliographic databases; as consumable objects in distribution systems like
Amazon; as complex textual objects in word processing applications. All of these sys-
tems can be said to adopt a different standpoint—a metaphorisation of a different set
of concepts and conceptual relations—of documents. Yet, equally, none of these views
capture the whole truth of a particular document for its author (the possible difficul-
ties of writing it), or a reader (the interpretive reading of it), or indeed the various
features of a document required for many other purposes. Rather they capture the
particular “facticities”—to employ a Foucauldian term—needed to exercise socially-
instrumented practical functions around documents: to retrieve them, catalog them,
edit them, print and bind them, distribute them, sell them, account for them, and
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so on. However, the conceptualisations engaged to describe documents for various
functions are not at the same time discrete and self-contained bundles of properties
or, in philosophical jargon, qualia, separate and unrelated to each other. To retain
the geometric and spatial metaphor which is used throughout the study, conceptuali-
sations frequently connect at orthogonal conceptual junctions and splices. They may
share common concepts and properties—in the same example, books, authors and
titles might be common terms across different system conceptualisations—and yet
they may stand in different configurations and relations, which more or less line up
depending upon the context of their translation and use. How to assess this “more-
or-less-ness”, the degree of commensurability, between the conceptual configurations
operationalised by different systems, is then a question which information system
“translators”—system analysts, engineers and programmers—increasingly face in a
world where the prolixity of systems and the range of functions performed by them
is ever-growing.
Between these opposing trends—towards standardisation, regulation, connectivity
and unification on the one hand, and differentiation, customisation and individuation
on the other—the promise of knowledge systems for these organisations has only been
partially fulfilled. The digitisation of records managements, the development of so-
phisticated data warehousing tools, the agreement on protocols for transmission of
data across networks—among other things—has led to vast increases of scale in the
both the amount of data captured and the level of analysis which can be performed on
this data. And yet here too, in the age of the Internet, the quantitative problems—
cost and complexity—of communicating meaningful information across organisational
boundaries have remained prohibitive, frustrating the aims of these very organisa-
tions. The Semantic Web is a technology platform explicitly designed to overcome
the dilemmas of inter-system translation: a set of standards designed to allow trans-
lation and migration of data between systems and applications with the minimum of
cognitive impedance or dissonance. Conceptual schemes are rendered as “ontologies”,
collections of concepts, properties and individual data records which can be developed
using the existing technical infrastructure of the World Wide Web. Even here, how-
ever, interpretation, translation, coordination and negotiation of meaning cannot be
relegated to the domain of purely technical and engineering considerations. While
the systems themselves are technological artefacts, assessment of their commensura-
bility leads from a concern over technical compatibility to broader questions of social
meaning—what background cultural beliefs and practices motivate, justify and orient
these systems? Along what dimensions can systems be said to be commensurable?
What must be investigated, negotiated and made explicit in order for systems to be
commensurable, translatable and interoperable? What elements of meaning might
be sacrificed or abandoned in these negotiations? Together these questions compose
a frame for exploring the central concern of this study—whether a holistic notion
of commensurability, embracing both sociological and technological dimensions, can
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be usefully applied to the translation and coordination of organising schemes in the
digital age.
1.2 Key Concepts—the Semantic Web, Ontologies
and Commensurability
1.2.1 A Web of Meaning
The Semantic Web “provides a common framework that allows data to be shared and
reused across application, enterprise, and community boundaries” (W3C, 2009b). It
is constructed on the existing scaffolding of the World Wide Web: it makes use of the
whole infrastructure of eXtended Mark-up Language (XML), Universal Resource In-
dicators (URI’s) and to a degree, Hypertext Mark-up Language (HTML). The frame-
work consists of two formal language specifications for making and connecting asser-
tions about the world: the Resource Definition Framework (RDF) and Web Ontology
Language (OWL). Several derivative standards describe rules, trust and proof condi-
tions for reasoning and sharing the resulting assertional networks. Any system which
supports these standards should be able to write and save data, which can in turn be
processed and reasoned over by other compliant systems—bringing about, in theory,
a level of interoperability not possible previously. Both RDF and OWL have been
developed to be compatible with XML (eXtended Mark-up Language), another stan-
dard and common language for the encoding of data and documents (W3C, 2009a).
One way of viewing the relationships between these standards is that XML supplies
a standardised syntax, and RDF and OWL supply standardised semantics for data.
Other syntaxes are also available for encoding RDF and OWL (Berners-Lee, 2009).
However, widely available support, in the form of software tools and libraries, make
XML a convenient choice for many purposes.
RDF is designed for describing resources—documents, images, audio and video
files, as well as real-world objects which “can be identified”—on the web (Miller and
Manola, 2004). Descriptions take the conventional logical form of subject-predicate-
object, where the subject and object are generally identified via a web address, or more
formally, a uniform resource identifier (URI). RDF does not supply an explicit vocab-
ulary of terms such as “author”, “publisher” or “creation date”. Instead it operates
at a higher level of abstraction, “specif[ying] mechanisms that may be used to name
and describe properties and the classes of resource they describe” (Guha and Brickley,
2004). In other words, it provides well-defined abstract and formal structures—such
as “class”, “property”, “string”, “date” and “collection”—for composing such terms
(Powers, 2003). OWL, in turn, extends RDF to handle descriptions of ontologies—a
central concept for this study, which warrants a more extended introduction below.
Together RDF and OWL form a basis for the standardisation of structured data
on the Web, in such a way that both human and machine agents can share, query,
1.2. KEY CONCEPTS 9
navigate, manipulate and conduct inferences with it.
The Semantic Web is often explained in terms of consumer convenience. In a now
famous statement heralding the advent of the semantic web, Berners-Lee et al. (2001)
describe how it makes possible, for example, providing the ability to the aggregation
of book catalogue records search across multiple websites for books, or the merging
combining of contact information from one application with calendaring information
data from another. The same article, written in the promissory and optimistic tones
of technology evangelism, outlines how the semantic web will, more broadly, simplify
the electronic life of a prototypical user:
The semantic web will bring structure to the meaningful content of Web
pages, creating an environment where software agents roaming from page
to page can readily carry out sophisticated tasks for users. Such an agent
coming to the clinic’s Web page will know not just that the page has
keywords such as ’treatment, medicine, physical, therapy’ (as might be
encoded today) but also that Dr. Hartman works at this clinic on Mon-
days, Wednesdays and Fridays and that the script takes a date range in
yyyy-mm-dd format and returns appointment times. And it will ’know’
all this without needing artificial intelligence on the scale of 2001’s Hal or
Star Wars’s C-3PO. Instead these semantics were encoded into the Web
page when the clinic’s office manager (who never took Comp Sci 101) mas-
saged it into shape using off-the-shelf software for writing semantic web
pages along with resources listed on the Physical Therapy Association’s
site (Berners-Lee et al., 2001) .
Arguably, though, the semantic web has greater application to the costly problems
of system integration which preoccupy organisational IT departments or enterprises:
for example, how to get the accounts system to ’talk to’ the human resources system,
how to integrate two customer databases after a company merger, or how to repre-
sent transaction details across different national taxation regimes. These translation
scenarios are common areas of complexity and cost in system integration, and stand
to benefit from the kinds of interoperability at least promised by the semantic web. A
key example of this use case has been the widespread adoption of the semantic web,
and of ontologies in particular, among the bioinformatic research community.
It is worth adding here a cautionary note: in the decade since the early euphoric
pronouncements of the semantic web, its adoption has been heavily fragmented. Re-
search communities, such as those of the life sciences mentioned above, have been
quick to embrace it. But the broader enterprise and consumer markets, targeted in
the pitch cited above for instance, have stumbled over the apparent complexity and
acronymic soup of its many recommendations and proposals. More specific causes
have also been raised within the informal channels of the blogosphere (Shirky, 2003)—
some of these are discussed in more detail in the comparison of knowledge systems in
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Chapter 7, ’An historical introduction to formal knowledge systems’. Suffice to say,
the degree to which the semantic web remains a research project, limited to scientific
and academic applications, remains a highly contested issue. The recent more catholic
usage of ’ontology’, evident in the studies presented here, is indicative of more general
desire to explore possibilities of many semantic webs, and many ontologies, inspired
but not necessarily constrained to the specific proposals of the semantic web-in its
proper noun form.
1.2.2 Ontology—Computing “What Is”
Before describing how ontologies are represented in OWL specifically, it is useful to
describe the term “ontology” in its more general computer science usage. The term
has been appropriated from its philosophical roots to describe knowledge systems.
Despite the shift in meaning from its traditional moorings—where it is far from be-
ing an unambiguous term—this appropriation is not without basis: an ontology, for
knowledge representation, is a series of statements which purport to describe how the
world is. The canonical definition for computer science usage of “ontology” comes
from Gruber (1993): “an ontology is an explicit specification of a conceptualization”.
Elsewhere he elaborates:
Pragmatically, a common ontology defines the vocabulary with which
queries and assertions are exchanged among agents. Ontological com-
mitments are agreements to use the shared vocabulary in a coherent and
consistent manner (Gruber, 1995, p. 909).
“Ontology” is therefore, even in its computer science usage, conceived in broad
terms. In this study, it is generally treated as an umbrella term for a range of electronic
classification systems: from those with minimal explicit semantics through to ontolo-
gies developed in OWL with a highly explicit semantics. It therefore includes tax-
onomies, controlled vocabularies, thesauri, classifications systems, catalogues, XML
specifications, software designs, database and knowledge-base schemas, logical de-
duction systems and, finally, knowledge representation formats such as OWL. It is
generally used interchangeably with the more descriptive term of “knowledge system”,
though sometimes it is employed specifically to differentiate Semantic Web ontologies
from other kinds of knowledge systems—such cases should be clear from the context.
“Information system” might equally serve this purpose; it has, however, a still broader
designation, which includes software programs which may or may not actually store
data, and which also have an executable component. Unlike programs, ontologies or
knowledge bases do not generally contain procedures, though they may include rules
which can be processed by programs.
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1.2.3 Networked Ontologies—Towards the Semantic Web
A key goal of ontologies is that they are shared, re-useable repositories of data. In
the short history of the Semantic Web a large number of ontologies have been de-
veloped for a range of fields and disciplines. Some of these ontologies define generic
concepts, so-called “upper-level” or foundational ontologies. These are designed to
be applied across many or all domains, and might include concepts such as Process,
Object, Time and Space1. Others are quite specific to a given domain, such as the
life sciences or linguistics. Upper-level ontologies can be incorporated or imported
into more specific ontologies, which can be imported by other ontologies again—
forming a lattice-like network of interconnected concepts. Ontologies which import
other ontologies can also re-use their conceptual definitions, analogous to the world of
object-oriented programming, where programming structures are re-used in a similar
fashion (Booch et al., 2007). This is one way that concepts and data can be put
towards purposes their original authors would not have envisioned. However, this
relies upon explicit directives from the authors of the importing ontology, who also
take responsibility for the explicit conceptual relations and translations they establish
between their own and the imported ontology.
In other contexts, two ontologies which have been independently authored often
need to be integrated, translated, aligned or merged. Developing points of connection
between two ontologies can be a time-consuming and error-prone task, particularly
if the ontologies are large—containing many concepts, relations or individual data
records. A specific sub-disciplinary area, ontology matching, has been established to
find automatic means of associating concepts from multiple ontologies. In addition
to the explicit authoring of connections between ontologies described above, ontology
matching holds promise for the explicitation of otherwise implicit connections between
ontologies. Together these two approaches make it possible to envisage a global
knowledge base—one of the declared aims of the Semantic Web. The literature review
in Chapter 2 distinguishes several specific ontology matching approaches; in spite of
these distinctions, though, the common underlying feature of these algorithms is the
production of a set of individual concept matches. This set, referred to as an overall
“alignment” of the ontologies (Shvaiko and Euzenat, 2005), can in turn be used to
generate a translation from concepts in one ontology to concepts in another. Ignored
in this translation process is the general degree of fit between the ontologies—how
their overall conceptualisations are commensurable.
1.2.4 The Question of Commensurability
Commensurability as a concept originates in the field of geometry, meaning “of com-
mon measure”. Wikipedia (2009), for example, defines this mathematical usage as
follows: “If two quantities can be measured in the same units, they are commensu-
1Use of concepts in actual or hypothetical ontologies use a monospace font throughout the text.
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rable”. Kuhn, introducing the term to talk about scientific paradigms, describes it as
follows:
The hypotenuse of an isosceles right triangle is incommensurable with its
side or the circumference of a circle with its radius in the sense that there
is no unit of length contained without residue an integral number of times
in each member of the pair.
The incommensurability of these quantities does not mean one cannot
be derived from the other however. In these two cases, hypotenuse = the
root of 2 x side and circumference = 2 x PI x radius express the relations
of these quantities. Since in both cases there is a residue, i.e. the equation
does not result in an integer, the quantities are incommensurable (Kuhn,
1970, p. 189).
Kuhn (1970) makes use of commensurability as a metaphor for how scientific
theories, “conceived of as sets of sentences, can be translated without residue or
loss”. Following Kuhn, I use the term “commensurability”—in place of synonyms
like compatibility, congruence, or consistency—to connote a deeper level of cultural
perspectival alignment between knowledge systems, while allowing for surface-level
differences, such as differences in nomenclature. When faced with matching two on-
tologies, for instance, commensurability suggests there exists some deep conceptual
equivalence between them, even if there are no shared terms or concepts. By contrast,
incommensurability suggests substantial differences between their underlying cultural
conceptions—differences requiring greater effort to effect translation between them.
This study presents a similar argument to that of Kuhn’s Structure of Scientific Rev-
olutions: that semantic web ontologies and other formal representations of knowledge
are not always commensurable, and that some form of social negotiation is needed to
effect translation when this is the case.
Like scientific paradigms, ontologies can be treated as holding a particular orien-
tation towards the slice of the world they describe. Such an orientation bears any
number of assumptions which are properly ontological in the philosophical sense—
assumptions about how the world is, derived from the cultural backdrop in which
the orientation is formulated. Together these assumptions form the epistemic con-
ditions under which ontologies—of the semantic web kind—can be developed. To
give a hypothetical example which is explored further in the work as a case study:
two separate ontologies could be developed to describe the world of documents. The
first ontology uses the term Author, while the second ontology uses the alternative
of Collaborator. Authors are people specifically engaged in the creation of the
document—they write the text, capture and insert the images, structure the docu-
ment and so on. Collaborators have a looser relationship—they may edit, publish,
translate, typeset or perform any number of other activities in relation to the docu-
ment. At this stage—without further knowledge or recourse to context—it is possible
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to interpret the difference in at least two ways. On the one hand, the difference could
be viewed as contingent and accidental—a question of near-synonymic variants. In
the second case, a more general term was chosen, which includes the specific term
of the first—all Authors are also Collaborators. On the other hand, the difference
could also mark a more fundamental ontological difference. Here, in the second on-
tology, there is no suitable translation for Author. Instead Collaborators simply
collaborate to create a document—which could mean writing it, editing it, typeset-
ting it, and so on. Indeed, possibly the concept of authorship is explicitly denied;
there are no Collaborators bearing the special distinction of authorship. The first
interpretation suggests there is in fact some underlying commensurability between
these ontologies, in spite of the different terms chosen. They share the same view of
the world, in which documents have both Authors and Collaborators, and Authors
are particular kinds of Collaborators. The second interpretation instead suggests
that at least in relation to these particular concepts of the two ontologies, the ques-
tion of translatability is ambiguous. Consequently, commensurability is a less settled
question, requiring at the very least further supplementary information.
According to the literal meaning, it could be argued that all knowledge systems,
insofar as they employ different conceptual schemes, are trivially incommensurable.
In the sense used here, however, commensurability is a question of degrees rather
than kind—what matters is the extent of difference, and by extension, the cost, time
and effort of translation, between those systems. To assess this means going beyond
the explicit representations of the systems themselves, inferring something about the
implicit background network of assumptions which underpin them—variously termed
their “world views”, “conceptual schemes”, “paradigms”, “epistemes”, “gestalts” or
“frames of reference”. This study aims to demonstrate that using the metaphor of
commensurability is a helpful way to conceive of both the explicit and tacit differences
in the design of knowledge systems; helpful insofar as it provides practitioners with
ways of identifying and bridging those differences—or, just as importantly, identifying
when such differences are not practically translatable. Here, incommensurability does
not imply a slippery slope into relativism or solipsism—a world in which knowledge
systems, no less than the cultures who construct and use them, forever remain trapped
in their particular hermetic conceptualisations. On the contrary, proper analysis of
ontologies can lead to productive insights into the sorts of differences between them,
and whether such differences can be readily reconciled in a given situational context.
The question of commensurability is directed towards the same sorts of prob-
lems identified by field of ontology matching (Shvaiko and Euzenat, 2005). Ontology
matching approaches seek to develop algorithms to match the terms of two or more
ontologies, based on exploitation of terminological similarities. As discussed further
in Chapter 2, concept-by-concept matches generated by these approaches are a nec-
essary but insufficient means of solving certain problems of “semantic heterogeneity”
(Shvaiko and Euzenat, 2005). The framework developed here is intended to augment
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these approaches by considering translation from a semantic holistic perspective—
where not only individual conceptual matches but overall schematic commensurability
can be assessed.
1.3 Research Questions
Having worked through some of the background concepts, the central research ques-
tion organising the study can now be stated:
Is the concept of “commensurability”—describing how electronic knowl-
edge systems compare across a range of both sociological and technological
dimensions—useful in guiding the alignment of these systems?
In order to answer this question, the study also poses and responds to a number
of subsidiary questions:
What sort of theoretical apparatus can be used to describe the commen-
surability of ontologies?
What kind of general purpose framework might be developed for evaluat-
ing the commensurability of ontologies?
How can the usefulness of the framework be assessed?
Can the framework be applied to current cases of knowledge system com-
mensurability?
Can the framework be implemented as a software system, and used by
others?
The scope and direction of the research questions, in seeking to direct attention
towards the sociological and technological—and, at times, delving into the cognitive
and linguistic—aspects of knowledge systems, requires the study to cross several dis-
ciplinary boundaries. At various points, the study adopts a range of perspectival
“frames”, shifting from an engineering orientation—looking at pragmatic trade-offs
involved in the practices of designing, modelling and aligning systems—to a socio-
logical or ethnographic one—looking at those practices from an estranged distance,
observing them as rituals enacted within broader overlays of cultural significance and
meaning. The interplay between these orientations bears witness to the complexities
of navigating cultural boundaries which form the foundational concern of the work.
In that sense the argument as a whole constitutes itself a kind of case study of the
commensurability of different knowledge systems.
1.4 General Approach
To explore these questions, I first discuss literature from a range of sources taken from
both technical and social scientific disciplines, and outline the general methodology
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adopted by the study. I then develop in more detail a theoretical discussion of cultural
conceptual schemes, and suggest a general purpose framework for comparing them.
The end result of the application of the framework ought to be detailed profiles of
two knowledge systems under consideration, comparable both as technical objects
and cultural artefacts. To evaluate the framework empirically, I apply the framework
to three case studies, and describe a further pilot study in which the framework is
operationalised in software for others to use. The findings, results, limitations and
future considerations are discussed in the conclusion. A more detailed outline of the
structure of the work is provided below.
1.4.1 Structure of the Work
Chapter 1, the present chapter, introduces the Semantic Web, ontologies and the
question of ontology commensurability against a general background of the develop-
ment of formal knowledge systems. The research questions of the study are posed
here, and the general approach and structure is outlined.
Chapter 2 examines four strains of literature dealing with the broad theme of
“semantics”. By examining this theme through various disciplinary rubrics—of lan-
guage, cognition, culture and computation—the specific concerns of knowledge system
translation and alignment can be brought into a larger constellation of concerns with
meaning generally. In the process several key concepts and specific dimensions relat-
ing to commensurability are teased out and analysed.
Chapter 3 describes both how the framework itself is evaluated in the study, and
also what is meant by “methodology” in the context of the framework itself. Just
how judgments about commensurability of ontologies are formed requires that the
framework contain a methodological component, which suggests ways of knowing and
understanding formal systems like ontologies much as one would a work of art or
cultural artefact—as an object interpretable against the background conditions of its
formulation and use. This chapter describes this aspect of the framework, but also
how the framework as a whole is tested and evaluated in terms of its usefulness in
assessing commensurability.
Chapter 4 examines part of the philosophical tradition dealing with what has been
referred to here as perspectival assumptions, orientations or views, and some near-
cognates such as paradigms, epistemes and conceptual schemes. Generally such terms
are applied in the domains of the physical or human sciences, to describe disconti-
nuities between historical periods, cultures and disciplines. Here these theoretical
models are applied to knowledge systems such as ontologies and databases. Several
criticisms of what is sometimes characterised as the Standard Social Sciences Model
(Pinker, 1995), the view that we cannot escape our particular paradigms and schemes,
are also acknowledged and discussed. This view can be further extended to suggest
paradigms are inescapably incommensurable—a corrosive position from the stand-
point of this study. I therefore work towards a modified version of this view, in which
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commensurability is an analytic assessment, not an ontological quality; this version
is not incompatible with particular readings of Kuhn, Foucault and Quine developed
here.
Having plotted out several formative theories of commensurability and conceptual
schemas, several more recent cognitive, linguistic and social developments are then
discussed—the social theory of Habermas, the pragmatic approach to language pro-
posed by Brandom, and the work of Gardenfors on “conceptual spaces”. These in
turn form the basis for the framework proposed in the following chapter.
Chapter 5 builds on the previous chapter by proposing a framework for assessing
commensurability in practice. The framework comprises of (a) a model of an on-
tology commensurability scenario; (b) a two-tiered series of dimensions for profiling
ontologies; (c) a methodological outline for investigating the social context in which
ontologies are developed and used, and for subsequently rating ontologies against
dimensions; and (d) a basic mechanism for generating a quantitative assessment of
ontological commensurability. The methodology comprises of two components: a
technical analysis of ontologies, using various metrics such as size, complexity and
scope; and a sociological exploration of purposes, motivations, practices and perspec-
tives embodied in the ontologies, using light-weight adaptations of social research
methods such as content analysis—of, for example, online forums, background pub-
lications and third-party commentary. As well as drawing out the assumptions of
the ontologies, the aim of the framework is make explicit the value judgments and
assumptions otherwise implicit in the evaluation process itself.
The subsequent three chapters (6 through to 8) develop case studies which apply
the framework in different contexts: to different kinds of formal knowledge systems,
upper-level ontologies, and document formats, respectively.
Chapter 6 develops a historical overview of the development of formal knowledge
systems themselves, through investigations in formal logic in 19th and early 20th
centuries; early database systems in 1960s and 1970s; dominance of relational model in
1980s and 1990s; and the emergence of Semantic Web in the past decade. Knowledge
systems such as relational databases, XML schemas and Semantic Web ontologies
each themselves have different histories and corresponding inflections on the question
of how to represent concepts and objects. The general ontological assumptions of the
relational model are contrasted with those of Semantic Web ontologies, in particular,
and a general assessment of their commensurability is developed.
Another area of recent activity in knowledge representation has been the devel-
opment of so-called “upper-level ontologies”—ontologies which describe abstract con-
cepts such as Process, Object, Time and Space. Chapter 7 presents a case study of
these ontologies. Authors working in this area have regarded upper-level ontologies
as foundational for system interoperability at less abstract levels of representation,
while others have advocated forms of ontological pluralism or agnosticism—again,
this makes a useful case study for the application of the framework. In addition to an
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analysis of the ontologies themselves, I look at two online mailing lists, where some of
the distinctions between these ontologies and the positions they entail are discussed
in more detail.
The more concrete world of document formats is considered in Chapter 8. While
document formats have not (yet) been specified using Semantic Web standards such
as OWL and RDF—authors have used syntax-only standards such as XML instead—a
recent controversy over document format standardisation provides an excellent set-
ting for examining the economic, political and legal factors which influence the de-
velopment of technology specifications and systems. The “real-politic” of standards
development, in this case played out in very public fora, showcases questions of com-
mensurability to which the framework can equally be applied.
Chapter 9, the penultimate chapter, discusses a software system which implements
and operationalises the framework. This software was developed over the course of
the study, and trialled to a pilot group at RMIT University. The process of software
construction, and its subsequent evaluation, are discussed here. Where the preceding
case studies represent examples of the framework applied by the researcher directly,
the pilot study presents the software as an instrument to other researchers, with mixed
results.
In Chapter 10, the conclusion brings together the various strands of the argument
of the work, to make a case for the pragmatic usefulness of a theory and a framework
of commensurability. Where the paradigmatic form of knowledge representation are
Semantic Web ontologies—designed expressly for the sharing and reuse of knowledge
in an interconnected world—understanding not only the explicit claims made by these
systems, but also the implicit cultural orientations which underpin them, is of funda-
mental interest to the avowed aims of the Semantic Web. The conclusion also suggests
ways in which the research can be furthered in future work, and potentially applied
beyond this specific area of focus.
1.5 Towards a Framing of Semantics
The Semantic Web makes bold claims about solving problems of system interop-
erability — a “silver bullet” solution, in effect, for an industry in which software
incompatibilities, project failures, patch-work solutions and “semantic heterogeneity”
are sources of significant costs (Shvaiko and Euzenat, 2008). Moreover it provides a
means for weaving together the rich tapestry of existing data on the Internet, by pro-
viding transparent means for making the structure of that data explicit. A subsidiary
discipline has developed, ontology matching, which has sought various algorithmic
solutions to the problem of integrating related ontologies. This study argues that
translation in some contexts needs a holistic regard for the general cultural concep-
tualisations underpinning ontologies, which can usefully augment concept-by-concept
matching algorithms. The Kuhnian term of commensurability is introduced in order
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to describe the overall degree of fit between two ontologies, assessed across a range of
cognitive, social and technical dimensions.
The next chapter explores literature from a range of disciplinary perspectives
that examine the question of conceptual commensurability through the very broad
thematic frame of “semantics”. This exploration also develops several general con-




The sentence “Snow is white” is true if, and only if, snow is white (Tarski,
1957, p. 190).
The question of commensurability of Semantic Web ontologies and related knowledge
systems raised in the introductory chapter can be explored from several disciplinary
perspectives. A guiding thread through these frames is the very general notion of
meaning—as something which can be variously reasoned over computationally, gen-
erated or processed cognitively, expressed linguistically and transmitted socially. The
question of commensurability can be re-phrased in relation to meaning as follows:
whether any two systems of meaning—combining units of meaning into a larger struc-
tural whole—can be related in a consistent, coherent and commensurate way. This
study suggests that answering this question involves understanding the different reg-
isters or dimensions of meaning in which those systems can be located. The literature
reviewed here discusses a number of these dimensions, which have been classified





In addition to surveying some of the current research in these fields, this review also
serves as a precursory schematisation of the kinds of variables used to organise, cluster
and describe knowledge systems. Chapter 5 later presents a formal arrangement of
these dimensions as part of a framework for assessing commensurability.
The first of the disciplinary frames surveyed below considers semantics as a sub-
sidiary linguistics discipline—as the study of meaning as it is expressed in language.
A general discussion outlines some of the major conceptual distinctions in this field.
Given the reliance of knowledge systems on formal languages of different kinds, work
in the area of formal semantics is discussed specifically. Other kinds of research have
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been directed towards the interpretation and use of ordinary everyday language—
these theories in related fields of hermeneutics and pragmatics are also reviewed
briefly.
Another, closely related frame concerns recent work conducted in cognitive science
and psychology on concept formation, categorisation and classification. Examining
recent models of cognition can provide clues as to possible causes and locations of
incommensurability between conceptualisations made explicit in ontologies. Several
recent theories have developed explicitly spatial models of mind and cognition, which
provide helpful metaphorical support, at least, for a discussion of commensurability.
A review of recent research in these fields is developed in the section on Cognitive
Semantics.
As well as being amenable to algorithmic analysis, representations of cognitive phe-
nomena, and linguistic artefacts, ontologies are also social products—they are things
produced and consumed within a broader marketplace of communicative practices.
It is then useful also to look at social theoretic models of communication generally,
to see how these devolve on to the specific concerns of ontology commensurability.
While Chapter 4 examines several social theorists in more detail, here it is useful
to survey a range of both theoretical and empirical research conducted under the
broad umbrella of the social sciences. Specifically, research in key fields—sociology
of knowledge, studies of technology and science, knowledge management, research in
IT standardisation and cross-cultural anthropology—help to introduce certain con-
cepts which emerge again in the development of the commensurability framework in
Chapter 5. A review of these fields is provided in the section on Social Semantics
below.
Extensive research has been undertaken in the field of computer science, notably
in the area of ontology matching but also in related areas of ontology and database
modeling and design. Much of this research focusses on developing improved algo-
rithms for concept translation between ontologies; as noted in the introduction, there
has been relatively little attention to using background knowledge as a heuristic tool
for augmenting ontology translation efforts. The section on Computational Semantics,
below, surveys work in ontology matching, and also discusses related studies looking
at ontology metrics and collaboration.
Finally, considerable work in philosophy of mind and language has been oriented
towards problems of conceptual schemes, translatability and interpretation. However
this field is much too broad to survey even schematically here; Chapter 4 does provide
further review of this tradition, within the specific context of outlining a theoretical
background for a framework of commensurability.
The trajectory plotted through this literature review, from the relationship of
semantics to language, mind and society, through to the specific problems of ontology
matching, moves in a somewhat spiral fashion: from broad down to narrow concerns.
This order of presentation is then inverted by the presentation of ontology profiling
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dimensions in the framework discussion in Chapter 5, as narrow technical dimensions
lead eventually to consideration of broader social ones.
2.1 Linguistic Semantics
2.1.1 Semantics in Language
As a subsidiary domain of linguistics, semantics is, as a recent textbook puts it, “the
study of the systematic ways in which languages structure meaning” (Besnier et al.,
1992). Early in the history of linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure established several
foundational semantic distinctions: between signifier (a spoken or written symbol)
and signified (a mental concept); and between sign (the combination of signifier and
signified) and referent (the thing referred to by the sign) (Saussure, 1986). Bloom-
fieldian research in the 1930s and 1940s emphasised structural, comparative and de-
scriptive rather than semantic features of language; ironically it was the advent of
Chomskyian generative grammar in the 1950s which, in spite of emphasising syntax,
also paved the way for a more explicit focus on semantics in the 1960s (Harris, 1993).
Since then, numerous kinds, branches and theories of semantics have emerged: gen-
erative semantics, formal semantics (applied to natural languages), lexical semantics,
componential analysis, prototype and metaphor theories, “universal” semantics, cog-
nitive semantics, hermeneutics, pragmatics and various theories of translation—not
to mention the general interest in semantic computer applications and platforms such
as the Semantic Web.
Linguistic meaning can be studied through several different lexical units or levels:
words, sentences, groups of sentences, discourse or text, and a corpus of texts (Besnier
et al., 1992). At each level, different types of meaning can also be distinguished. In
the classical essay “Sense and Reference”, Frege distinguishes what objects in the
world words refer to—their extensional or denotative meaning—from how those words
are defined by other words—their intensional or connotative meaning. More recent
analyses of meaning build on this primary distinction; for example, Chierchia and
McConnell-Ginet (2000) distinguish denotational (or referential) from both psychol-
ogistic (or mentalistic) and social (or pragmatic) theories of meaning, while Leech
(1981) proposes a total of seven types of meaning: conceptual meaning, connotative
meaning, social meaning, affective meaning, reflected meaning, collocative meaning,
and thematic meaning. Denotational or conceptual meaning is regarded as primary
in most mainstream semantic accounts; since this referring capacity of language is
essential for other types of meaning to be possible, “it can be shown to be integral to
the essential functioning of language in a way that other types of meaning are not”
(Leech, 1981, p. 9).
Approaches to understanding natural language meaning even in a denotational
sense vary considerably. Common approaches include componential analysis, where
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semantic units—typically, words—are given positive or negative markers against a
set of “components” or “dimensions” of meaning (Burling, 1964; Leech, 1981); and
lexical analysis, where relations of units to each other are defined according to a
set of rules: synonymy/antonymy (units with the same/opposite meanings to other
units); hypernymy/hyponymy (units which are superordinate/subordinate in meaning
to other units); holonymy/meronymy (units which stand in relation of wholes/parts
to other units); and homonymy/polysemy (units which have one/multiple definitions)
(Besnier et al., 1992; Cann, 1993).
As an early critic of componential analysis noted, underlying “dimensions” of
meaning are not immediately obvious—they need to be explicitly theorised (Burling,
1964). One effort to develop a core set of shared concepts which underpin all lan-
guages is Goddard and Wierzbicka’s “natural semantic metalanguage” (NSM). The
“metalanguage” proposes a highly abstracted lexical inventory of “semantic primes”
from which all lexical units in any language can be derived (Goddard, 2002)—an idea
which is related to Rosch’s “basic” categories, discussed below. Generation of such
primes requires a “trial-and-error” approach of postulating prime candidates (God-
dard, 2002), and mapping their derivation from the metalanguage into various natural
language forms (Goddard and Wierzbicka, 2002). As the authors suggest, the process
is time-consuming and highly speculative; yet brought to fruition, would provide a
powerful device for, among other things, providing unambiguous rules for the trans-
lation of concepts across natural languages (Wierzbicka, 1980). As the case-study on
upper-level ontologies shows, the effort to develop a metalanguage for natural lan-
guages has its direct analogue in equivalent efforts to develop a set of foundational or
core concepts for formal knowledge representations—with much the same difficulties
and trade-offs.
The remainder of the review of linguistic approach to meaning moves in three direc-
tions, which roughly mirror the division suggested by Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet
(2000): towards formal semantics, which seeks to describe meaning within a logic-
based framework; towards hermeneutics, which understands meaning in a holistic and
subjectively-inflected way; and towards pragmatics, which understands meaning as
a kind of social practice. Each of these approaches has important implications for a
theory of commensurability developed here, and while apparently contradictory, the
aim here is instead to demonstrate broad lines of complementarity. As Chierchia and
McConnell-Ginet (2000, p. 54) emphasise, in a related context:
We believe that these three perspectives are by no means incompatible.
On the contrary, meaning has all three aspects (namely, the denotational,
representational, and pragmatic aspects). Any theory that ignores any of
them will deprive itself of a source of insight and is ultimately likely to
prove unsatisfactory.
What is “representational” here is also given more expansive treatment under
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“Cognitive Semantics”; what is termed “pragmatic” is also discussed further under
“Social Semantics”. However, the hermeneutic and pragmatic traditions covered here
provide the means for extending out from language towards those cognitive and social
domains, and consequently provide important building blocks in the development of
the theory of commensurability.
2.1.2 Formal Semantics
A significant strain of semantic research arose from work conducted in logic and
foundational mathematics in the early twentieth century—a tradition touched on in
more, albeit still schematic, detail in Chapter 6. Within this tradition, “semantics” is
interpreted truth-functionally—a statement’s meaning is just whether the proposition
it expresses is true or false. Formal semantics arose generally through the interests
of logical positivism, but specifically through an ingenious response to the logical
paradoxes which had beset the preceding generation of logicians in the early twentieth
century. Tarski’s semantic conception of truth, first published in 1933, provided a
“formally correct and materially adequate” basis for describing the truth conditions of
a proposition (Hodges, 2008). One of Tarski’s innovations was to impose a condition
on a formal language, L, that it cannot construct a sentence based on an existing
sentence and the predicate “is true”—such a sentence could only be constructed in a
metalanguage, M , which contains all of the sentences of L and the additional “is true”
predicate. Consequently, a paradoxical statement like “this sentence is false” becomes
nonsensical—to make sense, it is split into two sentences, the first of which contains
the sentence under consideration in the object language L, and the second of which
defines the truth value of the first in the metalanguage, M (Hodges, 2008; Cann,
1993). For Tarski, at least, this conception could apply to the kinds of statements
common to the sciences:
At the present time the only languages with a specified structure are
the formalized languages of various systems of deductive logic, possibly
enriched by the introduction of certain non-logical terms. However, the
field of application of these languages is rather comprehensive; we are able,
theoretically, to develop in them various branches of science, for instance,
mathematics and theoretical physics (Tarski, 1957, p. 8).
The formal semantic conception of truth strongly influenced Quine, Davidson
and Popper, among others. Although directed specifically towards formal languages,
Tarski’s Convention T was applied first to natural languages by Davidson Davidson
(2006). More systematic accounts of natural language as a derivative of formal logic,
where sentential parts sit as truth-bearing components within a sentential whole, were
developed by Tarksi’s student Montague Montague (1974), followed by Dowty (1979),
Partee (2004) and others (Kao, 2004). The guiding insight of formal semantics was
the “principle of compositionality”:
24 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
The meaning of an expression is a monotonic function of the meaning of
its parts and the way they are put together (Cann, 1993, p. 4).
While Chomsky’s generative grammar demonstrated how sentences could be syn-
tactically “put together”, by the end of the 1960s rival generative (Lakoff, McCawley,
Postal and Katz) and interpretivist (Jackendoff and Chomsky) semantic movements
had as yet yielded no prevailing paradigm for accounting for how the meaning of sen-
tential parts—individual words, as well as noun and verb phrases, for example—could
account for the meaning of the sentence as a whole (Harris, 1993). Montague gram-
mar sought to provide a unified theory for the syntax and semantics of both natural
and artificial languages (Kao, 2004). In The Proper Treatment of Quantification in
Ordinary English, the seminal account of such a theory, Montague presents a syntax
of a fragment of English, a form of “tensed intensional logic” derived from Kripkean
possible world semantics, and finally, rules for translating a subset of English sen-
tences into the intensional logic. The role of the intensional logic is to handle certain
classes of “complex intensional locutions”, using “intensional verbs”. For example,
the truth value of a sentence containing the verb “seeks” can vary depending upon
the verb complement—resolving the truth value means knowing the state of affairs
which pertain within a possible world at a particular point in time (Forbes, 2008). By
demonstrating how it was possible to translate a large group of natural language sen-
tences into disambiguated propositions, analysable into parts with truth conditions
and able to stand as premises in logical inferences, Montague opened rich possibilities
for further research in formal semantics (Kracht, 2008; Partee, 2004).
Formal semantics inspired by Tarski’s model theory has also been used in the
construction of syntactically well-formed and semantically interpretable artificial lan-
guages for knowledge representation, including the languages of the Semantic Web,
RDF (Resource Definition Framework) and OWL (Web Ontology Language) (Hayes,
2004; Hayes et al., 2004). The somewhat arcane origins of this “semantic” epithet—by
way of the abstractions of model theory and description logics—has led, perversely,
to several varying interpretations of the Semantic Web itself: as a process of incre-
mental technological adaptation, or as a wholesale revolution of how knowledge is
produced, represented, disseminated and managed. Both the development and sub-
sequent interpretations of the Semantic Web are described in more detail in Chapter
6.
2.1.3 Hermeneutics and Semantics
Hermeneutics predates the scientific study of semantics described above by some
historical distance, originating in German Enlightenment philosophy in the eighteenth
and early nineteenth centuries (Mueller-Vollmer, 1988). Etymologically derived from
the Greek for “translate” or “interpret”, it is similarly concerned with meaning in a
very general sense. In its earliest incarnations, the aims of hermeneutics were broadly
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sympathetic with later waves of the epistemologically ambitious programs of logical
positivism and the Semantic Web:
Finally, with the desire of Enlightenment philosophers to proceed every-
where from certain principles and to systematize all human knowledge,
hermeneutics became a province of philosophy. Following the example
of Aristotle . . . Enlightenment philosophers viewed hermeneutics and its
problems as belonging to the domain of logic (Mueller-Vollmer, 1988, p.
3).
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, under the various influences of Roman-
ticism, secularism, materialism, vitalism and phenomenology, hermeneutic studies
became oriented towards psychological, historical and subjective aspects of interpre-
tation. Although treatment of hermeneutics differs from author to author, it can be
distinguished from semantics in being
• oriented more towards the holistic meaning of texts, rather than the individual
meaning of smaller linguistic units such as sentences or words;
• focussed on historical and humanist explanations of interpretation rather than
scientific and objective, truth-functional ones;
• more closely connected with traditional approaches to language—rhetoric, gram-
mar, biblical exegesis, and language genealogy—than semantics (Leech, 1981;
Mueller-Vollmer, 1988);
• directed towards the internal rather than external “side of our use of signs”—
towards how signs are understood, rather than, conversely, how concepts can be
signified (Gadamer, 2004);
• interested in disruptive semantic features of meaning—ambiguity, paradox and
contradiction are not features to be “explained away”, but rather are intrinsic
characteristics of an account of meaning.
Twentieth-century philosophers working in the hermeneutic tradition have also
pointed to a necessary structural relationship between holistic understanding and
atomistic interpretation, depicted by the “hermeneutic circle” (Heidegger, 1962; Gadamer,
1975). It describes a virtuous rather than vicious circular pattern of learning in re-
lation to a text, discourse or tradition—as individual parts are interpreted, so the
understanding of the whole becomes clearer; and as the text as a whole is better
understood, so new parts are better able to be interpreted. This broad structure
describes in the large the kind of complementarity described earlier between two
approaches to aligning ontologies: ontology matching—translating atomic concepts
found within them—and assessing commensurability—comparing holistically the con-
ceptual schemes underlying them. Similarly, where atomic interpretation works from
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the explicit features of the ontologies themselves, developing a holistic understanding
also engages the implicit assumptions and commitments held by those who design
and use them.
Although typically directed towards historical, literary or philosophical texts, then,
hermeneutics makes several distinctions and claims which can be no less applied to
the interpretation of ontologies and other information systems—as texts of a different
sort. Whereas ambiguity in poetical texts is often intentional, it is an unhelpful side-
effect of tacit assumptions in the case of ontologies—and a “broad-brush” hermeneutic
orientation, which seek to examine texts against the background of historical and
contextual conditions, can be useful in making such assumptions explicit.
2.1.4 Pragmatic Semantics
Linguistic pragmatics considers meaning a function of how words and phrases are
used, famously coined in the Wittgensteinian expression “the meaning of a word is
its use in the language” (Wittgenstein, 1963). According to this view, language, as
well as being a repository of lexical items arranged according to various syntactic
rules, primarily functions as a tool in the hands of linguistically capable agents. Ut-
terances can be understood as acts, and are best analysed in terms of their effects.
The meaning of words cannot be abstracted from their embeddedness in utterances,
in the broader situational context in which those utterances are made, and in the
practical effects they produce. Assertoric statements—of the kind analysed by formal
semantics, whose semantic import could be judged by the truth-value of their propo-
sitional contents—are an unremarkable region in the broader landscape of linguistic
utterances, which can be analysable against several other functional vectors (Austin,
1998). Unlike formal semantics, pragmatics focusses on a broader class of linguistic
phenomena; unlike hermeneutics, this focus is less directed towards subjective inter-
pretation, and more towards the social and intersubjective aspects of language use:
speech acts, rules, functions, effects, games, commitments, and so on.
In 1950s, Austin (1998), Wittgenstein (1963), Quine (1980) and Sellars and Bran-
dom (1997) collectively mounted a series of what can best be described as prag-
matically inflected critiques against the na¨ıve empiricism embedded within a logical
positivist view of meaning, a view which can still be traced in the formal semantics
tradition. Through a subsequent generation of philosophers, linguists and cognitive
scientists, these critiques presented a range of new perspectives for understanding
how semantic concepts are organised and used within a broader landscape of social
practice.
In his landmark text How to do Things with Words, Austin (1998) discusses sen-
tences whose functional role in discourse is distinct from that of assertional statements—
that is, sentences which are not directly decomposable into propositional form. Austin
directs attention particularly towards “performatives”—utterances which do things.
Unlike descriptive statements, which can be analysed in terms of truth-content, such
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performative sentences have to be assessed against different criteria: whether they are
successful in their execution, or in Austin’s vocabulary, “felicitous” (Austin, 1998). He
eventually introduces a trichotomous schema to characterise how a sentence functions:
1. As a locutionary act—“uttering a certain sentence with a certain sense and
reference”.
2. As a illocutionary act—“informing, ordering, undertaking, &c., i.e. utterances
which have a certain (conventional) force”.
3. As a perlocutionary act—“what we bring about or achieve by saying something,
such convincing, persuading, deterring . . . ”.
Searle (1969) offers an extended and systematic account of various kinds of such
speech acts, as well as various means for understanding their function and effects in
discourse.
Wittgenstein’s account represents a yet more radical departure from a view which
sees statement-making as the canonical and primary function of language—a view
which was moreover emphatically outlined in his own earlier work (Wittgenstein,
1921). Understanding language meaning, again, means understanding how it is used
in practice. He introduces the idea of language “games”, to direct attention to the
role utterances play as pseudo-“moves”. Such games need not have winners, losers, or
even outcomes—what is distinctive about any linguistic situation is that it conforms
to rules understood—at least partially—by its interlocutors. Despite its presentation
in an elliptical and short text, Wittgenstein’s later work has been immensely influ-
ential. As well as motivating Rosch’s studies of prototypes and family resemblances
(Rosch, 1975; Lakoff, 1987), his work has also been influential in a range of intersecting
disciplines—Toulmin’s analysis of rhetoric and argumentation; Geertz’ phenomeno-
logical anthropology, with an attentiveness to “thick” description and language games
(Geertz, 2005); and different strains of French philosophy and social theory, stretching
across Bourdieu (1990), Lyotard (1984) and Latour (2004).
Sellars’ critique of empiricism broadly echoes those of Austin, Wittgenstein and
Quine, but contains a more explicit and direct critique of empiricism (Sellars and
Brandom, 1997). The “Myth of the Given”, like the “Two Dogmas of Empiricism”,
forms part of the backdrop to the more recent pragmatist philosophy of Rorty, Mc-
Dowell and Brandom. Sentential or propositional meaning is not ignored in all of
these accounts. In Making it Explicit, for example, Brandom develops a monumen-
tal theoretical apparatus which connects a fine-grained analysis of assertions—the
ground left behind by previous pragmatist accounts—with the social game of, as he
puts it, “giving and asking for reasons” (Brandom, 1994). His brand of “analytic
pragmatism” provides one of the foundations for the framework presented here, and
is discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.
Several implications can be drawn from a general pragmatist orientation towards
language for the commensurability framework developed here. Firstly, the main unit
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of pragmatic analysis is the sentential utterance rather than the word—focussing on
the whole rather than the part. Secondly, a pragmatic treatment of meaning needs to
be attentive not only towards the utterance itself, but also the situational context in
which it is made—who is speaking, who is listening, what conventions are in operation,
in what sequence utterances are made, what effects the utterance produces, and so on.
Thirdly, definitional meanings can be understood not only as compositions of atomic
parts—a series of denotations—but also only as codifications of convention—a bundle
of connotations, associations and cultural practices. Fourthly, an utterance can be
understood simultaneously at variegated, multi-dimensional levels of abstraction—as
a direct assertion, as a move in a dialogical sequence, as a tactical move in a language
game, or as an act which conforms to understood social norms and conventions.
At first glance, a pragmatist orientation might appear irrelevant for the inter-
pretation of ontologies and other information schemes. After all, knowledge sys-
tems are developed in formal languages precisely to sidestep the kinds of ambiguities
and “infelicitations” which plague natural language. While systems are prima facie
expressions of definitions and assertions, however, they also serve other discursive
roles—to persuade, convince, insinuate and facilitate further negotiation. Moreover
they are used in quite specific social language games—as “tokens” in various kinds
of political and economics games, for example. Interpreting knowledge systems prag-
matically therefore means not only understanding their explicit commitments, but
the roles they play in these extended language games. What are they developed
and used for? What motivates their constructions—as very particular kinds of utter-
ance? How are they positioned relative to other systems—what role do they play in
the kinds of games played out between organisational, governmental, corporate and
inter-departmental, for example? Pragmatism therefore provides a useful “step up”
from viewing ontologies as representations of conceptual schemes to viewing them as
social products—“speech acts”, “utterances” and “moves” in very broadly conceived
language games. It is also underlines the contextual relevance of commensurability
assessments themselves—that interpretation and translation are also linguistic acts,
performed for particular purposes and goals.
2.2 Cognitive Semantics
2.2.1 Theories of Categorisation
One way of considering knowledge systems are as formal mechanisms for classifying
and categorising objects. Graphically, a typical ontology resembles a hierarchical
taxonomy—though, technically, it is a directed acyclic graph, meaning that concepts
can have more than a single “parent” as well as multiple “siblings” and “children”1. In
such systems, concept application relies on objects meeting necessary and sufficient
1Ontologies also can support other sorts of conceptual relations, but the relationship of subsumption
is axiomatised into the semantics of the OWL directly, as are several other relations.
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conditions for class membership. This general model accords well with the broad
tradition of category application stretching back to Aristotle. However, ontologies
are intended to be machine-oriented representations of conceptualisations, with only
an analogical relation to mental cognitive models. What, then, can be gleaned from
contemporary theories of categorisation?
Since the 1960s, alternative models have been proposed for how mental concepts
are organised and applied. Like ontologies, semantic networks, pioneered by Quillian
(1967), model cognitive conceptual networks as directed graphs, with concepts con-
nected by one-way associative links. Unlike ontologies these links do not imply any
logical (or other) kind of relation between the concepts—only that a general asso-
ciation exists. Semantic networks were adapted for early knowledge representation
systems, such as frame systems, which utilise the same graphic structure of concep-
tual nodes and links: “We can think of a frame as a network of nodes and relations”
(Minsky, 1974). Minsky also explicitly notes the similarity between frame-systems
and Kuhnian paradigms—what results from the construction of a frame-system as a
viewpoint of a slice of the world (Minsky, 1974). By extension, semantic networks
can be viewed as proto-paradigms in the Kuhnian sense, though it is not clear what
the limits between one network and another might be—this analogy should not, then,
be over-strained.
A feature of semantic networks is the lack of underlying logical formalism. While
Minskian frame-systems and other analogues in the 1970s were “updated” with for-
mal semantic layers, notably through the development of Description Logics in the
1980s, according to Minsky the lack of formal apparatus is a “feature” rather than a
“bug”—imposition of checks on consistency, for example, impose an unrealistic con-
straint on attempts to represent human kinds of knowledge, precisely because humans
are rarely consistent in their use of concepts (Minsky, 1974). At best they are required
to be consistent across a localised portion of their cognitive semantic network, rele-
vant to a given problem at hand, and the associated concepts and reasoning required
to handle it. Similarly the authors of semantic network models note the difficulty
in assuming neatly structured graphs model mental conceptual organisation: “Dic-
tionary definitions are not very orderly and we doubt that human memory, which is
far richer, is even as orderly as a dictionary” (Collins and Quillian, 1969). Seman-
tic networks represent an early—and enduring—model of cognition which continues
to be influential in updated models such as neural networks and parallel distributed
processing (Rogers and McClelland, 2004). Such networks also exhibit two features of
relevance to the theory adopted here: firstly, the emphasis on structural, connection-
ist models of cognition—that concepts are not merely accumulated quantitatively as
entries in a cognitive dictionary, but are also inter-connected, so that the addition of
new concepts makes a qualitative difference in how existing concepts are applied; and
secondly, the implied coherence of networks, which suggests concepts are not merely
arranged haphazardly but form coherent and explanatory schemes or structures.
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In the mid-1970s, prototype theory, another cognitive model, was proposed for
describing concept use. Building on Wittgenstein’s development of “language games”
(Wittgenstein, 1963), Rosch (1975) demonstrated through a series of empirical exper-
iments that the process of classifying objects under conceptual labels was generally
not undertaken by looking for necessary and sufficient conditions for concept-hood.
Rather, concepts are applied based on similarities between a perceived object and a
conceptual “prototype”—a typical or exemplary instance of a concept. Possession of
necessary and sufficient attributes is a weaker indicator for object inclusion within a
category than the proximation of the values of particularly salient attributes—markers
of family resemblance—to those of the ideal category member. For example, a can-
didate dog might classified so by virtue of the proximity of key perceptual attributes
to those of an ideal “dog” in the mind of the perceiver—fur, number of legs, size,
shape of head, and so on. Applying categories on the basis of family resemblances
rather than criterial attributes suggests that, at least in everyday circumstances, con-
cept application is a vague and error-prone affair, guided by fuzzy heuristics rather
than strict adherence to definitional conditions. Also, by implication, concept appli-
cation is part of learning—repeated use of concepts results in prototypes which are
more consistent with those used by other concept users. This would suggest a strong
normative and consensual dimension to concept use. Finally, Rosch (1975) postu-
lated that there exists “basic level semantic categories”, containing concepts most
proximate to human experience and cognition. Superordinate categories have less
contrastive features; subordinate categories have less common features—hence basic
categories tend to be those with more clearly identifiable prototypical instances, and
so tend to be privileged both in concept learning and use.
While both semantic network and prototype models provide evocative descriptive
theories that seem to capture more intuitive features of categorisation, they provide
relatively little causal explanation of how particular clusters of concepts come to
be organised cognitively. Several new theories were developed in the 1980s with a
stronger explanatory emphasis (Komatsu, 1992). Medin and Schaffer, for example,
propose an exemplar-based “context” theory rival to prototype theory, which eschews
the inherent naturalism of “basic level” categorial identification for a more active
role of cognition in devising “strategies and hypotheses” when retrieving memorised
category exemplar candidates (Medin and Schaffer, 1978). Concept use, then, involves
agents not merely navigating a conceptual hierarchy or observing perceptual family
resemblances when apply concepts; they are also actively formulating theories derived
from the present context, and drawing on associative connections between concept
candidates and other associated concepts. In this model, concept use involves scientific
theorising; in later variants, the model becomes “theory theory” (Medin, 1989). As
one proponent puts it:
In particular, children develop abstract, coherent systems of entities and
rules, particularly causal entities and rules. That is, they develop theories.
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These theories enable children to make predictions about new evidence, to
interpret evidence, and to explain evidence. Children actively experiment
with and explore the world, testing the predictions of the theory and
gathering relevant evidence. Some counter-evidence to the theory is simply
reinterpreted in terms of the theory. Eventually, however, when many
predictions of the theory are falsified, the child begins to seek alternative
theories. If the alternative does a better job of predicting and explaining
the evidence it replaces the existing theory (Gopnik, 2003, p. 240).
Empirical research on cognitive development in children (Gopnik, 2003) and cross-
cultural comparisons of conceptual organisation and preference (Atran et al., 1999;
Ross and Medin, 2005; Medin et al., 2006) has shown strong support for “theory
theory” accounts. Quine’s view of science as “self-conscious common sense” provides
a further form of philosophical endorsement to this view.
For the purposes of this study, a strength of the “theory theory” account is its
orientation towards conceptual holism and schematism—concepts do not merely re-
late to objects in the world, according to this view (although assuredly they do this
too); they also stand within a dynamic, explanatory apparatus, with other concepts,
relations and rules. Moreover theories are used by agents not to explain phenom-
ena to themselves, but also to others; concept use has then both a role in one’s own
sense-making of the world, and also in how one describes, explains, justifies and com-
municates with others. In short, concepts are understood as standing not only in
relation to objects in the world, as a correspondence theory would have it; they stand
in relation to one another, to form at least locally coherent mental explanations; and
they also bind together participating users into communities and cultures. The ac-
count presented here similarly draws upon supplemental coherentist and consensual
notions of truth to explain commensurability.
2.2.2 Semantics and the Embodied Mind
Several other influential cognitive models have also been proposed. Drawing together
several diverse theoretical strains—generative semantics, phenomenology, and Rosch’s
earlier work—Lakoff and Johnson (1980) suggest that analogical and associative pro-
cesses of metaphorisation are central to describing concept use and organisation. Es-
chewing logically-derived models popular in the 1960s and 1970s, Johnson and Lakoff
contend that conceptualisation is at least strongly influenced, if not causally deter-
mined, by the cognitive agent’s physical and cultural orientation. Rational minds are
therefore subject to a kind of phenomenological embeddedness within a physical and
cultural world—even the most abstract conceptualisations can be shown to “borrow”,
in the form of metaphorical structures, from the perceptual and intersubjective worlds
we inhabit. To take one of the case study examples presented later, “upper-level” or
“foundational” ontologies are so-called because “upper” refers to the head, the sky
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or the heavens—the phenomenological locus of conceptual abstraction—while “foun-
dational”, though physically inverted, refers to structural support, substance—again,
the phenomenological, and etymological, locus of conceptual “depth”. Johnson and
Lakoff seek to explain not only individual concept use by this kind of metaphorical
reduction, but also larger conceptual clusters, which when transposed from the im-
mediate and physical to some more abstract field, provide a means of understanding
that field economically and coherently.
Lakoff and others develop tantalising glimpses of a metaphorical account of cogni-
tion, grounded in the “embodied mind”, in several subsequent works, notably Lakoff
(1987); Varela et al. (1992); Dennett (1991). In part his critique—as with Rosch—is
directed towards a mechanistic or computational theory of mind, which views cogni-
tion as a series of abstract operations which could be conceivably replicated on any
suitable hardware—biological or otherwise. Implied in this view is a form of Cartesian
mind-body dualism; a false dualism according to Lakoff (1987) and Dennett (1991).
What can be extracted from these kinds of critique is a cautionary and corrective
view that sees cognition as irretrievably bound to a physically and socially embed-
ded agent, intent on making sense of new experience by drawing upon an existing
reserve of culturally shared, coherent conceptual constructs. Above all, both con-
ceptual and physical experiences here are firmly oriented within a series of “cultural
presuppositions”, as Lakoff and Johnson suggest:
In other words, what we call “direct physical experience” is never merely
a matter of having a body of a certain sort; rather, every experience
takes place within a vast background of cultural presuppositions. It can
be misleading, therefore, to speak of direct physical experience as though
there were some core of immediate experience which we then “interpret”
in terms of our conceptual systems. Cultural assumptions, values, and
attitudes are not a conceptual overlay which we may or may not place
upon experience as we choose. It would be more correct to say that
all experience is cultural through and through, that we experience our
“world” in such a way that our culture is already present in the very
experience itself (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, p. 57).
Lakoff and Johnson’s metaphorical model, while clearly capturing some part of
the way concepts are transferred over domain boundaries, nonetheless suffers from a
problem of theoretical indeterminacy—it fails to account for why some metaphors are
used and not others. Moreover, it arguably does not give sufficient agency to concept
users—under their theorisation of cognition, it is not clear how concept users are any
more than passive adopters of a shared collective cultural heritage. The creative use
of metaphor, much less the range of other, non-metaphorical linguistic actions, such
as various forms of deductive, inductive or abductive reasoning, are not explicitly
treated in their account.
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2.2.3 Geometries of Meaning—the Re-emergence of Concep-
tual Structure
In part to gather up both traditional and more progressive theories of categorisation,
several more recent models have been proposed. These are at once highly systematic,
and tolerant of the problems of vagueness and fuzziness which had plagued older logis-
tic approaches. Gardenfors (2000), for instance, proposes a sophisticated geometric
model of cognition, which blends together more conventional cognitive elements—
concepts, properties, relations, reasoning—with some of the suggestive elements pro-
posed by Lakoff and others. Rogers and McClelland (2004) put forward what they
term a “parallel distributed processing” account of semantic cognition, which builds
upon the descriptive and explanatory strengths of “prototype” and “theory” theories,
while attempting to remedy their defects. Goldstone and Rogosky (2002) propose an
algorithmic approach to translation across what they call a “conceptual web”, presup-
posing both holistic conceptual schemes and a quantifiable notion of semantic distance
separating concepts within and across schemes. While these recent accounts are them-
selves quite different in approach and findings, they share a greater willingness to use
computational and geometrically inspired models to explore feasible modes of cogni-
tive activity. These kinds of studies are evidence of a kind of re-systematisation taking
place in the cognitive sciences, as (qualified) structural models once more come to the
fore. Unsurprisingly, such models are also well suited to describing representations of
conceptual systems in ontologies and schemas. At the same time, the model presented
by Gardenfors (2000) in particular can be reconciled with the kinds of experiential
phenomenology and cultural embeddedness which feature in the work of Lakoff and
Johnson (1980). Chapter 4 employs Gardenfors’ model of cognition directly in relation
to the question of commensurability, connecting it to the pragmatist-infused account
of language offered by Brandom, and the more general social theory of Habermas,
as the basis for generating comparative views of conceptual schemes (“conceptual
spaces” in Garderfors’ vocabulary) across different cognitive, linguistic and cultural
tiers.
2.3 Social Semantics
The following section aims to sample some of the prevailing paradigms of sociological
theory and research in relation to semantics, and specifically in its intersection with
technological kinds of meaning formation.
2.3.1 Sociology of Knowledge
The semantic models put forward so far consider the creation and dissemination of
meaning to be first and foremost a concern of individual rational agents, in which
the influence of culture is a secondary and frequently distorting feature. The soci-
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ology of knowledge, following Marx and Nietzsche—both suspicious of knowledge’s
purported independence from its conditions of production—attempts to explain how
different epistemic “perspectives” emerge (Mannheim, 1998). A more modern render-
ing describes sociology of knowledge as an inquiry into how knowledge is constituted
or constructed within a social or cultural frame of reference (Hacking, 1999). That
is, knowledge is taken within such inquiry as not only trivially social—in the sense
that it typically involves more than a single actor—but also, and fundamentally, as
a product of social forces and relations. While epistemological inquiry has always
sought to understand the role of external influences—usually negative ones—on the
development of knowledge—even Socrates’ attack on the sophists can be read in this
vein—nevertheless there is a specific trajectory that can be traced across twentieth
century thought. This trajectory leads from Mannheim’s Ideology and Utopia in the
1930s (Mannheim, 1998), through to a revival in Kuhn, Foucault, Bloor and Latour
in the 1970s (Kuhn, 1970; Foucault, 1970; Bloor, 1991; Latour, 1993), up to a flurry
of present-day sociological interest in the natural and social sciences—most notably
in the field of Science and Technology Studies (Hacking, 1999; Keller, 2005).
Sociology of knowledge proponents are frequently accused of “relativising” knowl-
edge, making it little more than a circumstantial side-effect of social or cultural con-
text (Davidson, 2006; Pinker, 1995). As several authors note (Bloor, 1991; Hacking,
1999, 2002), however, discussing social constructions of knowledge need not imply
adoption of a relativising stance. Rather it can involve understanding why particular
problems of knowledge—and solutions—might present themselves at various times.
Moreover such an approach can be open to a two-way, dialectic relationship between
knowledge and society—arguing that society (however broadly construed) is equally
formed through the production of ideas, theories, facts and statements, as much as
knowledge artefacts themselves are formed by societal influences. Treating knowledge
as a social construct need not therefore be a one-way descent into epistemic relativism,
in which all “facts” can be merely be explained away as by-products of cultural forces,
power relations or other social entities.
Applied to contemporary knowledge representation systems, as a general rubric,
sociology of knowledge has much to recommend it. It opens a way to investigate not
only which perspectives emerge in relation to some domain of knowledge, but also how
those perspectives are coordinated with respect to each other—how, for instance, one
perspective within a given domain can cause others to emerge as well, in opposition,
or sometimes perhaps, in an uneasy alliance. It also provides a convenient lexicon
to move from technical discussions of ontologies—as knowledge artefacts—through to
a general cultural field of perspectives, orientations, world-views and stand-points.
Moreover it suggests that it is possible, when looking at an object like a formal
knowledge system through a sociological historical lens, to see it less in either strictly
idealist terms (as intellectual history pure and simple, as the production of useful the-
orems and theses by enlightened minds), or in strictly materialist terms (as the net
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effect of particular economic, political, governmental or military forces), but rather
as something like the dialectical and probabilistic outgrowth of both idealistic and
materialistic forces. As the case studies demonstrate, while ascribing direct causal
influence on the production of knowledge systems is inveterately difficult, it is still
possible to paint a plausible—and epistemologically defensible—portrait of the com-
plex interplay of these forces.
Swidler and Arditi (1994) note that considerable attention has been devoted to-
wards a “sociology of informal knowledge”. As the survey of science and technology
studies below shows, there have been many studies of various kinds of “formal knowl-
edge” too. However, the term “sociology of formal knowledge” is an apt epithet for
the kind of approach adopted here—the study of the perspectival standpoints which
underpin formal knowledge systems, where “formal knowledge system” specifically
means the encoding of some knowledge (a series of concepts, relations and individ-
ual objects) in a formal language. One of the claims of the study is that studying
knowledge systems as social or cultural artefacts is not only a matter of interest to
a sociologist of knowledge, but also provides practical guidance to a systems ana-
lyst faced with “day-to-day” problems of conceptual translation across perspectival
divides—indeed the claim suggests, perhaps, that these two disciplinary roles increas-
ingly converge in “networked societies” (Castells, 1996) where the technological and
the anthropological are inseparably intertwined.
As a fitting example of one such “intertwining” is the term “ontology” itself.
Although the term is introduced in its computer science appropriation in Chapter 1,
in its modernised philosophical sense “ontology” can be understood as the historical
and cultural ground against which conceptualisations are developed. This view of
ontology, freeing it from its metaphysical roots as the study of “what is”, is succinctly
encapsulated by Hacking:
Generally speaking, Foucault’s archaeologies and genealogies were intended
to be, among other things, histories of the present . . . At its boldest, histor-
ical ontology would show how to understand, act out, and resolve present
problems, even when in so doing it generated new ones. At its more modest
it is conceptual analysis, analyzing our concepts, but not in the timeless
way for which I was educated as an undergraduate, in the finest tradition
of philosophical analysis. That is because the concepts have their being
in historical sites. The logical relations among them were formed in time,
and they cannot be perceived correctly unless their temporal dimensions
are kept in view (Hacking, 2002, pp. 24–5).
In Chapter 4, some of the “sociologists of knowledge” introduced here—in par-
ticular, Kuhn, Foucault and Hacking—are discussed in more detail. For now, this
introduction is intended to demonstrate how the tradition of the sociology of knowl-
edge strongly informs the approach adopted in this study. It also suggests that an
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analysis of commensurability aims, ideally, to shed light on the historical and cultural
conditions—to the degree that these can be ascertained—of ontology construction
and design. What at a first glance can pose itself as a largely technical exercise, of
mapping, matching and aligning ontological concepts, can at its further degree present
itself instead as a complex task of translation across cultural conceptual schemes, or in
Hacking’s phrase, “historical ontologies”; the aim of the framework is, in part, to help
analyse concepts and their schemes against a broader historical and cultural backdrop.
Knowledge systems, no less than any other cultural artefact, “cannot be perceived
correctly unless their temporal dimensions are kept in view” (Hacking, 2002).
Critical Theory as a Sociology of Knowledge
The historical dimension to ontological standpoints is analysed further by the critical
theory tradition. Developed out of the work of Marx, Weber and Luca´ks, critical
theory dispenses with what it sees are idealistic aspects of sociology of knowledge—or
rather, re-orients these upon the materialist conditions of knowledge production (Pop-
per and Adorno, 1976). Different perspectival orientations, in more extreme variants
of this view, are the apparent epiphenomena which develop out of the structural char-
acter of the economy at given moments in history (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002).
While differences of opinion might always be free to circulate in any society, fun-
damentally incommensurable world-views, irreconciliable through rational discourse,
are the product of the alienating forces of modern capitalism, which rigidifies human
relations in terms of class structure.
Habermas sought to free analyses of knowledge and communication from the more
deterministic aspects of critical theory, while retaining its materialist foundations.
His theory of communicative action points to several complex overlapping dimen-
sions in post-Enlightenment society. For Habermas, the fundamental rift between
objective system and subjective lifeworld can be attenuated through the intersubjec-
tive sphere of communication and discourse (Habermas, 1987). Within this orbit,
different knowledge formations are free to circulate, with the potential to reconfigure
structural inadequacies in the growing systematisation of individual lifeworlds enacted
by capitalism.
Luhmann provides a related frame of reference via systems theory (Arnoldi, 2001;
Baecker, 2001). Not at all assimilable to critical theory, Luhmannian systems nev-
ertheless provide some elaboration on the objectivist, “system” side of the critical
theoretical coin. For Luhmann, systems are “autopoetic”—they engender their own
frames of meaning around a critical “distinction”. For economic systems, for example,
the motivating distinction is the presence or absence of money. The distinction then
structures the cluster of concepts which inform how those in the system operate. Luh-
mann’s views have some analogies with the model of culture put forward in Chapter
5; however, for reasons of parsimony, the theoretical cues from Habermas’ admittedly
less developed account of the complex overlays of systems in contemporary society,
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which provide a plausible generative and sufficiently abstract account of the divisions
which fissure through contemporary knowledge systems, are instead adopted here. I
return to Habermas in more detail in Chapter 4, where his theoretical apparatus is
woven in among more fine-grained analyses of language and cognition.
Globalisation and Technologies of Knowledge
Related forms of social theory and research have investigated the rise of informa-
tion technology and the correlative phenomenon of globalisation. Castells (1996),
for instance, documents exhaustively the emergence of the “network society”, in
which traditional forms of labour, organisation, urban planning, travel, markets, cul-
ture, communication, and finally, even human subjectivity, are transformed by the
“network”—a metonymic substitute for various kinds of physical and information net-
works that parallel the growth of globalisation and late or “hyper” capitalism at the
turn of the millennium. According to Castells, the ontological “horizon” of modern
times is qualitatively different partly due to quantitatively expansive affordances of-
fered by network effects or externalities. This results not in a simple homogenising of
cultural differences; rather, echoing the Frankfurt School and Habermas, the “global
network of instrumental exchanges”
follows a fundamental split between abstract, universal instrumentalism,
and historically rooted, particularistic identities. Our societies are increas-
ingly structured around a bipolar opposition between the Net and the Self
(Castells, 1996, p. 3).
Just as, for Habermas, radical ontological incommensurability arises between the
system and the lifeworld, so Castells sees a similar structural schism between “the
Net and the Self”, and its various conceptual analogues—culture and nature, society
and community, function and meaning. The rise of the network society therefore
produces incommensurability as an “unintended consequence” precisely because of its
globalising, standardising and homogenising character; it creates localised resistances
in the fissures or lacunae of its network. However, for Castells as for Habermas, these
differences can always be negotiated by the proselytising force of communication itself,
with ambiguous effects:
Because of the convergence of historical evolution and technological change
we have entered a purely cultural pattern of social interaction and social
organization. This is why information is the key ingredient of our social
organization and why flows of messages and images between networks
constitute the basic thread of our social structure (Castells, 1996, p. 508).
38 CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW
2.3.2 Studies on Technology and Science
Many of the pre-occupations of the “sociology of knowledge” have been inherited by
more recently emergent disciplines, such as Science and Technology Studies (STS).
Largely inaugurated through Latour and Woolgar’s seminal anthropological study
of a scientific laboratory (Latour and Woolgar, 1986)—though equally influenced by
earlier “structural” histories of science and technology—STS work for the most part
looks to examine the sites and practices of science and technology. A common fea-
ture of STS research generally, and of research inspired by the closely aligned Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) in particular, is the desire to show how clear-cut conceptual
boundaries—even those apparently fundamental, between subject and object, nature
and culture, active and passive agents—become blurred in scientific practice (Latour,
1993; Law, 1992, 2004). Not a “theory” in the usual sense, owing more to Geertz’s
“thick” methodological approach to ethnography than explanatory sociological mod-
els (Latour, 2004), ANT has nonetheless provided a broad rubric and vocabulary for
researchers attempting to analyse how different knowledge formations are constructed
socially, or as Law puts it, “scientific knowledge is shaped by the social” (Law, 2004).
And as information technology has began to play an important role in many sci-
entific disciplines, many STS studies have increasingly paid attention to the social
construction of computational systems of classification.
Bowker and Star (1999), for instance, examine how active political and ethical
choices become invisible once encoded within classificatory schemes in a variety of
bureaucratic contexts: medical, health and governmental demography. Adopting the
term “information infrastructures” to describe how such schemes facilitate organi-
sational practices just as physical infrastructure might do, their analysis develops
its own set of distinguishing—and inter-related—typological features. Classification
systems can be
• Formal/scientific or informal/folk—formal systems are used in “information
science, biology and statistics, among other places”, while informal systems are
“folk, vernacular and ‘ethno-classifications’ ”.
• Pragmatic or idealistic—pragmatic systems tend to be oriented towards a lim-
ited set of contemporary goals; idealistic systems are future-oriented, trying to
anticipate future uses.
• Backwards-compatible or future-oriented (related to the previous distinction)—
backwards-compatible systems endeavour to harmonise categories with pre-existing
schemes and data-sets; future-oriented systems are developed from relatively
new principles or methods.
• Practical or theoretical—practical systems tend to evolve to meet the needs of
new users and applications, and may lose original motivating principles; theo-
retical systems tend to retain such principles as endemic to their operation.
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• Precise or prototypical—prototypical taxonomies provide “good enough” de-
scriptive labels, rather than rigorous necessary and sufficient conditions, recall-
ing Rosch’s distinction outlined above (Rosch, 1975).
• Parsimonious or comprehensive—parsimonious systems capture only a limited
number of fields; comprehensive systems aim to gather as much information as
possible.
• Univocal or multivocal—univocal systems tend to reflect a singular, authorita-
tive perspective; multi-vocal systems tend instead to reflect multiple interests.
• Standardised or eccentric—standardised systems reflect a mainstream view of
field or domain; eccentric systems adopt idiosyncratic, unique or otherwise al-
ternative organisations of concepts.
• Loosely or tightly regulated—loosely regulated classifications systems develop
ad hoc—through trial and error, and incremental revision; tightly regulated
systems tend to have formal review processes and versioning systems2.
As the authors make clear, many of these distinctions are of degree rather than
kind—systems may be more or less formal in the above sense, for example. These dis-
tinctions motivate several of the second-order dimensions introduced in the framework
in Chapter 5; there they are applied as a means of classifying classification systems
themselves.
In a series of further case studies, Bowker and Star (1999) also demonstrate the
complexity of factors that motivate particular categorial distinctions behind classifica-
tion systems. They highlight the inherent fuzziness and historical residues that accrue
to systems over time; demonstrating how, for instance, political and ethical values
become embedded long past their historical valency. Such critical impulses can also
be found in a number of more recent studies—Smart et al. (2008), for instance, look
at how racial and ethnic categories become homogenised within scientific classification
systems. Other studies have also described the complications arising from overlapping
or conflicting methodological approaches to classification. Sommerlund (2006) demon-
strates how conflicting genotypical and phenotypical methodological approaches im-
pact on research practices in molecular biology. In another study, Almklov (2008)
has shown how formal classification systems are supplemented in practice by informal
heuristics, as “singular situations” need to be interpreted against potentially incom-
mensurable “standardised” conceptualisations and data sets. The negotiated process
of meaning-making involved in devising classification systems between diverse disci-
plinary experts has also recently received attention; for example, a study by Hine
(2006) of “geneticists and computer engineers” devising a mouse DNA database.
2Adapted from Bowker and Star (1999)
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The desire to renovate classification systems—either through development of new
systems, or refinements to existing ones—can, then, be motivated by numerous ex-
trinsic social factors. As these various studies show, individual classifications systems
can be shown to exhibit conflicting tensions and practical trade-offs in their design,
construction and application. Seeking to understand the commensurability of multi-
ple systems amplifies the potential noise generated by these tensions; tracing them in
turn relies upon examining each system against a matrix of inter-related dimensions—
including both the kinds of distinctions outlined above, and also a further series of
contextually-determined and more or less implied distinguishing elements: political
and ethical beliefs, disciplinary methodologies, theoretical-practical overlays, and vo-
cational orientations. The resulting profiles can in turn be used for comparing and
contrasting the systems concerned—or, in the language adopted here, for assessing
their commensurability.
2.3.3 IT Standardisation
Central to the rise of globalisation has been the phenomenal growth of standardis-
ation, a process of negotiated agreement across many social layers—from common
legal frameworks, economic agreements, political affiliations and linguistic consensus,
through to a myriad of ratified protocols, specifications and standards for mechani-
cal, electrical, engineering, communications and information technology instruments.
Considerable research has been directed towards standardisation in the information
technology sector specifically, much of it published through a journal dedicated to
the field, the Journal of IT Standards and Standardization Research. Unlike the pre-
ceding science studies, which for the most part adopt an anthropological orientation
towards the production of technical artefacts, this research views standardisation as
a predominantly economic phenomenon—though with important political, legal and
cultural bearings. Where an anthropological view is useful in bringing out the in-
ternal perspectival character of knowledge systems, describing how and why these
systems became widely used and adopted often requires a broader scope—looking
at the complex interplay between individual actors, corporations, governments and
multi-national consortia, well beyond the laboratory or workplace setting—and com-
mensurately, employing different research methods, examining the motivations and
processes of standardisation primarily through historical and documentary evidence,
rather than first-hand observation. From the point of view of developing a set of de-
scriptive criteria or dimensions for describing the cultures responsible for knowledge
systems, studies of standardisation provide a valuable supplementary source. The
sorts of distinctions developed here have, moreover, particular resonance in one of the
case studies, the standardisation of document schemas presented in Chapter 8.
Standards exists for a wide range of technical formats, protocols, processes and ap-
plications, and studies of IT standardisation have been accordingly eclectic—covering
style languages (Germonprez et al., 2006), E-Catalog standards (Schmitz and Leukel,
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2005), e-commerce (Choi and Whinston, 2000), mobile platforms (Tarnacha and Mait-
land, 2008), operating systems (Hurd and Isaak, 2005; Isaak, 2006; Shen, 2005),
project management (Crawford and Pollack, 2008) and software engineering processes
(Fuller and Vertinsky, 2006). The term “standard” itself is notoriously difficult to
define—Kurihara (2008) points to its French etymological origins as a military “ral-
lying point”; it has since been co-opted into economic parlance as being “required for
communication between the labeled product and its user in order to win the fullest
confidence of the market”. Blum (2005) suggests standards can be divided into “pub-
lic” and “industrial” types; “public” standards can be further distinguished between
national and sector-specific, while “industrial” standards can be either company or
consortia-based. Blum also suggests further criteria for considering standardisation
processes: the “speed of the process”; “outcomes”, in terms of the competitive con-
ditions of market; “legal status”; and the “nature of the economic goods created”—
whether they be closed or open, public or private (Blum, 2005). These criteria are
picked up further on in the presentation of the framework.
Several motivations have been identified for the development and use of standards.
Most commonly, authors point to one or more economic rationales. For example,
Krechmer (2006) identifies three economic beneficiaries of standardisation: govern-
ments and market regulators looking to promote competition; lowered production
and distribution costs for standards implementers; and user or consumer benefits
brought about by a standard’s adoption. Hurd and Isaak (2005) adds a fourth group:
individuals, usually professionals, benefitting by certain kinds of standards certifi-
cation and professionalisation. In addition, they note that standardisation benefits
companies at all stages of a product’s lifecycle: by accelerating the initial rate of
technology adoption and product diffusion; by expanding the functionality of a prod-
uct as it matures; and by extending the lifetime of a product as it becomes obsolete
or redundant in the face of new, emergent products (Hurd and Isaak, 2005). The
personal motivation which accrues to individuals through their involvement in stan-
dards development and certification processes is further noted by Isaak (2006) and
Crawford and Pollack (2008). Similarly, standardised quality processes accompa-
nied by internationally-recognised certification, can help differentiate a company in a
crowded market-place—as Fuller and Vertinsky (2006) observe, certification can, in
some cases, even be a good market indicator of “improved future revenues”. More-
over numerous authors have emphasised the direct and indirect benefits of “network
externalities” which technology process, product and platform standardisation brings
to users (Katz and Shapiro, 1985; Zhao, 2004; Park, 2004; Tarnacha and Maitland,
2008; Parthasarathy and Srinivasan, 2008).
The by-products of standardisation are not, however, always beneficial. Van Weg-
berg (2004) discusses the trade-offs between “speed and compatibility” in the develop-
ment of standards, focussing particularly on the problematics of competing standard-
isation efforts instigated by rival industrial consortia—a thematic which is revisited
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in the document formats study in Chapter 8. The fractious effects of multiple stan-
dards are further studied by Tarnacha and Maitland (2008) and Schmitz and Leukel
(2005)—though authors are divided as to whether such problems arise from excessive
competition, over-regulation, or are in fact intrinsic side effects of market dynamics.
The costs of standards compliance and certification processes can also produce neg-
ative unintended consequences, operating as market barriers to entry, and limiting
rather than fostering market competition (Tarnacha and Maitland, 2008). Further-
more, consequences can be culturally discriminatory: as one study has shown, on a
national level standardisation can lead to adverse effects for “indigenous technology
developments” (Shen, 2005), as the dispersion of proprietary, closed standards, in par-
ticular, can inhibit local training, innovation and industrial development. Again echo-
ing the document format controversy discussed in Chapter 8, Shen’s analysis of the
rivalry between Microsoft and Linux operating systems in China points to potential
negative normative and even imperialist implications of purely market-driven stan-
dardisation, if unattended by adroit legal and political policy. Even relatively benign
professional bodies, with no direct economic or political mandate, can, in developing
standards, implicitly promote national or regional agendas into global ones—at the
potential risk of marginalising those with less resources or authority (Crawford and
Pollack, 2008; Parthasarathy and Srinivasan, 2008). Moreover, corporations have be-
come experts at “gaming” the standards process, both by overt political and economic
influence, and by covert “patent ambush”, in which “submarine” patents are submit-
ted as part of otherwise “open” or “fair and reasonable” technological provisions to
standards, only to resurface at the corporate donor’s leisure—if new products or tech-
nologies inadvertently infringe upon the patents (Hemphill, 2005). Market dynamics
also often foster so-called “standards wars”, in which companies form competing con-
sortia promoting rival standards—a process which fragments the market and dilutes
the network externalities of standards, at least until a dominant candidate emerges
(Parthasarathy and Srinivasan, 2008).
Consequently, while many studies note the generally beneficial nature of standard-
isation, such processes—and the technical artefacts they produce—can be seen as part
of a social negotiation between different kinds of co-operative and competitive agents,
engaged in a series of complex trade-offs. In the case of ontologies and schemas, stan-
dardisation is often their very raison d’eˆtre—broad diffusion and adoption being key
elements of their promise to deliver interoperability. Understanding commensurabil-
ity of ontologies, then, can often involve understanding the methods and means by
which their authors endeavour to make them standards. Of the studies surveyed, only
Schmitz and Leukel (2005) offer something of a typology of distinguishing features of
standards; they propose the following for the purpose of choosing e-catalog standards:
• General:
– What is the market penetration of the standard—current and future?
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– What is the quality of the standard?
• Specific:
– Standard Organisation—How long will it remain effective? What level of
power and international exposure does it have? What is the level of user
involvement?
– Methodology—Is the underlying language of the standard highly formalised?
Machine-readable? Sufficiently expressive?
– Standard Content—Is the standard at right level? What objects are cate-
gorised? Is the coverage right and satisfying?
Some of these specific features are picked up and reworked as descriptive dimen-
sions later in the framework presented in Chapter 5. More generally, this review of
standardisation studies has extracted a number of dimensions which can be applied
to knowledge systems, particularly to the areas of process and motivation of system
design. These dimensions include:
• Open versus closed process;
• Levels of de facto and de jure standardisation;
• Size and levels of community activity around standards;
• Adoption rates, industry support, levels of satisfaction with standards;
• Differing motivations—economic, political, legal, social, technical.
2.3.4 Knowledge Management
Knowledge systems can also be studied through yet another disciplinary lens, that of
knowledge management (KM). KM approaches tend to discuss ontologies less as kinds
of classification systems or standards, and more as a kind of intangible organisational
asset (Volkov and Garanina, 2008). This perspectival shift brings about yet further
distinctions which can be used to compare and contrast ontologies. Moreover, the
literature review now moves closer to dealing with ontologies as a subject proper—
increasingly knowledge management has co-opted ontologies as an exemplary kind of
knowledge representation, with numerous studies explicitly proposing or examining
frameworks, processes and systems for handling ontologies in knowledge management
journals (Bosser, 2005; Ha¨rtwig and Bo¨hm, 2006; Lanzenberger et al., 2008; Lausen
et al., 2005; Macris et al., 2008; Okafor and Osuagwu, 2007).
Much attention in knowledge management studies is devoted to describing the
relationship between tacit and explicit knowledge in an organisational context. Non-
aka and Takeuchi (1995) put forward a widely adopted model for describing this
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relationship, which follows a four-step process of “socialization” (tacit-to-tacit), “ex-
ternalization” (tacit-to-explicit), “combination” (explicit-to-explicit) and “internal-
ization” (explicit-to-tacit). Hafeez and Alghatas (2007) study how this model can
be applied learning and knowledge management in a virtual community of practice
devoted to Systems Dynamics. They also demonstrate how discourse analysis of on-
line forums can be employed to demonstrate a process of knowledge transfer between
participants—a method increasingly used to capture features of “virtual” communities
generally. These communities are an increasingly prevalent cultural setting for knowl-
edge dissemination, as Restler and Woolis (2007) show; similarly, discourse analysis
is used in several of the case studies in this work. Other studies extend similar knowl-
edge diffusion models to the whole organisation life-cycle (Mietlewski and Walkowiak,
2007), or examine the application of such models as specific interventions into organ-
isations, in the form of an action research program aimed at improving knowledge
elicitation processes (Garcia-Perez and Mitra, 2007). Al-Sayed and Ahmad (2003)
also show how expert knowledge exchange and transfer is facilitated within organisa-
tions by “special languages”—limited and controlled vocabularies—which represent
“key concepts within a group of diverse interests”. As the authors point out, while use
of such languages can serve to further the political aims of a specialised group within
an organisation, the primary aim is one of parsimony “for reducing ambiguity and in-
creasing precision” within a professional context (Al-Sayed and Ahmad, 2003). Such
“languages for special purposes” (LSP’s) can serve to reify a given set of lexical items
into discourse, giving rise to particular conceptualisations within a knowledgeable
community of practice. In turn, these are frequently codified into knowledge systems;
understanding the practical generative conditions of such languages is one way, then,
towards understanding and describing the assumptions behind these systems.
Several authors (Hughes and Jackson, 2004; Detlor et al., 2006; Loyola, 2007; So-
ley and Pandya, 2003) have sought to analyze the specific roles played by context
and culture—two notoriously ill-defined concepts—in the formation, elicitation and
management of knowledge. Acknowledging the resistance of the term “culture” to
easy definition, much less quantification, Soley and Pandya (2003) suggest a working
definition: culture is a “shared system of perceptions and values, or a group who
share a certain system of perceptions and values”, which would include “sub-groups,
shared beliefs and basic assumptions deriving from a group”. This working definition
arguably ignores an important dimension of shared or collective practice which, follow-
ing Bourdieu (1990), would seem constitutive of any culture. Nonetheless the authors
point to important ways in which various cultural attributes—technical proficiency,
economic wealth, as well as linguistic, educational and ethical characteristics—impact
upon knowledge sharing, and suggest, anticipating some of the same points made in
this study, that a certain degree of sensitivity and comprehension of culture has ma-
terial consequences—although, in their case, these consequences are subject to the
overall “game” of corporate competition.
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Both Detlor et al. (2006) and Loyola (2007) seek to understand the role that a
similarly vexed concept, context, plays in knowledge management. Detlor et al. (2006)
provide a structural account of the relationship between a “knowledge management
environment” and both organisational and personal information behavioural patterns,
using a survey-driven approach to show that indeed a strong causal relationship exists.
In their analysis, four survey items relating to “environment” (used interchangeably
here with “context”) reference terms like “culture”, “organisation”, “work practices,
lessons learned and knowledgeable persons” and “information technology”—as well
as “knowledge” and “information”—which suggests the notion of “context” here is
synonymous with the modern organisational bureaucracy. Loyola (2007), on the other
hand, surveys approaches which seek to formalise context as a more abstract “fea-
ture” of knowledge descriptions. Building on earlier work in this area by (Akman and
Surav, 1996; Bouquet et al., 2003), Loyola (2007) argues these approaches strive to
describe context either as part of a logical language, or as part of a data, program-
ming or ontological model. Recognising that context is frequently tacit in knowl-
edge representations—that it “characterises common language, shared meanings and
recognition of individual knowledge domains”—Loyola examines attempts to make it
explicit as a kind of knowledge representation itself. After a comparative review, he
concludes an ontology developed by Strang et al. (2003) is best suited to describing
context, and sees the explicitation of context as a itself a vital part of facilitating
interoperability between conceptual, informational and social divides.
While no studies address the specific question posed here about the commensu-
rability of multiple ontologies, the relationships sketched in this literature between
knowledge assets, on the one hand, and cultures, contexts, and processes of knowl-
edge management, on the other, constitute a useful conceptual rubric for the model
of commensurability presented in Chapter 5. Moreover, these studies bring forward
several further salient dimensions which can be applied to ontologies:
• Whether the ontology represents a relatively small and insular, or large and
variegated “community of practice”;
• Whether the ontology uses “expert” or “lay” vocabulary;
• What sorts of cultural beliefs, values, assumptions and practices that impact on
an ontology’s design;
• What sorts of contextual factors can impact on an ontology’s design, and how
those factors can be best rendered explicit.
As the literature review moves from an engagement with various forms of un-
derstanding social semantics towards examining computational approaches to repre-
senting and reasoning with meaning—in particular how to align different systems of
meaning—the following complaint, ostensibly concerning the cognitive dissonance be-
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tween ontology and broader knowledge management processes, provides a convenient
segueway into the challenges at the intersection of these two fields:
Currently, none of the ontology management tools support social agree-
ment between stakeholders, or ontology engineers. They most often as-
sume one single ontology engineer is undertaking the alignment, and no
agreement is therefore necessary. However, the whole point in ontology
alignment is that we bring together, or align, ontologies that may have
been created by different user communities with quite different interpre-
tations of the domain. Social quality describes the relationship among
varying ontology interpretations of the social actors. Means to achieve
social quality are presentations of the alignment results in such a way
that the different alignment types are explicitly distinguished and the lo-
cation of the alignments from both, a detailed and global perspective are
highlighted (Lanzenberger et al., 2008, p. 109).
2.4 Computational Semantics
The question of meaning is foundational for Semantic Web and broader computational
research—indeed, the problems of how to represent and reason with concepts have
been central preoccupations since the earliest days of research in artificial intelligence
(Norberg, 1989). Considerable attention has been devoted both to the formal, logical
mechanisms for representing meaning generally, and to the construction of ontologies
for representing meaning in specific fields or domains—Chapter 6, which examines
different knowledge representation mechanisms, surveys some of these discussions. In
the decentralised world of the Semantic Web, with no governing authority dictating
which ontologies are useful, a corollary challenge of inter-ontology translation has led
to the development of specific algorithmic techniques for automating the production
of conceptual matches between ontologies. This field of ontology matching is explored
in brief detail below. Related work in ontology metrics and collaboration are also
relevant to the general approach and framework proposed here, and some recent
findings are presented as well.
2.4.1 Matching Ontologies
Ontology matching aims to find relationships between ontologies via algorithmic
means, where no (or few) explicit relationships exist between them; according to
a recent survey of ontology matching approaches, it “finds correspondences between
semantically related entities of ontologies” Shvaiko and Euzenat (2008). The fun-
damental problem faced by ontology matching is one of “semantic heterogeneity”
(Shvaiko and Euzenat, 2008). As Halevy (2005) notes:
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When database schemas for the same domain are developed by indepen-
dent parties, they will almost always be quite different from each other.
These differences are referred to as semantic heterogeneity. Semantic het-
erogeneity also appears in the presence of multiple XML documents, web
services and ontologies—or more broadly, whenever there is more than
one way to structure a body of data (Halevy, 2005, p. 50).
When dealing with one-to-one semantic mappings between databases within an
organisation—a familiar system integration scenario—semantic heterogeneity is typ-
ically met with round-table discussions between experts and stake-holders, who en-
deavour to engineer appropriate conceptual translations between schemas. This takes
time: “In a typical data integration scenario, over half of the effort (and sometimes up
to 80%) is spent on creating the mappings, and the process is labor intensive and error
prone” (Halevy, 2005). These twin motives—time and quality—have spawned fervent
searches for highly precise automatic approaches to mappings. Moreover, in the open
world of the Semantic Web, where collaboration by ontology authors is often impossi-
ble, and at any rate where mappings need to be many-to-many, humanly-engineered
translations may be necessary, but invariably are insufficient (Gal and Shvaiko, 2009).
Ontology matching algorithms typically take two ontologies (and possibly external
data sources) as inputs, and generate a series of matches as output. A match consists
of a tuple < id, e, e′, n,R >, where id is the identifier of the match, e and e’ are the
two concepts from the two respective ontologies, n is the (optional) level of confidence
in the match, and R is the relationship (one of conceptual equivalence, subsumption
or disjointness) (Shvaiko and Euzenat, 2005, 2008). The resulting match series is
termed an alignment. Evaluation of algorithms, given the plethora of possible inputs
and evaluative dimensions, is a notably difficult task (Do et al., 2003). Since 2004, an
annual competition has been held to rate algorithms outputs against expert humanly-
engineered alignments across a range of fields (Shvaiko and Euzenat, 2009). Some of
these approaches have demonstrated impressive precision and recall results against
humanly-engineered mappings (Lauser et al., 2008; Marie and Gal, 2008), although, as
Shvaiko and Euzenat (2008) note, no stand-out candidate approach has yet emerged.
In order to generate alignments, various approaches exploit the different syntac-
tic, structural and semantic properties of ontologies. Several surveys of ontology and
schema matching approaches have been conducted (Rahm and Bernstein, 2001; Do
et al., 2003; Noy, 2004; Halevy, 2005; Shvaiko and Euzenat, 2005; Choi et al., 2006).
Of these, Shvaiko and Euzenat (2008) provide a useful set of distinctions for grouping
different approaches and methods. As with the metrics below, some of these distinc-
tions re-surface in the presentations of dimensions in the framework in Chapter 5;
hence it is useful to summarise these distinctions briefly here (redacted from Shvaiko
and Euzenat (2008)):
1. Element versus structure. Element-based comparison refers to a comparison of
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individual concepts. An element-based comparison might be expected to find
any of the following results: that “tree” matches “tree”; that “tree” also matches
the French equivalent of “arbre”; that “leaf” is a part of “tree”; that “tree” and
“animal” are disjoint, etc.. A structural comparison, on the other hand, might
instead compare the overall ontology graphs, or sub-graphs. Instead of relying
upon individual element matches, element relations are also analysed. A “tree -
> leaf” relation might be found to be equivalent to an “arbre -> feuille” relation,
for example.
2. Syntactic versus external versus semantic. Both syntactic and semantic tech-
niques use only the information contained in the ontologies themselves; external
techniques may refer to other sources for information, for instance, a repository
of previous matches in the same domain, or a structured dictionary like Word-
Net. Semantic techniques are further differentiated through the analysis of
semantic relations between elements. In these cases the elements of each ontol-
ogy are first normalised into a set of comparable logical propositions. If any two
logical propositions from each ontology are found to have some valid semantic
relationship (where a relation may be equivalent, disjointness, generalisation or
specialisation), then a match is found. For example, ontology A may have some
proposition “entity -> organic entity -> tree” [A1 ] and ontology B may have
some proposition “thing -> life-form -> vegetable -> tree” [B1 ]. By reference
to some independent set of axioms, such as dictionary (WordNet is a common
choice), it can then be determined that “entity” is roughly synonymous with
“thing”; “organic entity” is synonymous with “life-form”; and “tree” is synony-
mous with “tree”. Hence the relation of equivalence is deemed to hold between
concepts A1 and B1.
3. Schema versus instance-based inferencing. The approaches described above
refer only to the structure of the ontologies themselves, and therefore are defined
as schema-based. Instance-based inferencing in contrast infers from the contents
of the data the correct concepts belonging to that data. For example, some data
containing a name with the word “tree”—as in “tree #35”—might be inferred
as an instance of the tree class.
4. Single versus hybrid/composite techniques. Hybrid and composite techniques
use a combination of the above approaches. Frequently such approaches use
various weighting schemes to preference one match over others.
Since the approach adopted in this study is contrasted with algorithmic ones
generally—as heuristic and holistically-oriented, rather than deterministic and atomistic—
how do these distinctions differentiate algorithms particularly? Broadly it suggests
that algorithms can themselves be plotted on a spectrum of “atomism–holism”: the
more “holistic” being those which are structural, utilise external sources, analyse se-
mantic over syntactic relationships, and exploit a hybrid of alternative techniques
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(including both schema and instance-based ones). One algorithm which would rate
high against these holistic criteria is S-Match (Giunchiglia et al., 2004). Even here,
however, both the mode of analysis and outputs remain very different from what is
proposed here, which is oriented towards the general cultural assumptions and beliefs,
and produces a general commensurability assessment rather than specific alignments.
Without prior humanly-engineered mappings to go by, the application of a culturally-
oriented holistic framework is a helpful process to cross-check the alignment results
generated by algorithms.
All of the algorithmic approaches discussed in the surveys so far use what Noy
(2004) terms “heuristic and machine learning approaches”. The other avenue towards
semantic integration is through explicit mappings, where two ontologies share some
common third ontology, typically asserting some set of generic and reusable conceptual
axioms. Such “foundational” or “upper-level” ontologies show promise for by-passing
both the time commitments and error-proneness of humanly-engineered mappings,
and the vagaries of algorithmically-generated alignments. However, as Chapter 7
demonstrates, the proliferation of upper-level ontologies can create new sources of
semantic heterogeneity or, in the language adopted here, incommensurability.
Why, across a given domain, are different ontologies ever produced? Relatively
little account is given over the causes of semantic heterogeneity. Halevy (2005) of-
fers: “Differing structures are a by-product of human nature—people think differently
from one another even when faced with the same modeling goal”. The resort to a
kind of naturalistic individualism here underestimates socially and culturally struc-
tural distinctions—of the sorts discussed in the literature above—which also generate
difference in conceptualisations in less stochastic ways. In the framework and case
studies which follow, no single causal theory is provided to account for these differ-
ences. Nonetheless, in specific cases it is possible to hypothesise socially structural
causal factors—distinctions in economic and political sub-systems, epistemological
assumptions, methodological practices, the processes and uses to which these systems
are put—which orient the categorial configurations of different ontologies one way or
another, without reverting to a psychologism which suggests individual agents simply
and inherently “think[ing] differently”. By making these factors explicit, it might
be possible to plot lines of potential translation and integration—or conversely, to
recognise obstacles to translation irreducible to individual idiosyncrasies.
2.4.2 Ontology Metrics
Several further studies have explored metrics for describing, comparing and evaluating
ontologies. Use of these metrics “are expected to give some insight for ontology
developers to help them design ontologies, improve ontology quality, anticipate and
reduce future maintenance requirements, as well as help ontology users to choose the
ontologies that best meet their needs” (Yao et al., 2005). Some of these metrics are
brought into the framework in order to characterise internal features of ontologies.
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Tartir et al. (2005) propose a more extensive model for describing different features
of ontologies, similar in principle to the framework presented here. They distinguish
schema metrics, which describe the only the arrangement of concepts in an ontology,
from instance metrics, which describe individual objects. The authors propose the
following schema metrics:
• Relationship Richness—“reflects the diversity of relations” (Tartir et al., 2005),
by comparing the number of non-subsumption relations to the number of sub-
sumption relations (which stipulate specifically that one class is a sub-class of
another);
• Attribute Richness—shows the average number of attributes defined per-class
within the ontology;
• Inheritance Richness—“describes . . . the fan-out of parent classes” (Tartir et al.,
2005); in other words, whether the ontology graph is broad or deep.
The instance metrics are more extensive, but generally are less relevant for the
kind of ontology comparison anticipated here. One exception is “Average Population”,
which describes the average number of instances or individual objects per class.
Yao et al. (2005) introduce three metrics specifically for describing the cohesion
of ontologies, “the degree to which the elements in a module belong together”. The
metrics are: the number of root classes (NoR); the number of leaf classes (NoL);
and the Average Depth of Inheritance Tree of Leaf Nodes (ADIT-LN) (Yao et al.,
2005). Together these metrics provide a picture of the structure of an ontology—
relatively low numbers of root and leaf classes, relative to the total number of classes,
and, conversely, high numbers of inheritance trees suggest a high overall degree of
coherence, a “deep” rather than “broad” lattice of concepts. These metrics, then,
can be used to further refine the metric of “Inheritance Richness” presented by Tartir
et al. (2005).
Other research has focussed on different aspects and uses for ontology metrics.
Alani and Brewster (2006), for instance, discusses four distinct measures for ranking
ontologies based on their relevance to search criteria, while Vrandecˇic´ and Sure (2007)
discuss how to develop semantic rather than purely structural metrics, by first nor-
malising the structure. However, the research by Tartir et al. (2005) and Yao et al.
(2005) has proven to be of greatest relevance to developing generalised features which
can be used to compare, as much as to evaluate, the intrinsic features of different on-
tologies. These metrics correspond to a number of the dimensions of the framework
presented in Chapter 5, and can be used to supply quantitative values as part of the
application of the framework.
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2.4.3 Collaborative Ontologies
As a coda to the discussion of the technical literature on ontologies, there has also
been considerable research around the idea of collaborative ontology development and
matching—an area which intersects with the concerns of the argument made here.
Several studies have investigated approaches and software systems for collaborative
ontology development (Sure et al., 2002; Bao and Honavar, 2004; Hayes et al., 2005).
In a sign that researchers are increasingly aware of social dimensions of both ontology
development and matching, two noted contributors to the field have advocated:
a public approach, where any agent, namely Internet user (most impor-
tantly communities of users, opposed to individual users) or potentially
programs, can match ontologies, save the alignments such that these are
available to any other agents’ reuse (Zhdanova and Shvaiko, 2006, p. 34).
The software implementation of the framework, results of which are presented in
Chapter 9, operates with similar goals, albeit with a different approach. As a tool
for capturing both the implicit and explicit commitments of ontologies, the software
can similarly promote reusability of the assessments of overall conceptual commensu-
rability, and usefully augment the development of reusable conceptual alignments.
2.5 Beyond the Literature. . .
The literature review has surveyed a wide range of disciplinary studies, to develop a
“four-pillared” scaffolding on which to erect a framework for comparing ontologies.
In turn, the review has looked at recent discussions of meaning in relation to four
themes: language, cognition, society and computation. The purposes of the review
have been several: firstly, to view how meaning is treated through a series of al-
ternative perspectival “lens”, each of which reveals an important facet towards the
development of comprehensive framework of commensurability; secondly, to develop
a series of specific dimensions which can be used to describe and profile ontologies;
and thirdly, to demonstrate that, in spite of wide-ranging studies in and around the
research question posed here, both the question itself and method of answering it are
unique—that the study fills a genuine gap in the literature.
The next chapter looks at methodological approaches to developing, exploring and
evaluating the question. It sketches, in advance of the presentation of the framework
in Chapters 4 and 5, both the general research strategy of the study, and the specific
methods employed by the application of the framework.
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Chapter 3
Methodology
When the specific character of her thinking starts to come into view for
us, we are not filling in blanks in a pre-existing sideways-on picture of how
her thought bears on the world, but coming to share with her a standpoint
within a system of concepts, a standpoint from which we can join her in
directing a shared attention at the world, without needing to break out
through a boundary that encloses the system of concepts (McDowell, 1996,
pp. 35–6).
The first two chapters of the study have outlined the motivating questions, terms
and parameters, and surveyed a sample of the wealth of literature around the piv-
otal topic of commensurability of knowledge systems—the what and why aspects of
the research. This chapter discusses in more detail how the research explores these
questions. The next two chapters (4 and 5) plot a framework for guiding an assess-
ment of the commensurability of Semantic Web ontologies, and subsequent chapters
(6 through to 9) apply the framework to several empirical scenarios. Here I present
the strategy and rationale for the particular methods employed to test the framework.
Since the framework itself includes a “methodology” component, I also discuss the
motivations for that aspect of the framework here. A more programmatic description
of the framework methodology is also outlined in Chapter 5, which introduces the
framework as a whole.
The chapter begins by considering ontologies, a pertinent subset of the general
class of knowledge systems, as objects of social research. This considerations aims
to capture less the features which distinguish these systems in a technical sense, and
more the connotative aspects which have accrued to them in the short history of the
Semantic Web. What kinds of objects are these, and what methods are suitable to
their analysis as specifically social artefacts? Connecting up with the discussion of
sociology of knowledge and STS in the literature review, I take some cues here from
other social studies of technical objects. I then provide some background to the iter-
ative process by which the commensurability framework presented in Chapters 4 and
5 was developed. I discuss the methods by which the framework is explored, fleshed
out and to some extent evaluated in practice, through a series of case studies, and
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an empirical pilot survey conducted on a software implementation of the framework.
The concluding section voices some limitations of the methods chosen, but also states
why ultimately, for the kind of prospective and exploratory models employed in this
study, they are preferred over alternatives.
3.1 Ontologies as Objects of Social Research
Considered as purely sociological products, ontologies are strange objects. Since they
are intended at least in part for machine processing their source format is often dif-
ficult to parse for a human reader. For example, so-called “anonymous” classes can
nest expressions of arbitrary logical complexity for defining necessary and sufficient
conditions for class membership. These expressions are couched in the set-theoretical
operators of “union”, “intersection” and “complement”, and may be further con-
strained by rules of negation, cardinality and data typing. Syntactically, they are
further obfuscated by the sometimes obscure nature of XML delimiters. Unlike tax-
onomies with only explicitly declared subsumption relations, then, ontologies can—in
the worst, but not uncommon cases, especially in the biological domain—use logical
expressions too complex to be interpreted by human agents. Indeed, handling very
complex relations is one of the reasons for applying machine learning techniques to
classification problems. Even armed with some knowledge of OWL and RDF seman-
tics, analysts can struggle to understand the implicit and inferred relations of an
ontology. Reasoning engines and ontology visualisation and editing tools like Prote´ge´
(Gennari et al., 2003) do offer some relief, certainly, and are indispensable for navigat-
ing and understanding their structure for large ontologies. However, the fact remains
that ontologies are in the first instance objects intended for consumption by software,
rather than by biological agents.
Ontologies also differ from more common software artefacts. Software code, for
example, is typically comprised of instructions written in a programming language,
designed to be compiled, interpreted and executed on a computational device. On-
tologies are neither compiled nor executed (although they are used by executable
software). They share more in common with data formats, in that they specify the
form for some information content. Yet where “format” connotes something triv-
ial and contrived—a convenient syntactic arrangement of information—ontologies are
more sophisticated, conceptual entities. Like databases, knowledge bases and expert
systems, they report authoritatively on the state of some slice of the world. They
can be queried; and, to further discriminate them from other kinds of knowledge sys-
tems, they can utilise rich logical axioms to make possible powerful computational
inferences. As noted in Chapter 1, ontologies are designed to be published into the
open space of the World Wide Web, and linked, connected and integrated into a
vast tapestry of concepts and assertions. Unlike traditional knowledge systems, then,
their potential dissemination both imparts to them certain expectations of generali-
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sation, reusability and intelligibility, and makes them—and the cultures responsible
for them—open to public scrutiny to an unusual degree.
Additionally, the term “ontology” is also partly, and increasingly, a token used in a
broader economic sphere—a way of differentiating in a marketplace a new technology
from an old one. Ontologies are then more than purely technical constructs—they
have a certain market value connected with a recent wave of technological innovation
captured under the various rubrics of the “Semantic Web”, “Web 2.0”, “Web 3.0”
and other monikers announcing the arrival of the technological avant-garde. Just
as assuredly, the term “ontology”—in its reincarnation in the technology field—has
participated in the epic journey known as the Gartner “hype cycle” (Fenn et al.,
2000)—from obscurity to rapidly inflated hype to rapidly deflated disappointment
through to, in turn, gradual acceptance and maturity. Understanding even something
as arcane as a knowledge representation standard, then, can mean understanding
something about the economic cycles of emergent technology and the subsequent
dissemination of marketing vocabulary too.
As with any artefact, ontologies are products of culture. They are produced
and consumed by cultures or, in more contemporary terms, “communities of prac-
tice” (Lave and Wenger, 1991). As the introductory chapters have suggested, on-
tologies are formalised representations of knowledge, and share many characteristics
with classification systems and taxonomic structures generally. These have been stud-
ied extensively, particularly within Science and Technology Studies (STS), branches
of sociology of knowledge and knowledge management disciplines. However, within
these disciplines there have not emerged any definitive and canonical methods for
studying such systems—ethnography, document analysis, interviews and surveys are
all common and equally valid investigative techniques. More critically, there are
no standardised classificatory schemes for treating classification systems (although
particular sub-disciplinary areas, notably the library sciences, have developed quite
specific meta-classificatory systems (Bailey, 1994)). Rather, each researcher tends to
rely upon their own unique apparatus for describing the systems they study. While
this provides considerable freedom, it also provides a source of incommensurability at
the meta-level of the distinctions and classifications made about the classification sys-
tems under study. The method for developing a taxonomic structure here—discussed
further below, and later in Chapter 5—is therefore quite syncretic, relying upon hints
and suggestions culled from the literature surveyed in the preceding chapter, as well
as heuristic trial and error, rather than being built upon an existing foundational
system.
3.2 Towards a Framework: Rationale and Evolution
The rationale for the framework stems in part from the literature survey provided in
the last chapter, which demonstrated that as yet no study had sought to apply social
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science research methods to the problem of ontology matching in a systematic fash-
ion. This might be deemed insufficient warrant for the heavyweight implications of a
“framework”, since it could be enough simply to use document analysis, interviews or
other methods to uncover background knowledge about the assumptions underlying
an ontology. Indeed, much of the literature points implicitly to informal use of such
methods and interpretative work in ontology matching. In practice, it was only after
I had begun conducting the case studies that I saw the need to adopt a more formal
apparatus for evaluating the different dimensions of commensurability which emerged
in the analysis. It was apparent that attempting to evaluate the very broad ques-
tion of commensurability with reference to specific data sources—both the ontologies
themselves and extrinsic evidence—required some intervening layers, to move from
concrete interpretation to a more abstract evaluation. I then attempted to “reverse-
engineer” the informal process I had undertaken in examining different ontologies,
with the eventual framework proposed here being the result.
While the framework is intended to guide a series of evaluative judgments, its
construction led in turn to the question of methodology for evaluating the framework
itself. Answering this question proved difficult, since I had already commenced a series
of case studies, which while pointing to the need for a framework, proved of relatively
little value in evaluating it. In practice the goal of evaluation was substituted by a
weaker one of exploration: the case studies now function as demonstrations of the
framework, and as such at least show that it can be applied. To further explore
use of the framework outside my own personal experience, I then decided to build
and deploy a software implementation of the framework that others could apply to
knowledge systems. This system was then piloted among a small cohort of researchers.
In that process, several of the purposes of the framework became increasingly
clear—in spite of limitations of the pilot. While there is substantial literature around
social science research methods, and how to apply them to scientific and technological
objects in particular, much of this literature presupposes a substantive time commit-
ment, and in many cases, prior knowledge of social studies and theories of various
kinds. Moreover—precisely because techniques like surveys, interviews and document
analysis tend to be applied to all manner of research subjects and purposes subsumed
under the broad category of the “social”—methods texts are understandably reluctant
to prescribe pre-formulated variable sets or taxonomic groups for labeling or describ-
ing the objects of research. Indeed, the entire practice of “coding” textual content is
a method in its own right (Bryman, 2004).
In this instance however, I could make several assumptions which could govern the
design and justify the very existence of the framework. Firstly, it is intended to be
used by practitioners with presumed technical expertise, but with no presumed knowl-
edge of social research methods. Since the outcomes of the framework are intended to
be practical—not necessarily research or academically-oriented—the framework could
by-pass some (but not all) of the scruples which typically govern an introduction to
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research methods. Secondly, I could also assume these practitioners would be “time-
poor”, and seeking a relatively “quick and dirty” result—which could nonetheless be
documented, and therefore justified after the evaluative fact. Thirdly, the nature of
the “objects”—formalised knowledge representations—have certain constant features,
discussed further below, which could permit the introduction of flexible set of vari-
ables or dimensions for describing them. Fourthly, a fortuitous side-effect in studying
Semantic Web ontologies particularly (though this applies, salve veritatae, to other
kinds of formal representations in many cases too) is that they are not only published,
but very frequently discussed, designed and developed on the web—so online content
analysis presented itself as an ideal “canonical” method for the framework.
Consequently it became apparent that a framework could provide a directed and
convenient way to apply “agile” research methods to the study of knowledge sys-
tems, and to record observations against a pre-defined (but extensible) set of dimen-
sions. Commensurability could further be assessed in quantitative terms by applying
a weighted average algorithm to the dimension values. These three components form
the basis of the framework, and are presented in more detail in Chapter 5. Packing
the components as a “framework” in turn allowed me to develop software which could
present the various parts described there as a coordinated whole.
The framework reached a relatively mature level of development only late in the
course of the study, and by this stage the case studies were already well underway.
“Re-engineering” them post facto appeared an impossibly difficult task, and one which
moreover would obscure the gradual germination of the framework through the case
studies. Thus, while Chapter 5 in particular precedes the presentation of the case
studies, it could only be developed to its current point of maturity via the practical
working through of them. These studies are therefore best read as embodying the
early spirit rather than the mature formulation of the framework.
The difficulty of “retro-fitting” the case studies pointed to a tension in the frame-
work itself. On the one hand, it is useful to the extent that it acts as a guide to
practitioners. On the other, this guidance cannot be overly prescriptive, since even
in the case studies presented here there is tremendous variability in the fields, data
sources and salient evaluative dimensions and methods applied. This variation could
only be exacerbated when the framework is applied by other users in other contexts
to different kinds of knowledge systems. To some extent, I have tried to accommodate
this variability in the framework itself. However, aspects of its presentation, especially
in its eventual software form, tend to negate this idea of “suppleness” or “agility”.
This difficulty is examined in much more detail in Chapter 9, where the results of the
software evaluation are presented.
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3.3 Applying the Framework: Making the Case for
Case Studies
The previous chapter surveyed several fields of research focussing specifically on the
sociology, economic, historic and philosophical dimensions of science. While these
differ markedly in orientation, there is considerably greater homogeneity at the level
of method. The most common approach used across these disciplines—and practiced
extensively in the landmark texts of Kuhn (2002), Foucault (1970), Latour and Wool-
gar (1986) and more recently, Bowker and Star (1999)—has been the case study. Case
studies seem particularly well suited to sociological studies of science and technology
since, like many of the objects they study, they too are amorphous—able to cover a
brief episode or lengthy period; capable of being homogenous or heterogenous with
respect to method; conducted by solitary researchers or large teams; alternatively
exploratory, descriptive or explanatory in aim; in short, they can be adapted to a
broad range of objects and social contexts.
A now classical reference point for describing case studies is (Yin, 2008), who pro-
vides a useful taxonomy for distinguishing various types of case studies. Yin helpfully
distinguishes three kinds of investigation: exploratory, descriptive and explanatory
(Yin, 2008). To employ a cartographic metaphor: exploration first maps out an area
for study; description then details the features which appear in the landscape; and
explanation points to the causal factors which generate the features. Yin points to
the common misconception that case studies are at best useful for exploratory kinds
of research, and argues that they can be equally valid research strategies for questions
directed towards the “how” and “why”—procedural and causal dimensions—of social
phenomena.
Yin also provides a useful working definition of the case study:
1. A case study is an empirical inquiry that
• investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life con-
text, especially when
• the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident.
2. The case study inquiry
• copes with the technically distinctive situation in which there
will be many more variables of interest than data points, and as
one result
• relies on multiple sources of evidence, with data needing to con-
verge in a triangulating fashion, and as another result
• benefits from the prior development of theoretical propositions
to guide data collection and analysis (Yin, 2008, p. 18).
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Applying this definition to the examination of a framework for assessing the com-
mensurability of ontologies, case studies make practical candidate research methods
for several reasons:
• Here, the relationship between “phenomena”— in this case knowledge systems—
and “real-life context”— the environments in which they are developed and
used— is one of the key findings being sought after.
• One of the outcomes of applying the framework is the discovery of as-yet “un-
known” variables, rather than the collection of “data points” against known
variables.
• Often ontologies and associated knowledge systems are important intangible
knowledge assets of the organisations which produce them. Even if the on-
tologies are made publicly available, frequently the process by which they are
developed—as well as guiding assumptions—remain proprietary. Research into
the assumptions behind ontologies often then needs to be opportunistic—to ex-
ploit “multiple sources of evidence”, where they are available, and also to utilise
appropriate methods.
• The postulation of a framework acts as a coordinating set of “theoretical propo-
sitions to guide data collection and analysis” (Yin, 2008). Even where the
framework is being deployed rather than evaluated, parts of its deployment in-
volved the generation of a set of working dimensions or variables for describing
ontologies. In this context, this act constitutes the postulating of “theoretical
propositions”.
• The concept of a “case”, which is itself difficult to define, implies some kind
of bounding on the scope of research. While the case studies undertaken here
are broad, in many practical scenarios scope needs to be considerably more
parsimonious.
• Moreover, increasingly technological artefacts are developed collaboratively in
a virtual environment. Forms of obtrusive methods—participatory or ethno-
graphic observation—are difficult or impossible to apply to processes which
unfold in the heterogenous space of the Internet.
Case studies are adopted here as the preferred strategic approach for these reasons.
The aim of the case studies is to establish whether a holistic and schematic approach
is useful for assessing the commensurability of knowledge systems. Towards this end,
the studies need to compare and contrast two or more systems, along with their
contextual conditions of production and use; in Yin’s terms, the studies constitute
contrastive “multiple case study designs”.
Yin also provides a helpful vocabulary for distinguishing criteria for judging study
findings, stressing four types of test, which are quoted in abridged form below:
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• Construct validity: establishing correct operational measures for the
concepts being studied.
• Internal validity: establishing a causal relationship . . . as distinguished
from spurious relationships.
• External validity: establishing the domain to which a study’s findings
can be generalised.
• Reliability: demonstrating that the operations of a study . . . can be
repeated, with the same results (Yin, 2008, p. 33).
Each of these tests can be applied to the conduct of the commensurability case
studies. Construct validity can be tested by looking to see whether the kinds of
differences teased out by the analysis are validly “perspectival”, or rather reflect
relatively trivial syntactic or semantic distinctions. Internal validity can be tested by
seeking to ascertain whether differences in the systems compared are caused by the
different perspectives in operation, or rather merely vary randomly. External validity
can be tested by examining whether the usefulness of the framework is sufficiently
demonstrated by the case studies, and whether this usefulness could be then extended
for other cases. Finally, reliability can be tested by seeking to repeat the studies and
observing whether the same results are obtained—within the broad ambit of varying
subjective interpretation. The latter condition is the most difficult to ascertain, a
difficulty which extends to some degree to all qualitative studies of this sort.
Notwithstanding that the exercise of the studies can be tested against these mea-
sures, it is also worth noting that in this context application of such tests is invariably
also an exercise in interpretation—much as are the studies themselves. It might be
argued conversely that to a large extent positive or negative test results against these
measures reflect a “meta-perspectival” attitude towards the very question of perspec-
tives themselves. In spite of these theoretical qualms, awareness and application of
such measures does provide at the very least some heuristic safeguards that the frame-
work, applied in the course of the case studies here, ought to demonstrate some utility
in other situational contexts.
3.4 Elaborating a Theoretical Approach to Case Study
Design
As mentioned above, case studies have been a popular research strategies for under-
standing scientific and technological practices. One benefit of case studies is the lack of
programmatic specificity about how they ought to be conducted. In order to develop
something like a reliable and repeatable procedure for assessing commensurability,
however, this laudable latitude needs tempering through several methodological and
structural constraints, which accordingly are spelled out and justified here.
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Since the studies ostensibly analyse cases which are spatially and temporally
diverse—covering different geographic regions and period of (albeit recent) history—
much of the source data is documentary and discursive. Consequently, a natural fit
for the evidentiary sources employed here is discourse analysis—an approach com-
monly adopted in other studies examining different forms of the social construction
of knowledge. Keller (2005), for instance, looks at applying discourse analysis within
a broader framework of a sociology of knowledge. He develops a useful, finely attenu-
ated series of distinctions for describing the relationship between discourse and social
practice, between discourse and individual language use, and between specialised
and generalised discourse. He also suggests four “analytical units or concepts” for
drawing together forms of discursive interpretation: interpretive schemes or frames;
classifications; phenomenal structure and narrative structure (Keller, 2005). While
these distinctions are useful for stretching down from the abstractions of sociology of
knowledge to applied forms of analysis, they do not provide the granular navigational
tools the latter task requires.
Focussing more at the level of argumentation between individual actors, Leita˜o
(2001) presents a Toulmin-inspired model for analysing the phases of argumentative
dialogue and associated epistemic transitions. As Gobo (2005) suggests, qualitative
methods have only been comparatively recently accepted—and then, only in some
quarters—as valid ways of doing social research. Structured computer-aided data
analysis of conversation, discourse, interviews and video are helping correct the tra-
dition bias against qualitative data analysis. This is particularly so when the original
documents are published online, and so readily available to be analysed using various
computer-aided qualitative techniques. Some of these techniques are applied in the
case studies which follow.
The growth of the web has inspired adaptation of conventional social research
methods to this medium (Schneider and Foot, 2004). These include Foucauldian-style
discourse analysis of online content, as well as various forms of online ethnography,
interviews and surveys, often deployed in a “multiple methodology” scenario (Bowker,
2001). As some of the studies of classification systems have shown, it is also possible
to mix analysis of electronic data and systems with obtrusive, “face-to-face” methods
(Bowker and Star, 1999). Recently, positioning theory—inspired by both discourse
analysis and speech act theory—has also been proposed by Tirado and Ga´lvez (2007)
as a means for studying conflict in virtual communities. The key insight of this ap-
proach is a focus on the specifically “agonal process of interaction” between members
involved in a discursive space, virtual or otherwise—transposed to knowledge systems,
these points of intersubjective, dramatic “agon” signify potential areas of cultural in-
commensurability. In their study, the authors analyse a fragment of a mailing list,
teasing out the positions staked in the discourse by different interlocutors (Tirado and
Ga´lvez, 2007). They argue that while they as analysts may disavow any privileged
position in relation to the discourse they analyse, their being positioned outside that
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discourse affords them opportunity to demarcate a dynamic constellation of positions
which emerge through a discursive “episode”. This constellation constitutes not only
multiple viewpoints and their respective relationships, but also represents an active
configuring of power and of social order. Korobov (2001) provides a more detailed
view of what positioning theory or positioning analysis might look like in a program-
matic sense, distinguishing it from both conversational analysis and critical discourse
analysis. Korobov (2001) adopts from Bamberg (1997) the following three levels of
analysis:
• Level 1—How the conversational units (i.e. characters, events, topics, verb
structure, etc.) or general conversational structure are positioned in relation to
one another within the reported events;
• Level 2—How the speaker both is positioned by and positions him/herself to
the actual or imagined audience;
• Level 3—How do the narrators position themselves in answering the specific
and general question of “who am I?” and “how do I want to be understood”.
(Korobov, 2001)
Applied differentially against levels of discourse, these questions permit analysis
to ascend from concrete verbal (or written) acts, through to the specific social scene
in which the discourse takes place, up to the general dimensions of social order—legal,
economic, political, cultural—in which individual subjectivity is located. Methodolog-
ically and theoretically, positioning analysis holds tantalising promise for the kind of
discovery of assumptions behind, and positions undertaken through, the construction
of knowledge systems. It also affords the possibility of systematisation, into quantita-
tive game-theoretical models for instance, while preserving the reflexivity and context
specificity of traditional qualitative discourse analysis. Since many of the materials
available for researching the cultures behind knowledge systems are only available in
online textual form, often couched explicitly in the form of argumentation, positioning
analysis presents itself as a useful “sub-strategy” to apply within the case studies.
The approach adopted here, then, synthesises several discrete methodological ele-
ments: it blends the insights of positioning theory with those of a revitalised tradition
of the sociology of knowledge, which in turn generates a theoretical grounding for a
kind of critical discourse analysis Keller (2005). At an instrumental level, the nature
of the “objects” treated here—both knowledge systems themselves, and the predom-
inantly online forms of discourse about those systems—also admit the tactical use of
computer-aided quantitative techniques, for counting, measuring and analysing these
objects. Together, selective employment of these approaches make it possible to de-
velop a working tool-kit which can be applied to both the technical and sociological
aspect of the commensurability studies. The key elements, then, of the sociological
analysis are
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• Sociology of knowledge—as the overarching theoretical frame for analysis;
• Positioning analysis—as the prima facie method of analysing discourses;
• Computer-aided analysis—for extracting heuristic metrics and indicators from
the ontologies themselves, and to a lesser degree, from the web of documents
which surround them.
It is worth emphasising that these are not prescriptive elements, to be adopted
slavishly, but rather act as useful directive sign-posts along the path of investigation
into the question of knowledge system commensurability. Other frames, methods and
techniques can be incorporated into the framework without compromising the insights
resulting from its application.
3.5 An Anatomy of a Case Study: Principal Com-
ponents
With positioning analysis forming a “baseline” method within each overall case study,
what sort of procedures or structures guides its actual design and development? Each
study here includes, to varying degrees, five basic components. The first of these is
an introductory section, which contains an outline of the guiding research question,
typically framed along lines of “how are systems X and Y commensurable”? The sec-
ond component is a negotiable element of each study, but included here for important
context and background, is an historical account outlining how the systems—and the
domains described by them—arise. To portray the systems in fine relief, a technical
analysis, examining each of the systems against some pre-defined metrics and indi-
cators, follows as the third element. The fourth element is a sociological analysis,
broadening the scope of the inquiry from the systems themselves to the context of
their development and use—employing, canonically, positioning analysis against the
available textual resources. The final component is the evaluation of the commensu-
rability of the systems themselves, given some hypothetical situation and goal. These
components are accorded differing degrees of emphasis in the actual studies which
follow.
Schematically, the typical components of the case studies are:
1. Introduction—describes the knowledge systems and any known issues of trans-
lating between them, posed in a question.
2. Historical overview—background on the systems being reviewed.
3. Technical analysis of the systems, using metrics and other indicators.
4. Sociological analysis of the cultures who develop and use systems—typically,
employing positioning analysis to draw out positions within available cultural
discourse.
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5. Assessment of the commensurability of the systems (given some hypothetical sit-
uational context and goal)—draws upon the preceding technical and sociological
analysis, along with any comparative evaluations against salient dimensions, to
develop an overall summary statement of commensurability.
For the study of the formal systems themselves in Chapter 6, the historical overview
comprises the mainstay of the analysis. For the upper-level ontology study, the techni-
cal analysis constitutes the major part of the analysis, while for the document format
study, roughly equivalent weight is given to the historical, technical and sociological
sections.
In spite of these context-led variations, what emerges in each case is an overar-
ching narrative, demonstrating in a qualitative sense the different dimensions along
which translation can or cannot take place. The framework emphasises the role of
context in assessing commensurability—since the context here is, at least broadly,
the validity and utility of the framework itself, it might be assumed that there is
a bias towards finding examples of incommensurability at the outset. Certainly in
the selection of case studies, finding possible scenarios of incommensurability was a
motivating factor. The role of the narrative, however, is intended to show in a more
nuanced way points of both similarity and difference, which could be used in scop-
ing the various variables—cost, time, resources and so on—involved in this or that
translation scenario. Admittedly those scenarios are artificial for these studies, and so
an additional strategy—the use of a software pilot, described below—has been used
to provide some methodological triangulation against this concern. Aside from such
issues of validity, and treated as a purely exploratory exercise, these studies also serve
to demonstrate alternate paths towards making explicit key, common dimensions of
commensurability—and can be further justified on these grounds.
3.6 Case Study Candidates: Finding and Justifying
Cases of Incommensurability
There are several desiderata in selecting case study candidates. Firstly, both the
languages, ontologies or schemas themselves, and some level of associated discourse
about them, should be publicly available. Just locating two ontologies in the same
field or area on the Internet is insufficient, without some further background forums,
publications or other discursive artefacts which can be used to develop points of both
similarity and difference between them.
Secondly, the case study should cover ontologies or schemas with largely overlap-
ping fields or domains—in order that commensurability between them can be assessed.
Although the question of commensurability can conceivably arise between ontologies
with minimal or no overlap, any conclusions drawn are necessarily more tenuous. For
instance two ontologies specifying concepts drawn from biology and physics respec-
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tively may also use radically different epistemic frames—but this may not be evident
through any review of the ontologies of themselves.
Thirdly, the case study need not necessarily be exemplary—in the sense that it rep-
resents the typical dilemmas associated with matching schemas or ontologies. Rather
it should show incommensurability in some conspicuous form. Using Yin’s taxonomy
of case studies, this criterion suggests the case study should be deliberately, selectively
and even atypically extreme (Yin, 2008). Examples of this criterion can be found in
Kuhn and Foucault, whose “paradigmatic shifts” and “epistemes” are, unsurprisingly,
especially evident in just those studies they choose to analyse. Since the claim being
tested here relates not to any ontological condition of incommensurability between
knowledge systems—in which case, the selected studies would have the burden of
being representative—but rather to its analytic utility, having atypical and extreme
cases does not weaken this claim.
Fourthly, the case study should demonstrate the utility of the framework in some
way, and also serve as a means for extending, adjusting and refining the framework, as
it is presented in Chapter 5. In practice, the framework was substantially re-modeled
during and after the case studies, and exhibits now a more formal appearance than
would have been possible without them. The studies should nevertheless demonstrate
the mature version of the framework is both consistent and productive in terms of
the results they present.
Finally, the question of incommensurability exhibited by the case studies should
not be simply taken as “problems” needing to be “solved”, whether algorithmically
or via some human-aided process. The contention here is that incommensurability,
a feature always discovered in some situational context, ought not necessarily be
something which ought to be eradicated. Rather it is itself a marker or indicator of
some degree of radical epistemic or cultural difference which needs preserving precisely
through the very process of being made explicit. The case studies ideally ought to
tease out just where these points and degrees of difference arise—not necessarily
through definitive isolation of explanatory, causal factors, but at least through a
more systematic and justifiable description of where those differences lie.
In summary, the case studies should
1. study ontologies or schemas which are available, and also have some associated
discourse about them;
2. cover ontologies or schemas with largely overlapping domains;
3. exhibit illuminating or revealing aspects of incommensurability;
4. offer some demonstration and possible explanation for incommensurability;
5. be amenable to the application of the framework discussed in Chapter 5.
Towards these various criteria, three case study candidates were selected. The
first of these considers differences between formal knowledge systems—which span
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a range of structured data formats, information systems and knowledge representa-
tion languages—themselves. Ironically, since the Semantic Web is designed to solve
problems of interoperability, it introduces new ones of its own—in particular, some
degree of incommensurability with the predominant information model, the relational
database. While there is considerable research and now practical products and ser-
vices designed to overcome this mismatch, this case study examines in synoptic form
the history of these and other candidate systems for representing information—and
why any kind of proliferation of multiple overlapping systems might exist at all. The
study provides some opportunity to take a longer range historical view than the other
studies afford, and also provide some insight into fundamental epistemic considera-
tions and orientations inherent in knowledge system design.
The second case study examines five so-called “upper-level” or foundational Se-
mantic Web ontologies developed in the past decade. “Upper-level” ontologies purport
to describe the fundamental existential categories, such as Time, Space, Process and
Entity, in a manner not dissimilar to Aristotle’s Categories (Aristotle, 1994) and nu-
merous metaphysical categorial constructions since. This case study is fortuitous in
that all ontologies use the same formalism (OWL—the Web Ontology Language of the
Semantic Web) and cover much the same domain (though with hugely varying degrees
of specificity). Each of these ontologies was developed in an academic environment,
and so is accompanied by varying levels of academic publication, which provides some
degree of context for the assumptions, methods and processes of their construction.
Some level of both technical and sociological analysis is therefore possible, though
further data about the social environment would have been highly desirable to “flesh
out” the picture provided in this study. To supplement this, I examine two online
mailing lists, where some of the foundational issues and debates around ontologies (in
both philosophical and technical senses of the term) are discussed. This examination
provides some supplementary and much-needed background to the analysis of the
upper-level ontologies themselves.
The third case study looks at two emergent document format XML standards.
Both standards have been ratified by ISO in recent years, and have very substantial
overlap—begging the question as to why both—rather than one or the other—should
have become standards. Resolving, or at least addressing, this question took the shape
of a long, controversial and—within the relatively occluded space of discussion over
data standards—highly publicised debate between proponents of the two standards,
and many other parties—government bodies, consultants, commentators—involved in
the standardisation process. Both formats embody clear, and clearly distinguishable,
views as to the nature of the ontological “objects” of documents. The proliferation
and ready availability of both the document specifications themselves, and the large
online debate around them clearly satisfies the first criterion listed above, while the
question of commensurability of the formats is front and center of the very debate
itself, which capably satisfies the remaining desiderata.
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Other case study candidates also presented themselves, though due to the emergent
nature of the Semantic Web, and the “research” or “beta” status of many of its
ontologies, the opportunities for conducting the kinds of discourse analyses applied
in the cases above are relatively few. As is the tendency with new technologies,
they are co-opted by “early adopters”, often enthusiastic individuals or organisations
for obscure or eccentric fields of application. As a consequence many prototypical
ontologies do exist in fields with little or no obvious competition—a precondition for
the issue of commensurability to arise. For example, modeling bibliographic records
(D’Arcus and Giasson, 2009) or providing “a lightweight, subject concept reference
structure for the Web” (UMBEL.org, 2009) may at some stage be of enough intrinsic
appeal or commercially profitable to warrant multiple competing efforts—however,
currently these are singular instances maintained by a small group of specialists.
One other area which has attracted substantial interest, research investment and
even active competition has been the life sciences. Here there have been several ef-
forts to construct biological ontologies, modeling genes, proteins and various organic
taxonomic and anatomic structures. Unfortunately relatively little about this ac-
tivity is evident beyond the austere academic publications which present them, and
consequently it is difficult to compare the processes, methods and paradigms under
which they are constructed. Alternative means of investigations—such as interviews,
surveys or direct observation—would have required practical affordances of time and
travel not available for this study. Nevertheless, in the first of the case studies, cov-
ered in Chapter 6, I discuss some of the reasons why the Semantic Web—and the
formal ontology languages of RDF and OWL—should be particularly appealing to
researchers in the bioinformatic fields. It is also worth noting that much of the re-
search into upper-level ontologies surveyed come about through efforts to support
development of biological ontologies—and so have particular leanings both towards a
“natural science” epistemological orientation, and the kinds of constructs needed to
support descriptions of biological objects specifically.
Finally the selection provides a useful triangulation of cases. The study of for-
mal knowledge systems narrates the emergence of the Semantic Web (and related
information models), supplying important historical context for the argument of the
work as a whole. The second study tackles one area of substantial investment and
development in Semantic Web technologies—the foundational axioms designed to un-
derpin domain-level ontologies, providing the basis for interoperability between them.
The third study moves from largely academic developments to the commercial in-
terests behind document format standards. Where the first two studies necessarily
engage philosophical and computer science literature as the basis for their analysis,
this study permits a greater focus on a broader array of sources—blogs, comments,
press releases, mailing lists and company filings. As a consequence the analysis here
takes on a more conventional sociological tone. All three studies therefore provide
different frames from within which to view the question of commensurability in rela-
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tion to the systems analysed, and in relation to the various cultures responsible for
them.
3.7 “Operationalising” the Framework: Implement-
ing a Software System
The case studies reflect my own application of the framework, as indeed much of its
development took place through the carrying out of the studies themselves. As a
further examination of the framework, I conducted a pilot test with a small cohort
of other users. The framework was operationalised as an online software system,
which leads users through a case study of two sample ontologies, and asked them to
complete a survey at the end. Chapter 9, “Framework in Practice”, describes in detail
the process of constructing the software and administering the survey, as well as an
analysis of the results. The following section limits discussion just to the rationale for
this pilot.
As exhibited by the case studies, the question of commensurability involve substan-
tial analysis both of the knowledge systems themselves, and of background discursive
materials. Several implicit findings emerged from conducting the studies: firstly, the
quantitative volume of work of compiling and analysing sources and developing a
narrative can be significant; secondly, the qualitative analysis of such sources is nec-
essarily heavily interpreted via the subjective lens of the analyst; thirdly, the results
are artificial and imprecise—since they are framed within an academic context. The
pilot test was designed to answer the question of whether the framework could be
oriented towards more practical ends by
• Using agile, “light-weight” variants of discourse and content analysis;
• Constraining interpretation through an existing set of criteria and methodolog-
ical direction;
• Generating both qualitative and calculated quantitative results for the commen-
surability comparison.
The sample cohort was comprised of other researchers, who were likely to have had
some exposure either to the specific technologies involved, or to related frameworks
and approaches. This is not particularly representative of practitioners who might
use the framework and software in day-to-day practice; however this group seemed
ideal for a “first pass” run-through of the system, and would at any rate likely be
attuned to various weaknesses in documentation, interface design, and the explanatory
instruments of the framework itself. The qualitative feedback from the cohort, in
particular, confirmed this suspicion.
On the whole, though, the pilot study proved a useful supplementary exercise in
understanding how the framework, having been trialled on a series of case studies,
3.8. LIMITATIONS 69
might next be operationalised in practical form. It also forms a triangulating element
in the case for the usefulness of the conceptual apparatus engaged in the study as a
whole, oriented towards exploring the holistic commensurability of knowledge systems.
3.8 Limitations
Together the case studies and pilot evaluate provide some means of empirically val-
idating the claims of the commensurability framework. However, several limitations
are also evident.
Firstly, and perhaps most crucially, a degree of a priorism persists in the methods
used. That is, given a particular framework—and attendant set of assumptions—it
is always possible to generate certain results of varying degrees of efficacy. But there
is no control test as to whether the framework and its assumptions are required to
produce such results. Experienced analysts of information models, faced with data
integration issues on a regular basis, might argue that expertise and practical “know-
how” answer the same questions without the elaborate theoretical constructs provided
here. Of course the aim of the framework is to make explicit just what sorts of tacit
“know-how” might be involved—but again, other methods—interviews or surveys
with experts, participant observation or long-term ethnography—might generate this
kind of explicitation in a more practically grounded way.
One pragmatic response to this objection is that the relative immaturity of the Se-
mantic Web makes sourcing such expertise difficult. Moreover, on theoretical grounds
it might be argued it would be difficult to construct something like a framework ab
initio from piece-meal empirical data collection, which at the same time stayed con-
ceptually coherent and non-contradictory. Moreover one of the arguments made in
this study is that the usually ignored or at best implicit dimensions of the question of
commensurability—that is, the irretrievably social dimensions—are best teased out
via application of social science methods to background sources. This may or may
not prove counterfactual to the practices of experts themselves, but at any rate this
argument would risk being lost if relying upon existing “best practices”.
More fruitfully, it might have been possible to ask practitioners to review the
constructed framework only after it had been augmented and made more robust
through application to the case studies. The pilot study is a step in this direction,
but the time involved in constructing the software, providing adequate documentation
about the framework, and administering the pilot prohibited further steps being taken.
It might also be claimed the case studies, limited as they are, are not particularly
representative of ontology or schema alignment scenarios generally. I partly respond
to this above in relation to the justification of atypicality. The studies are intention-
ally limiting cases, which explore the commensurability question in extremis. More
practically, Semantic Web ontologies have not permeated the main body of informa-
tion technology practice to the extent that overlapping ontologies are easy to source.
70 CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY
Conversely, data schema integration cases are considerably easy to find, since they are
an integral part of conventional IT practice. For the most part, though, organisational
data schemas are usually private, and rarely published—nor are the supplementary
documentary materials which have been used as the basis of these studies. Without
engaging some kind of ethnographic study, then, it is difficult to gain access to the
sorts of materials required.
A further twin set of concerns relate to the precision of the generated results.
On the one hand, it is evident that, however constrained, a strong degree of subjec-
tive bias is involved in the commensurability evaluations (whether conducted by me,
or by others in the pilot test). Given the same data, other evaluations are always
possible—a fact masked by, in particular, the formulaic casting of the framework. On
the other hand, for the purposes for which the framework is constructed, the results
are also too imprecise. Project scoping needs a more fine-grained and detailed pro-
cess for cost and time estimates. The response to these objections is that the frame-
work can conceivably be oriented either qualitatively—to emphasise the interpretive
aspects—or quantitatively— to focus on greater precision. Similarly, the scope can
be scaled up—towards a Kuhn-like treatment of grander conceptual “paradigms”—or
down—towards a narrow, context-bound consideration that would also focus more
on the technical dimensions of commensurability. The case studies here do cover
this “spread” to some extent; again, further work would be required to evaluate the
framework in a range of other practical scenarios.
Some of the specific limitations relating to the individual case studies and the pilot
study are treated in the relevant chapters ahead.
3.9 Towards a Theory of Commensurability
This chapter has outlined the general approach and specific methods used to develop
and evaluate the framework. First, it explored the idea of investigating ontologies as
specifically social objects, suggesting that this sort of activity can be subsumed within
the broader category—and tradition—of “Sociology of Knowledge”. There also, some
points of affiliation and distinction with what has become known as “Science and
Technology Studies” were put forward.
The rationale and evolution of the framework for evaluating commensurability,
the core argumentative construct of the study, were then discussed. The two main
vehicles used for exploring the framework empirically, comprising a series of three
case studies and a software pilot evaluation, were presented. Some discussion of the
limitations, and corresponding responses, followed.
In subsequent chapters the framework itself is developed and applied. Chapter
4 works through a series of philosophical positions to ground the framework theo-
retically. Chapter 5—the central chapter of the study—then unpacks the framework
itself. The following three chapters—6 through to 8—cover each of the three case
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studies. Chapter 9 presents the pilot test and its results, before Chapter 10 reviews
the progression and results of the study as a whole.
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Chapter 4
Towards a Framework
The freedom with the constraints of ritual logic that comes from perfect
mastery of that logic is what makes it possible for the same symbol to
refer back to realities that are opposed in terms of the axiomatics of the
system itself. Consequently, although it is not inconceivable that a rigor-
ous algebra of practical logics might one day be written, it will never be
done unless it is understood that logical logic, which only speaks of them
negatively, if at all, in the very operations through which it constitutes it-
self by denying them, is not equipped to describe them without destroying
them. It is a question of reconstituting the “fuzzy”, flexible, partial logic
of this partially integrated system of generative schemes which, being par-
tially mobilized in relation to each particular situation, produces, in each
case, below the level of the discourse and the logical control that it makes
possible, a “practical” definition of the situation and the functions of the
action (which are almost always multiple and interlocking), and which,
with the aid of a simple yet inexhaustible combinatory, generates the ac-
tions best suited to fulfil these functions with the limits of the available
means (Bourdieu, 1990).
The literature review and methodology chapters open up the disciplinary and strate-
gic paths for exploring knowledge systems against their broader cultural landscape.
The present chapter discusses the question of commensurability in more theoretical
terms, stepping through several philosophical positions to arrive at the basis for the
framework presented in the next chapter. So far, commensurability has been about
both the explicit commitments of knowledge systems, and an implicit “something”
which sits behind them. But what sorts of “somethings” are these; what is it which
can be said to be commensurable or otherwise? Not just the systems themselves,
otherwise ontology matching techniques would be presumably sufficient—there would
be no need to step outside the system to glean further information. Rather, it is the
constellation of beliefs, assumptions, commitments, intentions, structures and prac-
tices held by the people responsible for those systems, who design and use them.
Since people also engage in a range of other social constellations and configurations,
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it would be accurate to speak of the dedicated cultures—organisational, communal,
national or global—responsible for knowledge systems. This amorphous kind of entity
will be given greater specificity in Chapter 5; however its description will invariably
be indebted to, and share, many of the features exhibited by canonical “structural”
accounts of socialised knowledge: Kuhnian paradigms, Foucauldian epistemes and
Quinean conceptual schemes.
The discussion of the present chapter begins, then, with a survey of these sig-
nificant developments. It follows with an examination of several notable critiques of
these different brands of conceptual relativism, made by Davidson and Derrida. These
debates remain of central concern to contemporary theories of knowledge. Nonethe-
less they belong to a preceding generation of scholars; to counter with a more recent
debate, the discussion embarks upon an interlude examining the “science wars” of
the 1990s, via the series of critical analyses developed by Hacking. Returning to
the formative problems of describing shared conceptual schemes, the discussion then
presents recent theorisations by Habermas, Brandom and Gardenfors, in more detail
than was afforded in the literature review. Together the positions outlined by these
authors constitute an overarching theoretical scaffolding upon which a framework can
be erected, rehabilitated from the relativist critiques which beset their precursors. The
resulting view of conceptual cultures, interconnected through predominantly commu-
nicative practices, is not so much “poststructural”—through that epithet is employed
below—as a more elastic and granular form of “structuralism”. The critical result-
ing move is one from “conceptual relativism”—the charge laid, variously, at Kuhn,
Quine and Foucault—to a form of “conceptual perspectivism”, where concepts ori-
ented within a culture do frame the view out onto the objects they observe, but
critically permit a revisionary “kick-back”, both from the objects themselves, and
from the intersubjective communicative sphere of other cultures and agents who also
observe and engage them.
A full critical exposition of any of these authors might constitute a thesis topic in
itself. The apology for the abbreviated treatment offered here is only that these posi-
tions provide useful stepping stones towards the articulation of a theoretical position,
which in turn provides greater specificity and robustness for the specific methods and
dimensions offered in the framework description. The alternative—to do away with
the theoretical artifice altogether—would set the framework adrift, as just another
concocted instrument among others. It is intended that the discussion here offers the
epistemological foundations, then, that orient the subsequent technical and empirical
overlay that the framework and its application in the case studies provide.
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4.1 A World of “Material Intangibles”: Social Struc-
tures, Conceptual Schemes and Cultural Per-
spectives
Casting forward, Chapter 6 of the study presents a historical account of the rise of
knowledge systems. Part of this account describes the flavour of logical positivism, an
intellectual tradition which emphasised rigorous logical analysis and an unwavering
commitment to empirical observation. This line of thought, influential in early half
of the twentieth century, came under increasing critique in the post-war period. The
later Wittgenstein relinquished his early normative analysis (Wittgenstein, 1921) for a
descriptive exploration of language games (Wittgenstein, 1963); Austin suggested new
lines of inquiry for analysing utterances beyond their purely truth-functional semantic
content (Austin, 1998), instigating new dimensions for gauging their practical effect;
and Sellars demonstrated the implied metaphysics which dwelt within the purportedly
pure observational propositions of empiricism (Sellars and Brandom, 1997). From
other angles, Marxian, Saussurean and Freudian-fueled critiques sought to expose the
deep structures which lay beneath the apparent epiphenomena of social, linguistic
and psychological life.
Kuhn, Foucault and Quine represent further, mature “refractions” of the harsh
critical light shone on the presuppositions of the positivists. Kuhn argued that science
moved not due to the irrepressible spontaneity of genius, nor the industriousness of
well-managed institutions, nor, even, the inherent corrective process of Popperian fal-
sifications endemic to scientific practice. Instead, science is a puzzle-solving exercise
conducted, under normal conditions, under a “paradigm”—a set of core theoretical
tenets which laid out the problems normal scientific practice could pursue (Kuhn,
1970). Foucault in turn suggested that the human sciences operated under similar
epistemic structures—“epistemes”—which gave rise to a set of broadly contiguous dis-
cursive practices (Foucault, 1970). These discursive practices both participate within,
and help actively constitute, political structures and techniques. In short, knowledge
is power in a literal sense—it is invariably imbricated in the “political”. Quine, fi-
nally, put forward a variant of the “theoretical underdetermination” thesis—that for
any given set of observational data, more than one theory could be compatible with
it, and therefore a theory would always remain critically underdetermined by its evi-
dence. Prevailing theories instead do so because of the ease of their accommodation
within an encompassing conceptual scheme. Each of these points to structural fea-
ture in the production of knowledge: paradigms change when puzzles can no longer
be solved; epistemic discursive practices operate within a mutually reinforcing syner-
gistic dynamic with power structures; rival scientific theories win out because of their
fortuitous affiliation with peripheral sets of beliefs. Narratives of either the heroic
individual genius—the Darwin or Einstein of their field—or of the efficient manage-
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rial enterprise—of which IBM was an early progenitor—engaging in unencumbered
hypothesis testing are exposed as mythological fictions, or, at best, as radically insuf-
ficient conditions for the production of knowledge.
These kinds of structural accounts of knowledge hold considerable appeal—they
permit analysis to extend beyond the surface presentation of the practices, discourses
and statements which constitute the tangible aspects of knowledge. At the same
time, they are materialist rather than metaphysical, showing how epistemic concep-
tualisations are manifest through these very tangible elements. A paradigm is just
the collection of shared theories, hypotheses, puzzles, problems, experiments and
data which constitute “normal science” at a point in time. An episteme is similarly
only exhibited through the discursive practices which constitute it. A conceptual
scheme is the shared beliefs held by a scientific or knowledge culture, manifest in
both its utterances and practices. Yet these concepts are not mere relinquishable
or interchangeable metaphors. They reference an importantly emergent property of
knowledge, in which the whole is more than the sum of parts. Just as a portrait
is more than the quantities and intensities of colour which compose it, these struc-
tures organise and formalise concepts, relations and properties into crystalline frames
through which objects can be known. They constitute something like the perspective
or world-view through which objects can be observed, inspected, analysed, described
and, ultimately, acted upon. It is this material quality—that these structures allow
their participating agents to reach out, through conceptual frames, to the world—that
differentiates the epistemological bent of scientific and knowledgeable enterprises from
other, purely metaphysical kinds of conjecture.
The next two chapters, then, introduce a vocabulary to capture the characteristics
of this “material intangible” thing which is both part of and more than the knowledge
systems it sits behind. These first structural descriptions, invariably directed towards
sweeping periods of history rather than the micro-cultures which produce particular
knowledge systems, nevertheless pave the way towards the articulation of a framework
for describing this elusive entity.
4.1.1 Kuhnian Paradigms
Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions systematised a thesis which
had previously been only put forward informally in the earlier theories of authors
such as Koyre, Polanyi and Feyerband. The proposition that science proceeds, not
as an accumulation of facts which serve to inductively corroborate some theory—the
classical notion of science—but as a series of paradigms which instead determine what
sorts of facts may be produced, was succinctly and compellingly elaborated here. Since
its publication, it has tremendous influence in the history of science, and arguably,
even greater appeal through the “trickle-down” dissemination of key terms into the
broader cultural lexicon. In the practice of historical and social studies of science, rival
models such as Actor-Network Theory now hold sway. Nevertheless Kuhn’s thesis is a
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pivotal moment in the widespread recognition that the movement of science is marked
not only by quantitative epistemic growth but also, and more foundationally, through
qualitative epistemic shifts. These qualitative shifts are described by two key concepts
which warrant further exploration: paradigms and incommensurability.
Paradigms are, for Kuhn, the epistemological conditions under which the normal
enterprise of science operates. They are the “ways of knowing” which makes possible
the posing and solving of puzzles: “The existence of this strong network of commit-
ments — conceptual, theoretical, instrumental and methodological — is a principle
source of the metaphor that relates normal science to puzzle-solving” (Kuhn, 1970,
p. 42). While practitioners of science exhibit a kind of “know-how” imparted by
a paradigm, this does not necessarily constitute of “knowing-that” the paradigm ex-
ists; paradigms need not be, and only infrequently are, explicit: “Scientists work from
models acquired through education and through subsequent exposure to the literature
often without quite knowing or needing to know what characteristics have given these
models the status of community paradigms” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 46). Paradigms are also
the grounding conditions of the scientific practices they make possible, and cannot
be made explicit as form of rules, statements or axioms: “Paradigms may be prior
to, more binding, and more complete than any set of rules for research that could be
unequivocally abstracted from them” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 46). As Kuhn (2002) notes
elsewhere, paradigms have a very broad extensional definition—seeming to mean a
set of both implied and explicit epistemic commitments; a meta-theoretical ground
upon which more granular theories and experimental practice can be constructed; a
process of socialisation—what scientists do to become scientists; and an historically,
spatially or epistemically bounded field, separated from others before, after or around
it. In fact each of these definitional facets permit further generous extensions in the
application of “paradigm” (or its eventual cognate partner employed here).
On the one hand, following its popular usage there seems little reason to limit the
use of paradigm to scientific forms of knowledge only. Other disciplinary fields—both
academic and industrial—seem to meet some of not all of the qualifying features of
paradigms. Management practices, for instance, operate within broad cultural con-
ceptual models, which seem to undergo more or less radical transitions when they
lose their efficacy for problem solving. Moreover, often the distinction between a
paradigm of rigorous science and, perhaps, a broader paradigm of both the science
and its applications are difficult to distinguish, particularly as science itself frequently
bifurcates into sub-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary fields—ontology matching, in-
troduced in Chapters 1 and 2, is a good example of a self-contained field which
borrows approaches from beyond its computational science borders. Paradigms ap-
plied to clear historical revolutions—the Copernican turn in cosmology, Newton’s
laws of physics, Maxwell’ thermodynamic equations, Darwin’s theory of evolution,
to take some of Kuhn’s examples—show comparatively harsh lines of theoretical de-
marcation, and make a compelling narrative of different ways of seeing and knowing
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experienced through various paradigmatic lens. In the twilight world of less spec-
tacular transitions—but no less revolutionary, for those who go through them—such
lines are more blurry. Knowledge systems constitute ideal candidate expressions of
more fine-grained paradigms, and as the case studies in later chapters show, these
paradigms need considerably more elastic definition.
Similarly, for Kuhn—as for Foucault, further below—paradigms are invariably
expressed in historical terms; paradigms succeed each other. Yet at a more granu-
lar level, different spheres of knowledge frequently coincide, compete, intersect and
merge. Kuhn allows, for example, for a physicist and a chemist to provide differ-
ent definitions of a molecule, based on the different paradigms they operate under
(Kuhn, 1970). However, even this example assumes too rigid a distinction around
an agent’s paradigmatic engagement—as though one can be either a physicist or a
chemist, but not both. Paradigms operating at a useful enough level of granularity
to be applied to knowledge systems need to be the sorts of structures which agents
can belong to severally, and for limited durations—enough to allow self-conscious
and self-reflexive examination of the key commitments belonging to one or another
co-existing paradigms. This is not an arbitrary mandate imposed here, but rather
a feature of the kinds of analysis which take place in the translation of knowledge
systems. System analysts, at least on an implicit, phenomenological level, frequently
operate within a cognitive geometry of rotating paradigms—figuring out how to de-
scribe a concept first one way, then another; how to classify an object one way, and
then another; and so on. Kuhn’s paradigms all but cover these scenarios, but need
to be extended down towards the “micro-paradigmatic” level to be useful here. I
therefore look to carry across the insights of Kuhn’s definition of “paradigm”, as a
general set of epistemological commitments and practices, into the theoretical dimen-
sions of the framework, while looking to refine it into a concept more applicable to
more fine-grained knowledge structures.
Kuhn also introduces the even more critical term—in the context of the present
study—of “incommensurability”. This term is used in the The Structure of Scientific
Revolutions to describe how rival paradigms hold “incommensurable ways of seeing
the world and of practicing science in it” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 4). As discussed below,
incommensurability is a controversial term. Incommensurable paradigms suggests,
literally, that propositions belonging to one are untranslatable into those of the other.
By extension, these propositions are true or false only within the frame of reference
of the current paradigm. Kuhn first depicts incommensurability in optical rather
than linguistic metaphors. In a key chapter titled “Revolutions as Changes of World
View”, he works carefully to avoid the most obvious accusations of relativism:
Do we, however, really need to describe what separates Galileo from Aris-
totle, or Lavoisier from Priestley, as a transformation of vision? Did
these really see different things when looking at the same sorts of objects?
(Kuhn, 1970, p. 120)
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I am . . . acutely aware of the difficulties created by saying that when Aris-
totle and Galileo looked at swinging stones, the first saw constrained fall,
the second a pendulum. The same difficulties are presented in an even
more fundamental form by the opening sentences of this section: though
the world does not change with a change of paradigm, the scientist after-
ward works in a different world (Kuhn, 1970, p. 121).
Rather than being an interpreter, the scientist who embraces a new paradigm
is like the man wearing inverting lenses (Kuhn, 1970, p. 122).
Kuhn emphasises, over and over, how different paradigms cause scientists literally to
see objects differently. The constellation of concepts which compose a given paradigm
structure the observational work of science. Echoing Sellars’ critique of empiricism in
particular, Kuhn writes:
The operations and measurements that a scientist undertakes in the lab-
oratory are not “the given” of experience but rather “the collected with
difficulty” (Kuhn, 1970, p. 126).
Moreover empirical data is experienced against a paradigmatic backdrop which pro-
vides a pre-existing construct for how the data can be organised and interpreted:
All of this may seem more reasonable if we again remember that neither
scientists nor laymen learn to see the world piecemeal or item by item.
Except when all the conceptual and manipulative categories are prepared
in advance . . . both scientists and laymen sort out whole areas together
from the flux of experience (Kuhn, 1970, p. 128).
As these visual cues suggest, Kuhn wants perspectives to be incommensurable to the
extent that perceived objects are organised in different conceptual configurations and
constellations. In a later postscript (written after, and in response to, Davidson’s
critique discussed below), Kuhn asserts this incommensurability is not merely ter-
minological, and “they cannot be resolved simply by stipulating the definitions of
troublesome terms” (Kuhn, 1970). There is, on the one hand, no immediate language
capable of neutralising these conceptual and perspectival differences:
The claim that two theories are incommensurable is then the claim that
there is no language, neutral or otherwise, into which both theories, con-
ceived as sets of sentences, can be translated without residue or loss (Kuhn,
2002, p. 36).
Yet, on the other, there must be a way out of the solipsistic world of a paradigm.
There is both the direct “stimuli” of experience, and a broader communal culture that
agents under incommensurable paradigms share. This makes possible, not a neutral
language, but translation between two paradigmatically committed languages:
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Briefly put, what the participants in a communication breakdown can do
is recognize each other as members of different language communities and
then become translators (Kuhn, 1970, p. 202).
Translation is then the vehicle which begins the process of persuasion and conversion
to move from one paradigm to another. However, it is frequently insufficient:
To translate a theory or world-view into one’s own language is not to make
it one’s own. For that one must go native, discover that one is thinking and
working in, not simply translating out of, a language that was previously
foreign (Kuhn, 1970, p. 204) [my emphasis].
Paradigms are more, then, than use of a language—they are ways of knowing, “think-
ing and working”. Until scientists are thinking and acting as though the world oper-
ates under Einstein’s theory of relativity, they are not operating within the paradigm
of relativity.
It is not clear, however, that these clarifications are adequate. In spite of Kuhn’s
caveats, the edges or boundaries of paradigms seem immutably hard, and nothing
explains quite how, except by a process of gradual elision, an individual agent’s views
shift to the point of belonging to another paradigm. Yet this introduces the pain
of regress to an infinity of intermediate paradigms along the way, unacceptably di-
luting the concept altogether. One of the steps through this difficulty is to suggest
that paradigm are structures of considerably greater elasticity than Kuhn wants to
allow—that “scientific revolutions” represent simply quantitatively greater shifts than
other, more fine-grained changes in perspectival position. Paradigmatic incommensu-
rability then becomes a question of degree rather than kind—a measure of “semantic
heterogeneity” rather than a quality of conceptual structures.
4.1.2 Foucauldian Epistemes
Foucault’s notion of episteme is more difficult to trace and delineate than Kuhnian
paradigms. As Hacking (2002) notes, Foucault rarely lays out explicit definitions
of concepts, nor holds on to them for long. In one of his more programmatic dec-
larations, The Order of Things introduces epistemes indirectly as a means for de-
scribing epistemological affinities between different strands of intellectual production.
To characterise the sense of the modern episteme, Foucault describes the rise of the
classificatory disciplines—biology, economics and grammar—in the late eighteenth
century:
We have now advanced a long way beyond the historical event we were
concerned with situating—a long way beyond the chronological edges of
the rift that divides in depth the episteme of the Western world, and
isolates for us the beginning of a certain modern manner of knowing em-
piricities. This is because the thought that is contemporaneous with us,
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and with which, willy-nilly, we think, is still largely dominated by the
impossibility, brought to light towards the end of the eighteenth century,
of basing syntheses in the space of representation, and by the correlative
obligations—simultaneous but immediately divided against itself—to open
up the transcendental field of subjectivity, and to constitute inversely,
beyond the object, what are for us the “quasi-transcendentals” of Life,
Labour and Language (Foucault, 1970, p. 272).
In this and other descriptions, several qualities of the episteme emerge: it is historical
and, unlike a paradigm, situated across rather than within particular knowledge fields.
Here, an episteme appears resolutely structural—a broad, temporal swathe of beliefs
and practices which constitute both our subjectivity and our concepts. For Foucault,
as for Kuhn, these structures affect both ways of seeing and speaking.
What came surreptitiously into being between the age of the theatre and
that of the catalogue was not the desire for knowledge, but a new way of
connecting things both to the eye and to discourse. A new way of making
history (Foucault, 1970, p. 143).
Later, in the more programmatic text of The Archaeology of Knowledge, Foucault
explicitly defines an episteme:
The analysis of discursive formations, of positivities, and knowledge in
their relations with epistemological figures and with the sciences is what
has been called, to distinguish it from other possible forms of the history
of the sciences, the analysis of the episteme. . . By episteme, we mean, in
fact, the total set of relations that unite, at a given period, the discursive
practices that give rise to epistemological figures, sciences, and possibly
formalised systems (Foucault, 2002, p. 211).
Further on, he elaborates:
The episteme is not a form of knowledge or type of rationality which,
crossing the boundaries of the most varied sciences, manifests the sovereign
unity of a subject, a spirit, or a period; it is the totality of relations that can
be discovered, for a given period, between the sciences when one analyses
them at the level of discursive regularities.
The description of the episteme presents several essential characteris-
tics therefore: it opens up an inexhaustible field and can never be closed;
its aim is not to reconstitute the system of postulates that governs all the
branches of knowledge (connaissance) of a given period, but to cover an
indefinite field of relations. Moreover, the episteme is not a motionless fig-
ure that appeared one day with the mission of effacing all that preceded it:
it is a constantly moving set of articulations, shifts, and coincidences that
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are established, only to give rise to others. As a set of relations between
sciences, epistemological figures, positivities, and discursive practices, the
episteme makes it possible to grasp the set of constraints and limitations
which, at a given moment, are imposed on discourse. . . (Foucault, 2002, p.
211).
In this later explication, the structural features of an episteme appear looser, more
elastic. Moreover, an episteme is less directed towards the conceptual, and more
towards the discursive properties of knowledge formation. An episteme here seems
disembodied of the “us” which figured heavily in the description above. Rather it op-
erates as a sort of content-less grid, a network of rules which permits certain kinds of
discourse to emerge and be treated as “science” or “knowledge”. Naturally there re-
main human agents in the background, enacting discursive practices, reading, writing
and interpreting. However, these are extraneous to the construction of an episteme—
what matters are the discursive “relations”, “rules” and “regularities”. These in turn
stand in various relationships to other kinds of non-discursive practices, particularly
those employed in the administration of power. For Foucault, clinics, asylums and
prisons are the sites par excellence, where power-driven practices, both discursive and
otherwise, intersect—and where an analysis of these practices might lead to their re-
vision or erosion. Since “science”, as a privileged form of epistemic practice, invests
particular statements with a peculiar vindicating force for the exercise of power, mak-
ing explicit the conditions that particularise and legitimate them also exposes them
to critique:
In the enigma of scientific discourse, what the analysis of the episteme
questions is not its right to be a science, but the fact that it exists (Fou-
cault, 2002, p. 212).
Elsewhere in interviews Foucault has also emphasised the constraining character of
an episteme:
If you like, I would define the episteme retrospectively as the strategic
apparatus which permits of separating out from among all the statements
which are possible those that will be acceptable within, I won’t say a
scientific theory, but a field of scientificity, and which it is possible to say
are true or false. The episteme is the “apparatus” which makes possible
the separation, not of the true from the false, but of what may from what
may not be characterised as scientific (Foucault, 1980, p. 197).
In relation to Kuhnian paradigms, then, epistemes clearly have both points of affinity
and divergence. Among the more notable distinctions:
• Epistemes relate discursive practices of a science to other practices—both other
discursive practices of other forms of knowledge, and other, non-discursive social
practices; paradigms remain hermetically sealed structures of a singular science.
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• Epistemes—at least in the more explicit articulation Foucault provides in later
writings—are loose, permeable structures of discursive relations; not the shared
perspectives or world-views which constitute paradigms.
• Epistemes are framed as “rules” and “regularities” discerned by an observer—
the “archaeologist” of knowledge; paradigms are, while still unconscious to the
practitioners of science, much closer to the surface, and at least partially de-
scribable by those practitioners.
• Epistemes function to make possible and legitimate certain kinds of statements
within a broader nexus of power; paradigms function specifically for “normal
science” to solve puzzles—only indirectly, and coincidentally, do they engage
with discourse.
There are, however, features common to both paradigms and epistemes: they are
largely unconscious for those who engage them, and require particular interpretive
tools or methods to discover them; they are not purely conceptual constructs, but
also are exhibited within social practices (discursive and otherwise); both reflect social
features of a culture or community, rather than an individualistic psychological state
of mind; and both involve some form of “orientation” towards the objects under
description—through orientation must be understood in an active sense, as actively
constituting rather than merely passively observing those objects. These features
carry over to the description of a more fine-grained construct in the framework ahead.
Both also offer the problem of how statements can be translated across epistemic or
paradigmatic boundaries—a theme returned to below.
4.1.3 Quinean Conceptual Schemes
Quine’s notion of conceptual schemes fits within the generously extended family which
also includes Kuhnian paradigms and Foucauldian epistemes. As with epistemes, it is
difficult to get a definitive view as to what a conceptual scheme is. In a late interview
Quine admits:
The only meaning I attached to it is a vague one. Namely, the conceptual
scheme would be the more abstract general structure of one’s overall theory
(Quine, 1992).
Echoing a famous Quinean sentiment, that science is “self-conscious common sense”,
conceptual schemes embrace theories of both scientific and everyday varieties (Quine,
1964). While conceptual schemes might connote a sort of cognitive structure, for
Quine, they are equally “cultural posits”. As theories, ultimately they have an ex-
planatory function:
As an empiricist I continue to think of the conceptual scheme of science
as a tool, ultimately, for predicting future experience in the light of past
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experience . . . For my part I do, qua lay physicist, believe in physical
objects and not Homer’s gods; and I consider it a scientific error to believe
otherwise. But in point of epistemological footing the physical objects and
the gods differ only in degree and not in kind. Both sorts of entities enter
our conception only as cultural posits (Quine, 1980, p. 44).
Conceptual schemes of all sorts are irretrievably bound to a language, for Quine:
“Conceptualization on any considerable scale is inseparable from language” (Quine,
1964, p. 3) He is keen to show that both linguistic translation generally, and the
special kind of conceptual scheme inherent in scientific theory specifically, suffer the
same fate of indeterminacy. For any set of sensory stimuli, there are many more or less
meritorious theories to account for them; analogously, for any source language, there
are many more or less adequate translations into a target language. For Quine, the
idea of a direct “sense-datum language” capable of reporting just the facts is one of the
two infamous “dogmas of empiricism”, which he attributes to the more na¨ıve leanings
of positivism (the other dogma is that there can be a strict separation between analytic
and synthetic statements) (Quine, 1980). Empiricism instead must be rehabituated
to the a priori conceptual structures capable of organising perceptions, or else suffer
a form of circularity: “small wonder that the quest for sense data should be guided
by the same sort of knowledge that prompts it” (Quine, 1964, p. 2).
Unlike the rigid characterisation of paradigms, conceptual schemes admit of ongo-
ing partial and “self-conscious” revision. Scientific discovery differs in degree rather
than kind from other kinds of belief, precisely because it accepts revisionary evidence.
Rather than the relativism of pluralised conceptual schemes, though, Quine thinks it
is possible to be epistemically committed to a set of beliefs when none better present
themselves:
Have we now so far lowered our sights as to settle for a relativistic doctrine
of truth. . . ? Not so. The saving consideration is that we continue to
take seriously our own particular aggregate science, our own particular
world-theory or loose total fabric of quasi-theories, whatever it may be.
Unlike Descartes, we own and use our beliefs of the moment, even in the
midst of philosophizing, until what is vaguely called scientific method we
change them here and there for the better. Within our own total evolving
doctrine, we can judge truth as earnestly and absolutely as can be; subject
to correction, but that goes without saying. (Quine, 1964, pp. 24–5)
The problem of under-determination does not just relate to the relationship of
data to theory—it equally applies to translation of one theory to another. Multiple
viable translations are always possible: “manuals for translating one language into
another can be set up in divergent ways, all compatible with the totality of speech
dispositions, yet incompatible with one another” (Quine, 1980, p. 27). Here it is not
that the languages or theories are untranslatable; rather, they are translatable in many
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different ways. And it is the translations themselves which are incommensurable—
“incompatible”, in Quine’s words—with each other. He emphasises this point with
a lengthy thought experiment—what happens when a linguist is faced with some
unknown language presented by an informant? The preconditions of the experiment
are that there is no interpreter, and the language is not a “kindred” one for the linguist
(i.e. bears no common cognates or derivations). The linguist is presented with a word,
“gavagai”, in the presence of a rabbit. The linguist then employs a steady process
of elimination, with the aim of deriving the translation “gavagai = rabbit”. One of
the eventually excluded possibilities is that of equivalence based on stimulus meaning,
the sense derived from pure experience of the rabbit-phenomenon: perhaps the word
“gavagai” relates to this perception and not the actual animal? (Quine, 1964, pp. 31-
5) Another is that of occasion sentences, which refer to a particular circumstance of
perceiving the rabbit—is the perceiver in a state of “gavagai”, then, upon remarking
of the rabbit? Or is the rabbit instead in a particular state indicated by “gavagai”,
for example, that of being in position to be shot? (Quine, 1964, pp. 35–41) Yet
another possibility is that of observational sentences: does “gavagai” relate instead
to the phenomenological happening of an observation of a rabbit? (Quine, 1964, pp.
41–6) Even after these possibilities are systematically eliminated under controlled
circumstances, there is no guarantee of synonymity: “Who knows but what the objects
to which this term applies are not rabbits after all, but mere stages, or brief temporal
segments, of rabbits?” (Quine, 1964, pp. 51) Even if the stimulus meaning—the
responses of the informant hearing “gavagai” upon sight of the rabbit—is consistent
with the linguist’s interpretation of the word “rabbit”, Quine argues that the extra-
stimuli requirements for understanding the use of a term differ radically: “the whole
apparatus [for using a term] are interdependent, and the very notion of term is as
provincial to our culture as are those associated devices . . . Occasion sentences and
stimulus meaning are general coin; terms and reference are local to our conceptual
scheme” (Quine, 1964, p. 53). There is ultimately no recourse to sense data or an
ideal language for devising a singular mapping between sentences or theory-fragments:
Sentences translatable outright, translatable by independent evidence of
stimulatory occasions, are sparse and must woefully under-determine the
analytical hypotheses on which the translation of all further sentences
depends . . . There can be no doubt that rival systems of analytical hy-
potheses can fit the totality of speech behaviour to perfection, and can fit
the totality of dispositions to speech behaviour as well, and still specify
mutually incompatible translations of countless sentences insusceptible of
independent control. (Quine, 1980, p. 72)
As noted earlier, conceptual schemes seem broadly contiguous with other struc-
tural notions of paradigms and epistemes. Quine’s critique of positivism is derived
from a logical rather than historical analysis, and consequently specific kinds of his-
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torical and cultural “posits” are argued for analytically rather than demonstrated
through cases. Consequently their definition is considerably abstract; nevertheless
some concrete characteristics can be identified:
• Conceptual schemes are in the first instance cultural rather than cognitive en-
tities;
• Conceptual schemes are elastic, and capable of endless revision;
• More than one conceptual scheme can arise to account for the phenomena being
described;
• There can also be more than one translation between two conceptual schemes.
There are several implications of Quine’s analysis for the treatment of knowledge
systems: firstly, it admits the possibility both of multiple, equally valid knowledge
systems in a given domain, and also, of multiple ways of aligning or matching these
systems. Secondly, such systems do not describe the “sense data”, or objects belonging
to a domain, neutrally, but bring to bear the background cultural “posits” inherited
by their authors. Thirdly, these “posits” invariably undergo revision—hence schemes
should not be seen in rigid terms like the systems themselves, but a flexible networks
which “cohere” into reified form in systems. Hence uncovering background concepts
is necessarily a more heuristic and interpretive exercise.
These three accounts—Kuhnian paradigms, Foucauldian epistemes and Quinean con-
ceptual schemes—are now “classic” structural treatments of knowledge systems in
the broad sense, and deserve detailed coverage. The theoretical underpinnings of the
framework developed in Chapter 5 build on these treatments, but rely on more recent
work of Habermas, Brandom and Gardenfors, which adds both greater descriptive
precision about what schemes are, and causal suggestiveness for how it is that multi-
ple schemes arise. In the meantime, the specifically structural character of conceptual
schemes and its analogues was to receive significant critical attention in the 1970s;
two of these critical lines are reviewed in the next section.
4.2 De-structuring Critiques: Struggling with Sys-
tems, Structures and Schemes
What has been described as the “structural” tendencies in Kuhn, Foucault and Quine
is more by way of general shared analogical traits than any strong identifying ideolog-
ical tenets. Only Foucault could be tentatively affiliated with the intellectual move-
ment known as “structuralism”—and was, in any case, progressively characterised as
a post-structuralist in his later work. Nevertheless, as the discussion above shows,
there are common threads between these authors, and indeed others of the same pe-
riod. These in turn were to come under critical fire from various directions. The
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critiques by Davidson and Derrida are notable both from the prominence of their
respective authors, and for the “anti-schematic” and “post-structural” movements to
which they gave rise in various strains of linguistics, cultural studies and philosophy
of language. The general outline of these critiques is traced in the next two sections.
4.2.1 “On the Very Idea”. . .
Davidson (2006) explicitly responds to the positions espoused by Kuhn and Quine,
suggesting they represent various forms of conceptual relativism. Bracketing Whorfian
languages and Kuhnian paradigms under the general heading of Quinean “conceptual
schemes”, Davidson offers a basic outline of the conceptual relativist’s position:
Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they
are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they
are points of view from which individuals, cultures, or periods survey the
passing scene. There may be no translating from one scheme to another,
in which case the beliefs, desires, hopes, and bits of knowledge that char-
acterize one person have no true counterparts for the subscriber to another
scheme. Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one
system may not in another (Davidson, 2006, p. 186).
The inherent paradox involved in such as position is that explaining how concep-
tual schemes differ presupposes an underlying common language—and corresponding
conceptual scheme. The act of description shows how the terms of both schemes can
be mapped onto a higher level set of terms, the language of the description itself:
“Different points of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate sys-
tem on which to plot them; yet the existence of a common system belies the claim of
dramatic incomparability” (Davidson, 2006, p. 197).
Davidson distinguishes between two “failures of translatability”— complete and
partial (Davidson, 2006, p. 198). Complete untranslatability means no substantial
translation between two languages; partial means some sentences can be translated,
some cannot. In going after complete untranslatability, Davidson further distinguishes
between the following two scenarios: the first, where speakers talk about different
worlds using the same language; the second, where speakers talk about the same
world using different languages. The first case makes the mistake of exercising one
of Quine’s dogmas of empiricism, relying upon the distinction between analytic and
synthetic truths. The second case, Davidson argues, commits an analogous though
different sin of relying upon a distinction between “scheme” and “content”. This so-
called “third dogma”—extending the two Quinean dogmas discussed above—is one
which Quine himself is guilty of, as are Kuhn and other purveyors of conceptual
relativism.
Davidson proceeds to argue that this dogma assumes conceptual schemes are seen
as either “organizing” or “fitting in” with some “content”—in turn, such content is
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either “reality” or “experience”. Taken actively, schemes must organize pluralities of
worldly or experiential content. But such pluralities must, for Davidson, consist of
observable “individualities”, which in the final resort can be shown and demonstrated
to other linguistic speakers, even when languages differ. In such cases, “a language
that organizes such entities must be a language very like our own” (Davidson, 2006,
p. 203). Taken passively, schemes must generate true statements of the content they
purport to represent: “the point is that for a theory to fit or face up to the totality of
possible sensory evidence is for that theory to be true” (Davidson, 2006, p. 204). For
the thesis of complete untranslatability, it must be possible for two schemes both to
be “largely true but untranslatable”(Davidson, 2006, p. 205). Davidson then invokes
Tarski’s Convention T to demonstrate that on “our best intuition as to how the
concept of truth is used”, translation is in fact an “essential notion”:
. . . according to Tarski’s Convention T, a satisfactory theory of truth for
a language L must entail, for every sentence s of L, a theorem of the form
“s is true if and only if p” where “s is replaced by a description of s and
“p” by s itself if L is English, and by a translation of s into English if L
is not English (Davidson, 2006, p. 205).
Understanding that a sentence is true in another language involves being able to
translate that sentence, or a description of it, into a native language. Consequently,
a theory of schemes which are mutually and completely untranslatable (or incom-
mensurable), yet which together contain large sets of true sentences must lapse into
incoherence.
The case for partial untranslatability (or incommensurability) rests upon this first
result. Davidson invokes what he terms a “principle of charity”—we understand
speakers of other languages (and scientific theories or conceptual schemes) by “know-
ing or assuming a great deal about the speaker’s beliefs” (Davidson, 2006, p. 207).
Accordingly, “we make maximum sense of the words and thoughts of others when
we interpret in a way which optimizes agreement (this includes room, as we said,
for explicable error, i.e. differences of opinion)” (Davidson, 2006, p. 207). On this
view, substantial agreement needs to precede even the possibility of disagreement;
rival conceptual schemes are deflated for local “differences of opinion”. Less otiose,
for Davidson partial untranslatability is nonetheless equally incoherent, and as a final
consequence, the third dogma of empiricism—that of scheme and reality—can at this
point be happily dispensed with: “In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we
do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects
whose antics make our sentences and opinions true or false” (Davidson, 2006, p. 208).
4.2.2 The Incommensurability of Madness
Derrida’s early critique of Foucault, written in 1963, is lengthy and complex, pivoting
in part on a close reading and interpretation of Descartes, and of Foucault’s reading
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of Descartes (Derrida, 2001). In broad terms it mirrors the broad structure of the
critique Davidson levies at Kuhn and Quine; it is also worth noting that this critique
is directed towards an early variant of Foucault’s “structuralist” thought, which is
revised heavily by the time of the works cited above. Rather than follow the argument
in depth, I extract some salient lines of critique to demonstrate the analogy with
Davidson; points which also go to the heart of the structuralist program.
In Madness and Civilization, (Foucault, 1965) attempts to mark an epistemic
break in the eighteenth century in the dialogue between Reason and Madness. During
the Middle Ages and the Renaissance, Foucault argues, madness could be publicly
paraded—both literally and discursively, through the texts of Rabelais, Shakespeare
and Cervantes. The Enlightenment marks the breakdown of this dialogue into two
separate monologues; or rather, as madness became increasingly silenced through the
general institutionalisation of rationality and the specific institutions of psychiatry,
into the monologue of Reason and the silence of Madness. Foucault’s project is to
provide a history of that silence, to be the voice through which, retrospectively and
belatedly, Madness can once again speak. Transposed to more convenient vocabulary,
Reason and Madness are historically incommensurable, riven apart by the rationalist
episteme since the Enlightenment.
Derrida’s overt object of criticism is whether this project is possible and coherent—
or whether, rather, in attempting to liberate Madness from its Enlightenment con-
straints, Foucault merely repeats the constraining gestures of Reason:
Would not the archaeology of silence by the most efficacious and subtle
restoration, the repetition, in the most irreducibly ambiguous meaning of
the word, of the act perpetrated against madness—and be so at the very
moment when this act is denounced? (Derrida, 2001, p. 41)
And later:
Thus, not an expediency, but a different and more ambitious design, one
that should lead to a praise of reason . . . but this time of a reason more
profound than that which opposes and determines itself in a historically
determined conflict [with madness] (Derrida, 2001, p. 51).
More obliquely, Derrida also critiques the historical structures Foucault erects, to
describe the broad epistemic transitions from a dialogical—if strained—relationship
between Reason and Madness towards an exclusionary one marked by the advent
of the Enlightenment. At one point Derrida directs attention to the apparent ar-
bitrariness with which Foucault cites Descartes as an exemplar of a new, emerging
and ominously silencing attitude towards Madness, precisely as Reason is receiving
its definitive articulation: “It is an example as sample, and not as model” (Derrida,
2001, p. 51). What epistemic status, then, does this “sample” have in a history of
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madness? Its representativeness of Enlightenment constructions of madness, at least,
is for Derrida highly questionable.
Later, describing Foucault’s project, Derrida writes:
But I wonder whether, when one is concerned with history (and Foucault
wants to write a history), a strict structuralism is possible, and, especially,
whether, if only for the sake of order and within the order of its own
descriptions, such a study can avoid all etiological questions . . . (Derrida,
2001, p. 52)
Derrida wants to ask what relationship a singular passage from Descartes—later
to be analysed in considerable depth—has to the broad historical structure Foucault
seeks to account for: “Is this ‘act of force’ described in the dimension of theoretical
knowledge and metaphysics [that of Descartes’ Meditations], a symptom, a cause, a
language?” (Derrida, 2001, p. 53) If an example does not function as either cause or
effect, but simply count as a kind of suggestive evidence of the existence of a struc-
ture, what motivates its selection—and not others, in particular potential counter-
examples? Although at some remove from Davidson’s line of argument, there is a
common concern with the relationship of the “totality” of the structure to its parts—
“individualities” for Davidson, the unspecified “exemplarity” of Descartes for Derrida.
A lack of methodological specificity regarding the role of exemplary parts is met by
an equivalent concern voiced earlier: that different historical periods have complex,
shifting and overlapping trajectories regarding the conceptual delineations they make.
Consequently it is difficult to voice the history of a notion—“Madness”—which itself
has undergone considerable transformation over time:
Foucault, in rejecting the psychiatric or philosophical material that has
always emprisoned the mad, winds up employing—inevitably—a popu-
lar and equivocal notion of madness, taken from an unverifiable source
(Derrida, 2001, p. 49).
Just as, for Davidson, the attempt to separate content and scheme collapses—
and along with it, the problem of schematic incommensurability—so, for Derrida,
the various cases of conceptual and historical structures—between, respectively, the
concepts of Madness and History, and medieval and classical periods of treatment of
madness—are compromised. On the one hand the conceptual, structural opposition
between Reason and Madness is shown to be more complicated—that trying to speak
the history of a singularised entity called “Madness” risks objectifying it as an object
of an historicising and alienating Reason all over again. On the other hand, the
historical “structures” in which these concepts figure are shown to be less stable, and
less demonstrable by way of exemplary cases, than Foucault’s clear delineations might
suggest.
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4.2.3 Resurrecting Structures
Davidson and Derrida’s critiques are of the more strenuous variety directed towards
the implied relativist tendencies in any talk of conceptual structure, in either abstract
or concrete historical terms. It seems anachronistic, then, to commit to untranslatable
“ontological” entities such as paradigms, epistemes and schemes. Yet, as discussed
below, geometric metaphorisations of cultural and cognitive structure continue to
emerge in more recent theories. One way of avoiding the types of traps Davidson and
Derrida might lay out for prospective structuralist tendencies of this sort would be to
suggest such theories adopt the kinds of tempering characteristics at least implied in
Foucault and Quine—to suggest that conceptual schemes are elastic, supple sorts of
historical and cultural objects, without clear and rigid boundaries or demarcations.
As if to help avoid this impasse, at one stage Davidson makes a crucial elision—
caricaturing the relativist’s position, he notes: “the test of [schematic] difference
remains failure or difficulty of translation” (Davidson, 2006, p. 202) [my emphasis].
While Kuhn stress complete untranslatability, Quine in particular wants to acknowl-
edge that translation is a rough-and-ready, more or less inexact and partial process,
where “difficulty” need not necessarily elide into “failure”. This arguably accords
well with everyday intuitions about translation, even between the “micro-languages”
of various organisational and cultural settings, as well as, more concretely, between
the various orientations adopted within knowledge systems. And it ought to be possi-
ble to continue to think “schematically”—that is, retaining the language of conceptual
schemes and structures—just so long as those schemes are treated in a suitable elastic
sense. The question of commensurability can then be posed in many-valued degrees
rather than two-valued kind—as a question of “how” rather than “whether” two
schemes are commensurable. Moreover, schemes can be happily re-adopted having
been denuded of any palpable and reified ontological form—and instead be treated as
convenient bundles of particular concepts, beliefs, statements and practices of some
more or less aligned group of actors. Schemes and structures, in a rehabilitated and
analytical rather than ontological form, can serve a practical purpose in describing
both the tacit and explicit statements of systems, and the notion of commensurabil-
ity can further serve a derivatively useful function as a measure of the “difficulty”
translating one set of schematic commitments into another.
4.3 Interlude: Constructions of Science
In The Social Construction of What?, Hacking provides a contemporary review on
the kinds of positions reflected in the discussions above (Hacking, 1999). He reviews
not only the by-now “classic” articulations of what has become known as “social
constructionism”—through the work of Kuhn, Foucault and others—but also a series
of more recent exchanges which took place over the course of the 1990s, in the course of
the so-called “Science Wars”. The Sokal hoax, in which a fictitious article, hyperbol-
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ically overblown with postmodern cliches, was published in a literary theory journal,
supplied the catalytic impetus for the debate which followed. Hacking, in his account,
is less interested in accounting for the specifics of the exchange, than in endeavouring
to reconfigure the crudely bifurcated divide of “realist” and “constructionist” camps
into a more finely discriminated constellation of positions.
The purpose of covering Hacking’s analysis here is to demonstrate both the ongoing
resonance of the theoretical issues canvassed so far, and to suggest some ways that
the proposed framework can sidestep at least the more na¨ıve excesses of relativism,
if not several other related species of nominalism and constructivism. One of the
risks of applying the sorts of terms adopted in this study is that it itself can be
relativised to a particular cultural conceptual scheme—one which effectively mitigates
its putative claims towards truth or, less ambitiously, towards usefulness. By sifting
through the distinctions Hacking raises, the argument can escape with a lesser charge
of “conceptual perspectivism”; a viewpoint which holds that correspondence theories
of truth are usefully augmented, rather than replaced by, coherentist and consensual
notions. As a consequence the theoretical underpinnings of the study would then
be exonerated of the more exacting crimes of relativism and incoherence to which
Davidson and others have charged some of the foundational structuralist claims laid
out above.
Hacking begins by connecting the brand of conceptual relativism and social con-
structionism held by Kuhn, Foucault and others to an older philosophical position of
nominalism:
Constructionists tend to maintain that classifications are not determined
by how the world is, but are convenient ways in which to represent it.
They maintain that the world does not come quietly wrapped up in facts.
Facts are the consequences of ways in which we represent the world. The
constructionist vision here is splendidly old-fashioned. It is a species of
nominalism. It is countered by a strong sense that the world has an
inherent structure that we discover (Hacking, 1999, p. 33).
Hacking wants to show that exploded out of epithetic form, “realist” and “con-
structivist” positions need not entail mutually exclusive propositions. He argues that
while the natural sciences can be considered as describing reality compellingly, in
ways which mesh with our practical efforts to orient ourselves to the world, a degree
of social construction is frequently entailed as well. Aspects of the opposition degen-
erate into a “two-sides-of-the-same-coin”-type of argument: : for Hacking, rather, a
scientific theory can both be the best account of naturalistic phenomena we have—it
can even be “real”, “as real as anything we know” (Hacking, 1999)—and yet equally
belong to a given historical episteme or paradigm, exist in a given conceptual scheme,
and be socially constructed as much as any cultural or social—that is, as any iden-
tifiably unnatural—thing might be. This account explicates what is implicit in the
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theoretical overlays of Kuhn and Foucault in particular, and suggests they hold a
more complicated relationship between “scheme” and “reality” than the charge of
na¨ıve, full-blown relativism often laid against them would indicate 1.
Hacking is keen to pursue a demarcation of these positions in more fine-grained
terms, however. In circumscribing the field of positions identifiably constructionist,
Hacking sets up a simple analytic schema of three independent variables: a theory is
constructionist if it rates highly on scales of contingency, nominalism, and external
explanations of stability. For the adamant constructionist, scientific “truths” are
quintessentially contingent ones:
The constructionist maintains a contingency thesis. In the case of physics,
(a) physics (theoretical, experimental, material) could have developed in,
for example, a nonquarky way, and, by the detailed standards that would
have evolved with this alternative physics, could have been as successful
as recent physics has been by its detailed standards. (Hacking, 1999, pp.
78–9)
The opposite side of this coin is inevitability—the idea of regardless who invented,
discovered, studied or funded what, “if successful physics took place, then it would
inevitably have happened in something like our way” (Hacking, 1999, p. 79). The
inevitabilist position would claim that even some alien species, following a separate
historical, linguistic and cultural path, and having embarked upon a project to dis-
cover physical laws, must necessarily have derived something like our physics; if this
is the case, no amount of cultural deviation and contingency as to the superficiality of
discovery change the substantive content of the discovery. Hacking cites “Maxwell’s
Equations, the Second Law of Thermodynamics, the velocity of light” (Hacking, 1999,
p. 79) as particularly unshakeable discoveries. He then suggests that the position of
the inevitabilists, unlike those of the discoveries themselves, is “not derived by in-
ference from experience” but rather is prompted by “a sensibility that arises in a
great many people in Western civilization who are attracted to scientific styles of
reasoning” (Hacking, 1999, p. 79). As this quote suggests, Hacking’s analysis con-
tains a sense that at heart both contingency and inevitability theses arise from a
culturally-instilled aesthetic sensibility, rather than from rational calculation. On the
inevitabilist side, incompatible views are always trivially so—capable of reconcilia-
tion once the superficial contingencies of disparate lexical and observational items
1Rorty characterises the nature of this kind of critique in Pragmatism, Relativism, Irrationalism:
“ ‘Relativism’ is the view that every belief on a certain topic, or perhaps about any topic, is as
good as every other. No-one holds this view. Except for the occasional cooperative freshman, one
cannot find anybody who says that two incompatible opinions on an important topic are equally
good. The philosophers who get called “relativists” are those who say that the grounds for choosing
between such opinions are less algorithmic than had been thought” (Rorty, 1982, p. 166). Rorty
is here keen to separate pragmatism from the stigmatism of relativism and irrationalism. Hacking
is here, I would suggest, broadly sympathetic with the kind of pragmatism Rorty advances; as the
following sections suggest, Brandom forms an important stalwart for the pragmatically-inflected
framework for comparing knowledge systems.
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have been worked through by holders of those views. A believer in epistemic contin-
gency permits of radically different conceptual organisations, though how this might
be so would be difficult to determine in advance: “Moreover—and this is something
badly in need of clarification—the ‘different’ physics would not have been equivalent
to present physics. Not logically incompatible with, just different” (Hacking, 1999, p.
72).
Nominalism, the second variable Hacking introduces, is also is best understood
against its more familiar opposite, which supposes that reality has an inherent struc-
ture waiting to be discovered:
Even if we have not got things right, it is at least possible that the world
is so structured. The whole point of inquiry is to find out about the world.
The facts are there, arranged as they are, no matter how we describe them.
To think otherwise is not to respect the universe but to suffer from hubris
. . . (Hacking, 1999, p. 83)
Nominalism makes the opposite claim: “the world is so autonomous, so much to
itself, that it does not even have what we call structure in itself” (Hacking, 1999,
p. 72). Nominalists share, Hacking argues, Kant’s distinction between phenomena
and noumena—the world in itself is unknowable. “We make our puny representa-
tions of this world, but all the structure of which we can conceive lies within our
representations” (Hacking, 1999, p. 72). Words pick out groups of objects based
upon what appear to be their common properties. Science, as Quine would put it,
“is self-conscious common sense” (Quine, 1980, p. 3)—in light of an ever-growing
body of empirical evidence, new words are coined both to identify and differentiate
that evidence. Concepts thus coined are related into structures which appear to lay
bare the hidden organisations of things—but for a nominalist, these structures are
not lasting reflections of the nature they mirror, they are pragmatic tools to convey
a particular understanding, to achieve a given outcome. The indeterminacy of those
structures—that they could be otherwise—does not necessitate perpetual and crip-
pling doubt on behalf of the nominalist, however, unlike the caricature which would
claim “no one is a social constructionist at 30,000 feet”(Hacking, 1999, p. 67)2. There
is no inconsistency in holding that a given arrangement of concepts allows for con-
siderable practical feats of engineering, for example, while questioning whether that
arrangement is the only one given to adequate concordance with nature.
The final variable Hacking introduces concerns explanations of scientific stability.
The constructionist position here is that science is alternatively stable or volatile at
times depending at least in part upon the social context in which they operate. For
Hacking, the highly fluctuating states of the natural sciences in the early and middle
parts of the twentieth century account for a view of science as volatile and erratic—
Kuhn, Feyerabend, Popper and others were responding to unusual periods of both
2Both Hacking and Pinker (Pinker, 1995) quote Richard Dawkins making this claim.
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scientific and political activity and turmoil, and consequently found discontinuities,
anarchism and dialectic everywhere in what had previously been presupposed as a
stable and cumulative exercise. The challenge now for sociologists and historians of
science, states Hacking, is “to understand stability” (Hacking, 1999, p. 85), given
recent decades have tended to reaffirm the glacial rather the volcanic terrain of sci-
entific knowledge. This stability also plays into the hands of those who would like to
affirm the “ ‘objective nature of scientific knowledge [which] has been denied by Ross
. . . Latour . . . Rorty and . . . Kuhn, but is taken for granted by most natural scientists’ ”
(Hacking, 1999, p. 88) 3. Here “stabilists” tend to corroborate a traditional view of
science as progressionist, accumulative and rational; “revolutionaries” of science af-
firm its epistemic and paradigmatic disruptions, generated not by internal discovery
but by irrational external factors. Hacking connects these two trends with another
classical distinction between rationalism and empiricism:
Leibniz thinks that the reasons underlying truths are internal to those
truths, while Locke holds that (our confidence in) truths about the world
is always external, never grounded in more than our experience (Hacking,
1999, p. 91).
Hacking conveys a sense that, as with the previous “variables”, the choice here is
one of temperament: “rationalists, at least retrospectively, can always adduce reasons
that satisfy them. Constructivists, with equal ingenuity, can always find to their own
satisfaction an openness where the upshot of research is settled by something other
than reason” (Hacking, 1999, pp. 91-2). However, there is more at stake than a sim-
ple acknowledgement of the significance of aesthetics in determining positions on the
variable scales Hacking identifies. The provocations of constructivism have an impor-
tant deflationary role in the institutionalising and authoritarian tendencies of modern
science. In other words, Hacking recognises the structural side-effects of Kuhn and
Feyerabend’s critiques (Hacking, 1999)—and elsewhere, those of Foucault also (Hack-
ing, 2002)—which cause science to re-think its ontological foundations and perhaps
accept, in Hacking’s terms, a “kind of objectivity . . . that strives for a multitude of
standpoints” (Hacking, 1999, p. 96).
What can be taken from this analysis for considering the commensurability of
knowledge systems? It has already been emphasised that a simple binary opposition
of “commensurable”/‘incommensurable” is inadequate, and this assessment need to
be treated more as scaled, multi-dimensional constructs. Hacking’s three variables
for describing a more general orientation towards science—contingency, nominalism
and stability—also suggest a similarly scalar rather than binary application. The
variables themselves, moreover, are useful in rating the standpoints of more fine-
grained entities like knowledge systems; accordingly they will be carried over, in less
abstract form, to the presentation of system dimensions in the next chapter. More
3Hacking is here quoting from Steven Weinberg
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generally, Hacking’s analysis goes after what he terms elsewhere “historical ontologies”
(Hacking, 2002)—positions which, though framed in contemporary dialogue, in fact
exhibit historical resonances with earlier articulations, similarly locked into intractable
dialogical structures with their contraries. Tracing such “irresoluble differences” ,
all the better to “emphasize philosophical barriers, real issues on which clear and
honorable thinkers may eternally disagree” (Hacking, 1999, p. 68), is not, for Hacking,
an exercise in intellectual vanity, but serves to exorcise both the implacable grand-
standing and “false positive” of facile reconciliations of various standpoints. There is
an intrinsic sympathy, then, between his analysis here and the downstream exercise
of assessing inter-system commensurability, by allowing differences to be exhumed
in their various cultural refractions, and not to be merely reconciled algorithmically.
The correcting factor in the case of system translation is that such differences are not
presumed to be “irresoluble” in anything like an ontological sense—this judgement,
too, is one contingent on the conditions of particular situational contexts in which
translation takes place.
Finally, Hacking has suggested some ways out of the impasse brought about by
Davidson and Derrida, by replacing conceptual “relativism” with a weaker variant
of “perspectivism”—an acknowledgement that potentially irreconcilable views are or-
ganised within a historical structure of interdependent standpoints, which can in turn
be analysed and made explicit against adroitly selected dimensional criteria. This
insight can be applied no less to fine-grained “systems of knowledge”, in the specific
technical sense referred to here, as to scientific theories and indeed the whole of science
itself. The next section develops this guiding insight through the theories of Haber-
mas, Brandom and Gardenfors, who collectively provide a rehabilitated, elasticised
structural account—covering social, linguistic and cognitive aspects—of conceptual
schemes, which in turn paves the way for the elaboration of the framework in the
next chapter.
4.4 Elastic Structures: Linking the Linguistic, the
Cognitive and the Social
Habermas outlines a complex diagnostic theory of modern society which locates social
pathologies in the rise of instrumental reason since the Enlightenment, and its subse-
quent domination over ethical and aesthetic value spheres Habermas (1987). Within
the historical emergence of secularism and capitalism, this has led to the proliferation
of social systems with competing ends—in the context of my argument, this prolif-
eration spreads down to the conceptual schemes embedded within the information
systems which aid in the procedural means needed to meet such ends, and is thus a
major causative factor for creating conditions of incommensurability. Brandom of-
fers an exacting analysis of language, which builds upon the insights of analytic and
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pragmatist twentieth century philosophy. He outlines a fine-grained theory of mean-
ing which emphasises the normative, pragmatist, inferentialist and holist character
of language Brandom (1994). For Brandom, this account runs against the general
grain of twentieth century semantics, which he instead suggests offers a psychological,
idealist, representational and atomistic theory of meaning. Gardenfors’ work on con-
ceptual spaces, which uses geometric metaphors to describe cognitive structures, at
first glance seems incongruous against Brandom’s predominantly socialised account
of meaning Gardenfors (2000). Gardenfors, however, carefully reconciles concept use
in individuals with a pragmatist standpoint which leads back out to the social.
These accounts are correctively adjusted to the kinds of critiques laid at the “clas-
sical” structures described above. Gardenfors’ cognitive spaces are pliable and adapt-
able organisations of concepts, not, in this respect at least, dissimilar to Quine’s con-
ceptual schemes; Brandom’s assertional structures are not the unmediated neutral
language of description favoured by positivism, but sorts of trading tokens in a social
“game of asking for and giving reasons”. Habermas’ social structures are unfortunate
side-effects of an overly systematised modernity, but equally capable of interrogation
and revision. These traits were certainly observable in generous readings of Kuhn,
Foucault and Quine—though, as Davidson and Derrida’s readings demonstrate, it is
also possible to view paradigms, epistemes and schemes as overly reified, dogmatised
and fossilised structures which suffer incoherence under scrutiny. The second “tri-
umvirate” of theoretical positions moreover provides a suitable overlay of cognitive,
linguistic and social structures through which conceptualisations can be viewed and
described. For the purpose of establishing a theoretical basis for the framework which
follows, then, Gardenfors provides a thorough-going and empirical theory of concep-
tual schemes which serves to ground the analysis presented here; Brandom develops
the broad over-arching justification for connecting such schemes to the social context
in which they emerge; while Habermas offers a partially causal explanation for the
structural forms of these contexts, giving at least a generalised set of reasons for why
rival, incommensurable conceptual schemes should arise at all in the modern era.
4.4.1 Spatialising Concepts
In Conceptual Spaces, Gardenfors (2000) develops a theory of conceptual representa-
tion in the cognitive science tradition developed by Rosch, Lakoff and others (Rosch,
1975; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Medin, 1989), surveyed in Chapter 2. Gardenfors de-
velops a “conceptual framework”, a constellation of concepts in which “concept” itself
figures prominently. In the first part of the book, Gardenfors presents a framework
comprising:
• Conceptual Spaces—a high level collection of concepts and relations, used for
organising and comparing sensory, memory or imaginative experiences.
• Domains—a clustering of related concepts; Gardenfors (2000) suggests “spa-
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tial”, “colors”, “kinship” and “sounds” are possible concept domains.
• Quality Dimensions—generalised distinctions which determine the kinds of do-
mains concepts belong to, such as “temperature”, “weight”, “height”, “width”
and “depth”. Gardenfors states: “The primary function of the quality dimen-
sions is to represent various ‘qualities’ of objects” (Gardenfors, 2000, p. 6);
more specifically, they can be “used to assign properties to objects and to spec-
ify relations among them” (Gardenfors, 2000, p. 6). Dimensions can be either
phenomenal (relating to direct experience) or scientific (relating to theorisations
of experience); innate or culturally acquired; sensory or abstract.
• Representations—Gardenfors discriminates between three layers of representa-
tion: the symbolic (or linguistic); the sub-conceptual (or connectionist); and
the conceptual, which Gardenfors claims mediates between the other two lay-
ers. Each layer—from sub-conceptual through to symbolic—exhibits increasing
degrees of granularity and abstraction of representation. Gardenfors also notes
the conceptual mediates between the parallel processing of sub-conceptual neu-
ral networks, and serial processing involved in the production and interpretation
of symbolic language.
• Properties—are means “for ‘reifying’ the invariances in our perceptions that
correspond to assigning properties to the perceived objects” (Gardenfors, 2000,
p. 59). They are specialised kinds of concepts which occupy a “region” within
a single domain, delineated within the broader conceptual space by quality
dimensions. A feature of properties defined in this way is that they accord
both with strict and vague or fuzzy borders between properties—objects can
be permitted “degree[s] of membership”, depending upon their proximity to
the centre of the property region. Both classical and prototypical theories of
classification can be accommodated.
• Concepts—General (non-propertied) concepts differ from properties in that they
can belong to multiple domains, and different conceptual features can gain
greater salience in different contexts. Concepts are in a constant process of being
added, edited and deleted within new domain arrangements; consequently, con-
cept meaning is transient. Conceptual similarity comes on the basis of shared
or overlapping domains.
The resulting framework is pragmatic and “instrumentalist”; the “ontological sta-
tus” of conceptual spaces is less relevant than that “we can do things with them”
(Gardenfors, 2000, p. 31). Specifically, the framework ought to have “testable empir-
ical consequences”, and further, to provide a useful knowledge representation model
for “constructing artificial systems” (Gardenfors, 2000, p. 31). One advantage of the
use of geometric metaphors to describe conceptual arrangements is that it is possible
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to calculate approximate quantifications of semantic distance, between both indi-
vidual concepts and concept clusters. However, the mathematisation of conceptual
structures is to be taken as a heuristic rather than deterministic model—for Gar-
denfors, “we constantly learn new concepts and adjust old ones in the light of new
experiences” (Gardenfors, 2000, p. 102). In light of this every-changing configuration
of concepts, any calculation of semantic proximity or distance is likely to be at best
accurate at a point in time, although statistically—across time and users of conceptual
clusters and relations—there may well be computable aggregate tendencies.
The arrangement of concepts and properties within conceptual spaces and domains
depends upon a coordinating principle of similarity :
First, a property is something that objects can have in common. If two
objects both have a particular property, they are similar in some respect
. . . Second, for many properties, there are empirical tests to decide whether
it is present in an object or not. In particular, we can often perceive that
an object has a specific property or not (Gardenfors, 2000, pp. 60–1).
Dimensions form the basis against which similarity is assessed—a single dimension
for properties, multiple dimensions for concepts. Conceptual similarity for Gardenfors
is intrinsically a cognitive and theoretical notion, however, which can consequently
be varied as different dimensional properties are found to be more or less salient:
For example, folk botany may classify plants according to the color or
shape of the flowers and leaves, but after Linnaeus the number of pistils
and stamens became the most important dimensions for botanical catego-
rizations. And these dimensions are perceptually much less salient than
the color or shape domains. Shifts of attention to other domains thus also
involve a shift in overall similarity judgments (Gardenfors, 2000, p. 108).
In the latter part of the book, Gardenfors then shows how his framework can be
applied to traditional problems of semantics, induction and computational knowledge
representation and reasoning (Gardenfors, 2000). In particular he emphasises the re-
lationship of conceptual structures to broader spheres of human action and practice.
In what is an avowedly “pragmatist account”, meaning is put to the service of use
within these spheres—though it is not equivalent to it. Unlike conventional seman-
tics, the kind of “conceptual semantics” Gardenfors espouses works down from social
practice to fine-grained linguistics utterances:
. . . actions are seen as the most basic entities; pragmatics consists of
the rules for linguistic actions; semantics is conventionalized pragmatics
. . . and finally syntax adds markers to help disambiguate when the context
does not suffice (Gardenfors, 2000, p. 185).
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The pragmatist elements of this account fits well with the analysis of language
Brandom undertakes, while the social orientation begins to bring concepts both out
of mind and language and into the intersubjective domain theorised by Habermas—
points of accord succinctly encapsulated in the following quote: “In brief, I claim
that there is no linguistic meaning that cannot be described by cognitive structures
together with sociolinguistic power structures” (Gardenfors, 2000, p. 201). Applied
to knowledge systems, Gardenfors supplies a convenient “first tier” description of the
kind of entity which both includes the explicit conceptualisation of the system itself,
and the tacit commitments which stand behind it. “Conceptual spaces”, standing
here for Quine’s “conceptual schemes”, are mentalist metaphors for describing at
least part of what it is that a knowledge system represents. The remaining sections
add further descriptive tiers upon which the framework of the study can be mounted.
4.4.2 Practicing with Concepts
Brandom develops a contemporary account of linguistic practices grounded in the
pragmatist tradition of Sellars and Rorty. Unlike Rorty, for whom all kinds of linguis-
tic utterance were of equivalent functional significance, Brandom privileges proposi-
tional assertions as “fundamental speech acts”, without which other speech acts—
commands, interrogatives, exclamations—would not be thinkable (Brandom, 2000b).
Assertions are, for Brandom, tokens in a “game of giving and asking for reasons”,
nodal components in a vast articulated web of inferences which constitute discursive
practice. The primary role of assertions is not, as a correspondence theory of truth
would have it, to represent an actual state of affairs, but rather to express, or, in
Brandom’s more canonical expression, to make “explicit what is implicit” (Brandom,
2000b). In a pivotal passage, he continues:
This can be understood in a pragmatist sense of turning something we
can initially only do into something we can say : codifying some sort of
knowing how in the form of a knowing that (Brandom, 2000b, p. 8).
Where Gardenfors’ primary linguistic unit of analysis is the word, for Brandom
it is the sentential structure that provides the key to “knowing that”, to assertion-
making. An atomistic orientation towards concept-use might make it appear that
concepts are accumulated, one after another. For Brandom, contra Davidson, the
scheme necessarily precedes the individuated concept:
One immediate consequence of such an inferential demarcation of the con-
ceptual is that one must have many concepts in order to have any. For
grasping a concept involves mastering the proprieties of inferential moves
that connect it to many other concepts . . . One cannot have just one con-
cept. This holism about concepts contrasts with the atomism that would
result if one identified concepts with differential responsive dispositions
(Brandom, 1994, p. 89).
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Brandom’s implied broad swipe here is directed towards a whole semantically
formalist tradition whose origin he locates in the work of the later Frege (his reading of
early Frege is considerably more commensurate with the inferentialist, expressivist and
pragmatist line Brandom himself adopts). Demonstrating how sentences, and sub-
sentential devices such as anaphora, primarily function to relate concepts within an
inferentialist network of reasons take Brandom much of the 741 pages of his landmark
Making It Explicit (Brandom, 1994). At the heart of Brandom’s enterprise is an
attempt to reconcile the rigour associated with this formalist tradition with a more
appropriate philosophically holistic orientation, which sees assertional speech acts
within a broad tapestry of human action and “social practice” generally. This has
clear resonance with this particular project; although Brandom addresses neither the
question of translation nor of knowledge systems specifically, several inferences can
be drawn from his analysis:
• Knowledge systems utilise formal languages, which for Brandom differ by degree
rather than kind from natural languages. A fundamental feature of a knowl-
edge system remains that of making assertions and “giving reasons”. The very
purpose of employing such systems, with an underlying logical apparatus, is
precisely that of deriving conclusions from a set of axioms using an explicit
chain of reasoning.
• More generally, the systems themselves stand as discursive practices with a
general game between, typically, more course-grained sociological entities than
individual actors—organisations, departments, and other cultural groups.
• The semantically holistic and expressive orientation towards knowledge systems
can direct attention not only towards the existing “knowing-that’ s” asserted
by the systems themselves, but also towards both the background “knowing-
how’ s” and “knowing-that’ s”—the practices and as-yet unexplicated conceptual
commitments—of the cultures responsible for them.
• Finally, translation itself consists of a series of assertions; that concept A is
synonymous with concept B, for example. The act of translation therefore en-
tails its own “circumstances and consequences of application” (to invoke another
Brandom idiom). Recognition of the situational context of the translation di-
rect attention towards just what circumstantial and consequential conditions
impinge upon those assertions.
A further note relates to the specific treatment of structure in Brandom’s work.
The entire practice of making, interpreting and reasoning with assertions stands
within what he terms an “I-thou deontic score-keeping” relation. This, for Bran-
dom, is “the fundamental social structure” (Brandom, 1994). This base structure
operates like a simplified, idealised model, in which two interlocutors are locked into
a game, metaphorically tabulating each others’ reasons offered for actions, practices,
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commitments, beliefs and attitudes. This theoretically endless activity does not yet
offer an account for how some series of disagreements might grow into schemes which
are incommensurable. To explain this—without falling prey again to Davidsonian
lines of critique—requires a shift in registers, from what appears fundamentally a
psychological intersubjective scenario—between two well-intentioned agents—to a so-
ciological one—between two cultures, whose intentions are never quite irreducible to
those of the agents who represent them. To make this shift the next section draws
upon an essential Habermasian distinction, between lifeworld and system, which offers
explanation for how more fundamental rifts in the social tapestry might occur.
4.4.3 Socialising Concepts
Where Gardenfors and Brandom acknowledge the role played by the social sphere
in structuring conceptual arrangements, neither provide an account of what sorts of
structure are germane to this sphere itself, nor what might cause rival conceptualisa-
tions to emerge. Kuhn and Foucault had developed explanatory theories of sorts but,
at least in the case of Kuhn, these theories were limited to a particular domain of the
social—the scientific domain. While no encompassing causal theory might adequately
account for all variations in cultural conceptualisations—or less abstractly, differences
in how cultures see the world—a theory which at least makes perspicuous some com-
mon lines of demarcation would be helpful. Foucault’s later analysis of “micro-power”
goes some way in this direction, yet he consciously abjures any abstract generalisable
theorisation (Foucault, 1980). Bourdieu’s elaboration of “habitus” is similarly useful
at an intra-cultural level (Bourdieu, 1990), but is not directed oriented towards an
explanation of the sorts of inter-cultural differences which might arise, particularly
within the “networked societies” engaged in information system development and use
(Castells, 1996).
Habermas is sometimes taken as being either a theorist of “incommensurabil-
ity” (Latour, 1993) or, at others, its exact opposite: a na¨ıve advocate for an ide-
alised “communicative rationality” directed towards utopian understanding (Flyvb-
jerg, 1998). The interpretation offered here suggests he represents neither of these ex-
tremes, but rather a Kantian rationalism despondent—on the one hand—at the over-
systematisation and objectification of modernity, yet conciliatory—on the other—
towards the potentials of dialogue and communication for redressing this trend. As
with the other theorists encountered here, there is insufficient scope for any kind of
thorough treatment of Habermas’ full theoretical apparatus. Instead I focus attention
on a pivotal conceptual opposition: between system and lifeworld, outlined in The
Theory of Communicative Action (Habermas, 1987).
For Habermas, the Kantian trichotomy of instrumental, ethical and aesthetic ra-
tionality are ontologically primary categories of modernity. These broadly correspond
to objective, inter-subjective and subjective spheres of individual experience. Haber-
mas inherits the critical lines of Weber, Lukacs and the Frankfurt school towards
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post-Enlightenment reason, which has missed its potential to act as a liberating tool.
Instead it has been co-opted within specifically modern configurations and systems of
power and oppressive administration (Horkheimer and Adorno, 2002; Adorno, 2001).
Rationalisation has been operationalised as an instrumental process within all spheres
of human experience—everything has been subjected to systematised logic. Even indi-
vidual subjectivity, what for Kant ought to remain the inviolable sanctuary of private
experience, has been externalised, publicised and rendered transparent to the machi-
nations of modern systems—through, for example, the various concrete vehicles of
the media, the professed wisdoms of popular psychology, the endless commodification
of art, and the cult of celebrity. For Habermas, as for critical theory, this outgrowth
of hyper-rationalisation has a corresponding corrosive and pathological effect on the
“lifeworld”—the phenomenological horizon experienced by individual subjects. Para-
doxically, the domination of a singular form of rationality has also led to a fracturation
and destabilisation of a social world into multiple systems. Such systems—at a macro
levels, these include legal, economic, scientific and political systems—operate accord-
ing to the internal dynamics of their particularist ends, and remain only loosely, if at
all, coordinated within a social whole. Accordingly, conceptual schemes are segregated
in a profound way within the system spheres in which they are engaged. Habermas
describes this development:
At the level of completely differentiated validity spheres, art sheds its cul-
tic background, just as morality and law detach themselves from their
religions and metaphysical backgrounds. With this secularisation of bour-
geois culture, the cultural value spheres separate off sharply from one an-
other and develop according to the standards of the inner logics specific to
the different validity claims . . . In the end, systemic mechanisms suppress
forms of social integration even in those areas where consensus-dependent
coordination of action cannot be replaced, that is, where the symbolic
reproduction of the lifeworld is at stake (Habermas, 1987, p. 196).
However, this historical diversion is not irrevocable within Habermas’ schema; the
very conditions which effect the outgrowth of a particular form of rationalisation can
also serve to corral it within its proper sphere of operation—that of scientific knowl-
edge of the world. Provocations from the subjective sphere of experience, such as
various inflections of Romanticism, are insufficient for this containment and merely
serve to buttress the over-extended reach of systemic reason. Rather it is the inter-
subjective sphere, where human agents engage in communication and dialogue, where
reason can be directed not towards the achievement of specified functional ends, but
towards the formation of social consensus, that functional ends can be re-evaluated
within the context of society as a whole. The derivation of consensus through the
pure consideration of better reasons—a never fully realised process, but nonetheless
operating as a counterfactual ideal—acts as a mediating force between the private
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wants of subjective selves and the oppressive operations of hyper-rational systems
of modernity. For Habermas communication offers the potential to arrest “the un-
coupling of the system and lifeworld” and return from “the threshold at which the
mediatization of the lifeworld turns into its colonization” (Habermas, 1987).
Habermas’ analysis can be seen to supply the missing detail to Brandom’s refer-
ence to the “the social”, which is posited as an “unexplained explainer” in his account.
The connection between Habermas and Brandom is not seamless, as a recent exchange
attests. Despite many points of intersection, they differ precisely over the question
of whether Kantian trichotomy precedes or is instead subject to the role of logic and
inference—Brandom insists, contra Habermas, that specific domains sit downstream
from the primordial experience of “asking for and giving reasons” (Brandom, 2000a).
Broadly, though, Habermas can be seen as having developed an important and en-
compassing explanatory account of how specific schemes can be incommensurable. In
spite of how language appears, even in the work of Brandom, to be an undifferenti-
ated tool for establishing lines of inference between co-operative agents, social systems
have in the course of modernity increasingly operated according to local teleological
programs—programs which, through the operationalisation of specific language games
and jargon, serve to blunt language’s more incisive communicative potentials. Within
the “iron cages” of technocratic institutions, inter-system “interfacing”, using perfunc-
tory rational procedures, has replaced genuine intersubjective dialogue. Within these
differential ends and parametric conditions, unique morphologies of organisational
cultures generate different conceptualisations of common entities. Even conceptuali-
sations which are externalised and globalised—in the form of technology standards,
for example—are typically adopted via rationalising fiat, either via conformance to
de jure fiat or recognition of de facto network externalities—rather than because of
an internally deliberated conclusion brought about by the force of better argument.
Unlike the accounts examined above, it is not a foregone conclusion that the con-
ceptualisations produced within these spheres be radically incommensurable however—
only that it is possible to diagnose the potential causes, along lines of different cultural
ends, procedures and intentions, when they are. Moreover the efficacy of idealised
dialogue, of the kind both Habermas and Brandom are happy to countenance, and to-
wards which actual communication constantly strives, can assuage the rougher edges
of translation in practice. Brought back down to the technical domain of knowledge
systems—and in lieu of any active participation between the cultures responsible for
them—the role of the analyst is to ferret out both the points of differentiation and
the potential conciliatory paths between them. This involves, practically, identifica-
tion of salient dimensions against which such points and paths can be plotted, and
a corresponding process of interrogation of the cultures responsible for the systems
under review.
Habermas, then, does not endorse a romantic yearning for an over-arching meta-
physics, a stable social order or a single governing conceptual scheme. Nor does he
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champion endless devolution into more granular, localised and ultimately untrans-
latable systems of meaning. His aim is rather to recuperate the promise of Kantian
rationality by recalibrating the obsession of modernity with instrumental reason by
emphasing the equivalence of ethical and aesthetic spheres. In practice this allows
systems to proliferate in their respective manifold differences, but never so far as to
negate the potentials of translatability and commensurability completely. Further
consideration of the greater Habermasian project would take this discussion too far
afield; here it suffices to provide a sociological and historical explanation of causative
factors in the incommensurability of conceptual schemes, and thus serves to connect
up Brandom’s pragmatist analysis of linguistic meaning and Gardenfors’ analysis of
conceptual spaces to a broad historical context. Together these connections—linking
up the linguistic, the cognitive and the social—develop an altogether more fluid and
elastic conception of “structure”, one avowedly informed by materialist and prag-
matist concerns, than those advanced by the earlier generation of theorists discussed
above. A path has now been prepared for the description of such a rehabilitated struc-
ture, as it relates more directly to knowledge systems and the cultures responsible for
them.
4.5 Towards a Framework. . .
The early sections of this chapter outlined three broadly commensurate positions
which can be broadly subsumed under the title of “conceptual perspectivism”. Though
Foucault goes much further than Kuhn and Quine, little is articulated in these po-
sitions about why different perspectives take form—just that they do. Accordingly,
these positions are all open to charges of relativism and incoherence, which Davidson
and Derrida lay out powerfully. Hacking moves to outline a more nuanced position in
the context of the recent “science wars” of the 1990s, which demonstrates something of
a dialectal force which motivates the staking out of positions and perspectives within,
at least, the scientific domain. He demonstrates how the traditional debate between
realism and nominalism has been resurrected in these contemporary discussions.
Habermas then supplies a more directed account—historically grounded and ma-
terialist in orientation— for how perspectives emerge and acquire currency through
communicative practices. Brandom supplements this account with a more finely-
tuned analysis of linguistic utterances—paradigmatically, assertions—and how such
utterances operate as more literal tokens within a dialogical game of “giving and
asking for reasons”. Playing the game—requesting and making assertions—offers
language users endless opportunities to revise and correct a holistic conceptual net-
work. Gardenfors, in turn, provides a more granular account still of the kinds of things
which constitute a conceptual scheme—concepts, relations and properties—within an
ostensibly pragmatist framework. Together these theories can be pieced together to
formulate an explanatory device for conceptual schemes which is neither relativising
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nor succumbs to a purely representationalist thesis—“the myth of the given”, in Sel-
lars’ words. In short, it is possible to construct upon these theoretical underpinnings
a framework which embraces correspondence, coherentist and consensual notions of
truth. Or, in other terms, it ought now be possible to describe a framework which
examines conceptual translation in terms of denotation—whether two concepts refer
to the same objective things in the world; connotation—how two concepts stand in re-
lation to other concepts and properties explicitly declared in some conceptual scheme;
and use—or how two concepts are applied by their various users. Moreover there is
flexibility within the framework to lean towards either “realism” or “nominalism”,
since both can be accommodated—with varying degrees of approximation—within




S: But you always need to put things into a context, don’t you? P: I have
never understood what context meant, no. A frame makes a picture look
nicer, it may direct the gaze better, increase the value, but it doesn’t add
anything to the picture. The frame, or the context, is precisely the sum
of factors that make no difference to the data, what is common knowledge
about it. If I were you, I would abstain from frameworks altogether. Just
describe the state of affairs at hand (Latour, 2004, p. 64).
This chapter outlines a model for assessing the commensurability of knowledge sys-
tems, and of the cultures responsible for them. It represents the culmination of the
theoretical development of the idea of commensurability so far. The introduction
outlined the general parameters and questions of the research; the literature review
surveyed in broad brush strokes disciplinary views of semantics, and some of their
points of intersection; the methodology outlined the approach taken towards explor-
ing the research questions, and Chapter 4 worked through several contemporary views
on cultural conceptual schemes, with the aim of developing a theoretical foundation
for the key concepts presented in the framework here.
In constructing a framework for assessing commensurability of ontologies, this
chapter cements these argumentative levels together. It presents, firstly, a specula-
tive theoretical model, derived in large part from the literature review and theoretical
analysis (Chapters 2 and 4 respectively), of what it is that is being investigated in a
commensurability assessment—what sort of entity underpins a formal knowledge sys-
tem. Then the framework itself, designed to profile and explore differences in these
systems, is described. The framework comprises a) a model of an idealised commen-
surability situation, where two systems are to be aligned; b) a series of dimensions for
evaluating the cultures responsible for those systems; c) a quantification of the assess-
ment; and d) a procedure for applying the dimensions and interpreting the results.
Collectively these tools form part of an analyst’s toolkit for evaluating the degree of
fit between two knowledge systems.
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The next four chapters apply the framework in different ways. Chapters 6 to 8
apply the framework in the form of several case studies. These include: a comparative
study of formal knowledge systems themselves, notably the relational database and
the Semantic Web; a review of upper-level or foundational ontologies; an analysis of
a recent controversy over the standardisation of document formats; and the results of
a pilot study of a software implementation of the framework.
5.1 What to Measure—Describing “Ontological Cul-
tures”
The argument has developed to a point that it is possible to put forward a model of the
kinds of conceptual entities which are both explicit in knowledge systems themselves,
and implicit in the practices and beliefs of the people who design and use them. These
“entities” have so far been described through a series of near-cognate, proximally
synonymous terms, ushered in throughout this study to denote both a given system or
arrangement of concepts, and on occasion, also the social environment, and the people
who produce and consume them. Yet none of these terms—perspectives, world-views,
paradigms, epistemes, conceptual schemes or spaces, historical ontologies, lifeworld,
habitus—seems quite adequate for the kinds of entities wanted here. The following
account aims to characterise these entities in descriptive terms, before then offering
a formalised account as a part of the framework further on below. The account may
seem more dogmatic that is intended; just as Minsky notes in a similar framework
endeavour, this account proceeds while “pretending to have a unified, coherent theory”
(Minsky, 1974).
What is envisioned here, then, is an elastic, dynamic, fluid yet interconnected
“structure” shared across members of a group or organisation; neither a subjective,
individual cognitive “lifeworld”, nor a stable, socialised epistemic “system”, but some-
thing at an intermediate and intersubjective level of granularity. “Conceptual scheme”
seems adequate though insufficient, as the sought-after concept must also embrace the
structural conditions and social practices which give rise to such schemes. Stopping at
the conceptual misses out on these elements. A more embracing term is needed, which
directs attention out from subjective cognitive abstractions towards the objective and
intersubjective spheres in which those abstractions are generated, and to which they
correspond.
“Culture” is one possible term; it both signifies a collective group and, more
remotely, connotes a homogenous, self-replicating organism. The term has the advan-
tage of being at the right granular level, since it is elastic and can be stretched and
scaled along several dimensions—it can describe a large or small, short or long-lived,
casually or formally, historically or spatially organised collective of individuals. One
of the functions of the cultures considered here, though, is that they produce very par-
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ticular kinds of artefacts—formal knowledge systems. To describe just those cultures
engaged in the production of knowledge systems particularly, I have added the epithet
“ontological”. Taken literally, an “ontological culture”, then, is something which pro-
duces formal knowledge systems like Semantic Web ontologies—organisations, com-
munities, and other social groups who, as one of their practices, organise slices of the
world into classificatory schemes. More tenuously, “ontological culture” can also be
taken in several other senses too: a culture which, to coin a neologism, ontologises;
actively constituting its world and the beings in it (meaning something similar to
Hacking’s use of the phrase “historical ontology”); or even as a biological “culture”,
which is differentiated from more mundane microbial kinds of culture by being “on-
tological” in the philosophical sense. The conjoined term, as a result, operates as
a weak double pun, implying each of these meanings. Though concisely descriptive,
this term does however strain at convention use; occasionally through the study the
more conventional term of “knowledge cultures” has been preferred—though lack-
ing in specificity the latter term also has an existing resonance in the sociology of
knowledge and science (for instance, (Knorr-Cetina, 1999; Peters and Besley, 2006)).
An “ontological culture” inherits many of the characteristics ordinarily assigned to
cultures generally. The remainder of this section presents a basic narrative, unfolding
a series of terms as it develops a description of “ontological culture”. These terms,
in turn, are formalised into a more coherent model which is employed in the more
technical discussion of the framework further on.
The organic connotation of “culture” implies a certain autonomy—that cultures
are, like Luhmannian systems, first-order sociological, rather than psychological or
biological entities. They are in some sense irreducible to the agents or actors who
comprise them. Actors instead perform semi-deterministic roles in accordance with
the functional goals of a culture, of which there can be many: for example, generat-
ing profits, delivering services, providing welfare and conducting research. A typical
overriding goal is one of self-maintenance—one of the ways it achieves this goal is by
replicating its beliefs and practices. This may happen in a more or less predatory fash-
ion, and in part takes place through communicative practices which have the intended
effect of norming participating agents—of fostering adherence to beliefs and practices.
In a general sense, having goals gives a culture a quality of intentionality—its practices
are directed and goal-oriented, much as those of a biological agent might be. Retain-
ing the organistic analogy, cultures reproduce, evolve, inhabit spaces, communicate
with other cultures, and ultimately expire. While analysable and modelable, this cul-
tural activity is partly stochastic, predictable only within broader, non-deterministic
and probabilistic parameters.
A culture also operates within a general environment—what it sees as its “world”;
or, in Habermasian terms, its “lifeworld” (Lebenswelt). This environment supports
other cultures; cultures can stand in structural relations to one another. Cultures can
even be nested; for instance, when a greater culture harbours an embedded revolu-
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tionary cell. The relationships within and between cultures constitute semi-porous,
permeable networks — sub-cultures, cross-cultures or “hybrid cultures” are all ex-
amples. These structural delineations and permeations can be traced through the
practices enacted within those cultures—canonically, within discursive practices. Dis-
cursive practices produce epistemic artefacts—representations of knowledge—which
reflect the perspectival orientation of the culture towards the objects it encounters—
or engenders—in its world. However, a perspective is not fixed—it reflects a point-
in-time reification of a floating, variable conceptual scheme which coordinates the
production of beliefs within a culture. Other forms of practice, discursive or oth-
erwise, are always “kicking back” against a given perspectival view, which survives
just so long as it can withstand or absorb these challenges. This is particularly the
case in “experimental” cultures such as scientific and, in the narrow sense exploited
here, “ontological” ones—cultures whose a priori rather than by-product function is
the very production of knowledge. A characteristic of such cultures is their own self-
explication of the beliefs and practices they engage in—formalised in rule-governing
theory and rule-governed methodology respectively. This characteristic ensures re-
peatable observations—a kind of perspectival continuity across time, space, and also
other cultural boundaries. Perspectives also, critically, remain one-sided; from any
point of view there is always another, perhaps infinitely many other points of view
available, through other accultured lens. Aspects of objects are both seen and oc-
cluded under a given perspectival lens; belonging to a culture, no matter how highly
self-reflexively critical, means sharing both its insights and its blindnesses (De Man,
1983).
Cultures, then, have conceptual schemes, or in Quine’s other metaphor, a “web
of beliefs”. These beliefs can be described as structured like a network, spanning
from the concrete, synthetic and empirical through to the abstract, analytic and
conceptual—some beliefs are closer to the world than others. Again following Quine’s
breakdown of the synthetic/analytic divide, a belief can be plotted along a scale of
ontological/epistemological : ontological—here in the philosophical sense—to the ex-
tent that it refers to objects in the world; or epistemological, to the extent that it
refers to other beliefs (or their expression in language). A belief is canonically ex-
pressed in a proposition, an assertion of a relationship between concepts, objects and
properties. Together beliefs are mutually supporting, forming in the ideal system a
coherent, consistent and non-contradictory whole. Within the semi-bounded envi-
ronment of a culture, contradictions may nevertheless emerge in discursive practice
between agents. One of the roles of discourse is to establish the grounds upon which
such intersubjective inconsistencies arise, to make assonance out of shared cognitive
dissonance. Collectively, a network or web of beliefs constitutes a perspective—or, to
use other common optical metaphors, an outlook, a point of view, a vantage point, or
an orientation. A perspective, however, is not here a passive lens through which the
world is viewed; rather it actively constitutes, constructs and intends—in the active,
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phenomenological sense of “intending”—how things are viewed and arranged. Actors
partake or subscribe to belief networks to the extent they are imbricated in a culture,
acquire its “habitus”, although this is never (quite) a total imbrication. Through the
roles they play and practices they enact, actors rather develop more or less intensive,
comprehensive and enduring commitments to a set of beliefs. Understanding epis-
temic extent—the degree to which a belief is taken to be knowledge—is an important
part of developing a profile of a culture.
Beliefs are transmitted in language, via what Habermas terms communicative
practices. Communicative practice generally serves to break down what are other-
wise incommensurable divides between cultures, and permit actors to participate in
the “game of giving and asking for reasons”, in Brandom’s phrase. Hence assertoric
utterances are paradigmatic instances of communicative practices—used to proclaim,
query, test, revise, transmit, reconcile, and, in part, maintain cultural boundaries and
integrity. Conveying of beliefs in language, while bearing the risk of a dissenting re-
sponse, is above all an economic decision—it results in less work for belief transmission
than other kinds of practices, of a presumably more coercive kind.
Beliefs form “webs” in a less benign Quinean and more insidiously Foucauldian
sense—as socially norming practices, both discursive and otherwise. It might be
possible in some cases to identify beliefs which are intrinsic and “core” to a culture—
those which motivate practices and subsidise ancillary beliefs, and which constitute
the non-negotiable intransigent elements of a cultural “perspective”. These are likely
to be those which are practically intractable to empirical or communicative challenge,
since their invalidation threatens maintenance of the identity and boundaries of the
prevailing culture. Belief revision is consequently largely a piece-meal affair, at least
within the confines of a given culture, as the “carrying-out” of practices and even
the revision of certain beliefs can only take place while the remainder of the belief
system remains relatively stable. In this model, epistemic revolutions, as opposed to
revisions, are rare.
Yet beliefs, as purely ideational and immaterial constructs, are essentially unknow-
able directly, and only can be inferred via the evidence of a culture’s practices. For
“ontological” cultures—those who produce explicit representations of some slice of the
world they are concerned with—a conceptual scheme can be directly interpreted in
highly regulated ways, via the semantic specifications embedded in those representa-
tions. Such explicit representations cannot, however, be interpreted, purely and unre-
servedly, as the accomplished perspective of the culture which produces them. Rather
they are narrow, restricted and temporarily discrete frames on an ever-changing flux
of objects—or, in another formulation, sense-data “perceivings” which only a poste-
riori congeal into the sorts of things conceptualisable as objects—subject to a con-
tinually changing dynamic process of theorisation and practice. Moreover they are
also products with intended communicative effects. What is made explicit, then—the
arrangement of concepts—needs interpreting not only in terms of its mode of expli-
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cation, but against what remains tacit—a broader background of cultural beliefs and
practices. Unlike the first kind of interpretation, operating directly on the axioms of
a system itself and proceeding along set- or model-theoretic —in other words, strictly
analytical—lines, the second kind is necessarily dependent upon exploratory, heuris-
tic interpretive devices, using suggestive rather than direct forms of evidence. It is
possible, then, to present knowledge systems generated by a culture as, instead of
a stark unmediated delineation, a sort of highly detailed foreground, cast against a
vague, impressionistic yet significant cultural backdrop. The resulting “portrait” of a
culture is then comparable with other depictions—partly in the precise quantitative
sense of two geometric conceptual graphs being compared isomorphically, but also in
the deliberately imprecise sense of two holistic images being comparing impressionis-
tically.
Picking up methodological cues from Gardenfors (2000), to generate a portrait
involves analysing cultures across any number of possible dimensions, some of which
might be especially salient within a particular translation situational context. Gener-
ically, cultures can be described in terms of a number of commonly occurring di-
mensions: size, rate of growth, “core” or foundational beliefs, practices, perspectives,
material and environmental conditions, influence, aggressiveness, health, longevity,
maturity, internal organisational structure, relation to other cultures, organisational
type and purpose (economic, political, legal), and so on. Other, specific variables
relating to the situation in which translation takes place can be used as well. One
possible formalisation of generic variables is described in the set of dimensions out-
lined below. Regardless of exactly which set of variables are selected, and how they
are respectively weighted for saliency, what matters at this stage is that it is possible
to describe, qualitatively and quantitatively, both the explicit conceptualisations and
tacit structures, beliefs and practices which underpin them, as a kind of portrait or
profile. Commensurability of cultures involves, then, a comparison of the quantitative
and qualitative profiles developed in this way. The “tacit” part of a profile is not,
of course, truly silent—they represent aspects of a culture which need hermeneutic
or heuristic interpretation, typically kinds of discursive, textual practices in which
conceptual commitments need to be “drawn out” and inferred. Hence the method-
ological strictures, elaborated in Chapter 3 and repeated in a more applied context
below, about what counts as evidence, and what limits apply to the inferences drawn
from it—this form of interpretation is necessarily suggestive and exploratory, rather
than definitive and explanatory.
5.2 Presenting a Framework for Commensurability
The above characterisation is sufficiently abstract to describe the vague kinds of enti-
ties which reside behind knowledge systems. The remainder of the chapter now makes
a sharp transition from theory to practice; from a theoretical model to a framework
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which might help an analyst in working through practical problems of system transla-
tion. As indicated earlier, treatment of differences in knowledge systems takes place at
least implicitly in several common information technology tasks—system integration,
database design, information retrieval, decision support, resource planning, project
management, and so on. A starting point for the framework is to describe what might
be an idealised translation scenario, to serve as an approximation of the various real-
world situations in which translation takes place. This provides a way of orienting
the question of commensurability from the point of view of an analyst engaged in a
translation process. The formalisation of the model also provides a way of moving
from a qualitative to a quantitative characterisation of commensurability. From here,
several generic dimensions for describing knowledge systems and their underlying cul-
tures are proposed. Picking up on the more detailed discussion of method in Chapter
3, a schematic procedure for applying the dimensions is then discussed. The chapter
is concluded with notes on the interpretation of the commensurability assessment.
It is worth briefly reviewing the motivations for the framework. Referring back
to the introduction, there are broadly two ways of handling differences in knowledge
systems. Computer science approaches focus on how to achieve individual concept
alignment. They typically employ algorithms and external data definitions to match
concepts from different systems. Matches can then be used to develop transformation
rules to convert data from one system to another. These approaches can be broadly
described as forms of semantic atomism—concepts are primary to the schemes con-
taining them. Here by contrast system commensurability is considered in terms of
plausible schematic alignment. This approach is fundamentally reliant upon an in-
terrogation of the cultural character of these systems. Following one of Brandom’s
key distinctions Brandom (2000b), it can be considered a form of semantic holism,
where the overall underlying cultural conceptual scheme is primary with respect to
the individual concepts stipulated within it. Furthermore it can be described as pre-
dominantly interested in the pragmatic character of knowledge systems—what kinds
of use they are put to. The difference in approach, then, is largely one of orientation
and method; semantic holism as advocated here is consistent with algorithmic match-
ing techniques described above, and it can be used as a supplementary heuristic to
these techniques.
5.2.1 Modeling a Commensurability Scenario
Leading on from the preceding description, here a formal model of an idealised com-
mensurability scenario or situation is presented. The scenario is idealised in that it
may not correspond directly with the many actual contexts in which system trans-
lation, integration or alignment takes place, but it ought at any rate to capture key
or exemplary features which enable the model to be generalisable to those contexts.
The model distinguishes between knowledge systems and the “ontological cultures”
responsible for authoring and using them. The model includes concepts explicitly
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defined by the system, as well those tacitly implied by it—background assumptions
not evident in the system itself, but which can be inferred by the translating analyst.
The model describes the differences between “cultures”, in the sense defined above,
against several dimensions. It assumes assessment of commensurability is for the pur-
pose of aligning or harmonising two systems—or scoping out at any rate the work
involved in such a task.
The model supports the idea of partial or gradual commensurability between sys-
tems. In the preceding chapter, the idea of “commensurability” was picked up from
Kuhn’s account of scientific paradigms—there, commensurability is represented in
all-or-nothing terms. I suggested that at face value this goes too far, leading to forms
of linguistic or cognitive relativism, and begging the question of how communica-
tion across cultural or paradigmatic divides could happen at all. Commensurability
then becomes a reified, ontological property of the systems; not, instead—and more
helpfully—an analytic tool for describing their translatability relative to a context. If
commensurability is considered in comparative rather than mutually exclusive terms,
however, the ontological character and associated critique drops away. By extension,
discussion of fine-grained, more-or-less commensurable cultural conceptual schemes
can dispense with the charge of relativism. “Local” schematic incommensurability,
for example, can have reference to “global” commensurability, and a mutually un-
translatable pair of systems might well be translatable when transplanted to another
situational context, with new goals, additional information, different translators and
so on. This also accords with everyday intuition—language users frequently agree
to disagree about their use of individual concepts, for instance, while still sharing
sufficient common ground for these localised disagreements to be understood.
The model assumes the following scenario:
1. There are two formal systems which need to be aligned or harmonised, Sys1
and Sys2, which ought to meet the following conditions1:
• They are based on some more or less explicit formal language, with ap-
propriate syntax and semantics (candidates are the relational model, XML
schema, RDF, OWL).
• In terms of the term-assertion distinction—the systems in question must
include a non-empty set of terms (or concepts), but not necessarily asser-
tions (or objects / individuals).
• The actual process of alignment or harmonisation is performed algorith-
mically, based on a series of transformational rules converting instances of
concepts in Sys1 to instances of concepts in Sys2. However, the details of
this process are not relevant to the assessment of commensurability which
precedes it.
1Additional systems need to be considered as multiple pairwise comparisons: three systems would
involve three pairwise comparisons for instance. In general, where n is the number of systems,
n(n−1)
2
is the number of pairwise comparisons needed.
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2. There are two conceptual schemes, Sch1 and Sch2, corresponding to the two
formal systems. The schemes contain both explicit and tacit beliefs held by two
“cultures”, Cult1 and Cult2, in the broad sense described above.
3. There is at least one designated purpose for the alignment or harmonisation.
Collectively the set of purposes is defined as P (individual purposes could be
designated using lower-case and prime notation, for example p’, p”, etc.).
4. The purpose(s) are established within a situational context, Cxt. Assessment
of commensurability can be viewed as a judgement on the relative fit of cul-
tures for a given purpose. The degree of applicability of the judgement is thus
relative to the dynamics of the situational context. Making explicit the con-
text in the determination of commensurability promotes reusability—subject to
contextual qualifications—of the assessment. This may for instance be a simple
statement of the environmental or situational conditions in which the alignment
or harmonisation process takes place, or a more formal analysis 2.
5. There is some agent conducting the alignment or harmonisation, Agt. The agent
is assumed to be a human individual or group, with appropriate techniques for
characterising the formal systems.
6. Overall the alignment or harmonisation scenario consists of: two systems (Sys1
and Sys2 ), developed and used by two cultures (Cult1 and Cult1 ), a set of
purposes (P), a context (Cxt), and an agent (Agt).
7. Commensurability, Cms, can be defined as the degree of conceptual fit between
two cultures, Cult1 and Cult2, responsible for the knowledge systems Sys1 and
Sys2 respectively, given P, within Cxt, by Agt.
The model can be restated in plain language: assessing the commensurability for
the “ontological cultures” responsible two formal knowledge systems, suitable to par-
ticular purpose(s) within a context, and to be conducted by an agent(s). The problem
is further refined after the model of commensurability (Cms) is further elaborated be-
low.
The model contains a series of semantic dimensions (following Gardenfors (2000)),
which are applied to knowledge systems on the basis of interpretation of the cultures
responsible for them. The model is therefore multi-faceted or multi-dimensional.
Dimensions can be further characterised as follows:
• Dimensions (Dim’s) are salient properties of a “ontological culture”3;
• Collectively the defined dimensions of the model form a set of dimensions (Dim-
Set ’s);
2SWOT and PESTLE analysis are examples of such formal contextual analyses.
3The word “property” itself is deliberately not used, to avoid ambiguity with properties defined
within the systems themselves.
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• Dimensions can be grouped at multiple levels, thus forming a tiered hierarchy;
• Dimension values are interpretations of aspects of a system and the culture
responsible for it, relative to the purposes and other systems specified in the
situational context;
• Interpretations are in the first instance qualitative; they can also be converted to
quantitative measures to support statistical analysis. This entails assumptions
about the dimensions and their application—a point further expanded on below.
Figure 5.1 shows the relationship between the major components of the model.
5.2.2 Quantifying Commensurability
The qualitative measures can be interpreted quantitatively, as ordinal measures. Here
dimensions are represented as integer values between 0 and 10—any scale can be
applied, so long as it is consistent across all dimensions in the dimension set.
Analysing commensurability then proceeds by assigning a value of 0 to 10 to each
of the dimensions in the set for each of the systems being compared. This produces a
set of values for both Sys1 and Sys2, respectively V1 and V2, corresponding to each
dimension belonging to the dimension set DimSet. Commensurability between Cult1
and Cult2 is then derived from the collection of values V1 and V2 taken for Sys1
and Sys2, as follows:
1. The difference between two dimension values for Sys1 and Sys2 are defined as
the semantic distance (d) for the dimension in question.
2. Based on the collective purposes, P, and situational context, Cxt, the agent can
assign a weight, w, against each of the dimensions. The weight is considered
to be some value between 0 and 1. By default the weight is assumed to be 0.5
(permitting a relative strengthening or weakening of the weight). Weighting
permits differential emphasis on dimensions of relevance or saliency to a given
context 4.
3. Given n dimensions, three forms of commensurability measures can then be
derived:
(a) The average of the semantic distances. This is the sum of the differences
between the dimension valuations, divided by the number of dimensions.




4In a further refinement to the analysis, weights could also be applied against dimension groups.
This could have the effect either of applying the weight to each of the dimensions within the group,
or supplying a separate level of weighting. The first case is simply an overriding of the individual
dimension weighting case; the implications of the second are not considered in detail here, but
would have the effect of establishing multiple commensurability measures for different layers of the
model.
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Figure 5.1: Commensurability Model
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(b) The weighted average of the semantic distances. This is the sum of the






(c) The square root of weighted average of squared semantic distances. This
is the sum of the weighted squared differences, divided by the sum of the
weights, from which the root is calculated. This measure accentuates the





The second of these calculation, the weighted average, is the preferred formula for
most purposes, since it is readily interpreted in relation to the unweighted average,
but provides the benefit of differential assessment of dimension saliency. The derived
value provides a quantifiable measure for the commensurability of the two cultural
conceptual schemes, given the defined purpose(s) within a context, and as applied by
the agent. The previous definition can now be restated more precisely:
1. Let Sys1, Sys2 be two knowledge systems, and Cult1 and Cult2 be the cultures
engaged with the respective systems.
2. An agent Agt is tasked with aligning or harmonising Sys1 and Sys2 in a given
situational context (Cxt), for a set of stated purposes (P).
3. Let Cms be the unknown variable, the degree of conceptual fit or commensura-
bility between Cult1 and Cult2.
4. Then the calculation of commensurability, Cms, proceeds as follows:
(a) Define some set of dimensions, DimSet, for describing conceptual schemes.
(b) Interpret Sys1, Sys2 against each of the dimensions, Dim, in the set Dim-
Set.
(c) Take the semantic distances, d, as the absolute difference between each of
interpreted valuations.
(d) Assign weights, w, against each of the dimensions, Dim, in the set DimSet,
based on assessments of saliency of the dimension for the given purpose(s),
P, within a context, Cxt.
(e) Sum the weighted distances (
∑




(f) The resulting weighted average provides a measure of commensurability,
Cms, for the cultures Cult1 and Cult2, underlying Sys1 and Sys2.
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This measurement can be used in turn as an estimate for assessing the complexity
of aligning or harmonising the two knowledge systems. Some further remarks about
how the measurement is interpreted and used are warranted at this stage:
• Dimensions tend to be descriptive, rather than judgmental. However, judgment
is usually involved in the assignment of values to dimensions, hence the overall
assessment should not be presumed to be value-free—rather, the point is that
such value judgments are made explicit.
• In certain cases, applying a quantitative scale may imply a false degree of pre-
cision, and require greater rigour than the context warrants. In these cases, it
might be sufficient to rate the systems as either “Low” or “High”, or perhaps
“Low”, “Medium” or “High”. In such cases, quantitative analysis can still be
carried out by choosing appropriate values within the ranges set by dimensions
with the greatest number of values. For example, if at least one dimension is
scaled [0, 10], then other dimensions must have appropriate values within the
lower and upper bounds (i.e. between 0 and 10), and an equivalent mid-way
value. Value ranges such as [3, 7] and [2, 5, 8], for example, could be valid
interpretations of the respective qualitative evaluations above.
• Dimension valuations can in some circumstances be added directly to the sys-
tems themselves. Most formal systems provide various metadata or annotation
mechanisms. For instance, OWL provides annotation or metadata facilities
which can be applied to the system as a whole, or to specific entities (classes
or properties, for example) within it. Although the dimension valuations are
related to a specific context, they may also be useful for future assessments of
commensurability, or simply as annotated comments on the system itself.
• The set of dimensions constitute themselves a series of ontological claims about
cultures and conceptual schemes. These claims are part, then, of a second-
order conceptual scheme; the degree to which they require further explication
and rationalisation will depend on context.
Contrasting Ontology Matching Approaches
As discussed earlier, recent work in schema and ontology alignment views that task
as a “bottom-up” problem, that is, to be solved at the level of individual concepts
(Shvaiko and Euzenat, 2008). Designers of matching algorithms employ various strate-
gies for determining matches. They generally take the form of generating a set of
matches based on:
1. A concept, C1, taken from Sys1 ;
2. A concept, C2, taken from Sys2 ;
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3. A relation between concepts C1 and C2 : one of equivalence, generalisation,
specialisation or disjointness;
4. A degree of confidence in the match.
It is clear why such approaches are semantically atomic, according to the terms
outlined in this study. The degree of fit of the systems as a whole is derived from
the completeness and precision of the set of matches obtained between individual
concepts. Different strategies and algorithms can be compared with human inter-
pretations in this regard. Nevertheless these approaches do not capture important
contextual information about the knowledge systems, nor can they infer implicit in-
formation about the underlying cultural conceptual schemes. Rather this can only be
inferred by a human agent who is capable of interpreting knowledge systems against
a broader epistemological backdrop of purposes, contexts, and other social agents.
Such interpretation is argued here as a form of semantic holism—in which specific
conceptual representations can only be understood within a general social whole of
meaning production and consumption.
Interpretation, of the kind required to describe dimensions of a conceptual scheme,
is, however, a notoriously arbitrary process. As discussed previously in the method-
ology chapter, obvious criticisms are that interpretation is at best partial, subjective,
and in some cases irrelevant or not feasible given a cost-benefit analysis or other jus-
tificatory measures. There are several possible responses to these criticisms of the
framework: firstly, it supplements rather than competes with alignment algorithms—
as such, it can be regarded as a form of human rather than computer-aided design tool;
secondly, it is intended as a heuristic aid to alignment activities, not as a definitive
prescription, for tasks not amenable to algorithmic analysis; thirdly, it merely for-
malises intuitions at work in everyday practice, albeit with a series of epistemological
and methodological assumptions in tow; and finally, its inclusion of an appropriate
set of dimensions and application of method serve to corral the worst excesses of
interpretive work.
The dimensions presented in the next section endeavour to perform some of this
corralling work.
5.2.3 Describing Commensurability—A Generic Dimension Set
The framework also includes a default generic set of dimensions for describing knowl-
edge systems and the cultures behind them. In practice, as the case studies bear out,
the default set often needs revision, extension and weighting to fit the requirements
of a given translation situation. By abstracting out the formal model and process
for quantifying commensurability, it is possible to use any suitable dimension set,
without loss of general applicability.
Inevitably the choice of dimensions appears arbitrary, and need justification on
grounds of saliency and relevance to the systems under consideration. The dimensions
5.2. PRESENTING A FRAMEWORK FOR COMMENSURABILITY 121
have been selected on the basis of utility for determining commensurability. Some
of the intrinsic dimensions seem logical for any kind of system analysis; others—
particularly those relating to context—are governed specifically by the account of
commensurability presented here. The dimensions are intended to draw out salient
differences in systems and their underlying cultures and conceptual schemes.
The set presented here itself is intentionally abstract, and aims to capture the
general tendencies of the culture responsible for a knowledge system. The set dis-
tinguished between a) intrinsic and b) extrinsic dimensions of systems. The intrinsic
dimensions reflect both the concepts, properties and individuals stipulated in the sys-
tem itself, and its overall structural and stylistic features. Several of these have been
extracted and simplified from schema and ontology metrics discussions mentioned in
the literature review, notably in Tartir et al. (2005) and Yao et al. (2005). Unlike
metrics, which can be computed just with reference to a single ontology, these di-
mensions are comparative—for example, the scope of a system can be judged to be
general or specific only with reference to other systems under consideration.
The extrinsic dimensions aim to understand the implicit concepts which stand
behind the system, which operate within the broader social environment in which
the system is constructed. The distinction thus serves to differentiate a characteri-
sation of the system itself from the characterisation of the environment in which it
is constructed and used. A number of the extrinsic dimensions have been extracted
or correlated to those developed in the standardisation and knowledge management
literature discussed in Chapter 2. Others appear to be generic distinguishing traits
differentiating knowledge systems, part of which has been bourn out in the case stud-
ies which follow.
Intrinsic Dimensions
Intrinsic dimensions describe the knowledge system itself. There are four types of
intrinsic dimensions:
1. Structure—describes structural characteristics of the system; for example, whether
the system is relatively large or small, or detailed or sparse.
2. Style—describes stylistic aspects of the system; for example, whether the system
predominantly declares concepts or properties.
3. Scope—describes the scope of the system; for example, whether the concepts
concentrated on a particular area, or dispersed over several.
4. Subject—describes the subject(s) dealt with by the system, and how these are
characterised; for example, whether the concepts are relatively abstract or con-
crete.
Table 5.1 presents each of the dimensions with some brief explanation.
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Table 5.1: Intrinsic Dimensions
Dimension Group Dimension Description
Structure Dimensions which describe
the structural characteris-
tics of the system.
Small—Large Whether there are a small or
large number of concepts in the
system.
Light—Dense Whether the system contains
a small or large number of
properties and sub-classes for
each class (this dimension cor-
responds to that of “Inheritance
Richness” mentioned by Tartir
et al. (2005), and of “Average
Depth of Inheritance Tree of Leaf
Nodes (ADIT-LN)” introduced
by Yao et al. (2005)).
Self-contained—
Derivative
Whether the system uses only
constructs defined internally, or
makes use of imported constructs
(can be determined by the pres-
ence of owl:imports declarations,
and the extent to which imported
constructs are used within the
ontology).
Free—Restricted Whether the classes defined
within the system have a small
or large number of constraints
applied to them (this dimension
corresponds to that of “Rela-
tionship Richness” mentioned by
Tartir et al. (2005)).
Sparsely—Heavily
Populated
Whether the system contains a
small or large number of individ-
uals.
Style Dimensions which describe
the stylistic aspects of the
system.
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Table 5.1: Intrinsic Dimensions
Dimension Group Dimension Description
Classificatory—
Attributive
Whether the system uses pre-
dominantly sub-classes or prop-
erties/attributes to describe re-
lations between classes (this di-
mension corresponds to that of
“Attribute Richness” mentioned
by Tartir et al. (2005)).
Literal—Object
Composition
Whether the system uses pre-




Whether the system uses pre-
dominantly numeric or textual




Whether the system is well de-
scribed (uses a high number of
metadata annotations).
Scope Dimensions which describe
the scope of the system.
Coherence—
Dispersion
Whether the concepts listed in
the system belong to an exist-
ing coherent system, or are seem-




Whether the concepts are tightly
clustered around a particular
area or field, or are diffused over
a range of fields.
General—Specific Whether the concepts are gen-
eral in relation to a given field or
fields; or are instead highly spe-
cific.
Subject Dimensions which describe
features of the subject(s)
dealt with by the system.
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Table 5.1: Intrinsic Dimensions
Dimension Group Dimension Description
Concrete—
Abstract
The degree the system relates
to concrete objects (books, pro-
teins, people) or tends to-
wards abstract objects (space,
time, substance). Ontologies
are sometimes described as be-
ing “upper-level”, “mid-level” or
“low-level” according to their
level of abstraction—this dimen-
sion describes the same feature.
Natural—Social Whether the system describes
objects from a naturalistic or
socialistic perspective (in philo-
sophical terms, adoption of real-
ist or constructivist perspective).
Spatial—Temporal Whether the system describes
predominantly spatial objects
(books, people, organisations) or




Whether the system describes
objects from an everyday “phe-
nomenalist” perspective, or from
the standpoint of science.
Extrinsic Dimensions
Extrinsic dimensions describe the social context in which the system is developed. As
with the intrinsic dimensions, there are four types of extrinsic dimensions:
1. Perspective—describes the stated intention or purpose of the system; for exam-
ple, whether the system represents an ideal or a pragmatic conceptualisation of
a field or domain.
2. Purpose—describes the underlying motivation (as best inferred) of the system;
for example, whether strong financial or political motives underly the system’s
construction.
3. Process—describes the process of the system’s design and construction; for ex-
ample, whether the system design was relatively centralised or distributed.
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4. Practice—describes how the system has been received; for example, whether
the system is better characterised as a de facto or de jure standard.
Table 5.2 presents each of these dimensions.
Table 5.2: Extrinsic Dimensions
Dimension Group Dimension Description
Perspective Dimensions which describe
the general perspective or
orientation of the system.
Pragmatic—
Idealistic
Whether the system is
pragmatic—representing how
concepts are presently repre-
sented in information systems—
or idealist—suggesting how




Whether the system is intended
for academic research or for
“real-world” applications.




Whether the system is a specula-
tive or hypothetical point of view
about the objects it describes.
Committed—
Uncommitted
Whether the system is commit-




Whether the system is intended
by design to be compatible with
other systems.
Purpose Dimensions which the un-
derlying motivations and




Whether the system is moti-
vated by financial considerations
(for example, to promote related
products and services, to cut
costs of data management).
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Table 5.2: Extrinsic Dimensions
Dimension Group Dimension Description
Legally Motivated:
Weak—Strong
Whether the system is motivated
by legal considerations (for ex-
ample, to support particular li-





Whether the system is moti-
vated by political considerations
(for example, to influence policy





Whether the system is motivated
by ethical considerations (for ex-
ample, to promote interoperabil-





Whether the system is motivated
by personal considerations (for





Whether the system is motivated
by theoretical considerations (for
example, to promote a given on-
tological orientation).
Process Dimensions which the pro-





Whether the system is repre-
sentative of the community who
makes use of it.
Central—
Distributed Design
Whether the system is designed





Whether the system is designed
in a way which elicits and incor-
porates critical review and feed-
back.
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Table 5.2: Extrinsic Dimensions
Dimension Group Dimension Description
Formal—Informal
Construction
Whether the system uses a for-
mal process, such as those used




Whether the system makes ex-
plicit background assumptions,




Whether the system makes use of
a rigorous method in its design.
Practice Dimensions which describe
how the system is used.
Active—Inactive
Community
Whether the system is designed




Whether the system has a high
adoption rate among its candi-
date users or market.
Low—High Matu-
rity
Whether the system is mature—
has gone through multiple itera-




Whether the system is compat-




Whether the system is a de facto
standard among its users.
De Jure Standard:
Low—High
Whether the system is a de jure
standard—has received ratifica-




Whether the system is widely
supported within the industry
(as evidenced by supporting doc-





Whether the system is supported
by available documentation.
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Preempting the methods discussion below, the extrinsic dimensions clearly require
considerable interpretation. In contrast, some of the intrinsic dimension values may
be derived algorithmically, especially in the case of the structural and stylistic dimen-
sions. It is also clear that accurate evaluation of extrinsic dimensions may require
considerable discovery effort. The extent of effort needs to be justified against the
benefit of the assessment, on the basis of some kind of cost-benefit analysis. Never-
theless evaluation itself can be more or less formal or extensive—for certain purposes
and contexts, existing knowledge or opinion may be sufficient, or the dimensions
introduced here can be applied in an ad hoc fashion.
In conjunction the intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions provide a characterisation
of the knowledge systems in terms of both their underlying conceptual scheme, and
the background cultures responsible for them. The intrinsic Subject and extrinsic
Intention dimension groups do most to capture the implicit elements of the conceptual
scheme; while the other intrinsic groups summarise what is already explicit but not
immediately conveyed in the system; and the other extrinsic groups contextualise the
system in ways that make more evident the causes behind the construction of the
system itself. The next section outlines how the model can be applied in a given
commensurability assessment scenario.
5.2.4 Assessing Commensurability—Applying the Dimensions
As a final part of the overall framework, a basic procedure is proposed for the appli-
cation of the dimensions to the systems. The method of construction can be minimal
or highly sophisticated, depending upon the context of the assessment. Nevertheless,
some explicit treatment of method, in terms of how the model might be applied,
is useful. The method assumes the idealised scenario presented in the discussion of
the analytic procedure above—namely, Sys1, Sys2 represent the two systems, Cult2,
Cult2 the underlying cultural schemes, P the purpose(s), Cxt the context, and Agt,
the agent.
Firstly, the intrinsic character of Sys1 and Sys2 are described. This involves:
1. Surveying of parts or all of the definition of Sys1 and Sys2 . The “definition”
may be precisely specified in a formal language, or need to be inferred from sec-
ondary documentation. The following is a list of potential sources for analysing
the definition:
• The source definition of the system: the concepts and properties declared
in XML Schema files, RDF/OWL ontologies or relational models;
• System documentation, which may be in the form of annotations to the
source definition, external documentation or academic publications;
• Diagrammatic representations of the system, such as entity relational (E/R)
or Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagrams;
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• Available metrics summarising structural or stylistic aspects of the system;
• Secondary sources analysing or discussing the systems.
2. Analysis and rating of the systems according to the intrinsic dimension groups
of structure, style, subject and scope. In the case of structural and stylistic
dimensions, it may be useful to employ algorithms for counting numbers of
concepts, properties, annotations, restrictions and individuals. The following
list are examples of how the given intrinsic dimension groups and dimensions
might be analysed:
• Structural dimensions—may involve counting the number of concepts and
properties; finding “import” declarations; and checking the extent of con-
straints applied to concepts and properties.
• Stylistic dimensions—may involve counting the relative number of con-
cept and property declarations; examining property types (whether they
are literal or relations); examining literal property types (whether they are
numerical, textual or other); checking the internal documentation (whether
the system entities are annotated); and examining whether there are mul-
tiple methods to describe an object.
• Scope dimensions—may involve interpreting whether the concepts are co-
herently grouped or seemingly random; concentrated around their subject
matter, or diffused; and general or specific.
• Subject dimensions—may involve interpreting whether concepts are con-
crete or abstract; temporal or spatially-oriented; and refer to natural oc-
curring or socially constructed objects.
3. The valuations and differences between the intrinsic properties of the system
can at this point be analysed by grouping averages by dimension group.
Secondly, the extrinsic dimensions of the systems are analysed. This in turn
involves:
1. Surveying the social environment in which Sys1 and Sys2 are developed. De-
pending upon the scale of the method, availability of sources and nature of the
systems, this could incorporate several different methods:
• Interviews with the system designers and with other users of the system.
• Affiliation or participation in working groups, standards committees and
design teams.
• Analysis of online social groups—blogs, wikis, forums, mailing lists—in
which aspects of the system design are discussed or negotiated.
• Review of secondary materials: press, academic publications, conferences,
journals and books which discuss aspects of the systems.
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• Review of peripheral materials: government policies, company financial
reports, industry group minutes, standard body procedures related to or-
ganisations sponsoring, advocating or using the systems.
2. Analysis and rating of the systems according to the extrinsic dimensions. This
requires interpreting the materials in terms of the dimension groups of perspec-
tive, purpose, process and practice. The following list are examples of how the
given extrinsic dimension groups and dimensions might be analysed:
• Purpose dimensions—may involve examining the stated and implied in-
tentions behind a system, including any economic, political, philosophical
or technical rationales evident in the context of the presentation of the
systems themselves (websites, accompanying documentation) and other
sources (forums, commentaries, and so on).
• Process dimensions—may involve looking at how the system is developed:
what explicit or implied policies determine how the system is designed,
versioned, ratified and publicised.
• Practice dimensions—may involve examining how the system is used within
different environments; whether it is widely endorsed, supported and inte-
grated within an ecosystem of other systems, standards and products.
• Perspective dimensions—may involve direct interpretation or indirect sourc-
ing of commentary about the general “orientation” of the system: whether
it is oriented towards everyday “lay”, or scientific vocabularies; whether it
adopts a realist or constructivist position towards the objects it describes;
or whether it uses existing vocabularies or enforced a new normative vo-
cabulary of its own.
3. The valuations and differences between the extrinsic properties of the system can
also be separately analysed quantitatively, to generate averages by dimension
group.
Finally, the weighted average of all of the dimensional differences is obtained to
provide a quantitative measure of commensurability, using the procedure outlined
above. Any qualitative remarks, against dimensions or dimension groups, can also be
summarised into an overall qualitative assessment.
5.2.5 Interpreting Commensurability Assessments
Both qualitative and quantitative assessments need to be interpreted relative to the
specific context in which the assessments have taken place. This is particularly the
case for the quantitative measurement. High values of commensurability should cor-
relate to quicker and less problematic alignments between the systems concerns; con-
versely, low values should indicate slower and more difficult alignments. Low values
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might also suggest the need for various further activities: further consultation with
those knowledgeable about the respective systems; iterative cycles of translation; more
rigorous testing procedures; or, finally, that the task of translation is not viable within
available constraints. In some situations, these determinations might have other, flow-
on effects and impacts: the desirability for one system over another, for example, or
even of the “strategic fit” between two organisational cultures. Just as the background
cultures responsible for two systems impacts upon their relative commensurability, the
“embeddedness” of systems means their compatibility can be an indicator and even
determinant for general questions of cultural alignment and affiliation. These, nat-
urally, need to be asked with reference to specific operating conditions; so here no
more than a vague indication can be provided for what commensurability assessments
might mean, and how they ought to be interpreted, within those conditions. Some of
these considerations are, however, presented below in itemised form, to prompt this
interpretative process:
• What does a high value, signalling a high degree of incommensurability, indi-
cate? What if any consequences does this have?
Does it mean that the systems are radically incommensurable, and any effort to
align them will be in vain? Or does it entail practical consequences: a greater
amount of work is required, additional resources or time need to be allocated,
or further analysis or different approaches need to be explored? Or does it
indicate a preferential choice of one system over another, where the dimensions
have been interpreted as selection criteria?
Conversely, what does a low value signify? That the systems are commensurable
for the stated purposes, or that alignment or harmonisation of the systems is
comparatively trivial?
• How do the quantitative and qualitative assessments compare? Are they con-
sistent, and if not why not? Do some of the dimensions perhaps need to be
re-weighted?
• How do the assessments fit with intuitive understandings of the general “fit”,
or commensurability, of the systems concerned?
• What other steps or stages—consultation, testing, the alignment itself—need to
be modified as a result of the assessments? Qualitative as well as quantitative
findings could prompt particular decisions here.
• What follow-up actions or decisions might eventuate from these assessments?
Do they indicate preference for one system over another? Are there alternate
ways of achieving the ends to which the system alignment or translation is
directed?
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• Are there broader implications of these assessments? Do they reflect important
“extra-systemic” features, such as the “strategic fit” between organisations or
organisational units?
5.3 Applying the Framework
This chapter ties together the strands of the first half of the study, which outlined the
research questions, pertinent insights from the literature, the methodology and some
of the theoretical backdrop to the question of commensurability of formal knowledge
systems. Against this background, the chapter proceeds to develop a general theoret-
ical rubric and detailed framework for assessing the commensurability of both formal
systems and the cultures responsible for them. The framework has four components:
a model of an idealised commensurability scenario, a series of dimensions conforming
to the demands of the procedure, a means for quantifying commensurability and a
method for applying the framework and interpreting the results. The framework is
the fulcrum around which the response of the study to the central research question
pivots: that the commensurability of knowledge systems can be explored through
a holistic interrogation of both the systems and the cultures responsible for them.
The framework mobiles a series of analytic tools for understanding both the explicit
and implicit commitments entailed by those systems—both those directly stipulated
in the systems themselves, and those inferred through an examination of the back-
ground cultures in which they are produced and used. The series of dimensions uses
the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic dimensions to capture each of these
types of commitments. The separation of the model and methodology permits the
adoption of entirely different dimensions, allowing for considerable flexibility in how
other criteria and even different ontological and epistemological assumptions come
into play in the analysis.
The following three chapters apply the framework in an exploratory fashion, in
part to evaluate its effectiveness, and in part to examine real world cases where the
question of commensurability genuinely arises. Chapter 6 compares two knowledge
system types—the relational database and Semantic Web ontologies—against the his-
torical context of the rise of logic and knowledge systems in the twentieth century.
Chapter 7 examines recent efforts to construct “upper-level” ontologies, conducted
in the relative pristine surrounds of academia. Chapter 8 then looks at the contro-
versy over document format standardisation, which moves into the murky grounds of
government policy and corporate product positioning. Chapter 9 engages other users
in an artificially constructed commensurability problem, using a pared down form of
framework for practical purposes. In the process the framework itself is road-tested
upon the rocky terrain of empirical case studies and exercises. The conclusion seeks
to survey how the framework fared in the process, and looks at recommendations for




Kant moreover considers logic, that is, the aggregate of definitions and
propositions which ordinarily passes for logic, to be fortunate in having
attained so early to completion before the other sciences; since Aristotle, it
has not lost any ground, but neither has it gained any, the latter because
to all appearances it seems to be finished and complete. Now if logic
has not undergone any change since Aristotle—and in fact, judging by
modern compendiums of logic the changes frequently consist mainly in
omissions—then surely the conclusion which should be drawn is that it is
all the more in need of a total reconstruction; for spirit, after its labours
over two thousand years, must have attained to a higher consciousness
about its thinking and about its own pure, essential nature . . .
Regarding this content, the reason why logic is so dull and spiritless
has already been given above. Its determinations are accepted in their un-
moved fixity and are brought only into external relation with each other.
In judgments and syllogisms the operations are in the main reduced to and
founded on the quantitative aspect of the determinations; consequently ev-
erything rests on an external difference, on mere comparison and becomes
a completely analytical procedure and mechanical calculation. The de-
duction of the so-called rules and laws, chiefly of inference, is not much
better than a manipulation of rods of unequal length in order to sort and
group them according to size—than a childish game of fitting together the
pieces of a coloured picture puzzle (Hegel, 2004, p. 51).
Analysts discussing knowledge systems typically distinguish their logical (or proce-
dural) and ontological (or data) components (Smith, 1998; Sowa, 2000). To employ
another related distinction, the logical part can be termed the formal component of
a system—what preserves truth in inferential reasoning—while the ontological part
can be considered the material component—or what is reasoned about. While the
case studies which follow in subsequent chapters focus explicitly on the variant cul-
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tural conceptual schemes behind systems expressed in the same logical formalism, the
present case study looks at the minimal ontological assumptions which reside in two
different kinds of systems—the logical formalisms employed, respectively, in relational
databases and Semantic Web ontologies. As well as providing an important example
of how commensurability can be assessed for the formal apparatuses by which knowl-
edge systems are constructed, then, this study also provides useful historical context
for the more narrowly scoped studies which follow. Moreover, it demonstrates that
even the austere and minimal constructs employed by these formalisms cannot avoid
importing ontological concerns.
This chapter develops a general historical narrative, which plots the development
of knowledge systems against three successive different waves of modernisation. This
development is inherently tied to the rise of symbolic logic in the modern era, without
which both computation generally, and knowledge systems specifically, would not be
possible. A constant guiding goal, which can be termed, following Foucault, the
pursuit of a “mathesis universalis” (Foucault, 1970), motivates this development. At
its most extreme, this goal represents a form of epistemological idealism; it imagines
that all knowledge can be reduced to an appropriate vocabulary and limited rules
of grammar and inference—in short, reduced to a logical system. The extent of this
idealism is itself an important feature of the different formalisms surveyed. To focus
on this and other significant points of difference and similarity, the characterisation
of the history of this development is intentionally schematic; it does not attempt a
broad description of the history of logic, computers or information systems.
The study does however aim to illustrate the rough affinity between the specific
history of knowledge systems and the much broader history of modern industrialisa-
tion and capitalism. This is in part to counter the tendency of histories of logic and
computing to present them as purely intellectual traditions, with only coincidental
application to problems of industry, bureaucracy and governance. Logical “idealism”
in fact arose specifically in those places and times which demonstrated a practical
need for it—because, in a sense, both the quality and quantity demands of organisa-
tional knowledge management, traceable back to the rise of the bureaucracy in the
nineteenth century, foreshadowed the emergence of information systems concurrently
with the greater waves of modernity in the twentieth. The conclusion of the chapter
suggests that the nexus of tensions which arise in modernity play a structuring role
in the production of incommensurability.
The structure employed here distinguishes between “pre-modern”, “modern” and
“postmodern” development phases of knowledge systems. The “pre-modern” and
“modern” periods cover, respectively, the scattered precursors and the more struc-
tured programs in logic and mathematics which pointed towards the development of
knowledge systems. Early knowledge systems, such as the relational database, can be
said to apply the results of “modernist” logic in the form of highly controlled struc-
tures of knowledge. “Post-modern” knowledge systems, on the other hand, arise out
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of the perceived difficulties of coercing all forms of knowledge into rigid structures. In
particular, the era of the web has inspired the construction hybrid, semi-structured
knowledge systems such as Semantic Web ontologies—combining some of the compu-
tational properties of relational databases with support for documents, multimedia,
social networks and other less structured forms of data and information.
The latter part of the chapter shifts from an historical overview towards a more de-
tailed examination of the question of commensurability of relational database and Se-
mantic Web systems. In particular it looks at one stark area of potential incommensurability—
that of so-called “closed” versus “open” world assumptions. While this area of incom-
mensurability is well documented within the relevant literature (Reiter, 1987; Sowa,
2000), it resonates with several broader cultural distinctions between the two kinds of
systems. These distinctions, along with several recent discussions of them, are then
reviewed, followed by a suggestive assessment of commensurability between the two
kinds of knowledge representation surveyed.
The conclusion of the chapter recasts knowledge systems back into a broad his-
torical frame, suggesting several causal factors behind the production of differences
between them. These suggestive indications are further developed in the more detailed
case studies of subsequent chapters.
6.1 Pre-Modernity: Logical Lineages
Retrospectively, it appears that modern knowledge systems are the culmination of
a steady linear development in the field of logic. In the past century and a half,
since Frege’s efforts to systematise logic in symbolic form, progressive and continuous
advancement is a plausible narrative line. Prior to Frege, however, logic appears
at relatively brief intervals in the development of Western thought. A more fitting
metaphor is perhaps that of an expanding series of fractal-like spirals—sporadic and
incidental surges during the ancient, medieval and Enlightenment periods, prior to a
sudden and sustained preoccupation from the nineteenth century onwards (Kneale,
1984). Indeed, as the quote from Hegel suggests, at the start of the nineteenth
century, logic was perceived to be a field for the most part exhausted by Aristotle’s
exposition of syllogisms. More recent histories have shown a somewhat more complex
picture: important precedents to modern logic variants, such as predicate, modal
and temporal logics, can be found in Aristotelian and later classical works on logic
(Bochenski, 1961), as well as in medieval scholasticism (Kneale, 1984).
Notwithstanding these precursors, it is generally agreed that not until the seven-
teenth century was something like contemporary symbolic predicate logic, upon which
knowledge systems are based, conceived (Kneale, 1984; Bochenski, 1961). Largely the
product of a solitary figure, Leibniz, this conception was of a universal symbolism—
universalis mathesis (Foucault, 1970)—which would provide both a standardised vo-
cabulary and formal deductive system for resolving disputes with clinical and un-
136 CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY: FORMAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS
ambiguous clarity (Davis, 2001). Leibniz dreamed of a process which could strip
all argument from the vagaries and ambiguities of natural language, leaving only a
pristine set of statements and rules of valid inference in its place:
If this is done, whenever controversies arise, there will be no more need
for arguing among two philosophers than among two mathematicians. For
it will suffice to take pens into the hand and to sit down by the abacus,
saying to each other (and if they wish also to a friend called for help): Let
us calculate! (Lenzen, 2004, p. 1)
Set in the context of Cartesian geometry, Newtonian physics, Copernican cosmol-
ogy, the construction of the calculus, and a host of other mechanical formalisations of
the seventeenth century, that mathematics should be seen to be the epistemological
pinnacle towards which other kinds of thought might aspire—to reason “clearly and
distinctly”, as another rationalist, Descartes, put it—is perhaps not surprising. At
the time, consensual workings-out of “controversies”—with or without the aid of a
“friend”—was an important intellectual concomitant to the preferences for personal
introspection over traditional, largely clerical authority, for rationality over dogma,
for individual decision-making over ecclesiastical mandate, and for mechanical laws
over divine decrees, all of which mark the emergence of the Enlightenment (Habermas,
1989). The cry to resolve disputes via “sitting down by the abacus”—or any of its con-
temporary analogues—was, however, to inspire a much longer and sustained wave of
rationalist oneirism only by the middle of the nineteenth century. Arguably, Leibniz’
fervour was not yet met by a sufficiently developed and broader need for rationalised
and standardised communication in the social sphere at large. From the nineteenth
century onwards though, three further distinct points can be isolated within this his-
torical trajectory: Frege’s repudiation of German idealism and psychologism in the
late nineteenth century, which paved the way for symbolic logic; logical positivism’s
rejection of metaphysics, and its search for a purified, foundational mathematics;
and, most importantly, subsequent post-war exploration of computational methods
to represent, refine and extend human knowledge, which gradually filtered down from
“pure” research to applied problem-solving in a myriad of practical contexts. What
began as an individual exhortation, barely a rippling murmur in a sea of philosophi-
cal discourse, had, by the twentieth century, coalesced into a tradition of what Rorty
(1992) termed “Ideal Language Philosophy”—a putative, therapeutic program for ex-
tending the use of language, ultimately, from the selective company of human agents
to that which would embrace a wider family of computational agents as well.
One of the foundational populist expressions of the ambitions of the Semantic
Web, published in the Scientific American in 2001, gives a modern rendering of this
zeal for intellectual asceticism:
The Semantic Web is not a separate Web but an extension of the current
one, in which information is given well-defined meaning, better enabling
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computers and people to work in cooperation. The first steps in weaving
the Semantic Web into the structure of the existing Web are already un-
der way. In the near future, these developments will usher in significant
new functionality as machines become much better able to process and
“understand” the data that they merely display at present . . .
The Semantic Web, in naming every concept simply by a URI (Uni-
form Resource Identifier), lets anyone express new concepts that they
invent with minimal effort. Its unifying logical language will enable these
concepts to be progressively linked into a universal Web. This structure
will open up the knowledge and workings of humankind to meaningful
analysis by software agents, providing a new class of tools by which we
can live, work and learn together (Berners-Lee et al., 2001).
As with the Enlightenment, these more recent moments have been accompanied
by broader ideological trends. These are sketched out in more detail below—in part
to emphasise the inter-dependent structural connections between the emergence of
knowledge systems, on the one hand, and the rise of distinct styles of modern organ-
isation and management—features of contemporary capitalism—on the other; and in
part to help explain how variant knowledge formalisms—even at a level of abstraction
from questions of conceptual content—still bear substantial epistemological assump-
tions. These assumptions, in turn, can have significant bearing on how systems based
on these formalisms might be considered commensurable.
6.2 Early Modernity: the Mechanisation of Thought
After Leibniz, the dream of a formal mechanism for “calculating” the logical out-
come from a set of premises was to remain dormant for a considerable period. Vari-
ants of Germanic idealism sought instead to emphasise the irreducibility of thought
to pure procedure. Even the ostensibly logical works of Kant and Hegel differenti-
ated the sphere of the rational from other modes of thought: practical/ethical and
judgment/aesthetic categories were procedurally, not just substantively, differentiated.
Foucault goes so far as to argue that the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries,
in the human sciences at least, are marked by a departure, at the level of method,
from attempts at a common, universal and formal language:
In this sense, the appearance of man and the constitution of the human
sciences . . . would be correlated to a sort of ‘de-mathematicization’ . . . for
do not the first great advances of mathematical physics, the first massive
utilizations of the calculation of probabilities, date from the time when
the attempt at an immediate constitution of a general science of non-
quantifiable orders was abandoned? (Foucault, 1970, p. 349–50)
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It was not until the mid-nineteenth century, coincidentally when industrialisation,
and the associated widespread mechanisation of industry, grew rapidly (Hobsbawm,
1975), that logic began again to take on importance as an active field for new research
in its own right. The incipient form of logic as a coherent and regulated, machine-
like system began to take shape in four related British works around the middle
of the nineteenth century: Richard Whately’s Elements of Logic (1826); William
Thomson’s Outlines of the Laws of Thought (1842); John Stuart Mill’s A System of
Logic (1843) and, most significantly, George Boole’s An Investigation of the Laws of
Thought (1854). These developments, contemporaneous with the early computational
designs of Babbage, mark a shift in the treatment of logic from a study of modes of
argumentation (as a sibling discipline to rhetoric) to a study of a system, with strong
affinities to mathematics—logic begins here to be considered as a kind of calculus, of
the kind Leibniz envisioned, rather than a mere rhetorical aid (O’Regan, 2008). This
is especially evident in Boole’s landmark text, which not only marks its discussion
of logic with algebraic rather than verbal terms, but introduces for the first time a
set of logical operations equivalent to those of arithmetic (logical product, sum and
difference) (Bochenski, 1961; Kneale, 1984). Evidence of the radical nature of this
effort is indicated by a prolonged defence in the introduction:
Whence it is that the ultimate laws of Logic are mathematical in their
form; why they are, except in a single point, identical with the general laws
of Number; and why in that particular point they differ;—are questions
upon which it might not be very remote from presumption to endeavour
to pronounce a positive judgment. Probably they lie beyond the reach
of our limited faculties. It may, perhaps, be permitted to the mind to
attain a knowledge of the laws to which it is itself subject, without its
being also given to it to understand their ground and origin, or even,
except in a very limited degree, to comprehend their fitness for their end,
as compared with other and conceivable systems of law. Such knowledge
is, indeed, unnecessary for the ends of science, which properly concerns
itself with what is, and seeks not for grounds of preference or reasons
of appointment. These considerations furnish a sufficient answer to all
protests against the exhibition of Logic in the form of a Calculus. It is not
because we choose to assign to it such a mode of manifestation, but because
the ultimate laws of thought render that mode possible, and prescribe its
character, and forbid, as it would seem, the perfect manifestation of the
science in any other form, that such a mode demands adoption (Boole,
2007, p. 11).
For Boole, rendering the laws of thought “in the form of a Calculus” becomes
“perfect manifestation of the science”, and a natural accompaniment to the greater
scientific enterprise then burgeoning in mid-nineteenth century Britain. It is an un-
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dertaking which, moreover, fits comfortably with the broader economic and military
aspiration of a global-looking empire (Hobsbawm, 1975). Nevertheless, as the titles of
these works indicate, logic remained a description of concomitant mentalistic “laws of
thought”—however much they may be “mathematical in their form” (Boole, 2007).
That these laws themselves belonged to the domain of mathematics, or perhaps might
found a new branch of “metamathmatics”, rather than psychology—and thus could
be replicated by a machine—was an implication yet to be developed. For Frege, writ-
ing a little later in the nineteenth century, expressions such as “laws of thought” were
the last vestiges of a discipline about to be wrenched from its psychologistic origins
(Kneale, 1984). Subsequently, logic was to re-oriented onto new disciplinary founda-
tions, not on the basis of a mere analogy or affinity with mathematics, but as no less
than the very foundations of the mathematical enterprise.
The latter half of the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of two new global
powers which could compete with the military, economic and technological dominance
of the British Empire—Germany and the United States (Hobsbawm, 1987). Coinci-
dentally these two countries also boast the two seminal logicians of this period, in
Frege and Peirce. Quite independently, and in the case of Peirce, to relatively little
initial acclaim, they worked to develop completely axiomatised logical systems, which
in turn would form the basis for all modern-day formal knowledge systems (Sowa,
2000; Davis, 2001). Frege, in particular, developed three pivotal and influential inno-
vations: the “concept script” (Begriffschrift), a notational language of symbols with
variables and constants with well-defined semantics; the vital conceptual distinction
between connotational meaning (sense—Sinn) and denotational meaning (reference—
Bedeutung); and, most notably, the formalisation of quantified predicate logic, which
as one historian suggests “was one of the greatest intellectual inventions of the nine-
teenth century” (Kneale, 1984). While Frege’s notation was never widely adopted,
and presented considerable intellectual challenges to its early readers, the recognised
flexibility of predicate logic allowed for a explosion of interest in “metamathemati-
cal” problems—how to develop a foundational system from which all of mathematics
could be derived (van Heijenoort, 1967). Together with Cantor’s set theory, at the
turn of the twentieth century, it now appeared at least possible to unite mathematics
under a single universal theory—indeed, the very desire to develop, for the first time,
a unified coherent theory itself points to an uniquely modern epistemology of mathe-
matics (Davis, 2001). More ambitiously still, the challenge of erecting all knowledge
upon the rigorous epistemological foundations of logic and mathematics could now
be conceived—a challenge which, around the turn of the century, was indeed posed
by the mathematician Hilbert, and soon after, was also accepted by Whitehead and
Russell (van Heijenoort, 1967).
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6.3 Crises in Modernity: the Order of Logic and
the Chaos of History
The fascination with propositional form which characterises the enthusiasm for sym-
bolic logic in the early twentieth century has its suggestive cultural analogues in
the geometric obsessions of cubism, the calculating devices of the new mass culture
industries, modernist architecture, the ordered urban planning environments of Le
Corbusier, and the shared desire and horror of order that is a continued motif of
modernist art and literature (Adorno, 2001; Hobsbawm, 1994). It is also parallels
the development and interest in a host of more mundane technologies—double-entry
book-keeping, time-and-motion studies, efficient transportation, assembly-line man-
ufacturing, punch-card tabulation, the growth of explicit management techniques,
to mention but a few (Hobsbawm, 1994). The first half of the twentieth century
saw a highly productive period in the formalisation of logic, and laid the founda-
tions for contemporary research in artificial intelligence, cognitive science and a host
of affiliated disciplines today. It is during this period, too, that the latent poten-
tials of logic began to coalesce with a fully-fledged modernity to provide the kinds of
technological instrumentation required to meet the demands of large-scale adminis-
trations and bureaucracies. Here the quantitative growth of organisational data col-
lated would outstrip the capacities of pre-digital storage technologies—and companies
quickly emerged to fill the breach: the late nineteenth century already witnessed the
growth of one corporate entity willing to service government census needs with new
tabulating machines, which by 1915 had, after a three-way merger, started to operate
under the now familiar name of International Business Machines (IBM Corporation,
2009). Yet formal logical systems were, by and large, still considered without direct
regard for their applications. Prior to the elaboration of the first computers during
and after the Second World War, the steady production of theorems in set theory,
model theory, foundational arithmetic and mathematical logic form the basis from
which something like modern information and knowledge systems could emerge.
These innovations happen within an era of unprecedented political and economic
crisis: two world wars, numerous political revolutions and the Great Depression (Hob-
sbawm, 1994). The surrounding turmoil of Europe often appears eclipsed in the iso-
lated intellectual histories of this period, which feature predominantly the relative
sanctuaries of Cambridge, Oxford, Vienna, Warsaw universities, and eventually those
of Berkeley, Harvard and Princeton too. Yet the application of logic in military, ad-
ministrative and organisational context was to become an important factor in funding
and direction of problem solving within these as yet relatively small academic circles
(Ceruzzi, 2003). Some of the key figures in the emergence of the information age—
Turing and von Neumann—made vital contributions, respectively, in code breaking
and the construction of the atomic bomb (O’Regan, 2008). Notoriously, the Nazis
utilised ever more efficient information systems for cataloguing concentration camp
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prisoners—recently, for instance, it has been claimed that this use of punch-card tab-
ulators involved lucrative agreements and ongoing business with IBM subsidiaries
(Black, 2002). But on a more general level, systems for tabulating and calculating at
high speeds for academic, governmental, commercial or military purposes meant that
there was significant curiosity about the otherwise arcane results emerging from this
form of theoretical enterprise, even if it did not hold the public attention in the way
that, for example, theoretical physics did from the First World War onwards.
The following sections outline some of the salient developmental steps in the con-
struction of both computers generally and knowledge systems in particular.
1910s—Mathematical Principles
In Principia Mathematica, Whitehead and Russell (1910) endeavoured to re-found
the entirety of mathematics on the new “meta-mathematics” of formal logic. This
work developed upon Frege’s system, and was to prove instrumental in inspiring the
development of the austere brand of philosophy by the Vienna circle in the 1920s,
known as logical positivism (van Heijenoort, 1967). Principia Mathematica, more
than any other work, was responsible for directing Anglo-American philosophy away
from metaphysics, idealism and the na¨ıve empiricism of the nineteenth century, and
towards an empiricism instead founded upon the precise use of a language resolutely
committed to describing facts—a language epitomised in the severe codes of symbolic
logic. The impetus behind Russell and Whitehead’s project remained that of Leibniz’
dream, but phrased now in tones less of wishful thinking and more of matter-of-
factual inevitability. The task of logical analysis, in Russell’s telling introduction to
Wittgenstein’s work, is to show “how traditional philosophy and traditional solutions
arise out of ignorance of the principles of Symbolism and out of misuse of language”
(Wittgenstein, 1921). At the heart of this vision, in a reductionist form, is the idea
that, once the appropriate logical vocabulary is supplied, and the concepts of a field
made sufficiently clear, all knowledge can be reduced to empirical observation and
data collection.
1920s—“thereof one must be silent.”
This vision, in the various imaginings of Frege, Russell and the logical positivists,
receives its most incisive and forceful articulation in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-
Philosophicus (Wittgenstein, 1921). Not a work on logic in the usual sense—it uses
relatively little symbolism, almost no mathematics, and has none of the standard
hallmarks of logical papers or textbooks—it nevertheless had great influence, and has
continued to be read long after Principia Mathematica was relegated to relative ob-
scurity of the history of logic. Indicative of what was deemed to be the new putative
function of philosophy, the Tractatus took a long aim at the entire history of philos-
ophy, portraying it as a discipline awash with metaphysical confusion. The following
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exemplifies this critique, but also suggests the putative manner in which philosophy
ought to proceed—with surgical precision:
3.323 In the language of everyday life it very often happens that the same
word signifies in two different ways—and therefore belongs to two dif-
ferent symbols—or that two words, which signify in different ways, are
apparently applied in the same way in the proposition . . .
3.324 Thus there easily arise the most fundamental confusions (of which
the whole of philosophy is full).
3.325 In order to avoid these errors, we must employ a symbolism which
excludes them, by not applying the same sign in different symbols and
by not applying signs in the same way which signify in different ways. A
symbolism, that is to say, which obeys the rules of logical grammar—of
logical syntax.
(The logical symbolism of Frege and Russell is such a language, which,
however, does still not exclude all errors) (Wittgenstein, 1921, p. 41).
Wittgenstein’s specific technical contribution to the discipline of logic in the Trac-
tatus was limited to the construction of truth tables—a device for determining the
truth function of a proposition given the truth values of its atomic parts. The broader
influence of the Tractatus in philosophy, though, is inestimable—it completed the ex-
ercise instigated by Frege and Russell, of placing logic and linguistic analysis at the
centre of contemporary philosophical discourse (Rorty, 1992). Just as significantly,
once sufficiently interpreted and translated by Carnap, Ayer, Popper and others, it
emphasised just how the factual propositions constituting scientific knowledge, specif-
ically, were to be articulated—as a system of concepts, relations and properties. This
was to form the basis for how modern knowledge systems would develop. Of anything
which could not be subsumed directly within this system, logical positivists, following
Wittgenstein, might declare: “thereof one must be silent” (Wittgenstein, 1921).
1930s—Completeness, Truth, Decidability and Computations
The 1930s witnessed a furious explosion of both theoretical work in logic, and the first
emergence of its practical application. In the early years, two of the most significant
figures in the history of logic, Tarski and Go¨del, published vitally important results
for the future evolution of knowledge systems. Neither’s work is easily assimilable into
a historical synopsis of this sort, so this section focusses only on two of their more sig-
nificant results—published in Go¨del’s Incompleteness Theorem and Tarski’s Semantic
Conception of Truth, respectively. These results were to have near-immediate impact
on the development of computing—around the middle of the decade, both Church
and Turing delivered models of computation, and by the decade’s end, quite inde-
pendently, the first computer had been developed by Zuse in Germany (Lee, 1995).
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Thereafter, the war was both to disrupt and furnish new opportunities for research
in aid of the war effort, and, inadvertently, to establish a realignment of technological
prowess with the diaspora of mathematical talent from the old to the new world.
In 1931, Go¨del resolved the problem of providing a sufficient axiomatisation of
the foundations of mathematics, albeit with a negative result. In his Incomplete-
ness theorem, On Formally Undecidable Propositions in Principia Mathematica and
Related Systems, he proved that a logical system could not be both complete and
consistent. A system could only describe a complete set of theorems, such as those of
arithmetic, by also admitting contradictory theorems. This result was to have vital
implications—in Turing’s re-casting of it several years later, the “halting” problem
indicated that in the context of a hypothetical Turing machine performing an algo-
rithm, it was impossible to decide whether it would terminate or run forever. This
insight, vital to the general notion of computability, would also eventually mature into
different classes of logic-based knowledge systems, depending on the trade-off between
expressivity—what kinds of facts such systems can represent and reason over—and
tractability—what guarantees of performance and termination reasoning algorithms
would have (Nagel and Newman, 1959).
Tarski’s work on formal languages has greater application still for the development
of formal knowledge systems, and indeed has been highly influential in the philosophy
of natural language, as Chapter 2 suggests. Although most of his work related to
various fields in mathematics, several significant papers on logic published originally
in Polish in the 1930s focus on the concept of truth in formal languages (Tarski,
1957). These papers form the basis for the development of model theory, which aims
to describe how linguistic models (expressed in either formal or natural languages) can
be adequately interpreted in a truth-functional sense. Tarski’s relevant work from this
period is the Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages (Tarski, 1957). The aim of
the paper is to “construct—with reference to a given language—a materially adequate
and formally correct definition of the term ‘true sentence’ ” (Tarski, 1957). Tarski
is careful not to offer a definition of truth itself—that task, he states, belongs to
epistemology. Rather he is interested in answering the question: what is it for a
sentence constructed in a given (formal) language to be true? An important step
towards this result is the introduction of recursive languages, in which one language
(a metalanguage) can be used to give the truth conditions of those in another (an
object language). The metalanguage cannot however state the truth conditions of its
own sentences—these conditions must be stated in yet another metalanguage. For
Tarski, a sentence is true just in case there is a sentence in the metalanguage under
consideration which is its translation. Tarski frames this result as a postulate known
as Convention T. This semantic conception was eventually elaborated into model
theory in the 1950s, and gave the precise semantic determination required for the
construction of highly expressive formalisms, of which Semantic Web ontologies are a
contemporary example.
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Turing was another key figure who emerged in this period, building, as did Church,
upon Go¨del’s critical insights. Although Great Britain had a diminished role in the
development of computing in the post-war period, Turing remained a significant and
iconoclastic influence in this development until his death in 1954 (Hodges, 2009).
A member of the fervent Cambridge intellectual scene in the 1930s, Turing’s work
was to have greater practical consequence in the second half of the century than
any of his contemporaries. The Turing machine, elaborated in an effort to solve
the problem of mathematical decidability, was to form the basis of all of modern
computers. Its key insight is that a machine can not only encode information, but also
the very instructions for processing that information. This involved a virtualisation
of the machine: from a pre-defined instruction set built into the machine itself, to
one stored instead in “software”—a erasable, manipulable tape or script which now
programmed the machine. Critically, these instructions then could be modified, so
that the underlying physical machine would effectively be re-programmed using new
algorithms to replicate any number of different “logical” machines. In the same paper,
Turing also applied Go¨del’s incompleteness theorem to demonstrate the undecidability
of certain algorithmic classes. Just as the broad vista of the computer age was sketched
out in intricate detail via decidedly old-world metaphor of marked tape, ironically
its theoretical horizon—the limits of computability—were also being discovered and
announced.
1940s—Towards a Computational World
The work of Whitehead, Russell, Wittgenstein, Go¨del, Tarski, Church and Turing,
among many others, were to have substantial implications for modern computing
applications, but in the 1930s these remained confined to the small communities of
mathematicians and logicians. The first computers were developed in the late 1930s
and the early 1940s, in Germany and in Great Britain respectively (Metropolis et al.,
1980), and hence theoretical work in this field was only tentatively being applied
to practical applications. Although Great Britain and Germany continued to pro-
duce the predominant logicians of this period, the prominence of Tarski and others
attested to the broader interest in logic across the European continent, and increas-
ingly, in the United States (Davis, 2001; Ceruzzi, 2003). The advent of the Second
World War had two significant effects on the further development of logic and its
application. First, it brought greater attention and funding to a range of theoret-
ical disciplines, which suddenly appeared to have tremendous military application.
The most conspicuous example was the development of the atomic bomb, possible
only due to the recently realised theoretical feasibility of splitting atoms. But there
was also significant developing of computing applications, notably in Britain and the
United States—Turing’s enduring fame is partly due to his code-breaking work on
the Enigma project (Metropolis et al., 1980). Germany could also have entered the
computer age in this period; Zuse, an enterprising young engineer, built the first
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functioning computer in 1938, but ironically could not obtain funding from the Nazi
party to further its development (Metropolis et al., 1980; Lee, 1995). Second, with
less immediate but equally great long term effect, the rise of Nazism and the war
also stimulated the enormous migration of Jewish intellectuals to the United States
in the 1930s and the early years of the war (Davis, 2001). This included, along with
many others, both Go¨del and Tarski, as well as von Neumann, a leading logician
and economist, and also creator of the basic hardware architecture of the modern
computer (Lee, 1995). This influx of considerable talent provided an enormous stim-
ulus to American universities, noticeably at Princeton, Berkeley and Harvard. The
preponderance of these intellectuals led, in the post-war period, to a generation of
students who had been trained and influenced within the relatively sedate academic
climate of the wealthy American university system. In the context of the Cold War
and burgeoning economic conditions of the 1950s, highly trained mathematicians and
physicists were to be increasingly in demand for both industry and government. The
United States, and to a much lesser extent Russia, were well placed, then, to capi-
talise on the influx of significant intellectuals like Go¨del and Tarski—although their
influence was equally likely to be felt indirectly, through the work of their students,
and the subsequent dissemination of their results via translation.
Although they form only a small part of the broader work conducted in mathe-
matical logic, or as it was then termed, “metamathematics”, the logicians introduced
here still stand out as singularly responsible for both the disciplinary orientations of
philosophy and mathematics, and setting the foundations for the extraordinary rise
of the computing industry in subsequent years. In the latter part of the twentieth
century, this quantitative growth itself led to significant qualitative specialisation in
computing science, to the extent that the number of conferences, papers and results
has long since been impractical to survey single-handedly. Even this appreciable
academic activity pales in comparison, however, to the extraordinary industrial in-
vestment in computing applications. The next section aims to chart the direction of
this development in the latter part of the twentieth century, especially in the context
of the rise of knowledge systems. Of these, the relational database has had the most
spectacular rise, to the extent it is now a pervasive part of any modern-day organisa-
tional infrastructure. The Semantic Web represents an effort to develop an alternative
architecture for representing knowledge, featuring more expressive features than the
set-theoretic models of relational databases. Collectively, however, they both repre-
sent species of a broader common genus, a family of formal knowledge systems which
aimed to realise, with various inflections, the letter if not quite the spirit of Leibniz’
much earlier utopic dreams.
146 CHAPTER 6. CASE STUDY: FORMAL KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS
6.4 Tables and Webs: Emerging Structures of Knowl-
edge
6.4.1 Ordering the World by Relations
After the Second World War, and partially in response to the emergence of a new
kind of conflict in which information was to become a central rather than peripheral
military asset, the United States embarked upon a continuous and unabated course
of research into a wide range of computing applications. At one end of the research
spectrum was feverish, speculative and sometimes disappointing research into artificial
intelligence, conducted by technology-oriented institutes like MIT. At the other end,
companies and organisations like IBM, Xerox, DEC and the RAND Corporation de-
veloped their own, more commercially-oriented but still highly experimental research
incubators, which frequently coordinated with their academic counterparts, often hir-
ing bright PhD candidates with a firm eye on commercial applications (Ceruzzi, 2003).
Government departments, particularly those associated with the military, often en-
gaged researchers on various diverse computing projects, including cryptography, cy-
bernetics, game theory and large-scale networking (Ceruzzi, 2003). It was the work
of DARPA in the 1960s which gave rise to the first widespread computing networks,
forerunners of the modern Internet. Frequently more prosaic areas of research, like
networking, user interface development, typography and operating systems, yielded
long-term and substantial gains. Attempts to emulate concepts as nebulous and little
understood as human intelligence repeatedly hit low-lying hurdles—in the same pe-
riod Chomsky was demonstrating just how complex one area of cognition, language
acquisition and use, could be (Chomsky, 1965).
The rise of large commercial organisations operating over international territories
increased the imperative to develop technologies for managing the expansive quan-
titative growth of information (Lyotard, 1984). In the 1960s, as computers grew in
processing power and storage capacity, different methods were developed for manag-
ing volumes of structured information. A principal user of these technologies were
the banking and insurance industries, for whom the need to provide reliable and sys-
tematic information on customers and transactions was paramount. Data storage
at this time used a network or hierarchical model, where data records were linked
in a parent-child relationship. Navigating from parent records (for example, from a
customer) to children (to the customer’s transactions) was relatively simple program-
matically. However, the ad hoc aggregation of records based on relations which had
not been previously defined in this manner—for instance, a request for all successful
transactions within a given period—was time-consuming and computationally expen-
sive. An industry group, the Database Task Group, comprising a number of leading
technology companies, but notably excluding the market leader, IBM, proposed a
so-called “network” model in the late 1960s (National Research Council, 1999). Both
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this approach, and IBM’s subsequent alternative hierarchical model nonetheless con-
tinued to suffer the same limitations of performance and feasibility (National Research
Council, 1999).
In 1969, in response to these limitations, an IBM employee, Edgar Codd, de-
veloped a rich algebra and calculus for representing data using what he termed a
“relational model” (Codd, 1970). The model is comprised of several key concepts: re-
lations, attributes and tuples—concepts which became known to designers and users
of databases and spreadsheets under more familiar monikers of tables, columns and
rows. Although this paper essentially proposes the application of set theoretical con-
structs to data models, it has a practical purpose—it explicitly aims to provide a
better model for “non-inferential systems”, unlike the early progenitors of research
into artificial intelligence. The principal benefits of this model were to provide (a)
a sufficiently abstract series of informational constructs which, once standardised,
could allow for true data independence, and (b) a rigorous axiomatic system which
could ensure data consistency (although as subsequent database administrators would
discover, many other factors intrude upon the problem of maintaining a consistent
data set). IBM itself was slow to follow up on the promise of its own innovation,
and other elaborations of it which followed from its laboratories in the early 1970s.
The company did develop a prototype system based on the relational model, called
System R, but this failed to be adopted by IBM commercially (National Research
Council, 1999). It did however publish its research on the relational model; and in
1977, after reading some of this research, three entrepreneurs founded what was soon
to become the largest database company in the world, and one of the largest in the in-
formation technology sector (Oracle, 2007). Like Microsoft, Oracle’s growth through
the 1980s and 1990s was staggering—ironically, both companies profited from costly
miscalculations at IBM. Though IBM was soon to catch up somewhat with its own
commercial relational database system, Oracle’s success was largely driven by, and
indeed, cleverly anticipated the unrelenting drive of large organisations to manage
enormous data sets. This was complemented by the increasing affordances of ever
cheaper and more powerful hardware.
One of the principle advantages of the relational model is the provision of a stan-
dard and well-defined query language, SQL (Structured Query Language). In spite of
fierce competition among database vendors, and a corresponding emphasis on product
differentiation, SQL quickly became—and remained—an essential part of all modern
database systems (Date, 2007). SQL was ratified as an US ANSI standard in 1986,
and an international ISO standard in 1987, ensuring a minimal base compliance for
manipulating and querying data across rival systems (Wikipedia, 2009). Unhappily
for users of these systems, vendors like Oracle, IBM and Microsoft continued to ex-
tend the subsequent sequence of standards with various “proprietary” extensions—an
earlier example of the dynamics of standardisation pursued in greater detail in Chap-
ter 8. The preponderance of industry support for SQL demonstrates that even in the
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heavily competitive and nascent database software industry, vendors were prepared to
trade-off short-term competitive advantage against the longer term positive network
externalities of a larger marketplace built around selective feature standardisation and
differentiation (Katz and Shapiro, 1985). As SQL became an integral component of
modern computing degrees and certification processes, it demonstrated that English-
like formal languages could achieve widespread adoption, with the significant incentive
of a burgeoning job market in the 1990s and early part of the twenty-first century.
Moreover it was no longer just the domain of large organisations—small-to-medium
businesses and even keen individuals increasingly adopted relational databases as the
basis for data management, usually with convenient user interfaces overlaid. The
permeation of the relational data model into all aspects of computing culture repre-
sents the overwhelming and ongoing success of this paradigm for managing structured
data (National Research Council, 1999). Indeed, the relational model represents, in a
very direct sense, the culmination and fruition of the modernist dream to order and
organise knowledge systematically.
6.4.2 Early Threads of the Semantic Web
The evolution of the Semantic Web, and its methods for representing knowledge,
follow a decidedly different route. Since its earliest developments, when machines
first replaced human “computers” (Davis, 2001), theorists and philosophers had been
pondering the question of whether—and how—artificial intelligence was possible. The
Turing Test, developed as early as 1950, suggested a range of criteria for determin-
ing how machine intelligence could be tested (Turing, 1950). Research in artificial
intelligence was to proceed down numerous different lines over the remainder of the
century, in pursuit of the often elusive goal of emulating human behaviour and cogni-
tion. Frequently denigrated for not realising its lofty ambitions, many AI innovations
nevertheless filtered down from these comparatively abstract areas of research into
everyday practical technologies. One area which received particular attention was the
problem of modelling or representing knowledge—an essential step towards building
computational equivalents of memory and reasoning processes.
In the 1960s, Quillian (1967) pioneered the idea of “semantic networks”—graphs
of nodal concepts connected by associations, a precursor to neural networks. These
were followed by more detailed models, such as semantic frames (Minsky, 1974). Se-
mantic frames added the notion of “slots” to concepts, where their attributes could
be stored. Abstractly, both attributes and relations could be considered as proper-
ties of a concept, distinguished only on the basis of whether a property could take
a data value (attribute) or object value (relation). Semantic network and frame ap-
proaches were the basis of a number of early expert systems, with Minsky’s proposals
in particular galvanising interest in AI circles about the possibility of engineering com-
putational approximations to human cognitive processes (Sowa, 2000). From another
angle, there were various endeavours to instrumentalise theorem proving through use
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of declarative or logic programming languages (Colmerauer and Roussel, 1996). For
whatever reason—perhaps because it was easier to separate knowledge bases from the
procedures which reasoned over them—logic programming approaches were to remain
a niche market. On the other hand, it soon became apparent that the sorts of things
which constitute an “association” or “relationship” between concepts need greater
semantic specificity than existing semantic network or frame approaches allowed. In
1979, a new system, KL-ONE (Brachman and Schmolze, 1985), emerged with more
expressive semantics, where the kinds of relationships between conceptual nodes is
explicitly stipulated. This was a step closer towards greater levels of interoperabil-
ity between multiple knowledge systems; however, it was still possible to interpret
constructs differently across different systems.
Over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, researchers began developing restricted
forms of logic for representing knowledge (Sowa, 2000). “Terminological” or “de-
scription logics”, as they became known, were fragments of first order logic with
specific constructs for representing concepts, properties and individuals (Brachman
et al., 1991). Significantly, description logics were directly derived from Tarksi’s work
on model theory discussed earlier, providing unambiguous interpretation of the effect
of logical operations within conforming systems (Nardi and Brachman, 2003). For
example, if a concept is stipulated as being subsumed by two other concepts, its ex-
tension—the objects denoted by the concept—must be interpreted as the union of the
objects denoted by the parent concepts. For systems implementing these semantics,
and for users of these systems, this feature ensured consistency in the handling of
queries, and remedied many of the derivative problems which emerged in the imple-
mentations of earlier models (Nardi and Brachman, 2003).
Still, at this stage knowledge systems were invariably small scale—much too small
to capture the many background facts assumed to sit behind the kind of common
sense reasoning humans typically undertake. In 1984, Doug Lenat began a project
called Cyc, which was intended to contain all of the facts which constitute an or-
dinary human’s understanding of the world (Lenat, 2001). Development of the Cyc
knowledge base is still ongoing, part of the commercial intellectual property of its
owner, CycCorp, and represents a substantial undertaking to codify knowledge under
the auspice of a single overriding conceptualisation (Lenat, 2001).
Proposals for the Semantic Web built on the work of description logics even more
explicitly. Unlike Cyc, the vision of the Semantic Web involves many authors and
conceptualisations, linked together by a common model-theoretic framework in RDF
and OWL, explicit references and shared pointers to web resources. The explicit de-
sign goals of the Semantic Web were to provide a very general mechanism by which
knowledge could be represented, shared and reasoned over computationally. The first
published version of OWL came with different description logic variants, with dif-
ferent levels of expressivity and tractability—as the logic becomes more expressive,
there are less guarantees that in the worst case reasoning problems are tractable, or
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can be resolved in finite time (Levesque and Brachman, 1987). Though its precursors,
OIL (Ontology Inference Language) and DAML (DARPA Agent Markup Language),
were first motivated by a combination of academic and military research, OWL itself
quickly became sold to the broader web community as a facilitator for a new range of
“intelligent” services—process automation, e-commerce, system integration and en-
hanced consumer applications (Fensel et al., 2001; Berners-Lee et al., 2001). RDF had
similar, if more pragmatic origins as a language for data mark-up, with less emphasis
on automated reasoning. It was, however, also motivated by the need to model infor-
mation more flexibly than the highly structured models of preceding generations of
data technology—notably the relational model—would allow. The document-centric
nature of the World Wide Web suggested that significant amounts of information
could not conform to the strictures of a relational view of the world. While being
compatible with existing structured information sources was one constraint on the
design of RDF, so too was the need to permit modelling of flexible, semi-structured,
document-like and inter-connected data. The involvement of the World Wide Web
Consortium ensured that the Semantic Web architecture, both technically and philo-
sophically, built upon the foundations of the already—by the late 1990s, when the
first formal Semantic Web technical recommendations were drafted—hugely successful
precursor of the World Wide Web.
6.4.3 Shifting Trends or Status Quo?
Broadly, then, the Semantic Web can be seen as the consequence of three dominant
broad trends in information technology and management over the later decades of
the twentieth century. Firstly, organisations had grown in size; and commensurately,
the burgeoning fields of business, management and information studies had encour-
aged the use of disciplined techniques for obtaining greater predictability over key
variables in organisational operations. From the 1970s onwards, the explosive quan-
titative growth of data, the availability of and demand for computing resources for
storing and processing it, and the increasing awareness of the opportunistic value of
analysing it, led in turn to enormous investments in scientific research and develop-
ment, as well as considerable financial speculation in the data management industry.
This was primarily oriented around the relational data model—although other data
storage models continued to be prevalent in specific fields, the general applicability
of the relational model led to its near ubiquity as a mechanism for storing structured
information.
Meanwhile, a second, less perspicuous trend took place in the ongoing research
in artificial intelligence and knowledge representation, which in turn made feasible
a well-defined and consistent notation for describing facts and permitting sophisti-
cated inferencing operations. In fields with large numbers of concepts and very large
amounts of data, such as medical, financial and military applications, the need for
expert systems had long been evident.
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Finally, the rise of the World Wide Web—the third, and arguably most disrup-
tive of these trends—also brought new applications and therefore greater commercial
relevance for deductive reasoning systems. Where the relational model had typically
been used in intra-organisational (or even intra-departmental) settings, the advent of
a global network, and the academic, economic and political advantages to be gained
through its exploitation, made more evident than ever the need to supply unambigu-
ous definitions of data through a highly expressive formal notation. The application
of deductive reasoning to information from a myriad of sources gave rise to new prob-
lems of trust, proof and authentication, but also provided the tantalising prospect
of unprecedented data being accessible to reasoning algorithms. The development of
RDF and OWL were driven by the competing demands of providing notations simple
enough, on the one hand, to be used and developed by software engineers and web de-
velopers untrained in knowledge representation, and expressive enough, on the other,
to permit the kind of deductive power envisaged by the pioneers of AI, and indeed,
by their precursors, the foundational logicians.
In spite of these evolutions, it would be premature to conclude that the Seman-
tic Web is in the process of replacing the relational database. In fact the relational
model has proved remarkably resilient in an industry recognised for inevitable if not
always planned technological obsolescence. The massive commercial database indus-
tries still dwarf the largely academic and entrepreneurial world of the Semantic Web,
and considerable work has been devoted to building bridging technologies between the
respective formalisms—to promote, in fact, further use of the Semantic Web through
connections to existing relational repositories of data (Malhotra, 2008). Meanwhile,
many in the broader web community are also now examining alternatives to the Se-
mantic Web itself, suggesting a more complex picture marked by overlapping, shifting
trends rather than any clear pattern of technology phase-out (Khare and C¸elik, 2006).
At this stage it is more likely that both relational databases and Semantic Web ontolo-
gies will continue to be developed—making the question of their commensurability,
discussed in the section below, highly pertinent.
6.5 Systems of Knowledge: Modern and Postmod-
ern
These two models—the first, representing the fulfilment of modernist logicism, the
second, a postmodern response and would-be successor—have special interest within
a broader historical trajectory of formal systems. Relational systems hold, as men-
tioned above, a dominant position in the market of information systems. By one
indicator—worldwide “total software revenue” (incorporating licenses, subscriptions,
support and maintenance)—the relational database market grossed an estimated $15.3
billion USD in revenue in 2006, $16.8 billion USD in 2007 and $18.8 billion USD in
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2008, continuing to show strong growth rates in spite of a global economic downturn
(Gartner, 2007, 2009). While this figure includes immediately subsidiary revenues
accompanying software, it does not include the many development and maintenance
tools, services, related or derivative systems which depend on relational database
systems—a value likely to be much higher. Moreover, even an eventual meteoric rise
of the Semantic Web does not imply the eclipse of the database industry, since, as
suggested above, logical Semantic Web data structures like ontologies can be physi-
cally stored in a relational database; however, ontologies do present, as the analysis
above shows, a rival conception of knowledge representation at a logical level, and
also a separate tradition in a historical sense. Although they represent different
logical formalisms, with few ontological commitments, nevertheless they can be dis-
tinguished on the basis of certain minimal and abstract assumptions. Perhaps the
most contentious of these concerns the use of so-called “closed” versus “open” world
assumptions, a distinction which has received substantial attention in the literature
on logic, databases and knowledge representation (Reiter, 1987; Sowa, 2000). The
following review examines this distinction in greater detail.
6.5.1 Closed versus Open World Assumptions
Reiter (1987) introduced “closed world” assumptions to describe the interpretation of
an empty or failed query result on a database as equivalent to a negation of the facts
asserted in the query: “In a closed world, negation as failure is equivalent to ordinary
negation” (Sowa, 2000). In other words, the set of facts contained in a database are
assumed to be complete descriptions of a given domain of discourse—any proposition
not either directly stated or indirectly inferrable is interpreted to be false. In contrast
an assumption of an “open world” interprets the absence of a proposition as indicating
its truth-value is unknown (Date, 2007). One way of characterising this difference,
then, is to say that a “closed world assumption” interprets failure semantically—
directly, as a false proposition—where an “open world assumption” interprets failure
epistemologically—indirectly, as a failure of knowledge about the semantic state of
the proposition 1. An important consequence follows, related to the properties of
the logics which underpin these interpretive systems. Under open world assumptions,
reasoning is monotonic—no new information added to a database can invalidate ex-
isting information, and the deductive conclusions which can be drawn from it (Sowa,
2000). Reasoning is essentially additive—new facts added to the database always
increase the number of conclusions which can be drawn. In the extreme case, if a
new proposition contradicts something already stated, every proposition is rendered
provable. Conversely, nonmonotonic reasoning is revisionary—new facts can revise
existing conclusions. Depending on the scope of new facts, the sum of conclusions
derivable from a database can accordingly increase or decrease. In logical terms, if a
conclusion C is derivable from a premiss A, but not from the conjunction of A and
1This distinction is analogous to that between frequentist and Bayesian interpretations of probability.
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a further proposition B, then the mode of reasoning must be nonmonotonic (Hayes,
2004).
Matters are further complicated with the introduction of context. As Hayes (2004)
note:
The relationship between monotonic and nonmonotonic inferences is often
subtle. For example, if a closed-world assumption is made explicit, e.g.
by asserting explicitly that the corpus is complete and providing explicit
provenance information in the conclusion, then closed-world reasoning is
monotonic; it is the implicitness that makes the reasoning nonmonotonic.
Nonmonotonic conclusions can be said to be valid only in some kind of
‘context’, and are liable to be incorrect or misleading when used outside
that context. Making the context explicit in the reasoning and visible in
the conclusion is a way to map them into a monotonic framework.
Consequently it is possible to augment a set of propositions, interpreted under
local closed-world conditions, with explicit contextual information—temporal, spa-
tial, providential, jurisdictional, functional—to move towards an open-world inter-
pretation essential to the unconstrained environment of the Semantic Web. Since
specifying context is itself an open-ended affair, this suggests interpretation moves
across a scale of “closed-open worldliness”—a point also suggested by Sowa (2000):
“Reiter’s two categories of databases can be extended with a third category, called
semi-open, in which some subdomains are closed by definition, but other subdomains
contain observed or measured information that is typically incomplete”. Conversely,
Date (2007) disputes that anything approximating to open world reasoning ever takes
place, even on the Semantic Web—this would entail an unacceptable ternary logic, as
though the epistemic predicate “unknown” could sit alongside the semantic predicates
of “true” and “false”. It is worth noting that there is incommensurability here even
at the level of definition—by, as it happens, noted authorities on the Semantic Web
(Hayes) and the relational model (Date) respectively. Interpreting commensurability
of systems distinguished by this assumption depends, then, on how the assumption
itself is viewed: as an epistemological question over the nature of non-existent in-
formation; as a scale against which the state of information of a database can be
measured; or as a nonsensical category.
6.5.2 Modern Grids, Postmodern Webs
These properties of logical interpretation are not unconnected from the cultural en-
virons in which database systems are used. Indeed, it is precisely because of the
unusual usage conditions of the Semantic Web that “open world assumptions” and
non-monotonic reasoning are considered significant in this context. As Date (2007)
notes, the “closed” metaphor has an unfortunately pejorative connotations—but iron-
ically parallels the closedness of the cultural contexts in which systems with closed
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world assumptions are likely to be used. As the tracing of their respective evolu-
tionary paths above suggests, the Semantic Web is largely derived from academic
research; conversely, relational databases originate in commercial and organisational
environments. The connotations of these institutional settings impacts on the con-
temporary reception of the formalisms themselves. The following section examines
remarks made by online commentators in response to these cultural allusions.
Numerous media articles and bloggers have commented on the apparent threat
and “disruptive innovation” of the Semantic Web to the prevailing relational database
paradigm. Familiar tropes heralding the “shock of the new” are common in the more
hyperbolic of media reports. Several blog articles presage the “death” of the relation
database model2, while one blogger eulogises the rise of RDF and OWL3, delivering
an acute characterisation of the perceived distinction between old and new models:
The single failure of data integration since the inception of information
technologies—for more than 30 years, now—has been schema rigidity or
schema fragility. That is, once data relationships are set, they remain so
and can not easily be changed in conventional data management systems
nor in the applications that use them.
Relational database management (RDBM) systems have not helped
this challenge, at all. While tremendously useful for transactions and en-
abling the addition of more data records (instances, or rows in a relational
table schema), they are not adaptive nor flexible.
Why is this so?
In part, it has to do with the structural view of the world. If everything
is represented as a flat table of rows and columns, with keys to other flat
structures, as soon as that representation changes, the tentacled connec-
tions can break. Such has been the fragility of the RDBMS model, and
the hard-earned resistance of RDBMS administrators to schema growth
or change4.
Other commentators portray the shift towards the Semantic Web in similarly
revolutionary terms:
To me, the Semantic Web is a fundamental shift in software architecture5.
The relational database is becoming increasingly less useful in a web 2.0
world6.
2Lunn (2008); Williams (2008); Zaino (2008). In this and the following two case studies, primary
sources are footnoted in this manner, while secondary sources continue to be cited inline. The
distinction is not always clear-cut here, as some sources could be considered either primary or
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On the other side of the coin, many voices have decried the complexity, redun-
dancy and eccentric design of the Semantic Web, which intentionally introduces an
“impedance mismatch” with mainstream information technological infrastructure, no-
tably the world of relational databases and associated tools and expertise. An early
and infamous critique ironically postulated that the Semantic Web was a purist aca-
demic exercise designed to homogenise the world’s information under a complex ar-
chitecture, requiring both a deductive logic and a single global ontology, and with
little practical likelihood of adoption and uptake:
This is the promise of the Semantic Web—it will improve all the areas of
your life where you currently use syllogisms.
Which is to say, almost nowhere7.
More nuanced critiques have emphasised the beneficial character of de facto stan-
dards, preferring the gradual refinement undergone in practical situations and use to
the imposition of de jure standards:
The best standards are the ones that develop “from below” through widespread
use. Then the job of the standards committees is to recognize what is al-
ready being used, to tidy up the details, and to solidify the foundations8.
The articulation of these positions tend to congeal around several common metaphor-
ical tropes. The Semantic Web is open, free, “bottom-up”, democratic. The rela-
tional database is closed, secure, solid, robust, “top-down”, controlled. The Semantic
web conveys a chaotic sprawling information network or graph, without apparent
origin, centre or terminus. The relational database is housed within the “back of-
fice” of the modern-day enterprise, whose grid-locked modernist architecture mirror
structured data sets, with rectilinear tables, columns, rows and cells. The Semantic
Web is broad, visionary, idealistic, experimental, revolutionary, part of Web 2.0, 3.0
or even some futuristic variant; the relational database is mature, well-understood,
pragmatic, workable, third or fourth generational technology, protected by corporate
support. Where the Semantic Web famously envisions a world in which “information
wants to be free”—a phrase originating in an earlier period of computing infused with
libertarian ethos (Clarke, 2001), but often applied to the Semantic Web movement
equally—relational databases are often portrayed as siloed repositories of hermetically
sealed, “closed” organisational data, carefully managed by government and corporate
enterprises and departments—the catch-cry of this world might be instead “no-one
ever got fired for choosing IBM”. The world of the database is a de-humanised, ad-
ministered, bureaucratic, orderly, modernist Gesellschaft ; the semantic web instead
an interconnected, uncontrolled, chaotic and postmodern Gemeinschaft.
These metaphorical caricatures ignore numerous confounding elements: for exam-
ple, Semantic Web data (RDF and OWL ontologies) are capable of being stored in
7Shirky (2003).
8Sowa (2007e).
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relational databases, and relational databases have for some time supported a range
of technical connectivity options. It might well be argued that benevolent synergies
between styles of systems makes for less interesting debate, and less opportunity to
differentiate products and services which depend on perceived friction and dissonance.
More august commentary is provided by Tim Berners-Lee, suggesting, very early in
the development of the Semantic Web, that the major differences are superficially
syntactic, rather than semantic, ontological or epistemological:
The semantic web data model is very directly connected with the model
of relational databases . . . The mapping is very direct9.
Considerable commercial and academic research has also been directed towards
hybrid and bridging technologies between relational databases and the Semantic Web,
as the report by Malhotra (2008) suggests. Some of these involve simply publishing
relational data as RDF; others use relational models to capture RDF and OWL onto-
logical axioms directly; still others provide mappings between proprietary XML and
other formats and standard RDF. Current trends tend towards conciliation—perhaps
as both positive and negative hysteria around the Semantic Web changes into a more
mature recognition of its role, as something neither entirely central nor tangential, in
modern system engineering.
6.5.3 Assessing Commensurability
Some points of historical, technical and sociological contrast have been elaborated
in the discussion of knowledge systems above. What does this analysis imply for an
assessment of the commensurability of the systems? The table below picks up several
of the generic dimensions presented in Chapter 5 to characterise at least what are
perceived differences in the systems. These have been selected largely because they
have emerged as distinctive in the analysis above. Several addition dimensions have
also been added—“Open World Assumptions”, “Interconnected with Other Systems”,
“Trusting of Other Systems” and “Multi-modal” (meaning multiple generic “modes”
of information are supported—qualitative or quantitative; structured or amorphous;
textual or multimedia)—which are particularly relevant to this comparison. Each
of the dimensions is rated only in approximated quantitative terms—since the as-
sessment here is designed to exercise and explore the framework, and has no obvious
practical assessment, there are no clear grounds to be derived from a situation context
for weighting and valuing the dimensions more precisely. Nevertheless it is possible
to see a general outline emerge in the evaluations below.
9Berners-Lee (1998/2009).
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Table 6.1: Comparison of Knowledge Systems
Dimension Relational Model Semantic Web
Orientation
Open World Assumptions Low High
Interconnected with Other Systems Low High






Financially Motivated High Low
Politically Motivated Low Moderate
Process
Central—Distributed Design Moderate High
Closed—Transparent Process Moderate High
Reception
Low—High Adoption Rate High Moderate
Low—High Maturity High Low
Backwards Compatibility High Moderate
De Facto Standard High Low
De Jure Standard High High
Industry Support High Moderate
In terms of public perception and adoption, in particular, the analysis suggests
the two systems are broadly incommensurable. One key dimension, Open World
Assumptions, suggests a potentially insurmountable difference in orientation between
the two formalisms. As the analysis above suggests, evaluating the effect of this
distinction in particular depends critically on how radically it is interpreted. Several
interpretations were suggested: Date, for example, views the distinction itself as the
product of a confusion of semantic and epistemological boundaries; for Hayes, the
distinction can be erased through the explication of context; for Sowa, the distinction
is a gradual one, as system “subdomains” can be either closed or open; for other
commentators (Kolb, 2008; Williams, 2008; Bergman, 2009), the division is instead
indicative of more fundamental incommensurability. Assessing the very possibility of
translation between systems falling on either side of this assumption depends, then,
on which of these interpretations are adopted.
In relation to the broader social dimensions, the interest in the Semantic Web has
paralleled the phenomenal growth of “libertarian” technologies: commoditised com-
puting hardware and connectivity, open source software, standards and protocols, and
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the World Wide Web itself. Sympathies with these ideals might emphasise stronger
incommensurability with older, industrial and bureaucratic technological models like
the relational database. However, the relation between the knowledge system and
its field of application is far from a direct one—relational databases also benefit from
open standards; and a number of database products have been released as open source.
Equally, the Semantic Web has suffered from the perception that it is overly complex
and immature relative to its older representational sibling. How much of this critique
will endure in the face of further research and emerging industry supports remains to
be seen.
As suggested much earlier in the historical account, lurking within the deep divi-
sions of epistemological assumptions between these two formalisms is an even deeper
epistemological affinity—a putative view that knowledge can be heavily structured,
organised, cleaned and disambiguated from its natural language expression. Insofar
as formalisms can be contrasted, the salient contrastive features necessarily suggest
difference over similarity. It is only when positioned against broader epistemologi-
cal frames—which might dispute the very project of rendering knowledge faithfully
in denuded formalistic terms—that this deeper affinity is exhibited. In moving to-
wards other, more fine-grained domains of comparison and commensurability, this
irreducibly contextual aspect of assessment needs to remain prominent.
6.6 Knowledge Systems in Social Context
To round out the discussion of knowledge systems, the following summary also teases
out what was an underlying thread in the account above—the relationship between
technological innovation and broader social shifts. These shifts exhibit a complex
network of causal relationships to the general processes of technological design, devel-
opment and innovation, and hence, to the question of commensurability between rival
systems that emerge from these processes. These relationships, tenuously charted in
this study, are more explicit in the studies that follow.
In the last quarter of the twentieth century the development of formal knowledge
systems has been precipitous. The preceding discussion showed how this ascent was
premised upon the foundational work in mathematical logic in the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries. Leibniz’s dream—of a single symbolic language in which
thoughts and argument could be conducted without ambiguity—was a constant motif
throughout the evolution of this tradition. Symbolic logic, then, represents a pristine
formal component of a long-ranging historical epistemological ideal, while an endless
accumulation of “sense-experience” supplies the matter. The Semantic Web repre-
sents a modern-day re-casting of this ideal, in which precise agreement about meaning
forms the underlying substrate for sharing information and deducing inferences. It re-
ceives its most emphatic expression from Ayer, who envisioned philosophy and science
of ardent empiricism:
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The view of philosophy which we have adopted may, I think, fairly be
described as a form of empiricism. For it is characteristic of an empiricist
to eschew metaphysics, on the ground that every factual proposition must
refer to sense-experience (Ayer, 1952, p. 71).
The unfolding of this tradition in the account above describes three key phases—
classicism, modernism and postmodernism. These phases show an increasing impulse
towards the development of “taxinomia”—indexable, searchable and interoperable
knowledge systems which span from the globally networked enterprise down to the
fragmentary databases of commercial and social interactions managed by individual
consumers. By tracing this tradition through a purely intellectual history, it is possible
to suggest several causal factors internal to the tradition itself: the production of
particular fortuitous mathematical results, or a sense of exhaustion with the preceding
metaphysical speculations of Kant and Hegel, for example. It is equally possible,
though, to plot lines of concordance between this intellectual history and broader
transitions in economic and political history. Is it purely fortuitous that the search for
logic formalisms coincided with a reciprocal drive towards standardisation, in a host of
technological, communicative and legal fields, that is related to modern capitalism—
specifically, of its relentless need and demand for predictability and efficiency? For
Foucault, the modern taxonomic impulse originate alongside the great social and
political shifts of the Enlightenment:
What makes the totality of the Classical episteme possible is primarily
the relation to a knowledge of order. When dealing with the ordering
of simple natures, one has recourse to a mathesis, of which the universal
method is algebra. When dealing with the ordering of complex natures
(representations in general, as they are given in experience), one has to
constitute a taxinomia, and to do that one has to establish a system of
systems (Foucault, 2002, pp. 79–80).
By the time of the emergence of formal logic in something like its rigorous modern
form in the nineteenth century, the world was also undergoing a period of rapid eco-
nomic expansion, industrialisation, scientific endeavour and technological innovation
(Hobsbawm, 1975). Already the opportunities of standardisation were being consid-
ered in a host of practical contexts—rail gauge standardisation, currency exchange,
scientific notation, legal charters and academic disciplinary vocabularies. The coun-
terweight to international and inter-corporate competition was the beneficial network
externalities—greater efficiency, information transparency and intelligibility—these
standards would bring. Since these first standards emerged, their growth has been
rapid—the ISO website alone presently advertises 17,500 separately catalogued stan-
dards (ISO, 2009).
While standardisation might rightly seem, then, to be an inextricable feature
of modernity, coupled with economic globalisation and cultural homogenisation, it
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can equally be argued that capitalism also harbours countervailing trends towards
systemic differentiation. Most notably in the case of the quintessential capitalist
organisation, the company, product or service differentiation forms the foundation
for market share, profit, and thus for increasing shareholder value. To take one
metric of the extent of differentiation, at the level of invention and innovation: the
US Patent Office has filed over seven million utility patents alone since 1836 (United
States Patent and Trademark Office, 2009), with an average rate of increase in the
number of patent applications between 1836 and 2008 of 23.5%. In 1838, 436 patent
applications were filed; in 2008, 158,699 applications were filed, an overall increase
of 36,398% over 170 years10. Whatever explanation of drift towards standardisation
can be drawn from modern capitalism, there is an equivalent burden for explaining
a similar level of hyper-activity towards proprietary protection of intellectual capital
and assets.
Equivalent, if more tenuous motives for differentiation can be found in other or-
ganisational types—political affiliations, methodological distinctions and sublimated
competitive instincts exist in government, scientific and academic institutions as much
as in corporate ones. The development and coordination of knowledge systems—
formalised representations of meaning—has its origins, in one side of modern capi-
talism, in the impulse to order, organise and predict. The proliferation of multiple
systems represents, then, another facet of capitalism—the need for differentiation
and competition. Schumpeterian “creative destruction”, describing the process by
which capitalism continually cannibalises its own monuments with successive waves
of technological and procedural innovation, captures something of these apparently
contradictory impulses towards both standardisation and differentiation at the level
of systems of meaning. However, as this and the following studies show, other, less
tangible vectors can also be seen influencing the mutations of these systems.
At this stage, though, it is sufficient to draw out the coincidental tendencies be-
tween the specific phenomenon of the emergence of knowledge systems and the much
broader chameleonic shifts of capitalism, without pursuing too strong an attribution
to determining causes. The following studies bring out other complicating and more
fine-grained features of the contexts in which these systems emerge, and of the factors
which influence their respective differentiation.
10The raw data has been taken from (United States Patent and Trademark Office, 2009)—the per-




Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity,
quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection. To sketch
my meaning roughly, examples of substance are ‘man’ or ‘the horse’, of
quantity, such terms as ‘two cubits long’ or ‘three cubits long’, of quality,
such attributes as ‘white’, ‘grammatical’. ‘Double’, ‘half’, ‘greater’, fall
under the category of relation; ‘in a the market place’, ‘in the Lyceum’,
under that of place; ‘yesterday’, ‘last year’, under that of time. ‘Lying’,
‘sitting’, are terms indicating position, ‘shod’, ‘armed’, state; ‘to lance’,
‘to cauterize’, action; ‘to be lanced’, ‘to be cauterized’, affection (Aristotle,
1994, p. 4).
The following case study examines the field of “upper-level”, or foundational, ontolo-
gies. In the past ten years a number of upper-level ontologies have been developed
to establish a set of concepts and definitions which could be shared by lower-level,
domain ontologies. A good upper-level ontology should aim to:
• promote design modularity, by abstracting common concepts from domain on-
tologies;
• encourage reusability by domain ontologies, by providing useful concepts which
do not need to be re-specified by those ontologies;
• enhance interoperability among domain ontologies, by providing common points
of reference.
“Upper-level” ontologies are therefore one approach to the problem of commensu-
rability for domain-level ontologies. By establishing a core set of abstract concepts,
use of an upper-level ontology by domain-level ontologies is at least some guarantee
of a shared metaphysical orientation. For example, several upper-level ontologies sur-
veyed below make a fundamental distinction between “endurants” and “perdurants”,
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or in another vocabulary, “occurrents” and “continuants”. Roughly, this conceptual
pair distinguishes things which take place in time—such as events—from those which
exist through time—such as material objects. Domain-level ontologies which import
an upper-level ontology making this distinction can be said to inherit this conceptual
distinction too. So two such ontologies can at least be said to be commensurable
insofar as their subordinate conceptual classes are distinguishable as either event-like
endurants or object-like perdurants. Use of the OWL syntactic imports construct to
import an ontology does not guarantee that all—or even any—of its semantic com-
mitments are inherited in this way, but does provide a starting point for domain-level
ontologies to establish points of connectivity and interoperability.
Inevitably there has been competition in the development of upper-level ontolo-
gies. Rather than answer questions of compatibility and commensurability among
domain-level ontologies, then, this has served to redirect these question towards the
upper-level ontologies themselves. In a scenario where two domain-level ontologies im-
port and use different upper-level ontologies, a matching task may need to establish
concordance between the concepts specified in both the domain-level and upper-level
ontologies. Moreover, precisely due to the abstraction of conceptualisations specified
in the upper-level ontologies, these matches become considerably more difficult to
establish, especially by purely algorithmic means.
The first part of the study below surveys five ontologies developed in the OWL
language over the past decade, to examine what sorts of evaluation of commensurabil-
ity can be made about them. As well as using the framework established in Chapter
5, this study also makes use of some earlier comparative work by Oberle et al. (2007).
All of the ontologies were developed by academic groups, with some level of industry
and government input. One side effect of this method of development, and of the
relative obscurity of upper-level ontologies, is that while there are more or less corre-
sponding academic publications for each of the ontologies, it is comparatively difficult
to understand much of the motivations, reasons and processes by which the ontologies
are developed. To date, the ontologies are not widely used either, making it difficult to
understand how they are used in derivative domain-level ontologies. To combat this,
the second part of the study also examines two public mailing lists (the Semantic Web
and Ontolog Forum lists), where many of the issues relating to upper-level ontologies
are debated, and several of the ontology authors themselves also appear. A series
of quantitative and qualitative techniques are used to elicit clarification of several of
the distinctions developed in the review of ontologies. The study then concludes with
a general assessment of the commensurability of the ontologies, and some notes on
potential implications for the overall model of commensurability developed thus far.
7.1 A Survey of Upper-Level Ontologies
The following survey describes the ontologies in terms of five specific features:
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• Background contextual information
• Stated or implied methodologies
• Explicitly stated assumptions
• Structural features
• Key concepts and categories
The survey covers five published upper-level ontologies which have expressed in the
Web Ontology Language (OWL), version 1.0 (Hayes et al., 2004). These ontologies
are: Basic Formal Ontology (BFO)1, PROTo ONtology (PROTON)2; General Formal
Ontology (GFO)3; Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering
(DOLCE)4; and Standard Upper Merged Ontology (SUMO)5.
7.1.1 Background
The upper-level ontologies surveyed are developed within academic, or joint academic-
government initiatives, sometimes as part of larger projects. For example, the BFO
ontology has been developed within the Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical In-
formation Science (IFOMIS), utilising a grant to “develop a formal ontology that will
be applied and tested in the domain of medical and biomedical information science”6.
Similarly the DOLCE ontology has been developed as part of “EU IST integrated
project Semantic Knowledge Technologies (SEKT)”, a project funded by the “EU
6th Framework programme”7. Two of the ontologies—BFO and GFO—have been
developed with specific focus on medical classification applications. The institutional
nature of ontology engineering is common to domain-specific ontologies also, although
several popular ontologies have been developed in the public domain, without any no-
table institutional involvement—the Friend of a Friend (FOAF) ontology is one such
example8.
All of the ontologies have been developed in Europe, with the exception of SUMO,
developed in the United States. Each of the ontology results have been presented at
semantic web-related conferences—suggesting that, at time of publication, upper-level
ontologies generally have been of greater interest to academic communities than either
commercial or software engineering communities. In addition, there are numerous
academic publications which cite these ontologies or the papers describing them, either
1Grenon (2003a). Note that as with the other studies, sources treated as primary are cited as
footnotes rather than inline.
2Terziev et al. (2004).
3Herre (2009).
4Masolo et al. (2002).
5Niles and Pease (2001).
6IFOMIS (2007).
7Semantic Knowledge Technologies (SEKT) (2007).
8FOAF (2007).
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in the context of ontology engineering specifically, or in relation to broader ontological
questions.
Many of the authors of findings actively contribute to public domain mailing lists
where ontology engineering issues are discussed. For example, Barry Smith and John
Sowa have been actively involved in the construction of two of the featured ontologies
(BFO and SUMO respectively), and also have contributed extensively to mailing lists
analysed further on in this analysis. In spite of the lack of mailing lists or other
discursive sources dedicated to the surveyed ontologies themselves, there is active
online debate about the sorts of concepts and distinctions which feature in upper-
level ontologies generally. An analysis of these mailing lists is presented in further
detail below.
At time of writing it is difficult to measure the relative impact of the ontologies
quantitatively. For the purpose of the survey, two sources have been used to indicate
the impact:
• Results from Swoogle, a semantic web search engine (Ding et al., 2004);
• Citation counts from Google Scholar in relation to the titles of key papers pre-
senting the ontologies.
Results have been collated from Swoogle and Google Scholar searches conducted
in October, 2007 and October, 2009. They are presented in tables 7.1 and 7.2.
Table 7.1: Swoogle Results
Ontology Search Terma 2007 2009
BFO “BFO” 10 135
PROTON “Proto Ontology” 5 10
GFO “GFO” 10 38
DOLCE “DOLCE” 108 157
SUMO “SUMO” 92 121
aThe “Search Term” is the actual text searched for, in order to disambiguate ontology names or
acronyms from other names. In the case of “Proton”, for example, the ontology title is also the
name of a physical object (positively sub-atomic particle).
The comparison between Swoogle and Google Scholar show a positive correlation
of 0.67 for the results in 2007, and a weaker correlation of 0.37 for those in 2009. With
the exception of the large number of ontology references for BFO, DOLCE and SUMO
are more prominent both in terms of ontologies references and citations. This does
not take into account private usage of these ontologies, but provides a useful heuristic
of present adoption rates. It indicates also the increased use of upper-level ontologies
over time, according to both of the metrics used, with numbers roughly doubling on
average over the two year period for all ontologies surveyed. As mentioned, the BFO
ontology experienced a large surge in number of ontology references—this abnormal
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Table 7.2: Google Scholar Results
Ontology Search Terma 2007b 2009
BFO “Spatio-temporality in Basic Formal
Ontology”
11 13
PROTON “Base upper-level ontology (BULO)
Guidance”
9 19
GFO “General Formal Ontology (GFO)” 2 12
DOLCE “The WonderWeb Library of Founda-
tional Ontologies”
71 168
SUMO “Toward a standard upper ontology” 356 773
aIn this case the “Search Term” is the name of the main paper in which the ontology is presented.
The same paper can be listed several times in results (for example, as both conference proceedings
and technical reports); the citation counts have been totalled where this has occurred, and also
where the citation count is greater than 1.
bBoth 2007 and 2009 figures refer to the aggregate number of citations as reported by Google Scholar.
jump appears to the result of widespread references from newly developed biological
ontologies housed by the OBO Foundry, which the BFO was designed to support9.
It is also worth noting there have several prominent efforts at upper-level ontologies
which predate the emergence of OWL as a standard for modeling ontologies:
• Cyc
• WordNet
• Standard Upper Ontology (SUO)
These are expressed in different formalisms, and so are not amenable to algo-
rithmic comparison with those expressed in OWL. The SUMO ontology is explicitly
indebted to the SUO ontology (Niles and Pease, 2001), and most of the ontologies
described have some level of mapping to WordNet—a publicly available online dictio-
nary which links words based on semantic relations (Miller, 1995). Cyc is an older and
well-established representation of both upper-level and domain-level knowledge10, de-
veloped privately by CycCorp—it is frequently cited in the literature on upper-level
ontologies (and knowledge representation), but for reasons of both its proprietary
nature and different formal structure, it is not available for direct comparison.
Finally, as discussed at further length in the Assumptions section below, several
of the upper-level ontologies have been developed with awareness of competing on-
tologies, and so reference distinctions between them explicitly. For instance, the GFO
ontology is compared with SUMO and DOLCE by its authors11; the BFO ontology
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CYC13; and the SUMO ontology, as mentioned, is itself compiled from both SUO and
a range of other sources:
The SUMO was created by merging publicly available ontological con-
tent into a single, comprehensive, and cohesive structure. This content
included the ontologies available on the Ontolingua server, John Sowa’s
upper level ontology, the ontologies developed by ITBM-CNR, and various
mereotopological theories, among other sources14.
There has also been a certain amount of post facto literature comparing DOLCE
and SUMO in particular (the innovatively entitled DOLCE ergo SUMO (Oberle et al.,
2007) and OntoMap (Kiryakov et al., 2001) being two such examples). This activ-
ity suggests that ontology engineering is a highly dynamic social process, and at the
present time, still far from finding agreement for the abstract concepts upper-level
ontologies describe. The engagement with the mailing lists—the informal “chatter”
which sits behind the formal austerity of ontologies—explores this dynamic and dia-
logical process further.
7.1.2 Methodologies
The methodologies outlined in the literature surrounding upper-level ontologies vary
from highly explicit (SUMO) to implicit (PROTON). Table 7.3 represents an overview
of the methodological approach adopted—as best as can be inferred if not otherwise
stated—and the degree of formality of process of ontology construction.
The variance in methodology (both in terms of the adopted approach itself, and
the degree of explicitness about the approach) is one indicator about the degree of
commensurability between upper-level ontologies. How concepts are selected and ar-
ranged can divulge further assumptions not explicit in the conceptualisation. However
even in the case of the SUMO ontology, little is stated about how one concept was
chosen over another: what leads to a particular arrangement of concepts, beyond an
acknowledgement of certain existential assumptions, and what degree of detail is suit-
able. Arguably methodology is harder to apply to upper-level ontologies especially,
given the abstractions of the concepts concerned. The later discussion returns to this
variance, since it has a bearing on what can be said about the commensurability of
these ontologies.
7.1.3 Assumptions
None of the upper-level ontologies surveyed lay great pretensions towards definitive-
ness; the authors of DOLCE for instance state “we do not intend DOLCE as a
candidate for a ‘universal’ standard ontology”15. In the literature showcasing the
13Terziev et al. (2004).
14Niles and Pease (2001).
15Masolo et al. (2002).
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Table 7.3: Ontology Methodologies
Ontology Methodology Degree of For-
mality
BFO Draws on an explicit account of philo-
sophical ontologya
Moderate
GFO Draws on abstract conceptualisations
presented in philosophical literature
(Brentano, Husserl, Hartmann, Ingar-
den, Johansson, Searle)
Moderate
PROTON Designed as a “light-weight” ontology,
modeled on “common sense”b
Low
SUMO Identifies a range of prior ontologies,
including SUO; ensures each identi-
fied ontology is syntactically compati-
ble; performs a manual semantic merg-
ing of the ontologies
High
DOLCE Unknown (seems to rely upon prior re-
search)
Moderate
aGrenon and Smith (2004).
bTerziev et al. (2004).
ontologies, their designers are overtly aware of the assumptions which characterise
their construction16. Nevertheless there are clear differences in these assumptions,
both in kind and degree. The following section examines both what assumptions are
employed, and how these compare.
BFO
The Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) is by far the most explicit about the assumptions
the authors employ in its design. The three papers outlining the BFO are presented
alongside six other papers authored or co-authored by Smith, heavily directed to-
wards justification of a philosophical orientation of “realist perspectivalism”17. This
is characterised by “the view that any given domain of reality can be viewed from
a number of different ontological perspectives, all of which can have equal claim to
veridicality”18. Realist perspectivalism avoids two key fallacies of ontology engineer-
ing, in Smith’s views: on the one hand, those inherited from “idealist, skeptical, or
constructionist philosophy”, which “appear commonly in the wider world under the
guise of postmodernism or cultural relativism”19; and on the other, those incurred
through too enthusiastic an adherence to predicate logic and the stark ontology of its
formalism—a brand of philosophy described by Smith as “fantology”20. This latter
16Grenon (2003b); Masolo et al. (2002).
17BFO (2007); Smith (2004).
18Smith and Grenon (2004).
19Smith (2004).
20Smith (2005).
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kind of fallacy has, for Smith, been perpetuated by logicians since Frege:
But [Frege’s] signal achievement was for a long time marred by its associ-
ation with an overestimation of the power of a relatively simplistic type of
logico-linguistic analysis to resolve ontological problems. Exposing some
of the effects of this overestimation should allow us to understand the
development of analytical philosophy in a new way, and to bring to light
aspects of this development which are normally hidden21.
Smith’s alternative, which forms the guiding principle of the BFO’s construction,
is admit perspectivalism only in veridical form, that is, only insofar as any given
perspective is corroborated by natural science:
But perspectivalism is constrained by realism: thus it does not amount to
the thesis that just any view of reality is legitimate. To establish which
views are legitimate we must weigh them against their ability to survive
critical tests when confronted with reality, for example via scientific ex-
periments22.
In this paper, the realist perspectivalist account is augmented with fallibilist and
adequetist qualifiers. Smith names philosophical precursors to this account are Aris-
totle and Husserl—though, with similarities to the GFO assumptions discussed later,
Husserl is mediated by Ingarden’s realist phenomenology.
A pivotal difference between the approach promulgated by Smith and Grenon in
their introductory paper to the BFO, and the unified reductivist ontology they cri-
tique, concerns the treatment of time, or in the more particular words of the authors,
different “Temporal Modes of Being”23. Smith and Grenon devote considerable atten-
tion to the distinction between 3D and 4D perspectives (which they translate into the
more convenient monikers “SNAP” and “SPAN”24. According to the perspectivalist
account, a generalised account must be capable of reflecting both perspectives (oth-
erwise it falls on the side of a reductivist account, privileging a single perspective).
The 3D/SNAP perspective treats entities in the world as continuant or endurant (en-
tities which exist wholly at some point in time). The 4D/SPAN perspective treats
entities as occurrent or perdurant (entities which exist only in part at any point in
time). Each perspective is assumed to be valid and veridical, that is, verifiable via
empirical evidence. Nevertheless “they are incompatible”25—or in the terms familiar
to this study, incommensurable. The authors deal with this troubling incompatibil-
ity by developing two ontologies, side by side, within the same overriding ontological
scaffolding. The following quote highlights the role of this key assumption:
21Smith (2005).
22Grenon and Smith (2004).
23Grenon and Smith (2004).
24Grenon and Smith (2004).
25Grenon and Smith (2004).
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In order to do justice to the entities of each type, we need to have two
distinct ontologies. The ontology adequate for 3-D entities is analogous to
a snapshot of the world, it accounts for the entities as they are now. That
adequate for 4-D entities is more analogous to a videoscopic view taken
upon reality. Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) is the complete and adequate
ontology of reality which is divided into the two aforementioned ontologies.
More precisely, there is, on the one hand, a succession of ontologies for
substances and like 3-D objects, namely, a series of snapshot ontologies of
the world at any given instant of time26.
This distinction is found in several other of the ontologies, and is further pursued
in the analysis below.
General Formal Ontology (GFO)
The General Formal Ontology (GFO) is perhaps the easiest of the ontologies to ex-
amine in terms of assumptions, which are discussed in section 2.1 of the GFO pre-
sentation27. The authors initially take a “realist position in philosophy”, aware that
“there is the need to clarify more precisely the term ‘realism’ ”28. However, in terms
of the actual categories employed (presented in the following section (2.1.1)), they
“are conceived in such a way that we are not forced to commit ourselves to realism,
conceptualism, or nominalism”29. This is yet further complicated by the brief discus-
sion in section 2.1.2, entitled “Existence and Modes of Being”. It is worth quoting
this section in full:
In [32] a classification of modes of existence is discussed that is useful for a
deeper understanding of entities of several kinds. According to [32] there
are—roughly—the following modes of being: absolute, ideal, real, and in-
tentional entities. This classification can be to some extent related to Gra-
cia’s approach and to the levels of reality in the spirit of Nicolai Hartmann
[29]. But, the theory of Roman Ingarden is not sufficiently elaborated
compared with Hartmann’s large ontological system. For Ingarden there
is the (open) problem, whether material things are real spatio-temporal
entities or intentional entities in the sense of the later Husserl. We hold
that there is no real opposition between the realistic attitude of Ingarden
and the position of the later Husserl, who considers the material things
as intentional entities being constructed by a transcendental self. Both
views provide valuable insights in the modes of being that can be useful
for conceptual modelling purposes30.




30Herre (2009). Reference [32] in the text refers to Roman Ingarden. Der Streit um die Existenz
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In contrast with other forms of realism related below, and with the exception of the
BFO, this is a realism unusually highly inflected by the phenomenological tradition,
established by Husserl, Ingarden, Hartmann and others.
PROTON
Opposed to the BFO and GFO, the PROTON (formerly “BULO”) ontology au-
thors employ what may best be described as relativist, constructivist and pragma-
tist assumptions about the world they set out to model. They happily confess “Its
common-sense basis is, of course, quite an arbitrary claim to deal with”31. More-
over “the diversity of world knowledge . . . actually blur[s] the horizon of hope from a
purely philosophical point of view if one wants an ontology that is . . . ‘compliant’ with
the common-sense of ‘everybody’ ”32. The two pages which discuss the philosophical
considerations are somewhat vague about what constitute the “common-sense basis”
of the ontology. The discussion presented concerns less the question of assumptions
in the sense invoked here (what motivates the categories and distinctions of the on-
tology) than what might be termed a quasi-philosophical discourse on “logicalized”
ontology, existence, essence, meaning and cognition. For example the authors claim
“the end users of PROTON are also humans and therefore it is all about everyone’s
personal cognition and perception of reality”33. In fact, as discussed below, the for-
malisation of the ontology presented in the subsequent fifty or so pages is anything
but “arbitrary”. The author’s conclusion suggests the aim is indeed to describe the
“very basic spatial, temporal, material (‘physical’), and abstract concepts of world
knowledge, which for the most part are independent of a particular problem or do-
main”34. There is little else in the text which suggests what sorts of principles or
assumptions might guide the selection of such “concepts”.
SUMO
The SUMO ontology is one of the two more widely used upper-level ontologies, and yet
it is presented minimal discussion of its assumptions. This is perhaps largely due to the
syncretic nature of the ontologies; as the authors characterise its development, “This
content included the ontologies available on the Ontolingua server, John Sowa’s upper
level ontology, the ontologies developed by ITBM-CNR, and various mereotopological
theories, among other sources”35. The hybridisation of other ontologies suggests that
SUMO must in some sense inherit the assumptions of its sources. This becomes a
question of methodology, which the authors discuss at some length: “we were faced
with the much more difficult task of the ‘semantic merge’, i.e. combining all of the
der Welt I (Existentialontologie). Max Niemeyer Verlag, T(umlaut)ubingen, 1964 ; reference [29]
refers to Nicolai Hartmann. Der Aufbau der realen Welt. Walter de Gruyter and Co, 1964.
31Terziev et al. (2004).
32Terziev et al. (2004).
33Terziev et al. (2004).
34Terziev et al. (2004).
35Niles and Pease (2001).
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various ontologies into a single, consistent, and comprehensive framework”36. The
difficulties of reconciling different assumptions are clear from a later section of the
paper—again worth citing at length, since it highlights a key distinction which is
discussed further below:
Under the concept of “Physical”, we have the disjoint concepts of “Object”
and “Process”. The existence and nature of the distinction between these
two notions was the subject of much heated debate on the SUO mailing
list. According to those who adopt a 3D orientation (or “endurantists”, as
they are sometimes called), there is a basic, categorial distinction between
objects and processes. According to those who adopt a 4D orientation
(the “perdurantists”), on the other hand, there is no such distinction.
The 3D orientation posits that objects, unlike processes, are completely
present at any moment of their existence, while a 4D orientation regards
everything as a space-time worm (or a slice of such a worm). On the
latter view, paradigmatic processes and objects are merely opposite ends
of a continuum of spatio-temporal phenomena. The current version of
the SUMO embodies a 3D orientation by making “Object” and “Process”
disjoint siblings of the parent node “Physical”37.
This passage echoes in almost identical terms Kuhn’s concept of “paradigms”, de-
scribing the difficulties of assimilating two fundamentally distinct and incompatible
“orientations” towards the world. Unlike the BFO, SUMO’s authors assume paradig-
matic incommensurability presents even co-location of 3D and 4D perspectives.
DOLCE
The DOLCE (Descriptive Ontology for Linguistic and Cognitive Engineering ) on-
tology devotes several of its 38 pages discussing assumptions. Like the PROTON
ontology, it takes what might be termed a “constructivist” stance, in which cate-
gories are chosen for their proximation to “cognitive artifacts ultimately depending
on human perception, cultural imprints and social conventions (a sort of ‘cognitive’
metaphysics)”38. Moreover the authors of DOLCE confess their ontology is not in-
tended “as a candidate for a ‘universal’ standard ontology”, but rather “has a clear
cognitive bias, in the sense that it aims at capturing the ontological categories underly-
ing natural language and human commonsense [sic]”39. The philosophical antecedents
of their approach is motivated in part by the work of Searle, and his notion of “deep
background” (Searle, 1983).
The authors also make use of the endurant[or continuant] /perdurant[or occurrent]
distinction, as well as several other “classical” concepts, which have been part of
36Niles and Pease (2001).
37Niles and Pease (2001).
38Masolo et al. (2002).
39Masolo et al. (2002).
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philosophical ontology since Aristotle’s Categories (Aristotle, 1994). Hence, categories
like “universal”, “particular”, “physical”, “abstract”, “qualities”, “time” and “space”
can be located within the upper taxonomic echelons in the ontology40.
SWIntO—Taxonomising Ontological Assumptions
One effort to make sense of the medley of assumptions made by upper-level or foun-
dational ontologies is represented by the work of Oberle et al. (2007). As part of a
broader effort to develop a “demonstrator system which combines intelligent multi-
modal and mobile user interface technology with question-answering functionalities
over both the open internet and specific thematic domains at the same time”41, the
authors discuss their efforts to construct a hybrid foundational ontology as the basis
for subsequent domain-level ontologies. As part of this work, they consider “onto-
logical choices” or “meta-criteria”, against which they rate many of the ontologies
canvassed here42. The “choices” consist of the following distinctions, which briefly
paraphrased below:
• Descriptive vs. Revisionary—“descriptive” aims to capture intuitionist, “common-
sense” categories; “revisionist” aims to describe the “intrinsic nature of the
world”43.
• Multiplicative vs Reductionist—“multiplicative” allows for the possibility of mul-
tiple, potentially competing ontological points of view; “reductionist” aims to
reduce such perspectives to a unifying, single point of view.
• Possibilism vs Actualism—“possibilism” allows for possible as well as actual
entities (and typically requires some form of modal logical distinction between
necessity and possibility); “actualism” admits only actual entities.
• Endurantism vs Perdurantism—as previously discussed, “endurantism” consid-
ers entities as wholly “in time”; “perdurantism” considers entities as potentially
containing temporal parts (and are therefore not “in time”, but persist “through
time”).
The authors present their assessment table 7.4 (redacted here to eliminate other
candidate ontologies not surveyed here—OpenCyc and OCHRE, neither represented
in OWL)44.
The authors proceed to develop a hybridised upper-level ontology based on DOLCE
and SUMO, SmartSUMO45—using a similar grafting method to that described by the
authors of SUMO itself. I return briefly to this development in the final section below.
40Masolo et al. (2002).
41Oberle et al. (2007).
42Oberle et al. (2007).
43Oberle et al. (2007).
44Oberle et al. (2007).
45Oberle et al. (2007).
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Table 7.4: Foundational ontologies and their ontological choices.
Requirement \ Alternative BFO DOLCE SUMO
Descriptive - × ×
Multiplicative -a × ×
Actualism × - unclear
4D × × ×
aGiven the discussion above, it might be argued that the BFO is similarly multiplicative, although
it does indeed aim to be “revisionist” in the sense used here.
Extending the Taxonomy
Based on the brief review above, several further salient dimensions can be added to
the model for comparison:
• Derived vs. Original Composition—SUMO is explicitly derived from several
existing ontological sources; the other ontologies appear to be constructed orig-
inally, with reference to other systems.
• Realist vs. Constructivist Attitude—Both SUMO and DOLCE have some con-
structs for representing a subjective point-of-view within the ontology itself,
suggesting they support a “constructivist” or nominalist standpoint. BFO, by
comparison, is stridently realist (though with complications). The GFO leans
strongly towards realism also, while the PROTON ontology as best can be di-
vined, also adopts a more constructivist attitude.
• “Home-grown” vs. Imported Philosophy—DOLCE explicitly acknowledges the
work of John Searle and others as guiding the development of the ontology—and
in a general sense can be said to use an “imported” philosophy. The authors
of the BFO, at the other extreme, spend considerable time in various publica-
tions justifying a “home-grown” take on various philosophical issues. The other
ontologies sit somewhere in-between these two extremes.
7.1.4 Structural Features
The most evident structural difference between the ontologies is in size. Table 7.5
compares the number of classes, properties and individuals contained in each of the
ontologies.
In terms of modularisation, as indicated the PROTON and DOLCE ontologies
have been constructed as a series of smaller ontologies, which are linked together via
the imports construct. In contrast the other ontologies are contained within single
files.
The PROTON has been separated into three separate ontologies: system, top
and upper. The upper imports the top ontology, which in turn imports the system
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Table 7.5: Ontology Sizes
Ontology1 # of Classes # of Properties # of Concepts Ratio
BFO 36 0 36 36.00
GFO 78 69 147 1.11
PROTON 2 266 113 379 2.33
SUMO 630 236 866 2.66
DOLCE 2 159 280 439 0.57
aAll figures have been derived by using the OWLAPI library (Horridge et al., 2007) and some custom
scripts.
bThese ontologies are split across a series of physical files, and figures have been collated from all of
the files.
ontology.
The DOLCE ontology contains 8 separate subsidiary and interconnected ontolo-









To use the SocialUnits ontology for example means to import the classes and
properties from InformationObjects, ExtendedDnS, TemporalRelations, SpatialRela-
tions andDOLCE-Lite ontologies.
It is also noticeable that the ontologies differ in the degree that they use classes
over properties—expressed in the ratio figures above. In the case of DOLCE in partic-
ular, this suggests a what might be termed a “functional” or “attributive” approach
to the organisation of entities, since the majority of its conceptual constructs are
properties rather than classes. This point is elaborated upon further in the discussion
of categories below.
7.1.5 Categories
The preceding sections suggest the five upper-level ontologies employ somewhat dif-
ferent methods, assumptions and design strategies; how, then, do they compare in
terms of actual categorial or conceptual content? The following sub-section aims to
compare only the most abstract, top-level concepts described in the ontologies. Di-
agrams of the top three or four graph layers (depending upon visual clarity) of the
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five ontologies were generated using Prote´ge´ (Gennari et al., 2003) and the OWLViz
plug-in (Horridge, 2005)—these are shown in Appendix A.1. A subset of these graphs

































































Even this schematic outline shows some initial points of similarity and difference
between the five ontologies. In terms of similarity, each starts with a common root
concept, “Entity”. The following conceptual distinctions, or near synonyms of them,
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• Continuant/Occurrent (or, alternatively, Endurant/Perdurant)
• Independent/Dependent
• Conceptual/Physical
These distinctions can be mapped to specific concepts in each of the five ontologies
in Appendix A.2.
This comparison demonstrates that there is a high degree of overlap in the use
of concepts across the ontology set, and equally, that these concepts are differ-
ently configured, so that establishing direct concordances between apparently syn-
onymous concepts is risky. The interpretation of the above distinctions, when ap-
plied to particular ontologies, carry considerable ambiguity. For example, the Con-
ceptual/Physical distinction aligns Concept (GFO), [GeneralTerm | Topic] (PRO-
TON) and Proposition (SUMO, DOLCE) as all conceptual entities—clearly, how-
ever, they are not all synonymous terms. More tenuously, the meaning of Dependent
might appear to be preserved by the [Relation | Attribute | Quantity] (SUMO)
and quality (DOLCE) classes, since these have equivalently named terms in other on-
tologies which are sub-classes of kinds of Dependent entities: the DependentContinuant
and Dependent classes of BFO and GFO ontologies respectively. The Continu-
ant/Occurrent distinction is also difficult to interpret consistently across the on-
tologies. Broadly, continuant entities are those which “are wholly present (all their
parts are present) at any time at which they exist” while occurrent entities “that
extend in time and are only partially present for any time at which they exist be-
cause some of their temporal parts may be not present”46. The GFO ontology syn-
onym for this distinction, the Continuous/Discrete pair, nevertheless contains a mix-
ture of both object-like and process-like classes within each of the Continuous and
Discrete super classes—and the ontology also contains a sibling Presential class,
which appears a more natural synonym for Continuant. The BFO ontology subsumes
TemporalRegion under Occurrent and SpatialRegion under Continuant classes,
but also adds SpatiotemporalRegion as a subclass of Occurrent, with the following
extended note:
An instance of the spatiotemporal region [span:SpatiotemporalRegion]
is a part of spacetime. All parts of spacetime are spatiotemporal re-
gion [span:SpatiotemporalRegion] entities and only spatiotemporal region
[span:SpatiotemporalRegion] entities are parts of spacetime. In particu-
lar, neither spatial region [snap:SpatialRegion] entities nor temporal region
[span:TemporalRegion] entities are in BFO parts of spacetime. Spacetime
is the entire extent of the spatiotemporal universe, a designated individual,
which is thus itself a spatiotemporal region [span:SpatiotemporalRegion].
46Bazzanella et al. (2008).
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Spacetime is among occurrents the analogous of space among continuant
[snap:Continuant] entities47.
This confirms the point made earlier: two ontological perspectives are supported
by the BFO—one sharply distinguishing spatial and temporal, continuant and occur-
rent entities, the other collapsing within a general occurrent, spatio-temporal concep-
tual apparatus. Habituation of two fundamental perspectives within the one ontologi-
cal housing creates a point of dissonance with other ontologies which maintain a single
viewpoint, preserving “Continuant” and “Occurrent” entities as primordially distinct
and mutually disjoint. The SUMO and DOLCE ontologies are largely consistent in
maintaining this distinction, while the PROTON ontology seems idiosyncratically to
treat JobPosition—arguably a continuous entity—as a kind of Happening, while
Service (in the sense of a service rendered) is a kind of Object.
The difficulty of drawing synonymous relations across ontologies is more notable
still in a comparison of the summative effect of multiple conceptual distinctions. For
example, while each of the ontologies has classes to represent the Spatial/Temporal
and Continuant/Occurrent conceptual pairs, how these distinctions are organised dif-
fers markedly. The BFO ontology makes a primary distinction between Continuant
and Occurrent classes. The distinction between spatial and temporal entities is then
a subordinate one—more formally, the pair [SpatialRegion | TemporalRegion] is
subordinate to the pair [Continuant/Occurrent]. The GFO ontology treats these
distinctions as equivalent—both [Discrete | Continuous] and [Space time/Space
| Space time/Time] class pairs are subsumed by the Entity/Item/Individual class.
The PROTON ontology follows the BFO organisation: the pair [Object/Location |
Happening/TimeInterval] is subordinate to the [Object | Happening] pair. Mean-
while the SUMO ontology has an orthogonal relation between the equivalent pairs:
while Object/Region is clearly subordinate to Object, the nearest temporal synonym,
TimeMeasure, is treated as a kind of Quantity, not a subordinate of Process—the
nearest SUMO synonym to the Occurrent concept used by the BFO. The DOLCE
ontology pairs both sets of conceptual classes: the Continuant/Occurrent distinction
are matched by the near-synonymous pair [endurant | perdurant], while the Spa-
tial/Temporal distinction is matched by the [space-region | temporal-region]
pair of classes. However, the latter pair is subordinate to a higher level class, abstract,
which is distinguished from the spatio-temporal-particular class. Instances of the
spatio-temporal-particular class (whether members of an endurant, perdurant,
or of another class) are bound to space or time regions via properties, rather than
through direct class subsumption relations. This suggests conversion between DOLCE
and other ontologies would need to interpret and transform other kinds of relations
into class subsumption ones.
Similar complexities can be found in other conceptual overlays. The BFO ontol-
ogy has no class pair corresponding to the Abstract/Concrete distinction, yet syn-
47Grenon (2003a).
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onymous class pairs are primary distinctions for the PROTON, SUMO and DOLCE
ontologies (and a more subordinate distinction for the GFO ontology). Only one
of the ontologies, DOLCE, reinforces this conception distinction with a logical con-
straint: the abstract class is declared logically disjoint from endurant, perdurant
and quality subclasses of the spatio-temporal-particular class, and further an-
notates the abstract class: “The main characteristic of abstract entities is that they
do not have spatial nor temporal qualities, and they are not qualities themselves”48.
The five ontologies also have clear conceptual areas of what might be termed “per-
spectival specialisation”—areas in which they move beyond upper-level abstractions
towards domain-level specificity. The BFO ontology, with 36 classes and no properties,
contains only abstract physical classes, roughly representative of the distinctions intro-
duced above (Continuant/Occurrent, Dependent/Independent, Collective/Individual).
The emphasis on supporting the mutually exclusive three- and four-dimensional per-
spectives is the main unusual feature of its categorial structure—although this fea-
ture is also supported by DOLCE and SUMO ontologies within a single perspecti-
val view. The GFO ontology uses a number of specialised terms further down the
class hierarchy which indicate a scientific or technical orientation: Chronoid (“Ev-
ery chronoid has exactly two extremal and infinitely many inner time boundaries
which are equivalently called time-points”), Topoid (“connected compacted regions
of space”), Configuroid (“integrated wholes made up of material structure processes
and property processes”) and Situoid (“processes whose boundaries are situations
and which satisfy certain principles of coherence, comprehensibility, and continu-
ity.”) are examples49. The PROTON ontology contains Product, Service, Document,
JobPosition and ContactInformation, which relate more specifically to organisa-
tional or commercial fields50. Moreover PROTON makes a first-order distinction
between Entity, LexicalResource and EntitySource, suggesting a primary demar-
cation between entities in the world, and their discursive description and provenance.
The SUMO ontology explicitly incorporates the intentional or constitutive stand-
point of an agent—a large number of agent actions, including Guiding, Classifying,
Listening, Looking and Meeting, are subsumed within an IntentionalProcess class.
These total 114 classes, or 20% of the number of classes in the ontology as a whole,
which is suggestive of an internalist or subjectively-oriented perspective towards onto-
logical entities. Finally, the DOLCE ontology largely mirrors the kinds of distinctions
maintained by SUMO, but models these as object properties between classes, rather
than as class inheritance. Thus it sees entities as bound by mereological and func-
tional, rather than by subsumption relations. This formalist perspective is mirrored
by object property names such as parameterizes, postconditions, preconditions,
deputes and interprets. The SUMO ontology has a similarly large number of object
properties, but use more colloquial and lay terms such as causes, employs, larger
48Gangemi (2006).
49Herre (2009).
50Terziev et al. (2004).
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and uses.
Table 7.6 summarises these underlying differences in orientation. These qualitative
distinctions could be used to further form the basis of a set of quantitative valuations
against the dimensions introduced in the commensurability framework chapter, as
well as refinement of what those dimensions, in the case of the five upper-level ontolo-
gies, should be; at this stage, it is enough to demonstrate the utility of the kind of
interpretative analysis employed here for teasing out what some of the salient distinc-
tions between the ontologies are. The next section examines the sociological context
in which these distinctions are voiced and debated, through an online content analysis
of two mailing lists. This analysis also brings forward further suggestive extrinsic or
social distinctions which mark these ontologies.
Table 7.6: Ontology Orientation Summary
Ontology Orientation
BFO Minimalist; Supports mutually exclusive 3D/4D
physical perspectives; Continuant/Occurrent dis-
tinction fundamental; Scientific naturalist epistemol-
ogy
GFO Naturalist epistemology; Uses scientific over “folk”
terms
PROTON Focus on commercial/industrial terms; Pragmatic
SUMO Intentional; Constructivist epistemology; Pragmatic
DOLCE Constructivist; Scientific; Theoretical; Func-
tional/attributive
7.2 A Dialogical Account of Ontology Engineering
>I think we’re arguing about the definitions of our terms, here. My >use
of the term “Truth” causes cognitive dissonance for you.
Well, you haven’t actually defined it: but I think I get your drift. It
doesn’t cause me cognitive dissonance (if it did, I might be more inclined
to agree with it): I just think its mistaken51.
The analysis of the five ontologies suggests that to some degree ontology devel-
opment takes place in isolated engineering teams, drawing upon disparate sources of
inspiration, with different goals and perhaps some level of collegial overlap. In prac-
tice, this picture is distorted by the presence of public social media through which
researchers openly debate many aspects of ontology design. These represent a fasci-
nating insight of how debate and dialogue around ontologies take place.
51Hayes (2007b).
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The following sections present a brief analysis of some of the discussion on these
lists in relation to upper-level ontologies. The Semantic Web and Ontolog Forum
mailing lists are reviewed in detail, since these include messages from a number of
researchers who have worked on the ontologies listed above, or who contribute to
the broader academic discussion around formal ontologies. Both lists are publicly
available, and anyone can request subscription. In the case of the Semantic Web list,
subscription is automatic (http://www.w3.org/Mail/Request); the ontolog forum
requires an email request be sent to the forum convenor (http://ontolog.cim3.
net/cgi-bin/wiki.pl?WikiHomePage#nid1J). The lists have different objectives,
and consequently different kinds of communities. The Semantic Web list covers all
topics related to the Semantic Web, usually with a technological rather than philo-
sophical focus. Subjects include discussion of Semantic Web architecture, terminology,
application and specific ontologies, as well as frequent conference announcements and
job advertisements. The ontolog forum, by comparison, is concentrated on the con-
struction of upper-level ontologies, with considerable reference to both technological
and philosophical aspects of this task. Both lists are attended by prominent contrib-
utors to academic and practical ontology engineering, and comprise what might be
termed “expert communities of practice” in these fields.
7.2.1 Analysis of Mailing Lists
To analyse the lists, a small software script was developed to harvest the contents
of emails from their publicly-available archives(W3C, 2010; Yim, 2010). The script
retrieved posts since their inception (Semantic Web: March 2000; Ontolog Forum:
May 2002) until May 18, 2009. Mailing list archives typically employ the following
structure:
1. Main index page—containing the months the list has been running, with links
to posts listed by dates or by thread (subject);
2. Date pages—containing a list of posts for the month, organised by day;
3. Thread pages—containing a list of posts for the month, organised by thread
(subject);
4. Individual posts—containing the contents of a single message, including subject,
date, author and message contents.
The script exploits this common structure (at least for the two archives in ques-
tion), and starting with the index page, follows links to the date and message pages
automatically. On each of these pages it parses the contents for common elements,
such as the date, author, subject and contents of the message. Importantly, message
“threads” retain the same subject heading for the most part, permitting analysis of
common topics and keywords. The script then captures unique authors, subjects,
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messages and individual words in a database system. Care has been taken to ensure
accuracy in the results, however, for various reasons it is difficult to gain precision
with subject, author and word counts—continuous subjects can be arbitrarily varied
by authors or their mail clients; authors can post from different mail accounts, with
different names or variants; word morphographic variants, aside from plurals, can be
difficult to correlate automatically; email thread subject headings can be renamed by
correspondents, to follow new “threads” of conversation; and mailing lists can allow
for the possibility of “spoofing”, faking email contents, due to lack of rigorous au-
thentication methods. The last concern, given the specialised nature of these lists, is
a relatively low risk in these particular cases.
7.2.2 Quantitative Analysis
Table 7.7 summarises the number of messages received on both lists by year, based on
a survey conducted 19 May, 2009. These figures show a rising interest in both forums
in recent years—the Semantic Web growing rapidly in 2005, the Ontolog Forum in
2007. Total number of messages is comparable, with indications in 2009 that the
Ontolog Forum is experiencing roughly twice the amount of activity.











2009 (May 18) 965 1,891
Total 10,579 10,669
In terms of distinct author and subject counts, the Ontolog Forum exhibits a
smaller and more focussed community, as table 7.8 suggests. These numbers indi-
cate each author contributes on average approximately 23 messages across the period
surveyed (January 2000 through to May 2009), and each subject receives four mes-
sages on the Ontolog Forum, compared with approximately eight and two messages
respectively for the Semantic Web list. This is confirmed by an analysis of the top 20
authors and subjects, which show higher message-to-author and message-to-subject
ratios again for the Ontolog Forum list.
Although the five ontologies and two comparative studies (OntoMap and SWIntO)
analysed above are products of private development, and consequently do not have
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Table 7.8: Author and Subject Counts
SemWeb Ontolog
Total Messages 10,579 10,699
Total Authors 1,361 461
Total Subjects 4,487 2,649
Messages per Author 7.77 23.12
Messages per Subject 2.36 4.04
mailing lists or other public fora, several of the contributing authors featured in both
of the lists surveyed. Table 7.9 shows each of the contributors featuring in the lists,
along with the number of messages posted.
Table 7.9: Joint Ontology and List Contributors
Author Ontology SemWeb Ontolog
Pierre Grenon BFO 4 0
Barry Smith BFO 2 68
Adam Pease SUMO 0 172
Stefano Borgo DOLCE 0 3
Aldo Gangemi DOLCE 13 1
Nicola Guarino DOLCE 0 1
Alessandro Oltramari DOLCE 78 0
Marin Dimitrov OntoMap 1 0
Philipp Cimiano SWIntO 3 0
Pascal Hitzler SWIntO 32 0
Daniel Oberle SWIntO 1 0
Michael Sintek SWIntO 2 0
These figures can be used as basic heuristics for some of the dimensions introduced
for classifying the ontologies above. While over-extrapolation from these figures can
be misleading—for instance, other relevant mailing lists are not included here, and
there is no means of reviewing offline discussions—based on the characterisation of
the lists themselves, it is possible to make several inferences:
1. A contributor to each of the BFO and SUMO ontologies is also actively in-
volved in the Ontolog Forum list—suggesting these ontologies have a stronger
philosophical orientation;
2. DOLCE contributors were involved in both lists, although only to a minimal
degree on the Ontolog Forum list—suggesting DOLCE has a stronger technical
orientation;
3. No contributor to the GFO or PROTON ontologies participated in either of
the lists—suggesting authors of these ontologies are less active in the broader
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ontology community, and possibly, that the ontologies themselves experience
lower rates of adoption;
4. Contributors to both OntoMap and SWIntO comparisons had some involve-
ment in the Semantic Web rather than the Ontolog Forum lists—suggesting
ontological comparison, even of upper-level ontologies, is regarded as more of a
technical than abstract philosophical task.
These tentative observations are corroborated by a word frequency analysis of the
ontology terms themselves. Fortuitously, each of the ontologies has an acronym which
is unusual enough to make collision with quotidian usage quite unlikely. Table 7.10
shows the number of times each ontology is mentioned, along with their frequency
relative to the most commonly cited ontology. Discussion on the Ontolog Forum list
is predictably far more prolific, given it is dedicated to the establishment of founda-
tional or upper-level ontologies. All of the ontologies are mentioned more often in
absolute terms on Ontolog Forum, with SUMO, DOLCE and BFO cited more often
by a factor of ten or more. Notwithstanding this absolute difference, in relative terms
DOLCE is mentioned twice as often on the Semantic Web list as SUMO, while SUMO
is mentioned nearly three times more often on Ontolog Forum. Both GFO and PRO-
TON are mentioned relatively infrequently, reinforcing earlier suggestions that these
ontologies have low levels of interest and community engagement.
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Word Frequency Analysis
A more general word frequency analysis table is shown in Appendix A.3. It displays
the top 100 words for both Semantic Web and Ontolog Forum mailing lists. The fre-
quencies were compiled by counting discrete words in every message across the corpus
of each list, and eliminating prepositions, pronouns, common verbs and adjectives,
HTML elements and entities (such as <span> and <font> tags), and certain template
words which appeared in every message (such as “unsubscribe”). The entire cor-
pus was converted to lower case during extraction of these statistics. Morphological
variants, such as plurals, are have not been controlled for.
Both lists exhibit a large number of common words, 51 out of a possible 100. Terms
like “ontology”, “semantic”, “web”, “language”, “knowledge” and “information” are
clearly of central interest to both communities. However, there are pertinent differ-
ences, both in which terms are not common, and in how common terms are ranked.
As expected, the Semantic Web list has a large number of technical terms, with “rdf”,
“owl”, “uri” and “xml” all featuring in the top twenty results. None of these are in
the top twenty results for the Ontolog Forum list, with only “rdf” and “owl” ap-
pearing in the top hundred (each is mentioned approximately 10% and 25% as often
respectively). The Semantic Web list also contains a number of terms which relate to
possible contexts for discussion and application of the technologies discussed: terms
like “workshop”, “conference”, “systems”, “applications”, “services”, “management”,
“business” and “social” are either ranked lower or do not appear at all in the Ontolog
Forum list.
Conversely, Ontolog Forum contains many philosophical and mathematical terms
which rank highly: “ontology”, “time”, “language”, “logic”, “set”, “point”, “model”,
“theory” and “world” all appear in the first thirty most frequently used words. De-
spite the fact that real-world application of ontologies is a frequent topic of debate,
these terms indicate a heavy orientation towards abstract and formal discussion. Less
perspicuously, three proper names appear in the first forty words—more often than
words like “meaning”, “list” and “thing” for example—indicating dialogue takes place
among a more concentrated group of members. Still less conclusively, many terms
refer to the epistemic conditions of the discussion itself—verbs like “leave”, “say”,
“know”, “agree”, “mean”, “take”, adjectives like “shared”, “real”, “true” and “com-
mon”, and nouns like “context”, “discussion”, “question” and “view” all suggest a
strong tendency towards self-referential discussion about the process of discussion on
the list. This tendency, however tenuous, does correlate loosely both to the larger
average number of posts per subject (Ontolog Forum: 4.03; Semantic Web: 2.36), and
the substantially larger average number of posts per author featured on the Ontolog
Forum list (Ontolog Forum: 23.14; Semantic Web: 7.77).
The word frequency analysis shows some significant difference in the nature of
the two list communities. But what can be inferred from this to the question of
commensurability of the ontologies themselves? At most the results are suggestive:
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they show that the SUMO and BFO ontologies have contributors who are active on
Ontolog Forum, which might suggest they are more oriented towards philosophical
rather than technical issues of ontology composition, and more inclined to engage in
active debate over these issues with a broader community over time. Potentially these
two ontologies themselves are more commensurable also, or at least the differences
between them more likely to have been made explicit in the course of discussion on
the list. Similarly the kinds of concepts treated in upper-level ontologies—“time”,
“set”, “process”, “context”, “thing” and so on—receive frequent attention on the
Ontolog Forum list. Interestingly, many of the pertinent concepts and distinctions
used in the five ontologies—such as “entity”, “object”, “item”, “discrete”, “abstract”,
“individual”—do not appear in the top hundred words of either lists. This sug-
gests that neither list is predominantly engaged in trying to determine, for instance,
whether the endurant/perdurant distinction is foundational or not. Across both lists,
considerably greater discussion centers rather around the formal aspects of knowledge
representation. In the case of the Semantic Web list, these aspects are discussed in
preponderantly technical terms: for example, how to construct and connect ontologies
using constructs from OWL and RDF language specifications. On the Ontolog Forum
list, this sort of discussion tends to be considerably more abstract, and is focussed
more on general issues of logical syntax and semantics.
7.2.3 Qualitative Analysis
One conversational thread from the Ontolog Forum list has been selected for more
detailed qualitative analysis. Entitled Two ontologies that are inconsistent but both
needed, the conversation involves one of the authors of the BFO ontology (Barry
Smith), as well as other influential participants—the author of the RDF specification,
Pat Hayes; a frequently cited author on ontologies, John Sowa; and a number of con-
tributors to various standards initiatives. Usefully, the subject matter covers both
the general problem of commensurability between ontologies, as well as the specific
question of interoperability between upper-level ontologies. The conversation takes
place in June 2007, some time after the ontologies covered here were developed, so it
does not directly relate to the background of their development. Nevertheless it elu-
cidates many of the foundational issues involved in upper-level ontology engineering,
which remain active subjects for debate, and brings into view a range of perspectives
on the challenges of interoperability between multiple ontologies.
Ontological Dialogue
The discussion in this thread principally involves the problem of reconciling two on-
tologies with potentially different presuppositions. As such discussions tend to do,
it winds over a range of different subjects however, and engages different disputants
along the way. Appendix A.4 provides details of the specific turns and twists of the di-
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alogue, with interspersed commentary. Table 7.11 summarises the major movements
in the dialogue. The message responsible for the change of topic (within the same
subject heading) is indicated, along with a summary of the topic.
Table 7.11: Ontolog forum—Dialogue Map
Message ID Date Author Summary
Preliminaries
27–04–2007 Di Maio Announces invitation for participation
in Disaster Management ontology.
54 07–06–2007 Barker Problem of multiple ontological “per-
spectives” raised.
59 07–06–2007 Andersen “Perspectivalism” queried; two options
proposed: either ontologies are “incom-
mensurable” or they are not (and “per-
spectivalism” disappears)
71 08–06–2007 Sowa Preceding dichotomy queried, perspec-
tivalism re-introduced; granular incon-
sistencies can dissolve under different
perspectival orientations. Issue raised
of work involved.
80 08–06–2007 Kusnierczyk Expresses sympathy with message 59—
either ontologies are consistent, or they
are not.
81 (?) 08–06–2007 Smith Offers evidence of logically consistent
but philosophically incommensurable
ontology (own work).
Perspectives on the Continuant—Occurrent Distinction
91 08–06–2007 Hayes Argues for reconciliation of perspec-
tives expressed in Smith’s work. Mul-
tiple “perspectives” can be reduced,
simplified—issue one of terminological
rather than ontological difference.
98 08–06–2007 Smith Pragmatic rebuttal; BFO is successful
in practice.
108 08–06–2007 Sowa Claims informal, lay distinctions are
susceptible to critique even when
dressed in formal ontological axioms.
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Table 7.11: Ontolog forum—Dialogue Map
Message ID Date Author Summary
169 11–06–2007 Smith Further pragmatic justifications—
successful use justifies an ontology’s
design rationale.
? 12–06–2007 Hayes Reiterates mutual translatability be-
tween continuant and occurrent “per-
spectives”.
180 12–06–2007 Smith Seeming agreement with Hayes’ posi-
tion.
181 12–06–2007 Conklin Frustration at tenuous discussion, given
its initial practical aims—to provide
some consensus on whether multiple on-
tologies can be both consistent, yet re-
flect different perspectives.
Diversions
182 12–06–2007 Laskey Begins discussion on “probabilistic” on-
tologies; where concept agreement is ex-
pressed as “degrees of certitude”.
361 18–06–2007 Barkmeyer Discusses distinctions between ontolo-
gies and data models.
Metaphysical Dilemmas
308 16–06–2007 Partridge Re-opens debate about
continuants/occurrents—suggests
distinction depends upon metaphysical
perspective rather than empirical
evidence.
358 18–06–2007 Hayes Disputes metaphysical bias; suggests
that even upper-level ontologies can be
constructed solely out of abstraction
from empirical (scientific) observation.
378 19–06–2007 Laskey Emphasises role of pre-existing cultural
bias.
381 18–06–2007 Hayes Re-affirms value of intuition and
observation—rather than metaphysical
speculation—as basis for ontology de-
velopment.
383 19–06–2007 Laskey Agrees on the value of observational
starting points, on pragmatic grounds.
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Table 7.11: Ontolog forum—Dialogue Map
Message ID Date Author Summary
409 20–06–2007 Partridge Parodies Hayes’ comments re: meta-
physics, by directing criticism instead
towards unreflective logicism and em-
piricism.
411 20–06–2007 Sowa Points towards continuous “forgetting”
of previous development in AI and
logic.
417 20–06–2007 Hayes Emphasises that logic and science, un-
like metaphysics, can be measured by
demonstrable progress.
432 21–06–2007 Partridge Critiques this view as being na¨ıvely
“positivist”—ignoring essentially Kuh-
nian “paradigmatic”—and irrational—
nature of scientific development.
433 21–06–2007 Hayes Underscores distinction between pro-
gressive science and philosophy mired
in “opinion”.
Concluding Remarks
435 21–06–2007 Brown Questions (similar to message 181)
value of the preceding discussion.
448 22–06–2007 Partridge Affirms need for metaphysical under-
standing when devising upper-level on-
tologies for use in large-scale, complex
systems.
449 22–06–2007 Hayes Affirms need to begin with user needs
and observation to more abstract con-
cepts (“bottom-up”) rather than work-
ing down from metaphysical systems
(“top-down”).
454 23–06–2007 Sowa Suggests “middle-road”; metaphysical
systems can be useful, but only when
road-tested against “observation and
experiment”.
Positions and Distinctions
This thread demonstrates the shifting sands which underpin the building of founda-
tional, upper-level ontologies. The evident tensions between metaphysical speculation,
of the kind which have always beset abstract philosophical ontological formulations,
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and pragmatic engineering concerns—how to construct workable ontologies of the
technical kind which facilitate system and data-level interoperability—are drawn out
but far from reconciled here. Readings of earlier and later threads, in this forum
and others like it, show similar tensions continually emerge. One of the unintended
consequences, ironically, of attempting to focus on purely engineering concerns is the
inevitable lapse—not always unwelcome, as this thread shows, but invariably pro-
tracted and inconclusive—into various forms of metaphysical speculation.
Equally evident are the various postures and positions adopted by those involved
in the dialogue. The ontologies surveyed above have the appearance of being effected
as a result of some purist intellectual effort, with only a handful of attendant pub-
lications describing the process. This debate makes evident, on the other hand, the
communicative market-place under which even the most abstract conceptualisations
are formulated through the retail practice of what Brandom terms the practice of
“giving and asking for reasons”. In particular, several crucial distinctions in orien-
tation towards the construction of upper-level ontologies can be drawn. These, in
turn, can be applied as dimensions to the assessment of the commensurability of the
ontologies themselves.
The first distinction, exhibited throughout the thread, concerns that between prag-
matic, empirical, “bottom-up” and metaphysical, speculative, “top-down” approaches
to upper-level ontological construction. While the majority of the voices on the list,
particularly Hayes and Smith, have a noted aversion to “philosophising” over cate-
gories, a minority point to the merit of engaging philosophy as means of avoiding
errors in categorial construction. Even Hayes, at one stage, points to the need for
some philosophical background:
Just be aware of a few common mental traps, such as not making the
use/mention confusion, and you should do OK52.
If a consensus emerges at all here, it is that some level of “metaphysics is unavoid-
able”53—the dispute is the degree to which abstract theorising of the philosophical
kind is embraced, or alternatively, brought in as a last resort. The distinction hinges
on the extent to which upper-level ontology construction is viewed as a purely en-
gineering activity, or whether it is a continuation of a much longer philosophical
activity—one in which Aristotle’s categories are as relevant as contemporary techni-
cal artefacts. Partridge and Sowa, in particular, appear to hold some sympathy with
the latter view.
The next distinction is between so-called “3D” and “4D” world views, and whether
these are merely verbal transpositions of the same underlying “view”. The dispute
between Smith and Hayes essentially involves this question. For Hayes, “continuants”
are sometimes fortuitous, but always unnecessary ways of speaking about existential
52Hayes (2007c).
53Hayes (2007c).
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phenomena. Smith regards the relationship between “continuants” and “occurrents”
as ontologically primary—a view which informs both BFO and DOLCE ontologies.
A further distinction is introduced by the Probabilistic Ontologies sub-thread.
Here the question is whether existing logical formalisms are sufficient to express de-
grees of certitude over the claims made in an ontology. Laskey suggests they are
necessary refinement to connect machine reasoning, of the “either/or” binary vari-
ety, with the kinds of everyday ambiguous reasoning human agents engage in. Sowa
cautions that tradition logical expressions can be trivially extended to add modal
and veridical meta-claims to ontological axioms. This conversation concerns whether
modalities such as necessity and possibility ought to be first-order constructs of the
logical formalism in which ontologies are expressed, or rather, treated as axioms of
the ontologies themselves. All of the ontologies surveyed above use canonical forms of
OWL, and therefore represent necessary and possible modalities as postulated axioms,
if at all.
Yet another distinction involves another sub-thread, Ontology-building vs Data
Modelling, where conventional data modelling is distinguished from ontology engi-
neering. The debate here centres on whether the distinction is one of kind (ontologies
being of a different, conceptual order to their physical representation as data models)
or of degree (ontologies are simply more refined sub-sets of a general vague category
called “data models”).
It is worth noting the thread as a whole arose out of an introduction to participate
in the development of a disaster management ontology. At least several participants
express some frustration that the meandering threads never tie back to the originating
subject, and note the difficulty of ever arriving at consensus over deep philosophical
issues, while practical issues of (lower-level) ontology engineering remain. A further
distinction can be introduced to capture these positions—about whether there is a
need for upper-level ontologies at all.
In terms of the possibility of originating question—“how to reconcile two poten-
tially inconsistent ontologies”, which can be transposed into the terms of this study
as the question of commensurability—again several distinct positions can be identi-
fied. Hayes argues, at least for the “potentially inconsistent” examples given, that
this is a purely terminological issue, one in which one set of axioms can be re-written
into another trivially—at the cost of some effort, but without sacrificing integrity or
consistency. Smith, at least in relation to the “3D/4D”, argues for an essentially “in-
commensurable” thesis—two inconsistent viewpoints can, however, be housed within
the one ontological scaffold. Laskey and Sowa both argue that commensurability is
a question of degree rather than kind (with Laskey further insisting that probabilis-
tic ontologies can best represent such degrees)54. Partridge suggests that a common
metaphysical foundation is essential—otherwise there is no means for establishing
commensurability at the level of domain ontologies. The value of an upper-level on-
54As it happens, these authors share the point of view adopted in this study as well.
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tology is therefore not its purely veridical status, but its usefulness as a means for
making explicit what underlying assumptions those domain ontologies make. Hayes’
response echoes obliquely the findings of the survey above—that the push for res-
olution at an “upper-level” makes for further questions and yet further speculative
“levels”.
In addition to explicit positions adopted, there are implicit differences in how mem-
bers of the list engage. While it is an “expert” community, some members are more
conciliatory to opposing positions than others. Where Hayes, Partridge and Smith—
along with many others who post less verbosely and frequently—often happily engage
in point-scoring, Sowa, in particular, generally adopts a strategy of qualified agree-
ment, where the qualification attempts to extend a line of thought or embrace other
contrary positions. For example, out of nearly a thousand messages posted to the
forum over the period surveyed by Sowa (nearly ten percent of the total number of
messages posted), 264, or more than a quarter, include the exact construction “I
agree”. Elsewhere, authors use familiar tropes of informal online communication:
irony, parody, questions (both rhetorical and intentional), long interleaving responses
and brief, dismissive rebuttals, exasperated summaries and erstwhile explanation. The
performative flavour of individual contributions, and of the community as a whole,
can be used to characterise particular ontological efforts, however tangentially—they
are suggestive, at least, of the motivations, orientations and intentions under which
such technological artefacts are produced. Directly, in this instance, Barry Smith’s
tone conveys a sense of hard ontological commitment to the categories posited in
BFO; indirectly, the forum provides a sense of the “behind-the-scenes” gerrymander-
ing required to build consensus around ontologies, particularly those which are not
subject to established disciplinary or community practices.
These distinctions can be summarised in the following set of dimensions of specific
relevance to the ontologies in this study:
• Role of metaphysics in ontology engineering: essential or accidental?
• “3D/4D” distinction: ontological or terminological?
• Possible and necessary modalities: require first-order support in the formalism?
• Ontologies and data models: different in degree or in kind?
• Upper-level ontologies necessary?
• Commensurability: multiple, potentially inconsistent viewpoints supported?
• Viewpoint: negotiable or resolute?
With some modest adaptations, these in turn can be applied as interpretive di-
mensions to the surveyed ontologies as part of a general evaluation of their commen-
surability. The evaluation of the ontologies against these dimensions is presented in
the concluding section below.
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7.3 Conclusions: Assessing Commensurability
This analysis concludes with two sets of findings: one outlining what can be said
about the commensurability of upper-level ontologies on the basis of the analysis
above, the other reflecting on what the analysis might mean for a general theory of
commensurability, based on the framework which has been applied.
7.3.1 Commensurability of Upper-Level Ontologies
The exploration of the five “upper-level” ontologies has suggested considerable areas
of both similarity and difference. Structurally, the PROTON and DOLCE ontolo-
gies show greater modularisation, while PROTON, DOLCE and SUMO are consider-
able larger and semantically denser than GFO and BFO. The DOLCE ontology also
favours use of object properties to relate entities functionally, rather than via class
subsumption relations. This is carried over in the more scientific and theoretical ori-
entation of DOLCE, evidenced by use of specialised terminology, a feature it shares
with GFO, and to some extent with BFO. Comparatively, the PROTON and SUMO
ontologies share a more pragmatic and vernacular orientation. The BFO, SUMO and
DOLCE also permit multiple perspectives on physical entities—they can be described
using spacetime coordinates (4D), or with clearly demarcated spatial and temporal
characteristics (3D), along a more abstract distinction between “Continuant” and
“Occurrent” categories. This is evident in the BFO ontology directly, but requires
some reference to the surrounding literature for SUMO and DOLCE. It is unclear
how the GFO and PROTON ontologies are positioned around this distinction, but
since both support some variant of the “Continuant/Occurrent” distinction, it can
be assumed they operate within a three-dimensional paradigm. The SUMO ontology,
and to a much lesser degree the PROTON and DOLCE ontologies, also explicitly
model an agent’s intentional relation to entities in the world, permitting—though not
necessarily insisting upon—a constructivist rather than naturalist outlook. Despite
considerable overlap, conceptual equivalence, or synonymy, is frequently hard to es-
tablish, due to differing levels of terminological intersection, use of functional roles
over class subsumption (in the case of DOLCE), greater conceptual density with the
larger ontologies (in the cases of PROTON, SUMO, DOLCE), and a general lack of
transparent isomorphisms between the conceptual graphs of the ontologies.
Table 7.12 summarises some of the findings, using a combination of the dimen-
sions introduced in the general model in Chapter 5, and those which have presented
themselves in the course of the analysis of upper-level ontologies particularly. In ad-
dition, I have added the SWIntO variables ((Oberle et al., 2007)) as supplementary
dimensions, since these are largely specific to the upper-level ontologies described, and
are not included in my general taxonomy. Valuations for each of the ontologies are
relative—a low valuation on the “Small vs. Large” dimension, for example, indicates
a small number of logical axioms relative to the other ontologies considered. “Low”
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and “High” values reflect evaluations against the second term of each conceptual
opposition expressed by a dimension.
Table 7.12: Ontology Commensurability Matrix
Dimension BFO GFO PROTON SUMO DOLCE
Structure—How are the ontologies structured?
Small vs. Large Low Low Low High High
Light vs. Dense Low Low Moderate High Moderate
Classificatory vs.
Attributive
Low Moderate Moderate Moderate High
Low vs. High Mod-
ularisation
Low Low Moderate Moderate High
Semantics—How do the ontologies relate to “real-world” objects?
Possibilism vs Ac-
tualisma
High Unknown Unknown Unknown Low
Simple—Complex Low Moderate Low High High
Subject—What sorts of objects do the ontologies describe?
Concrete vs. Ab-
stract Objects
High Moderate Low Moderate High
Natural vs. Social
Objects
Low Low High Moderate Low
Style—How are the ontologies authored?
Normative vs. De-
scriptive
Low Moderate Moderate High Moderate
Tentative vs. Com-
mitted
High Moderate Low Moderate High
Process—How are the ontologies developed?
Derived vs. Origi-
nal Composition




High Moderate Moderate Moderate Low
Implicit vs. Ex-
plicit Assumptions
High Low Low High Moderate
Ad Hoc vs. Rig-
orous Design Meth-
ods
Moderate Moderate Low High Moderate
Practice—How the ontologies are used?
Low vs. High
Recognition
Low Low Low High High
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Table 7.12: Ontology Commensurability Matrix
Dimension BFO GFO PROTON SUMO DOLCE
Low vs. High Us-
age
Moderate Low Low High High
Purpose—What motivates the development of the ontologies?
Low vs. High Eco-
nomic Motivation
Moderate Low High Low Low
Low vs. High Sci-
entific Motivation
High High Low Moderate High
Perspective—What perspective “informs” the ontology?
Realist vs. Con-
structivist Attitude
Low Low Moderate High High
Descriptive vs. Re-
visionarya
High Unknown Unknown Low Low
Multiplicative vs
Reductionista
Moderate Unknown Unknown Low Low
Endurantism vs
Perdurantisma
High Low Low High High
Essential role of
metaphysicsb




High Unknown Unknown Low Moderate
Modalities sup-
portedb
Moderate Low Low High High
Ontologies vs data
modelsb
High Moderate Low Moderate Moderate
Necessity of upper-
level agreementb
High High High High High
Multiple view-
points
High Low Low High Moderate
Negotiable view-
point
Low Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate
From this matrix several patterns emerge. SUMO and DOLCE ontologies match
up on a number of dimensions, and do not differ greatly on any. That they are broadly
aTaken from the SWIntO analysis (Oberle et al., 2007).
bThese dimensions are derived from the mailing list analysis above. See discussion below for some
important caveats about their application to ontologies directly.
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commensurable is further bourn out in efforts to develop translations between them
(Oberle et al., 2007). However, their relative size and complexity would suggest
a large number of “local” commensurability issues, at particular branches of their
respective taxonomic structures. BFO seems to differ markedly from both of these,
and indeed from the aims of PROTON as well. Since it is similarly designed for use in
scientific and biological systems, it is perhaps unsurprising that the GFO ontology is
closest, at least for dimensions where values can be meaningfully derived. Otherwise,
the GFO and PROTON ontologies stand out as relatively idiosyncratic in terms
of usage and available documentation—relatively little more can be inferred from
the sources available. A large number of “Unknowns” for these ontologies might
imply either better commensurability—or more likely, since they leave open large
degrees of interpretative scope for different domain ontologies importing them, might
imply “hidden” pockets of potential incommensurability which might emerge only on
further analysis. By contrast, the explicitness attached to BFO, SUMO and DOLCE
ontologies suggests areas of incommensurability are easier to locate up front.
While the mailing list analysis can be used to generate a series of evaluations of
the ontologies themselves, this kind of exercise is perhaps more helpful for considering
the question of commensurability of upper-level ontologies generally. In particular,
the distinctions raised at the end of the analysis are perhaps questions more to be
asked of the situational context in which upper-level ontologies are being considered.
In some situations, it might be useful to ask whether there are metaphysical issues
important for the users, systems and requirements at hand; whether different systems
must agree on their definition of abstract concepts; whether multiple viewpoints can
be accommodated; and whether differences in viewpoints can be negotiated, and if so,
how? In other situations, where an analyst needs to evaluate upper-level ontologies,
the dimensions and distinctions outlined above could become a series of evaluative
criteria. Here it might be useful to ask what it would mean to view the world as on-
tologically divided into objects and processes, or on the other hand, to see all things
as possessing both “object-like” and “process-like” features in different measures—
or, pace Smith, to ask whether both viewpoints can be housed in a single, logically
consistent but philosophically incommensurable system. A further question might
query whether, from a procedural point of view, these kinds of distinctions ought to
arise organically, through piece-meal observation and analysis, or alternatively, ought
to be imposed as a set of guiding metaphysical assumptions from above. And, fi-
nally, it might be asked what kinds of downstream commensurability issues arise by
the assumptions made by upper-level ontologies, and the lower-level domain ontolo-
gies they are designed to support. In short, these questions could be more useful as a
broader interpretive “framings” for consideration of other, more fine-grained commen-
surability dimensions, such as whether the ontologies employ similar design methods.
Consequently, while these dimensions are included under the “Perspective” group
above, they better reflect general aspects of the situation in which the ontologies are
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considered, rather than the ontologies themselves. This point is revisited briefly in
the “Implications” section below.
7.3.2 Implications for a General Theory of Commensurability
What do these findings suggest for a theory of commensurability? As indicated in
Chapter 5, commensurability is assessed against a contextual backdrop of a given
scenario—typically, a project with requirements, aims and purposes. Since the de-
velopment of upper-level ontologies is what might be described as a niche market—
particularly relative to the wide levels of use of document formats, the subject of the
next chapter—it is hard to characterise the sociological environment in which these
ontologies are developed and used. However, the quantitative and qualitative analy-
sis of two mailing lists— featuring some of the ontology contributors and many other
developers and users of ontologies—are revealing. On the one hand, comparatively
little discussion takes place over the actual categories of upper-level ontologies, in
spite of the avowed purpose of the lists. On the other, the lists do discuss questions
of mechanics—how to develop and deploy ontologies—as well as questions of logical
entailment within and between ontologies. The Semantic Web list is on the whole ded-
icated to both the technological and operational side of ontologies—announcements
about conferences, workshops, specification releases, and so on— while the Ontolog
Forum list focusses more on issues of ontology content, but nonetheless features many
discussions around broadly logical and methodological issues, rather than those of
substantive ontological content. As the thread described above shows, this coverage
includes the very problem of ontology commensurability itself.
The lists proved useful as heuristic aids for understanding the general backdrop
against which the surveyed ontologies can be understood. One immediate result is that
what appear to be posited categories within those ontologies are still very much the
subject of considerable contention. Further, what appear to be circumstantial devia-
tions between ontologies—fortuitous reliance upon one distinction over another—can
be shown to be rooted in fundamental philosophical positions, which are not clearly
evident in either the ontologies themselves, or their supporting literature. How vital
differences in these positions are again is a matter for context—but clearly, in the case
of BFO ontology, one of the key authors holds a resolute view as to the primacy of the
top-level categories posited. Drafting connections from BFO to other ontologies based
on purely lexical considerations is likely to obscure at least the authorial intent, if not
the actual extension of these categories to other domain-level ontologies in practice.
How much adoption of an upper-level ontology implies a wholesale commitment to
its claims is yet a further question, bearing here on the commensurability relation be-
tween importing domain-level and imported upper-level ontology. Concern over this
question has, in turn, led some members of these lists to advocate either forms of on-
tological pluralism—in which multiple, incompatible conceptual schemes are happily
co-opted—or abnegation—where talk of “upper levels” are ignored altogether. Each
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of these options implies some weaker form of interoperability, where total agreement
is passed over in favour of partial and local—but perhaps workable—agreements.
Practically, the absence of direct background material about the ontologies them-
selves led me to examine two mailing lists where the peculiar fusion of speculative
philosophical and detailed technical subjects are discussed. This suggests, firstly,
that a range of approaches and data sources need to be considered when looking for
commensurability “clues”. Another consequence of this analysis was the addition of
several further distinguishing dimensions to the commensurability evaluation model.
However, these dimensions could relate better to the situational context in which
commensurability is evaluated, rather than to the ontologies themselves—and sug-
gests that, in terms of the commensurability model outlined in Chapter 5, it may
be important to model the context more stringently. In practice, the vagueness and
open-endedness of “context” make such a formal treatment a difficult prospect—
despite some existing efforts to do this. I return to this subject in the conclusion to
the study, as a candidate area for further refinements and research of the model.
While the upper-level ontologies surveyed demonstrate impressive theoretical co-
herence, engaging with the public fora in which they are produced shows that for
many questions of fundamental ontological importance—in both philosophical and
engineering senses—no kind of Platonic-level resolution is in sight. Rather the mail-
ing lists evoke an atmosphere of interminable dialogue, intractable positions and an
endless recasting of distinctions. Nevertheless, engagement with these social net-
works provides a necessary warning against any superficial reconciliations between
concepts which a purely technical review of ontologies might suggest. It indicates
the question of commensurability itself is enmeshed within the messy retail world
of discursive practices. The next chapter, covering efforts to standardise document
formats, demonstrates just how much retailing can take place in the effort to produce
standards of supposedly pure technical formats, models and specifications.




‘Henceforth, my dear philosophers, let us be on guard against the danger-
ous old conceptual fiction that posited a “pure, will-less, painless, timeless
knowing subject”; let us guard against the snares of such contradictory
concepts as “pure reason”, “absolute spirituality”, “knowledge in itself”:
these always demand that we should think of an eye that is completely
unimaginable, an eye turned in no particular direction, in which the ac-
tive and interpreting forces, through which alone seeing becomes seeing
something, are supposed to be lacking; these always demand of the eye
an absurdity and a nonsense. There is only a perspective seeing, only
a perspective “knowing”; and the more affects we allow to speak about
one thing, the more eyes, different eyes, we use to observe one thing, the
more compete will our “concepts” of this thing, our “objectivity”, be’
(Bourdieu, 1990, quoting Nietzche).
This study seeks to examine the commensurability of document formats, with a par-
ticular focus on the recent controversy over the question of document format stan-
dardisation. At first glance, this is a peculiar choice of study, since document formats
are not technically ontologies at all, in the terms outlined by the Semantic Web
(Bechhofer et al., 2004). Indeed, the largely unstructured nature of documents makes
them poor choices for definition as an ontology. Recent efforts to describe document
formats more formally require some revision to this picture, however. Firstly, the
idea of a “format” implies at least some level of structuration. Secondly, the lingua
franca of contemporary document formats is XML (eXtended Mark-up Language);
and it also provides the canonical syntax in which ontology-like definitions are ex-
pressed. Thirdly, there has been some effort towards an inverse move—embedding or
extracting the facts of an ontology contained within documents (RDFa (Birbeck and
Adida, 2008) and GRDDL (Davis and Halpin, 2007) are two such examples). It is not
therefore unreasonable to consider the structure and metadata of documents as them-
selves representing a series of facts expressible in a formal ontology. Finally, and of
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greatest significance here, document formats embed precisely the kinds of background
assumptions of formal systems which have been considered in the overall study so far.
What motivates the selection of document formats in particular—in contrast to
ontologies or schemas from some other field—is the (for this argument at any rate)
timely and fortuitous presence of a controversy around format standardisation, which
brings to light political, economic, legal and cultural dimensions of the question of
commensurability. The controversy concerns the standardisation of Office Open XML
(OOXML), a proposal put forward by the Ecma International standards consortium
to the International Organisation for Standardization (ISO) in December 2006 as
ISO/IEC DIS (Draft International Standard) 29500. OOXML has been largely de-
veloped and promoted by Microsoft, a member of Ecma International. The process
of standardisation is controversial due to the presence of another rival document for-
mat, OpenDocument Format (ODF), which only recently was also ratified by ISO
(as ISO/IEC 26300). This format is strikingly similar in aims, if not in detail; it was
largely sponsored by Microsoft competitors, Sun Microsystems and IBM.
This controversy has brought forth an unprecedented amount of press and com-
mentary, much of it publicly available via online media, blogs and mailing lists. As
the authors of a comparative report on the two formats suggest, in exuberant tones:
The software industry has rarely seen debates as intense as those surround-
ing OpenDocument Format (ODF) and Office Open XML . . . during recent
years. It’s a story that has many elements appropriate for a James Bond
movie, with multibillion dollar business empires at risk, global political
intrigue, and even some conspiracy theories at the interaction of capital-
ism (commercial software products), democracy (industry standards), and
communism (e.g., related standards controlled by the People’s Republic
of China). This is improbably heady stuff for what’s ultimately a debate
about something as mundane as file formats (O’Kelly and Creese, 2008)1.
The public nature of the debate, as well as the international scope of the standard-
isation process, provide a more visible and relevant context for examination than most
discussions around ontologies, which tend to be embedded within relatively small pro-
fessional communities. Aside from the prurient interest, many of what might normally
be implicit assumptions about the formats become explicit in this debate via the av-
enues of public dialogue and discourse. This case study departs from the previous one
on upper-level ontologies, which was to a large extent an intrinsic technical analysis
of upper-level ontologies, and only to a lesser degree an extrinsic social analysis of
the communities who develop them. The current study focusses on both in roughly
equal measure. Only through such an examination can some of the more complex
dimensions of the question of commensurability be brought into the open.
1Ironically, the report’s authors themselves were to become embroiled in part of the controversy (see
the Sociological Analysis below).
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The study begins with an outline of the background of the controversy, including
a brief history of document formats in the electronic era. Given the enormous scope
of the specifications underwriting the formats, the technical analysis examines some
key points of difference, rather than attempt an exhaustive comparison. The socio-
logical analysis, in turn, uses the language of game theory to describe the sequence of
events in the controversy—a decision prompted in part because the language of game
theory is itself embedded in much of the discourse of the participants. A formal game
theoretic model is not developed here however; rather the purpose is to demonstrate
how, in this instance, a broader view of social context can inform the practical ques-
tion of document format interoperability. Towards this end, the commensurability
framework developed earlier is applied to both technical and sociological dimensions.
The findings are then summarised, and the framework is evaluated in terms of how
well it facilitates the assessment of commensurability in this particular case. Such
pay-offs ought to be useful both to engineers engaged in document conversion, and
policy makers reflecting on document management policy.
A preliminary note: the treatment here oscillates between consideration of doc-
uments specifically as the products of word-processing software (such as Microsoft
Word), and more generally, as the products of office suite software (such as Microsoft
Office). The two formats considered here cover word-processing, spreadsheet and pre-
sentation documents, as well as subsidiary document objects, such as charts, graphs,
tables and so on. However, for reasons of space and convenience the analysis of-
ten focusses only on word-processing kinds of documents. It should be clear from
the context which kind of document is being discussed—in the absence of indicators,
it is used in the general sense as outputs of office productivity software (including
word-processor software).
8.1 A Brief History of Document Formats
What is a document? Occasionally the semantic questions generally left to lexicogra-
phers and linguists take on vastly greater economic and political dimensions. In 2005
the State of Massachusetts made a decision that all documents created and archived
by the state must be based on open formats2. This decision caused a simmering
debate on document formats to erupt into the public domain. Until now a largely ar-
cane technical dispute had been conducted over the choice between a format proposed
by Ecma International, largely sponsored by Microsoft, and another format proposed
by OASIS (Organization for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards).
On the one hand, Microsoft documents had been de facto standards for at least the
previous decade and a half, as competition gradually petered out of the office software
market in the 1990s. On the other, due in no small part to the enthusiastic enter-
2Commonwealth of Massachusetts (2005). Note that as with the other studies, sources treated as
primary are cited as footnotes rather than inline.
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prise of several of key Microsoft competitors (most notably, Sun Microsystems, IBM
and Novell Corporation), a new document format called the OpenDocument Format
(or ODF) had been attracting attention as a possible alternative. On May 1, 2005,
ODF had been submitted to ISO (International Organisation for Standardisation) /
IEC (International Electrotechnical Commission)3, and had been subsequently rat-
ified under the name of ISO/IEC 26300:2006 in 20064. This set the scene for the
State of Massachusetts policy statement, which acted as a catalyst for wide-ranging
governmental and organisational reviews of document standards around the world.
The case of the State of Massachusetts itself is a complex one, and worthy of study
in its own right. The initial decision to adopt ODF as the standard for documents
within the State quickly became embroiled in political debate, which saw the resig-
nation of the policy’s key architects, Erich Kriss and Peter Quinn (respectively, the
state’s Administration and Finance Secretary, and CIO) in late 20055. Subsequently
the state’s strong stance on ODF was ameliorated to include the emerging Microsoft
standard, OOXML (Office Open XML) in 20076. Instead of being written off as yet
another failed government IT initiative, the case prompted significant interest in a
variety of media channels. The “blogosphere” was to become an especially important
outlet, one through which opinion, commentary and technical analysis increasingly
were voiced, as both proponents of ODF and OOXML sought to analyse and indeed
influence governmental policy outcomes7. In the broader, global dimensions on the
subsequent debate over the standardisation of OOXML, the rapid rate of often volatile
discussion on blogs and other online forums proved to be a fascinating counterpoint
to the slow-moving diplomatic discourse echoed through the bureaucratic channels of
august standards bodies. Before venturing into the wilderness of that debate, how-
ever, it pays to look further at the recent history of document formats, to understand
why the question of commensurability between duplicated standards ought to arise
at all.
8.1.1 Whys and Wherefores of Document Formats
Electronic documents are one of the cornerstones upon which the computing era
has been founded. They represent the convergence of two mid-twentieth century in-
novations: xerography and electronic computers. Efforts to standardise upon the
formats of electronic documents betray nearly as long a history. The first standard-
ised character set, ASCII (American Standard Code for Information Interchange),
was approved by the American National Standards Institute (ANSI) in 1963 (Bran-
del, 1999; Jennings, 2004). A subsequent iteration was released in 1967 by the Ecma
group—a consortium body that also plays a central role in the current document
3Wikipedia (2008b).
4ISO (2008a).
5Shah et al. (2007).
6Pepoli and Dormtzer (2007).
7Updegrove (2007a); Mahugh (2007).
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formats debate. ECMA-6, the current version, is spelled out in a terse 28-page docu-
ment8. However, this conciseness belies the heated debate that took place during the
development of ASCII—a debate prescient of contemporary battles over standards
development. IBM, already an entrenched leader in the fledgling computer industry,
completely by-passed ASCII in favour of a rival character set, EBCDIC (van Wingen,
1999).
In the 1970s, a number of approaches were undertaken to specify standardised doc-
ument structures composed of more coarse lexical units than character sets. Two of
these formats are briefly discussed here, since they indicate two contrasting approaches
to document formatting which resonate in more contemporary debates. SGML (Stan-
dard General Markup Language) was developed out of an earlier General Markup
Language (GML), developed by IBM as part of a publishing system called the Doc-
ument Composition Facility9. SGML was designed to give precise meaning to the
structure of documents, while separating out instructions for rendering or present-
ing those documents10. SGML arose out of several simultaneous projects in both
academia and industry in the late 1960s and early 1970s. In response to problems of
machine hardware interoperability, Charles Goldfarb, an IBM employee, proposed a
method of partially automating what in today’s terms would be described as “supply
chain integration” in the publishing industry. The result was a mark-up language and
environment that could integrate “publishing and information retrieval activities”11.
IBM contributed much of the research and development required to make SGML
both an operable working environment and a standardised document mark-up lan-
guage; this led, in turn, to its success in large publishing and document management
environments in the 1980s12. The role of market-dominant companies steering stan-
dardisation efforts is a theme which reappears in the content of the current debate,
and IBM was early to recognise the commercial advantages in doing so. However,
complexity of SGML itself, coupled with the then still nascent era of personal com-
puting, ensured it remained in the terrain of heavy industry, where there existed the
human and machine resources capable of processing it. It nevertheless was the pro-
genitor of two later mark-up languages of considerably greater consequence: HTML
and XML.
TEX(and later, LATEX) was developed purely as a typesetting language in the
late 1970s. Its goal was orthogonal to SGML; it was both more oriented towards
specifically textual mark-up, and more ambitious in terms of representing typography
at a high level of fidelity. It was designed by Donald Knuth, a highly respected
computer science academic, in response to the poor drafting and typesetting of his own
book, The Art of Computer Programming13. It became gradually widespread within
8Ecma International (1991).




13The CTAN team (2008).
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academic publishing, particularly in the mathematical and scientific communities, as
it provided a mechanism for rendering complex notations typographically14. Outside
of this community, however, uptake has been relatively low, again due to the technical
complexity of the syntax. TEXwas a purpose-built format, designed to provide highly
detailed instructions to software on how to layout a document for printing—it thus
provided considerable semantic specificity. SGML, on the other hand, provided the
syntactic structure for documents, as well as the general means for specifying the
semantics—however authors themselves had to supply the actual semantic definitions.
Aspects of both of these approaches come to be used in present-day document formats
like ODF and OOXML.
Both SGML and LATEX, then, are early examples of highly structured document
formats, adopted as de jure and de facto standards within the relatively niche indus-
tries of industrial and scientific publishing. Both formats were stored in humanly-
readable ASCII text form. While this complicated textual composition for non-
technical users, it allowed programmers from different companies and organisations
to read and write document expressed in them. As developers of the World Wide
Web, using HTML, were to come to know by the 1990s, this was a vital property for
the development of many kinds of textual processing tools and systems—document
editors, browsers, search engines, cataloguing and content management systems, and
more. However, human legibility (albeit legibility by those with proficient technical
skill) was a feature that was soon to be lost among document formats in the world
of word-processing and office suites, which up until the present controversy utilised
exclusively binary formats, for the best part technically opaque and heavily protected
as company intellectual property. Nevertheless, in the same period, several other,
more specialised formats also emerged: troff and nroff for typesetting, Postscript
and PDF for printing, and TEI and Docbook for structured mark-up15.
The early period of computing witnessed, then, the development of many key
elements of the modern electronic document: character encoding, formats, mark-up
languages and typesetting systems. Broader computing developments included fea-
tures necessary for document transmission: fonts, image formats, printer technology
and communication networks. Soon after, these technologies were to move beyond
the specialised fields of industrial publishing, and become ubiquitous through their
dissemination on personal computers. Already some of what were to become common
problems of technical standardisation had emerged: companies which filled a key role
in technological innovation also had vested interests either to ignore (in the case of
EBCDIC) or promote actively (as with SGML) various standardisation efforts. The
involvement of corporate actors in the contrary movements towards both standardisa-
tion and differentiation of technical data formats becomes considerably more complex
in the case of the current controversy. In anticipation of some of the themes treated
14The CTAN team (2008).
15A recent survey of document formats highlights the differences between these formats in some
detail (Wilkinson et al., 1998).
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further on below, it is worth also noting the longevity of some of these formats—
SGML and LATEXcontinue to be widely used in their respective niche markets up
until the present day.
8.1.2 The Resistible Rise of Microsoft Office
In the 1980s a new sub-revolution was under way—the rise of the personal computer.
Document composition was one of the key tasks demanded of it, and the kinds of tech-
nical standards available—ASCII, SGML, LATEX—were too limited or too challenging
for the new possessors of these machines, the home computer enthusiast or office
knowledge worker. Thus word-processing and spreadsheet software became a lucra-
tive market for newcomer companies like Lotus, and semi-incumbents like Microsoft
(founded in 1975). These applications stored data in binary formats, unreadable and
usually undocumented (since the format represented an important piece of a software
vendor’s intellectual property). The first version of Microsoft Word was developed
in 1982 under the name “Multi-Tool Word” (Allan, 2001); it was preceded by some
years with the launch of WordPerfect in 1979 (Mendelson, 2009). The first version
of Microsoft Excel was released under the name “Multiplan” in 1981, although it too
was quickly eclipsed by the success of Lotus 1-2-3 (Allan, 2001). For much of the
1980s, and beyond, Microsoft engaged in the kind of corporate struggle symptomatic
of the IT industry: on the one hand, and at all costs, it needed to win new customers
in new software markets; on the other, as an operating system vendor, it needed
also to ensure some level of interoperability and compatibility with its office software
competitors, since it had to support the emerging ecosystem of software development
on it platform. Moreover, alongside other vendors it had to contend user complaints
about the difficulties of opening, reading, editing and saving documents created in
different tools. Hence the question of commensurability was important even in the
earliest days of commercial word-processor software development. Naturally, it was
not a question asked in abstract terms of commensurability, paradigms, epistemolo-
gies and ontologies; it was asked rather in terms of a new set of information technology
criteria and desiderata: compatibility, formats, performance and competing features.
Equally a new vocabulary emerged to describe the electronic workplace. Terms like
“document incompatibility”, “file conversion”, “software versions”, “binary formats”,
“printer errors”, “help systems”, “invalid characters”, “vendor lock-in” and “feature
creep” infiltrated the general professional lexicon. Where previously they had been
the obscure domain of IT technicians and engineers, by the 1990s these terms, and the
problems they directed attention towards, became endemic to virtually every office
environment. What motivated the rise of this new vocabulary? In particular, just
how can documents be “incompatible”?
Word-processor software systems facilitated in one sense the democratisation of
electronic documents from the highly structured, yet obscure document formats that
preceded them. Their main purpose was to simplify the entry of text into a file, for
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printing, archiving and sharing. The sorts of features that demarcate a document from
any kind of written or graphical information had to be faithfully replicated in their
electronic forms. Electronic document formats thus had to support a long list of exist-
ing textual conventions: margins, spacing, alignment, emphatic marks, hyphenation
and pagination, lists, tables, headings, fonts, international characters, graphical ele-
ments, bibliographies, indexes and tables of contents, footnotes and endnotes, header
and footer information, comments and annotations. Soon they also needed to support
a host of new features and functions specific to the electronic era—hyperlinks, video
and audio, forms, programmable events, change tracking, versioning, fax, email and
real-time collaboration. Yet there were, during the incipient years of word-processor
development, no governing bodies declaring which of these features were necessary,
nor in what order they must be implemented. In typical capitalist fashion, the market
declared what it wanted, and software vendors responded as best they could. Small
wonder then that differences arose between software programs, and even between ver-
sions of these programs. What with hindsight appears poor planning was more likely
a justified response to market demand, alongside fierce competitive pressure to be
“first to market”. To a large extent compatibility itself arose as an issue companies
needed to support as they would any other feature—it was the market that demanded
this too. At this point vendors were faced with the dilemma mentioned earlier—how
to differentiate product features in order to gain a competitive advantage, and yet
provide as one of these features compatibility with other products? This dilemma
returns in a revised form in the current debate between the latest Microsoft format
(OOXML) and the OpenDocument Format (ODF).
Allan (2001) writes of the early word-processor market:
At the end of the 1980s the two leading word processor programs were
WordPerfect and the different versions of Microsoft Word. WordPerfect
was in the number one position. However with the Macintosh application
included, Microsoft Word was closing the gap.
By the end of the 1990s, this situation had changed drastically. Aside from niche
markets, notably including the legal profession, WordPerfect had overwhelmingly lost
its dominant position. Several factors contribute to the rise of Microsoft Word during
this period:
• The rise of the Microsoft Windows operating system during the 1990s (in rela-
tive contrast to its competitors, Apple Macintosh and IBM OS/2 ) gave it un-
precedented access to burgeoning market of personal computer retailers. This
access meant it could conveniently bundle both the operating system and office
suite (Microsoft Office, of which Microsoft Word was and is an integral part)
at discount rates to its independent software vendor channel. Neither its oper-
ating system nor office suite competitors had such unprecedented global access
to their respective markets.
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• In turn, its dominance as an operating system vendor gave Microsoft techni-
cal advantages in terms of performance and compatibility with its operating
system. WordPerfect, by contrast, took longer to release versions for both Win-
dows and Macintosh systems. Microsoft first released Word for Windows in
1989 (Wikipedia, 2008a); WordPerfect appeared in late 1991 (as reported by
(Mendelson, 2009)).
• Conversely, the fact that Microsoft continued to sell and support its word-
processor on its chief rival operating system, Apple Macintosh, meant that it
could boast unrivalled interoperability across platforms. Its competitors were
slower to port their software versions to the Apple platform.
• The very issue of interoperability meant that, in the absence of standards, once
a market dominant player emerged, the easiest way for users (organisations and
individuals alike) to ensure interoperability was to continue to purchase initial
and future versions from the same vendor.
This combination of factors, collectively contributing to the “network externali-
ties” effected by market consolidation and the de facto standardisation of the Windows
platform and Office suite, meant that Microsoft was able to emerge not only as the
leading vendor in the office suite market, but in fact to assume a virtually monopolis-
tic position—within the very short space of a decade. This is all the more remarkable
given the barriers to entry in this market were to become increasingly low, due to
lower costs, improved tools and larger pool of technical labour available for software
development. In fact the major competitor to new versions of Microsoft Office and
Microsoft Word were its own predecessors (Hamm, 2006)—the chief marketing hurdle
for Microsoft was not how its product differed from competitive offerings, but why its
existing customers should bother to upgrade for new features.
Two quotes taken from Microsoft employees in the 1990s give some indication
of the extent to which the company prosecuted its now dominant market position.
The first is taken from a memo from Bill Gates to several program managers in 1998
(presented as Plaintiff’s Exhibit 2991 in Comes versus Microsoft; the anti-trust case
launched by the U.S. Government in 1999):
One thing we have got to change in our strategy—allowing Office docu-
ments to be rendered very well by other peoples [sic] browsers is one of
the most destructive things we could do to the company.
We have to stop putting any effort into this and make sure that Office
documents depends on PROPRIETARY IE capabilities.
Anything else is suicide for our platform. This is a case where Office
has to avoid doing something to destory [sic] Windows.
I would be glad to explain at greater length16.
16Comes v. Microsoft (2000a).
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The second is an internal marketing manual, this time released by a Microsoft
“Technology Evangelist”, James Plamondon, suggests that Microsoft make strategic
use of “independent” academics, analysts and consultants in promoting its products.
The manual is imbued with a suitable mix of religious and military metaphor (one
section is titled “Evangelism is War”; another, simply “Jihad”). It states:
“Independent” analyst’s report should be issued, praising your technology
and damning the competitors (or ignoring them). “Independent” consul-
tants should write columns and articles, give conference presentations and
moderate stacked panels, all on our behalf (and setting them up as ex-
perts in the new technology, available for just $200/hour). “Independent”
academic sources should be cultivated and quoted (and research money
granted). “Independent” courseware providers should start profiting from
their early involvement in our technology. Every possible source of lever-
age should be sought and turned to our advantage17.
These remarks are indicative of a highly combative company, fiercely protective
of its revenues and market share. They also point to the emergence of a more com-
plex game in the software market, involving not merely supplier-customer relations
of a single product, but an array of intervening, additional and not-always-visible
“players”—so-called independent academics, consultants and technical experts, who
can be brought into the commercial arena as forms of guerrilla or viral marketing,
and, just as vitally, a platform comprising a suite of multiple, interconnected prod-
ucts. Microsoft was not the only the most company employing such tactics—IBM
for example had a long history of leveraging its market dominance into more or less
conspicuous forms of economic and political pressure, with its suppliers, customers
and competitors alike. In the 1990s Microsoft had, however, in part inherited the
mantle of the IT industry “beˆte noire” from IBM by virtue of its unrivalled predatory
excellence. Its relationship to standards and competitors was neatly encapsulated in
the phrase “Embrace, Extend, Extinguish”, apparently attributed to a Microsoft ex-
ecutive during discussions with Intel in 199518. The phrase referred to a three phased
strategy: first, “embrace” a potentially threatening standard (often introduced by
Microsoft’s competitors); then, “extend” the technology with various enhancements,
under the apparent auspices of meeting customer demand; and finally, by virtue of
the effect of the enhancements corroding the positive network externalities effected by
the standard, “extinguish” its value to customers, and hence its threat to Microsoft’s
own market share and revenue.
Several indications emerged by the turn of the millennium that this hegemonic
position, and the blatantly manipulative practices it entailed, would become unstable.
Firstly, and most evidently, the rise of the World Wide Web provided new avenues
17Comes v. Microsoft (2000b).
18United States v. Microsoft (1998).
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for the development and distribution of software, and, just as significantly, a new
language for encoding documentation in a plain-text markup that was considerably
easier to learn than prior formats. Hypertext Mark-up Language (HTML) put the
creation and dissemination of content into a new generation of computer-literate,
though not necessarily technically expert, users. HTML, however, was not designed
for editable and printable documents, and hence could not yet act as an immediate
surrogate to existing office document formats.
Secondly, and alongside the rise of the web, open source software (OSS) became
a powerful stimulus for re-considering software licensing models, with the rise of the
Linux operating system, the Apache web server software, and a host of other open
source projects. Open source software also pointed to a future without restrictive li-
censing terms, since they were commonly accompanied with “copy-left” licenses such
as the GPL license19. By the late 1990s, several open source word-processors had
become available, though many were arguably limited in features compared with Mi-
crosoft Word. Ironically, one feature Microsoft’s competitors found difficult to emulate
was fully-fledged support for Microsoft Word documents themselves—the proprietary
nature of the document format made choice of software alternatives difficult for organ-
isations with large and growing document corpuses. Nonetheless, there was a clearly
evident path towards open source alternatives that were at least feature-rich enough
to compete with Microsoft Office.
Finally, the monopolistic position of Microsoft itself was motivating governments
in both the U.S. and Europe to instigate proceedings designed to protect compe-
tition, and limit what were widely deemed to be the anti-competitive practices of
the company. The U.S. government filed an antitrust suit against Microsoft in 1998,
alleging the company had discriminated against competition in bundling the Inter-
net Explorer web browser with its Windows operating system, using its power as
a monopolist in the operating system market to suppress incipient competition in
the emerging browser market20. The case was severe enough to warrant speculation
about potentially splitting the company in two—one to develop the Windows oper-
ating system, the other to develop business applications21. After considerable legal
wrangling over the complex issue of product “tying”22, the Supreme Court handed
down a guilty verdict, but with considerably reduced penalties—principally, that Mi-
crosoft not prohibit manufacturers and retailers from including other software on new
computers23. Nevertheless this, and a subsequent case successfully prosecuted by the
European Union, set limits on the extent to which Microsoft could maintain an un-
rivalled position in the office and word-processing software markets. Coincidentally
the EU, along with many national governments, began developing policy frameworks
19Free Software Foundation (2007).
20Wired News Report (2002).
21Hendren (2000).
22Chin (2005).
23United States District Court (2001).
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and commissioning reports on how to bring about greater interoperability through
the use of open standards (Ditch, 2007).
8.1.3 The Challenge of the OpenDocument Format
In 1999, Sun Microsystems acquired StarOffice, a German company which had de-
veloped a competing office suite of the same name24. At the time, Sun supposedly
rationalised the acquisition of the company, at a price of $73.5 million USD, as be-
ing a cheaper way of providing office software for its own employees than purchasing
Microsoft Office licenses25. Soon after it released the source code as open source
under the name of OpenOffice. Although it continued to sell StarOffice, along with
documentation and support, the act of releasing the source code was an important
public relations gesture, and the community which developed around the open source
version was to become an important activist group. The rise of OpenOffice, though
still insignificant compared to Microsoft, soon propelled an effort to standardise its
XML-based file format. In 2002, the first meeting of the OASIS Open Office Technical
Committee (TC) took place26. This formalised the standardisation effort under the
name of the OpenDocument Format (ODF). In 2005, the ODF format was submitted
to the International Standards Organisation (ISO); in 2006, this standard was ratified
as ISO 2630027.
What differentiates the OpenDocument Format from previous document formats?
Unlike PDF, PostScript and LATEX, it is based on XML, which since the turn of the
century had become both a de facto and de jure standard for representing data. ODF
is also sufficiently rich in concepts pertinent to generic documents, including spread-
sheets, presentations, graphs, equations, diagrams and embedded media—two other
document standards, for instance, DocBook and HTML are by comparison consider-
ably simpler, and dedicated to quite specific forms of document representation (book
and article semantics, and screen rendering, respectively). Since it is derived from a
working office application (originally StarOffice, renamed OpenOffice shortly after the
Sun acquisition), it has been designed to capture faithfully the minutiae of document
data—down to international character support and spacing. This is a key requirement
for ISO standards in particular28. ODF also uses a compressed ZIP format for man-
aging a set of related document assets, which simplifies the transmission, archiving
and dissemination of documents. Just as importantly, ODF provides a guarantee of
lossless data during the opening and saving of documents.
Yet a document format is unlikely to have been developed were it not for the
timely confluence of wide governmental dissatisfaction with the near-monopolistic
dominance of a single vendor, the sponsorship of ODF by several powerful rival ven-
24Shankland (1999).
25Lai (2007).
26OASIS ODF Adoption TC (2006).
27ISO (2008a).
28ISO/IEC (2004).
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dors (Sun, and key corporate allies IBM and Novell—and, to a lesser extent, Google,
Apple, Oracle and other Silicon Valley stalwarts), and an increasingly active and vocal
open source community. Rich document formats are not only the valued intellectual
property of their owners; they are extremely intricate and costly to develop. Whereas
LATEX, DocBook and HTML are of a size that they could conceivably be developed,
documented and steered by dedicated individuals or small cohorts, the current pub-
lished version of OpenDocument Format (1.1) is a 700-page specification, covering
everything from document metadata to precise typesetting rules, graphs, charts and
animations29. Sun Microsystem’s successful moves to release both the source code to
its office applications, and to sponsor (through the contribution of its employees) the
development and review of the OpenDocument Format may have had a pragmatic
motive of threatening its competition, but doubtless it accelerated the examination of
organisational document management policy and licensing the world over. Combined
with this, a large and heterogeneous community seized upon these moves as further
corroboration of the merits of open source and open standards, both practically and
ideologically. Coupled with the technical advantages of ODF over its precursors, this
set the scene for the greatest challenge yet to Microsoft’s office suite, and indeed, to
its entire stable of products built around its Windows and Office platforms.
8.1.4 Microsoft Responds
Not to be outdone, Microsoft quickly responded with its own standardisation effort
around its Office format. Despite wide-ranging scepticism over its moves in this di-
rection, it represented a marked change in attitude from its position in the 1980s
and 1990s, when the proprietary, closed nature of its formats was a critical aspect of
its market strategy. At the time, this not only protected the company from poten-
tial competition in the office software market; competition in this market was also
potentially corrosive of the company’s overall fortunes, since the Windows operating
system and a range of subsidiary products belonging to the Windows platform ben-
efited from Microsoft Office’s dominant position in the market. As the figures below
show, even up until recently Microsoft’s fortunes and market position had not been
overly effected by these threats.
Microsoft by Numbers
In the recent period of the so-called “format wars”, Microsoft Office continued to be
a highly profitable product of a very profitable company. In its six monthly (July-
December) SEC filings for 2007-2008, Microsoft reported overall revenue figures of
$30.129 billion, $12.399 billion in operating income and $8.996 billion in net income
(all figures in USD)30. Its MS Business Division (MBD), of which Microsoft Office
29Microsoft Corporation (2008b).
30Microsoft Corporation (2008b).
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Table 8.1: Comparison of IT Company Financials (end of 2007)
MS MBD Googlea Sunb IBM c Novelld Corele
Revenue 30,129 8,921 8,297 6,834 27,314 466 125
Operating
income
12,399 5,801 2,542 325 6,560 (28) 3
Net income 8,996 2,101 349 4,722 (22) (14)
Market Cap-
italisationf






fIn billions, USD. Market capitalisation figures taken from Google Finance, on the 28th of February,
2008 (Google, 2008a).
sales “generate over 90% of MBD revenue”, reported in the same period $8.9 billion
in revenue and $5.8 billion in operating income. The filings include the following note:
For the remainder of fiscal year 2008, we expect revenue to continue to in-
crease over the prior year due to the strong performance of 2007 Microsoft
Office system31.
Put in context, StarOffice’s purchase price ($72 million) represents (notwithstand-
ing the eight year gap) a mere 1.24% of the six monthly operating income of the
Microsoft division responsible for Microsoft Office. Just as strikingly: within this
division (which includes its own manufacturing, packaging, sales, marketing and ad-
ministrative costs), costs were just 35% of revenue—which compares well even against
the company’s overall impressive figure of 59%. Table 8.1 shows how Microsoft com-
pares with several other US information technology companies who figure prominently
in the controversy. (Note: in some cases most recent figures are quarterly or annual
only—these figures have been artificially converted to six-monthly figures for compar-
ison, by doubling quarterly, or halving annual results. All figures are in USD millions
unless otherwise indicated).
Not only, then, was Microsoft clearly the dominant force in the IT industry in
absolute size, these numbers also show the ongoing high profitability of software li-
censing as a business model—by comparison, advertising (Google), and hardware and
services (Sun, IBM and Novell) are considerably less lucrative. In the context of such
enormous fiscal results, even record-setting fines like those imposed by the European
Union against Microsoft for breaching anti-competitive practices—page 300 of the
ruling stipulated “a fine of EUR 497,196,304”32—seem diminutive. Moreover, these
31Microsoft Corporation (2008b).
32Commission of the European Communities (2004).
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figures show a year-on-year increase of 28% (although the release of Office 2007, along
with strong PC sales in this period, go some way towards explaining that growth).
Needless to say, so far the challenge of the OpenDocument Format had been muted—
at least in direct financial terms.
Microsoft “Interoperates”...
Both the memorandum and the manual quoted above were released during the US
anti-trust case, which ran from 1998 to 2002. Perhaps as a consequence of this—of
both the legal, and potentially far more damaging, the public relations ramifications—
the company’s tactics in the recent debate have become more subtle, its strategies
more implied than stated, at least on public record. Sceptics, including at least one
noted commentator, would continue to find the company’s practices utilised much
the same manipulative methods33. Regardless, standardisation and interoperability—
“soft”, apparently cooperative tactics—now began to play complementary key roles in
Microsoft’s strategy to retain market share and profitability, particularly in relation
to its office suite software.
Microsoft’s shift towards increasing standardisation and interoperability can be
charted through its office software versions. In 1999, with the release of Microsoft Of-
fice 2000, documents could be saved in HTML format, and published on the Internet
(although these could be viewed only with considerable difficulty and lack of fidelity by
non-Microsoft browsers). With the release of Microsoft Office 2003, Word, Excel and
PowerPoint documents could also be imported and exported in XML format, which
permitted the use of a range of XML technologies to query, manipulate and transform
the documents. The XML schemas provided by Microsoft were at the time complex
and required significant reverse engineering to interpret all but the most trivial docu-
ments. However, that documents could be both parsed and generated by third-party
software was a major step forward for engineers involved in document workflow and
conversion software development (Lenz et al., 2004). These schemas formed the basis
for Microsoft’s subsequent submission of a rival open document format to Ecma Inter-
national, a private member-based standards organisation, in December, 200534. This
format was named Open Office XML (OOXML); intentionally or otherwise, this set
the stage for both comparisons and confusion with OpenDocument Format (ODF—
also expressed in XML). A version of OOXML was then included in Microsoft Office
2007. Ecma approved the standard in December 2006—however, this approval carried
little weight in and of itself, since the two chairs of its supervising technical committee
were themselves senior Microsoft executives35. (The population of technical commit-
tees by employees of the company promoting standards is not unusual—for example,
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Format was similarly led by employees of Sun Microsystems and IBM36). The main
objective was to mirror the ODF progression towards rapid ISO ratification as an al-
ternative open document format—Ecma International played (and continues to play)
a similar shepherding role to OASIS in the case of ODF. In 2007, OOXML was sub-
mitted to ISO; but failed to get sufficient votes to be ratified. The controversy and
publicity surrounded this submission are analysed further on below.
Why then did Microsoft embark upon a program, contrary both to its express at-
titude and clear financial incentives, to open up its document formats to a standard-
isation process? One obvious reason is concern over the rise of ODF as a creditable
document format. The same SEC filings cited above include a mandatory report on
business risks—and high on its list, Microsoft includes the threat of changing business
models and competition due to open source software, and concern over “government
litigation and regulation activity”37. Meanwhile, successful advocacy has seen ODF
rise from obscurity to a potential format for both software interoperability and long-
term document preservation. This begs the corresponding question of why Microsoft
did not then instead support ODF in its office software. At face value the deci-
sion to develop OOXML appears part of a hedging strategy, designed both to satisfy
customers—particularly governments—of Microsoft’s commitment to openness, and
simultaneously to preserve control over the technicalities of the format. However, as
the analysis below aims to show, this simple explanation is complicated by a number
of factors.
8.2 A Tale of Two Formats
8.2.1 Preliminary Remarks
The coverage of the controversy proceeds in two parts. I first conduct a technical
analysis of the formats in some detail. This analysis shows how decisions involved
in designing the specifications are themselves pivotal “moves” in the overall game of
standardisation. As their respective sizes indicate (700 pages for ODF; 6000 pages
for OOXML), this is necessarily be a cursory analysis, and aims to capture something
of the overall flavour of the two formats. I then pursue a sociological analysis of
the standardisation controversy itself. As suggested earlier, the analysis operates in
a broadly game-theoretic fashion—although the specifically rationalistic calculations
of utility commonly employed by game theory are not pursued here, the metaphor
of a game is nevertheless particularly apposite to this study. From the standpoint
of someone engaged in interpreting, translating, converting, integrating or choosing
between these two formats, the social study should augment the technical one by
making explicit what are otherwise implicit perspectival differences on what sorts of
things documents are—by highlighting in particular the way those perspectives are
36OASIS (2008).
37Microsoft Corporation (2008b).
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shaped by economic, political, legal and cultural distinctions. The argument advanced
throughout this study is that no formal specification alone can bring to light each of
the assumptions brought to bear on the domain under consideration. A supplementary
sociological analysis is needed to bring into the open the various viewpoints of the
designers of these specifications, bearing in mind that such analysis is itself always
subject to yet further perspectival presumptions. In this particular case, more than
perhaps most—conducted as it is upon a global stage, and being so rich in political
intrigue, economic interest and legal complexity—untangling these assumptions is
best a partial undertaking. Nevertheless it presents a dynamic, hybridised socio-
technological model of commensurability of these formats, tailorable to the needs of
particular scenarios.
To use a metaphor which features prominently below, what is the proposed pay-off
for undertaking this analysis? What is presented here is ideally a model of analysis ap-
plicable to any ontology matching or document harmonisation work. It might well be
argued that social and political differences are irrelevant to the task of translating ap-
parently mechanical concepts belonging to world of documents. However, such work is
itself never conducted in a vacuum. The same organisations undertaking translations,
conversions or evaluations of document formats also make weighty policy decisions
on document management issues; they consider multi-million dollar software licens-
ing purchases; and they expend significant effort in conducting requirement analysis
exercises to determine the scope of work of new projects, including those of data
conversion, software migration and document management. Asking the question of
commensurability in these cases brings into play non-technical decision-making crite-
ria. Understanding differences along a series of both technical and social dimensions
ought ideally, then, to have the practical pay-offs of delivering more accurate project
estimates, saving money in IT expenditure, making decisions that align with policy
goals and directives, and serving the needs of document users more effectively.
8.2.2 Two Formats Compared—Technical Analysis
Current drafts of both the ODF and OOXML specifications are long: the ODF spec-
ification reviewed here (version 1.1) is 738 pages38, while the OOXML specification
reviewed (1.3, draft) is contained in five documents totalling six thousand pages—the
main technical reference, Open Office XML Part 4—Markup Language References,
stands at 5219 pages alone39. By way of comparison, current versions of two stan-
dards mentioned earlier, HTML and DocBook, have specifications which stand at
389 and 15 pages respectively (Raggett et al., 1999; Walsh, 2009). An exhaustive
treatment of each of these formats, perhaps for purpose of developing document con-
version tools, would need to analyse each and every concept in both of these formats
(conversion tools already exist—see for example the open source project supported by
38Durusau et al. (2006).
39Ecma International (2008b).
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both Novell and Microsoft40—however, a comprehensive mapping has not yet been
undertaken). The following analysis does not aim for such exhaustiveness, but rather
to capture the salient differences between the two formats. It is enough therefore to
show here that the formats have markedly alternate conceptualisations of documents,
which issue from different circumstances, goals, beliefs and motivations of the par-
ticipating actors. The subsequent section examines how these factors—both those
explicit in the peripheral literature on the formats, and those implicit in the format
specifications themselves—can be tied back to the broadly social characteristics of
the game of standardisation, of which the formats themselves comprise key strategic
moves.
The technical analysis then examines four areas of comparison: the schemas and
namespaces in which the concepts of the formats are defined and organised; the
organisation of documents into packages; the handling of document metadata; and the
basic textual elements of a very simple document. Several salient technical differences
considered in other studies are also discussed here.
Schemas and Namespaces
Both ODF and OOXML formats are designed to capture the terms required for office
documents, and both declare a number of schemas and namespaces for describing
different kinds of related document concepts. Namespaces are modules of elements
and attributes which are in some way related (Bradley, 2003). Elements and attributes
are syntactic elements of XML, which are frequently used to model semantic concepts
and relations—one approach to modelling OWL classes and properties, for instance,
would be to treat them syntactically as elements and attributes. Elements can contain
both attributes and other elements, though such containment is also a purely syntactic
feature. In the case of a highly simplified document format represented in XML,
elements could conceivably include concepts like document, paragraph and comment ;
attributes might include document title, paragraph width and comment author.
The specification of elements and attributes is usually performed in XML via a
schema, using a standardised XML definition language like Document Type Definition
(DTD), XML Schema or RelaxNG. While Document Type Definitions are a founda-
tional part of the older SGML standard41, XML Schema and RelaxNG are newer
definition languages which provide greater expressivity for the constraints in which
elements and attributes are arranged. XML Schema is authored by the World Wide
Web Consortium42; RelaxNG has been developed by the OASIS standards group
(the same body responsible for the development of the ODF)43. Though the subject
of its own (though less public and acrimonious) format debate, the differences are
minimal between XML Schema and RelaxNG, largely a matter of style for most ap-
40ODF Converter Team (2009).
41Maler and El Andaloussi (1999).
42Walmsley and Fallside (2004).
43Clark and Makoto (2001).
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plications (van der Vlist, 2002). Any XML document which is purely syntactically
correct is said to be well-formed ; a document is also valid if it conforms to some
schema, i.e. does not violate the constraints set out by that schema. A schema must
have a namespace, which must be unique within the scope of the system processing
schema-conforming documents. For schemas intended for public adoption, names-
paces are typically unique resource identifiers (URI’s), which are guaranteed to be
unique across the world wide web. Metadata standards—such as the DublinCore, a set
of elements for describing document metadata44—are typically expressed in schemas
with a unique URI namespace. A schema may be specified in one or more physical
files; additionally, a single file can define multiple schemas. The use of public names-
paces is an important mechanism for linking schemas without a common author; it
permits any public schema definitions to be imported into another schema.
ODF and OOXML are both specified in a number of schemas, each with an asso-
ciated namespace. ODF 1.1 is defined in a single file, comprises 22 namespaces, and
utilises RelaxNG for defining elements and attributes. OOXML is defined in a total
of 90 files, comprising a total of 27 namespaces, and utilises XML Schema. Seven
of the 22 ODF schemas in fact reference other standardised schemas, including ones
defined for typesetting, metadata, graphics and mathematical notation. All of the
OOXML namespaces reference other schemas defined within OOXML itself, with the
exception of the DublinCore schema. Table 8.2 summarises these differences.
Table 8.2: Overall Schema Comparison
ODF 1.1 OOXML 1.3 draft
# of files 1 90
# of declared namespaces 22 27
# of imported namespaces 7 1
# of declared elements1 536 3427
# of declared attributes1 1608 3374
XML formalism RelaxNG XML Schema
The schemas themselves describe various features of documents. Each format cov-
ers three types of document content: textual content (produced by word-processing
software); tabular content (produced by spreadsheet software); and presentational
content (produced by presentation software). Absent are definitions of data com-
monly produced by other office software: databases, email, notes, project manage-
ment charts, and so on. An important design consideration motivating the division
of schemas is the separation of content from other aspects of the document, such as
styles, metadata, application settings and package information. The structural sep-
aration permits other systems to interrogate the document for just the information
they require: a search engine may only be interested in the content parts of the doc-
44DCMI (2008).
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ument, a cataloguing system in the metadata, and so on. The distinction between
document aspects is also evident in the discussion of package structures below.
Despite differences, the formats share many features at an abstract level. Both
ODF and OOXML have three central schemas for describing each of the document
types (documents, spreadsheets and presentations). For convenience these are clas-
sified here as “core” schemas. The document types also have numerous shared char-
acteristics, which are described by the remaining schemas. These include document
packaging, container and metadata information (termed here “meta-level” schemas);
and constructs for drawing, graphing and charting, mathematical notation, biblio-
graphic data, forms, and custom or user-defined schemas (termed “detail” schemas).
These schemas intersect with the specific document type schemas in a lattice-type
structure: package, container and metadata schemas embed the core, content-specific
schemas; these in turn embed the detail schemas.
Figure 8.1 depicts these abstract schematic relations. This depiction is a loose
approximation, and indicates only the general arrangement and dependencies between
schemas (which flow from meta to core to detail schemas). Table 8.3 is a more detailed
mapping of the schemas to each other—while a general indication of purpose of the
schemas is provided here, they are naturally documented at greater length in the
respective specifications themselves45.
45Durusau et al. (2006); Ecma International (2008b).
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Figure 8.1: Overview of Schema Composition
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Table 8.3: Comparison of Namespaces






















































Detail Charts chart Chart; ChartDraw-
ing
Detail Embedded forms in
documents
form; xforms —c
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Table 8.3: Comparison of Namespaces









Detail Document styling style —c
Detail Number concepts number —c











Schema names in bold have been imported from other standards. The prevalence
of imported schemas in ODF is indicative of a stated objective to “ ‘borrow’ from
similar, existing standards wherever possible and permitted” (Valoris, 2003). Con-
versely, the choice to define schemas in areas such as mathematical notation, graphics
and forms suggest that OOXML has placed significantly greater emphasis on compat-
ibility with the overwhelming preponderance of existing Microsoft Office documents.
Rather than follow newer standards like MathML, SVG and XForms in these respec-
tive areas, OOXML is modelled on how previous Microsoft Office binary formats have
treated such objects. A thorough review of compatibility would need to examine just
how these respective “detail” schemas for mathematical notation, graphics and forms
also align. One advantage of ODF approach in this regard is the ease with which
other software developed around these standards can extract and manipulate data
conforming to these standards, while being agnostic of the OpenDocument Format
itself. The question of backward compatibility is a concern for both formats; assum-
aBraces are used here to indicate namespaces (e.g. Diagram) within a broader functional grouping
area of OOXML (e.g. DrawingML).
bSee discussion below for distinction between DrawingML and VML in OOXML.
cForm, styles, numbers and print concepts are defined within the core schemas in OOXML. For exam-
ple, WordprocessingML defines styles and form information for textual documents; SpreadsheetML
defines styles in tabular documents, and so on.
dAt this stage, ODF does not define concepts for handling formulae or custom XML schemas.
Support for formulae and extensible schemas are planned for version 1.2 (Durusau and Brauer,
2007). Bibliographic entries are supported within the text schema.
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ing a sufficient body of documents in ODF 1.1 format, future iterations of the format
will need to consider the need to support this version itself, as well as versions of its
externally referenced schemas like MathML.
The difficulty of handling legacy documents while supporting improved data mod-
els is evident with the introduction of two separate schema collections in OOXML for
handling graphical data. In the OOXML Primer document, DrawingML is considered
the canonical method for describing embedded shapes, colours, styles and effects46.
VML (Vector Markup Language) is a XML format for graphics introduced by Mi-
crosoft in 199847, and at that time failed to be accepted as a standard. Nevertheless,
it was adopted in MS Office 2000, and consequently requires inclusion in OOXML
in order to support documents created in this and subsequent versions up until MS
Office 2003. On this subject, the OOXML Primer states:
The VML format is a legacy format originally introduced with Office 2000
and is included and fully defined in this specification for backwards com-
patibility reasons. The DrawingML format is a newer and richer format
created with the goal of eventually replacing any uses of VML in the Of-
fice Open XML formats. VML should be considered a deprecated format
included in Office Open XML for legacy reasons only and new applica-
tions that need a file format for drawings are strongly encouraged to use
DrawingML in preference48.
The redundancy of including two graphical formats, one of which is clearly depre-
cated, in a first version of a specification caused various national bodies commenting
upon the ISO submission of OOXML to request its removal or annexation to the
main specification49. Based on the comment from the ECMA Technical Committee
in January, 2008, this recommendation has since been approved: “As suggested by
many National Bodies, we will also make the necessary changes to enable the usage
of DrawingML everywhere VML was previously used”50.
The differences at a schema level between the formats can be summarised along
the following lines:
1. Semantic specificity : the number of physical files, schemas, and declared ele-
ments and attributes in OOXML significantly outweighs the equivalent number
in ODF, reflecting the general difference in size between the documentation of
the two specifications. This is only partially explained in the use by ODF of ex-
ternal schemas—it in part reflects an aim of ODF towards semantic minimalism
(using a minimal set of concepts, differentiated where necessary with the use of
46Ecma International (2008b).
47Mathews et al..
48Ecma International (2007b). Although, as the discussion of individual documents below indicates,
Microsoft Office itself does not yet take this advice
49Ecma International (2007a).
50Ecma International (2008a).
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attributes, in other words, parametrically), and a converse tendency of OOXML
towards semantic maximalism (using a maximal set of concepts, differentiating
on the basis of classificatory elements). This latter point is expanded in the
section below, A Sample Document in ODF and OOXML.
2. External schema re-use: as explicitly reflected in the statements of both OA-
SIS and ECMA technical committees, ODF is directed towards schema re-use
where possible. In contrast OOXML uses concepts almost exclusively defined in
internal schemas, in part to support backwards compatibility with earlier XML
and binary formats authored by its principal sponsor, Microsoft.
3. Internal schema re-use: the differences are less marked here. OOXML redefines
particular structures such as tables within each of the core schemas, Word-
processingML, SpreadsheetML and PresentationML. In contrast, ODF uses the
same table schema in all of its document types. This simplification comes at
the cost of specificity—spreadsheets typically include a larger number of rows
and columns than word-processing and presentational tables, yet the use of
the same model means word-processing and presentation applications need to
consider the possibility of large tables being included.
4. Multiple methods: OOXML is designed to support existing document created
in earlier versions of Microsoft Office. In the case of graphical objects, this has
led to the inclusion of two overlapping schemas: the VML schema for older
documents, and the DrawingML schema, for documents created by Microsoft
Office 2007. ODF has a single schema set for handling graphical objects.
5. Formal validation: ODF uses RelaxNG, while OOXML uses XML Schema. Al-
though the differences are slight, RelaxNG provides a more flexible and humanly-
readable model (Clark, 2002), arguably more suited to the loose-fitting nature of
document rather than transactional data. It suggests ODF uses a more flexible,
descriptive model, while OOXML is comparatively prescriptive, and provides
more strict data validation as a result. This reinforces the first point above,
that OOXML focuses on greater semantic specificity.
These differences are summarised in the conclusion to the technical analysis.
Packages
Both ODF and OOXML use the ZIP file format as package containers for documents.
One implication is that any ODF or OOXML can be opened by conventional de-
compression software. This was the not the case with previous binary formats. In
both cases, the packages contain a number of XML files conforming to the respec-
tive format schemas, along with various media assets required by the document, such
as images, audio and video. Both formats also permit the inclusion of non-standard,
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application-specific data, so long as this does not break conformance with the schemas.
This is useful for storing particular application or document configuration settings,
for example.
The ODF package specification is a brief nine pages51; the OOXML package spec-
ification has its own document, “Open Office XML Part 2—Open Packaging Conven-
tions”, and consumes 131 pages52. Again, only the key differences are highlighted here.
Whereas the ODF package specification details only the key elements likely to appear
in a package (it is therefore both concrete and non-normative), OOXML outlines
both a generic model and specific implementation details for a package, collectively
entitled “Open Package Conventions” (OPC)—it is abstract and highly normative in
contrast.
The OPC is designed as generic container for XML files and associated resources—
not simply OOXML documents. According to the specification, “It is intended to
support the content types and organization for various applications and is written
for developers who are building systems that process package content”53. The OPC
model has three key concepts: Parts, Part Addressing and Relationships. Parts are
specific “streams of bytes”54, that is, specific content within the package. Parts have
names, content types, and “growth hints”, which indicate the number of bytes to
reserve in the package. There are specific rules in the specification for handling parts
with XML content. Part Addressing covers how parts are referred to within the
package. Relationships describe relations between parts and other resources—either
within or outside of the package—in a generic way, in order to avoid the problem of
“arbitrary markup or an application-specific encoding”55. For example, a system with
no special knowledge of document formats or other parts of OOXML could conceivably
navigate the relationships to determine the resources used by the package—ODF has
no such generic facility. Specification of relationships also permits reference to digital
certificates, and provides a means for handling version and extensibility issues within
the package. Together these concepts provide an abstract model for applications to
package and extract data. The package schemas introduced above specify how the
relationships, part content types and core properties are stipulated within the package
format.
The ODF package format follows a more conventional pattern for embedding pack-
age information (see for example the Java Archive Format56). The package contents
are outlined in a manifest file, which lists the package files names, paths (equiva-
lent to the OPC Reference concept), size, media or content type, as well as digital
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manifest description of the package contents—these are only referenced within the
document itself. There is also no equivalent abstraction of relationships between files.
Instead relationships are inferred by naming conventions spelled out elsewhere in the
specification (section 2.1)—in the case of media assets stored in the package, these
referred to explicitly within the contents of the document. Using descriptions taken
from the specification, the file names and their associated function, quoted from the
specification, are as follows:
• content.xml—“Document content and automatic styles used in the content”58.
• styles.xml—“Styles used in the document content and automatic styles used in
the styles themselves”59.
• meta.xml—“Document meta information, such as the author or the time of the
last save action. Application-specific settings, such as the window size or printer
information”60.
• settings.xml—“Application-specific settings, such as the window size or printer
information”61.
Alternatively the entire document contents can be stored in a single XML file, of
any name.
The abstract model introduced by the OPC makes for a far less intuitive format, as
can be seen by the comparison between two basic ODF and OOXML documents below.
No effort is made by the ODF package conventions to provide a generic specification
for packaged data generally, and this means the files contained with package have
simple, self-explanatory names. Conversion between formats would generally need to
interpret the abstract OPC relationships, and downgrade these to the concrete form
required by ODF; conversely, the ODF files would need to be converted back to an
abstract set of relationships when converting in the other direction. Since the package
formats are comparatively a small and trivial part of an overall document conversion
process, this introduces an unnecessary burden for those undertaking the conversion.
Metadata
Both specifications outline metadata properties, and both allow for further properties
to be added by users to a document. Both reference the DublinCore property set,
although at time of writing neither major implementation of the formats (OpenOf-
fice and Microsoft Office, respectively) support these properties directly within their
user interface. The ODF does, however, explicitly reference the DublinCore for meta-
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package format, within the OPC described above. It is the area of metadata that
document formats most closely resemble the highly structured formalism of Seman-
tic Web ontologies—indeed DublinCore has been expressed as an OWL ontology62.
Consistent use of DublinCore is of considerable benefit to content management and
workflow systems, citation indexes, and information retrieval software like search en-
gines, providing unambiguous identification and retrieval of documents by author,
title, publisher and other metadata fields. That both formats utilise the DublinCore
is of considerable potential benefit for these reasons; a content management system
could provide a single search interface to users for finding document authored in either
ODF or OOXML formats.
This promise is compromised by differences in how metadata is arranged within
the two formats. Both separate metadata into three categories, but these are not
consonant. ODF stipulates the following categories:
1. Pre-defined Metadata. These include the DublinCore metadata set (which in-
clude creator, subject, title and other common metadata fields), as well as
additional document-specific elements declared within the office:meta schema
(such as who last printed the document, what template the document uses, and
what general statistics have been recorded about the document).
2. User-defined Metadata. An arbitrary number of pairs of metadata elements can
be added to a document by users. A user-defined metadata element has a name,
a value, and optionally a value type (such as whether the value is a string of
characters or a number).
3. Custom Metadata. An application can add any further arbitrary well-formed
XML metadata elements. Such content must be preserved by any system reading
and writing ODF documents. This permits application-specific extensibility (for
example, a content management system could add properties specifying user
roles and rights to the document).
Meanwhile, OOXML defines the following metadata categories:
1. Core properties. Core properties include those defined within the OPC (Section
10), namely the DublinCore property set, as well as a separate series of fields
roughly equivalent to a subset of the document-specific elements described under
ODF’s Pre-defined Metadata above.
2. Extended properties. Extended properties are broadly equivalent to a subset of
ODF Pre-defined Metadata fields.
3. Custom properties. These are equivalent to the User-Defined Metadata elements
described above.
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Table 8.4: Comparison of metadata categories





















Table 8.4 contrasts the two sets of metadata categories.
The lack of equivalent for ODF’s Custom Metadata in OOXML is another sign of
the restrictive, normative character of OOXML compared with the ODF. Theoreti-
cally, application-specific properties could be added as custom properties; although
this does permit user access to these properties, not always a desirable outcome.
On the other hand, OOXML permits both simple and complex properties. Simple
properties are equivalent to all ODF properties; they have a name, a value, and a
value type. Complex properties permit XML fragments (elements and attributes) of
arbitrary complexity. Such properties could be multi-part types, like an event (with
a start and end date), some media resource (like pictures or video), or the results
of a form. Four of the defined extended properties are complex properties—Digital
Signature, Heading Pairs, Application Specific File Properties, and Part Title. All
custom properties are treated as complex properties. Complex properties cannot
be treated as User-defined Metadata in ODF, since it has no support for more than
simple name-value properties. Data captured as complex properties in OOXML could
be stored as Custom Metadata in ODF; however, these would necessarily be invisible
to users—the opposite problem to that caused by the absence of a Custom Metadata
equivalent in OOXML.
Table 8.5 lists the DublinCore elements, their definition as per the DublinCore
Metadata Element Set (1.1) and Terms63, and whether they are used by the ODF,
OOXML or both. The definitions are taken directly from the DublinCore documen-
tation64. The Element Set itself also contains several useful clarifying comments—for
reasons of space these have been omitted.




aDefined in the DublinCore Terms (an extension of the DublinCore Metadata Element Set), which
are specialisations of the Date element (DCMI, 2008).
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Table 8.5: Use of DublinCore properties
Element Definition Used by
Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions
to the resource.
Neither
Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource,
the spatial applicability of the resource, or the




Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the
resource.
Both
Datea A point or period of time associated with an
event in the lifecycle of the resource.
Both
Description An account of the resource. Both
Format The file format, physical medium, or dimen-
sions of the resource.
Neither
Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource
within a given context.
OOXML
Language A language of the resource. Both
Modifieda OOXML
Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource
available.
Neither
Relation A related resource. Neither
Rights Information about rights held in and over the
resource.
Neither
Source A related resource from which the described
resource is derived.
Neither
Subject The topic of the resource. Both
Title A name given to the resource. Both
Type The nature or genre of the resource. Neither
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1. In relation to the Creator element, the OpenDocument Format (3.1.7) specifies:
“The <dc:creator> element specifies the name of the person who last modified
the document. The name of this element was chosen for compatibility with the
DublinCore, but this definition of ‘creator’ used here differs from DublinCore,
which defines creator as ‘An entity primarily responsible for making the content
of the resource.’ In Open Document terminology, the last person to modify
the document is primarily responsible for making the content of the document”
(OASIS, 2008). This differs from OOXML, which simply assumes the Creator
element to be document’s author.
2. The ODF fields Creation Date and Time and Modification Date and Time fields
listed below in fact use the DublinCore Date element, just as the Created and
Modified DC terms do—so these fields can be assumed to be equivalent.
The majority of the properties are defined by the document formats themselves
(either as ODF Pre-defined Metadata or OOXML Core and Extended Properties).
These are listed in Table 8.6.
Table 8.6: Comparison of Metadata Properties
ODF OOXML Type
Generator Application name Simple
Keywords keywords [Core] Simple
Initial Creator Simple
Printed By Simple




Print Date and Time Simple
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Document Statisticsa Total Number of Charac-
ters [Extended]a
Simple
Document Statisticsa Number of Characters
(With Spaces) [Extended]
Simple









Heading Pairs [Extended] Complex
Document Statisticsa Number of Hidden Slides
[Extended]
Simple













Name of Manager [Ex-
tended]
Simple
Total Number of Multime-
dia Clips [Extended]
Simple
Number of Slides Contain-
ing Notes [Extended]
Simple
Document Statisticsa Total Number of Pages
[Extended]
Simple
Document Statisticsa Total Number of Para-
graphs [Extended]
Simple
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Table 8.6: Comparison of Metadata Properties
ODF OOXML Type















Part Titles [Extended] Complex
Total Edit Time Metadata
Element [Extended]
Simple
Document Statistics a Word Count [Extended] Simple
Of a total of forty-four properties, seven of ODF properties have no equivalent
OOXML value (nor, due to the lack of extensibility, any way of adding these other
than as Custom (user-defined) Properties); 23 of the Core and Extended OOXML
properties have no ODF equivalents (although—except in the case of the complex
properties, Heading Pairs, Hyperlink List, Application Specific File Properties and
Part Titles—these could be added as ODF Custom Metadata). The remaining 31%
of properties are common to both formats.
In the case of document statistics, there is again rough but incomplete overlap. As
table 8.7 below shows, six of the statistics are common to both formats; ODF contains
eight not reproduced in OOXML, and OOXML contains three not reproduced in ODF.
Around 35% of statistics produced in one format could therefore be meaningfully
translated into the other.
This analysis of metadata shows that even in the use of the same metadata stan-
dard (DublinCore), there is not perfect commensurability. In the use of format-specific
aThis field contains the individual document statistics, many of which map to OOXML equivalents.
See discussion below for further details.
bSee 8.5, Note 2 above.
cEmbedding a digital signature in a document’s property has been deprecated in favour of the method
described in the Open Package Conventions (OPC). The Digital Signature field appears to have
been retained for backward compatibility reasons only .
dThe Application Specific File Properties field lists all of the extended properties supported by the
OOXML application itself. It appears this field cannot be extended by further arbitrary properties
by an given OOXML application.
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Table 8.7: Comparison of Statistical Properties
ODF OOXML




Object Count Total Number of Multimedia Clips
OLE Object Count
Paragraph Count Total Number of Paragraphs
Word Count Word Count





Non Whitespace Character Count Total Number of Characters
Number of Hidden Slides
Number of Lines
Number of Slides Containing Notes
document information and statistical metadata, roughly one third of properties are
common. While there are ways of capturing exclusively OOXML metadata in ODF,
this would have no semantic significance for applications producing and consuming
ODF documents—they would need to honour the syntactic containers of the meta-
data, but would not be able to update or render this information meaningfully. In
the case of the four complex properties, this information can at best be captured
as an undifferentiated stream of XML characters. Going the other way, the situa-
tion is much the same—possibly ODF-only properties can be rendered as OOXML
Custom Properties, although in the case of automatically generated fields (such as
Print Date and Time and exclusive statistical figures), this information could quickly
become out-of-date and erroneous. In such cases it would preferable not to include
such metadata at all. Data staleness is a potential problem in both conversion cases,
especially for properties which are updated automatically by the application, rather
than the end user.
There do not appear to be major significant design differences in how metadata
is conceived. Several OOXML metadata properties appear obscure and complex, and
related to application behaviour than document description. This may be for the
purpose of preserving backward compatibility with legacy Microsoft Office formats.
ODF also appeared to be more flexible and extensible.
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A Sample Document in ODF and OOXML
By far the bulk of both ODF and OOXML specifications is naturally dedicated to
the actual contents of textual, tabular and presentational documents. An exhaustive
treatment of these elements is beyond the scope of this study, but it is useful to com-
pare some of the central elements used in word-processing documents to capture the
flavour of how each format structures document content. For this purpose the word-
processing software packages of OpenOffice 2.3 and Microsoft Office 2003 equipped
with the Microsoft Office Compatibility Pack has been used to generate, respectively,
an ODF document and an OOXML document. The contents of the document utilise
several basic word-processing features—formatting, embedded links and images—as
follows:
Sample Document
This has some bold formatting, also some with italics, a web link
and a picture. . . [followed by the picture itself]
The content is the same as that used in a recent technical report, “Technical
Distinctions of ODF XML and OOXML” (Macnaghten, 2007)—although the purpose
of that paper is somewhat distinct from those of this study, the use of the same
minimal text and formatting allows for comparison with its results. The original
image has replaced with one of my own. Appendix B.1 demonstrates how this content
appears in each of the software programs.
After saving the documents as, respectively, SampleDocument.odt for ODF and
SampleDocument.docx for OOXML, their contents were extracted using a common
ZIP format decompression utility. Conventional file and text editing software were
then used to view the resulting directory structure and text contents65.













65As a side note: prior to the introduction of these non-binary formats, it would not have been
possible even to inspect the contents of OpenOffice or Microsoft Office documents using generic
utilities in this way.











The Configurations2 directory contains a range of settings, and the Thumbnails
directory contains a small image showing the first page of the document—these are
application-specific, and not part of the ODF standard. The manifest.xml file contains
the package information, while the content.xml, meta.xml, settings.xml and styles.xml
fields are briefly described in the Package section above.



















While the file names are similar, unlike the ODF they are essentially arbitrary,
and are identified functionally according to the Open Package Conventions described
above in the document.xml.rels file.
Both formats rely heavily upon a “separation of concerns”—different files con-
tain data conforming to different schemas, which in turn reflect different conceptual
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aspects of the document. Consequently, package, metadata, setting and style infor-
mation is separate to the content. The content.xml file in the ODF structure and
the document.xml file in the OOXML structure contain the content proper of the
document; the respective contents of these files are listed below.









- "This has some"
- text:span [@text:style-name = "T1"]
- "bold formatting"
- ", also some "
- text:span [@text:style-name = "T2"]
- "with italics"
- ", a "
- text:a [@xlink:href = "http://www.w3.org/"]
- "web link"
- " and a picture..."
- text:p
- draw:frame
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- v:imagedata [@r:id = "rId5"]
- w:sectPr
Both formats wrap the contents in a document and body element; thereafter,
they diverge in how they handle actual textual data. Table 8.8 depict the ODF and
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OOXML elements and attributes (prefixed with “@”) used in these documents, with
a brief explanation. Elements are juxtaposed if their function is sufficiently similar,
but this ought not imply precise semantic equivalence.






document-content document Root element, contains all of
the document contents.
body body Contains the content body.
text Indicates textual (as opposed
to tabular or other kind of)
content
h Indicates a heading (OOXML
equivalent must be defined in
the referenced style—see note
below)
p p Indicates a textual paragraph
pPr Contains paragraph
properties—generally a





References a style for the con-
taining paragraph or run
span r Indicates a span or run of text
rPr Contains the run’s proper-
ties (if these differ from
the containing paragraph)—
generally a rStyle element
with a val attribute which ref-
erences the run’s style
t Contains actual text of the
run
i Indicates the text must ren-
dered italicised (ODF equiv-
alent must be defined in the
referenced style—see note be-
low)
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b Indicates the text must ren-
dered bold (ODF equivalent
must be defined in the refer-
enced style—see note below)
a hyperlink Indicated the enclosed text is
a hyperlink (a stands for the
“anchor” of a hyperlink)
@href @id Contains the reference (ODF)
or relationship ID (OOXML)
for a resource, such as a web
link or image
frame pict Indicates some embedded ob-
ject (in the OOXML case, the
object must be a picture)
shapetype Specifies key properties of a
shape, including the stroke,
formulas and path of the
shape
shape Indicates a shape, which may
be an image or some other
graphical object
image imagedata Indicates an image (the im-
age itself is referenced by the
href or id attribute on this el-
ement)
sectPr Contains the section’s proper-
ties. Even if no sections are
included explicitly, the doc-
ument has a default section,
which specifies page size, lay-
out, columns and grid dimen-
sions.
Table 8.8 indicates what might be described as the best fit between the key ele-
ments in the two documents. However, six ways in which the two formats differ have
been identified in this review of document structure:
1. Verbosity. Structurally the ODF document is considerably more terse—this is
due to its use of mixed content, where XML elements can be interweaved with
8.2. A TALE OF TWO FORMATS 241
standard text. ODF shares this feature with HTML, and it makes for code which
is considerably easier to read and write (Carrera et al., 2005). The OOXML
model does not permit mixed content, and so suffers from an extrapolated struc-
ture. From a machine processing point-of-view, it has been argued that mixed
content leads to more inefficient parsing—since the underlying XML content is
intended to be generated automatically, the readability might be deemed un-
necessary. Converting to OOXML would require each instance of text in ODF
mixed content segments to be translated into new w:r (run) elements.
2. Referentiality. Both formats use references to styles for span/run format-
ting. In the case of OOXML, headings are not marked explicitly—rather the
value of the pStyle attribute would need to be consulted to see how the first
paragraph need be formatted. Similarly, italic and bold formatting would need
to be derived from the style-name attribute for the ODF document. In this
respect ODF is more consistent with other text standards, such as HTML and
DocBook—headings there are treated as semantic, rather than presentational
markers of text, whereas typographical effects (such as font weight and itali-
cization) are matters of style.
3. Abstraction. Hyperlink and image data can be easily read off the href at-
tribute of anchor and image elements in the ODF document; this could either
resolve to an image in the document package, The OOXML document adds an
additional layer of abstraction: an id attribute refers to a Relationship defined
elsewhere in the document package, which in turn references the resource—a
model defined as part of the OPC, and described more fully above. Moreover
the href attribute is in fact part of the imported XLink schema, which is part of
the wider web architecture—its adoption here simplifies processing for systems
which already utilise this standard.
4. Single versus Multiple Methods. As mentioned in the brief history of the
formats above, the OOXML is burdened by compatibility with the voluminous
corpus of existing Microsoft Word documents. This is evident here in the use
of the VML schema—for elements pict, shapetype, shape—rather than the
newer DrawingML schema (both of which are part of the OOXML specification).
Conversion tools converting to ODF would need to handle the possibility of
images using either one of these schemas.
5. Classificatory versus Attributive. The terseness of the ODF document leads
to a corresponding distinction between the number of elements and attributes
in each document. In the case of the ODF document, there are 33 elements and
74 attributes (a ratio of 2.24 attributes per element). In the case of the OOXML
document, there are 68 elements and 65 attributes (a ratio of 0.96 attributes per
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element)66. This suggests that ODF more generally modifies a small number of
elements with a large number of attributes; OOXML uses a larger number of
elements, with fewer attributes.
6. Prescriptiveness. Although this sample document is too small to provide
ample evidence, OOXML appears to be more restrictive in what must be stated
about a document for it to be handled correctly. The use of additional concepts
to specify image and section properties, compared with ODF, tend to confirm
this.
Findings—Technical Dimensions of Commensurability
Of the various differences between the two formats, the preceding technical analysis
demonstrates a number of salient ones along which they can be said to be, in varying
degrees, incommensurable:
1. Self-contained versus derivative. The analysis of schemas showed OOXML
to be highly self-contained, referencing only the DublinCore metadata standard.
ODF, referencing a total of 7 other schemas, is highly derivative.
2. Abstract versus concrete. The analysis of package formats showed that in
this area at least, OOXML employees a considerably greater level of abstraction
to ODF. Similarly the handling of hyperlink and image resources demonstrates
a higher degree of abstraction.
3. Prescriptive versus descriptive. The analysis of metadata showed OOXML
to be less extensible and therefore more prescriptive in orientation. This was
reinforced by the high degree of specificity in the handling of image and section
information in the document itself.
4. Verbose versus dense. In the document analysis, OOXML appeared more
verbose both in the quantitative number of elements (68 to 33) and in the
complexity of structure. This is due to ODF’s use of a mixed content model,
permitting elements to contain both child elements and text.
5. Referential versus in-place. Both formats use styles extensively to describe
how content ought be presented and formatted. However, the orientation is
somewhat different; what might be considered structural information (such as
headings) must be inferred from the style name and properties in OOXML,
whereas in ODF, typographical instructions are relegated to style specifications.
6. Single versus multiple methods. OOXML permits two separate models to
be used for specifying graphical data (DrawingML and VML), whereas ODF
uses only one model.
66The following XPath expressions have been used to count element and attributes respectively:
count(//*) and count(//@*)
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Multiple methods? Low Medium
Classificatory? Low High
7. Classificatory versus attributive. ODF uses a smaller range of classifica-
tions for content elements, preferring to use attributes to specify styles and other
features.
Table 8.9 summarises these differences, providing a rating of Low, Medium or High
against these factors. Several other studies of the formats mention these differences,
and suggest others:
1. Mathematical notation and formulae. OOXML supplies a full notational
and formulaic syntax; ODF currently uses MathML for notation, but does not
specify which spreadsheet formulae are to be supported67 (the latest draft of
ODF attempts to remedy this68).
2. Use of incomplete and undocumented features. OOXML has numer-
ous obscure attributes, such as “autoSpaceLikeWord95”. It is not clear how
applications other than Microsoft Office are meant to handle such features69.
3. Similar style. In addition to re-using standards, ODF also uses similar element
names and constructs to other standard mark-up languages such as HTML,
lowering the learning curve for engineers using the standard70.
4. Terse element names. OOXML uses a highly concise set of element names,
which make the XML document contents difficult for human readers71.
5. Internal conceptual re-use. OOXML has separate definition for word-processing
and spreadsheet tables, whereas ODF defines a common table model through-
out72.
6. Idiosyncratic data definitions. OOXML uses internal representations for
dates, colours, language codes and paper sizes, whereas ODF uses ISO and
W3C standards for these definitions (Ditch, 2007).
67Ditch (2007).
68Durusau and Brauer (2007).
69Ditch (2007).
70Carrera et al. (2005).
71Weir (2006); Macnaghten (2007).
72Macnaghten (2007).
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Some care needs to be taken in the inferences made from these observations. While
they appear to cast OOXML in a somewhat negative light, there are important design
and technical considerations which motivate particular differences. For instance, the
terse syntax and lack of mixed content appear to be designed for improved perfor-
mance opening and saving documents73. Many other differences are directed towards
supporting the very large existing corpus of Microsoft Office documents—an obvious
goal behind OOXML. This goal mandates awkward compromises: bugs or idiosyn-
cratic features introduced by Microsoft Word 95 need to continue to be supported
within the OOXML specification, for example. The divergent design objectives help
explain away the technical differences; but given the two formats were developed in
full view of one another74, what in turn can explain the differences in these objec-
tives? To help answer that, the analysis now turns towards a recent, and fascinating,
part of the history in which these formats emerge—specifically, the attempt to ratify
OOXML as an ISO/IEC standard.
8.2.3 A Game of Standards—Sociological Analysis
The brief history of document formats came to a close with mention of Microsoft’s
attempt to have the Open Office XML specification ratified as an ISO/IEC standard,
having first gained approval of the Ecma International standards group in 2006. The
current section picks up the thread of this story. Unlike the preceding history and
technical commentary, analysis of recent events proceeds on shifting ground—given
the publicity surrounding the controversy, each week during the period covered—from
late 2006 through to early 2008—has produced a fecund and prolix amount of event
and commentary. Moreover, many of the intricacies of the controversy lie hidden be-
hind corporate strategic and standard committee meetings—since the analysis draws
only on materials evident in the public record, it is necessarily partial and speculative.
As a means of reducing this complexity from an analytical standpoint, the contro-
versy is described through a range of gaming metaphors. This metaphorical scheme
is fortuitous in two key respects: firstly, the rhetoric of games is pervasive in the lan-
guage of the technology industry generally (“pure play”, “company strategy”, “zero
sum game” are some examples), and this rhetoric has been particularly prevalent
here; secondly, the theoretical rubric of commensurability adopted here itself leans on
similar tropes—for instance, “language games” (Wittgenstein) and “score-keeping”
(Brandom). For a large and complex case study, with intersecting parties and over-
lapping interests, the language of games can be useful in simplifying and to a limited
extent rationalising a complex set of events. Adopting this scheme is therefore useful
in simplifying the complex set of events involved in the controversy, and in drawing
out the key strategies, players and pay-offs.
What should a game-theoretic analysis of a controversy like this do? As a min-
73Ou (2007).
74Jones (2007).
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imum, it ought to account for the behaviours of a group of social actors or players
in a given situation. Frequently, game theory makes an implicit assumption—that
players behave rationally, that they perform actions to maximise their pay-offs and
achieve the best outcome at the end of the game given the information available to
them. Acting otherwise is a mistake, a “bad move”. Game theory is usually applied
to counter-factual or “what-if” scenarios, but is often also applied to explain past
behaviour (Smith and Varese, 2001). In most real-world situations, outside of mod-
elling environments, the factorial explosion of players, moves, information, pay-offs
and strategies quickly exhausts human comprehension. Equally, when describing past
behaviour, clearly players do not always behave rationally, at least under neo-classical
economic terms. The game-theoretic analysis is therefore best treated as a heuristic
model of the situation—a plausible account of why the situation has emerged as it
has.
A social game of the kind examined here typically has a number of common
elements:
• Outcomes (possible end states of the game)




• Pay-offs (what players have to gain or lose)
• Moves (actions and events made in the game)
• Strategies (designs directed towards particular outcomes, which in turn motivate
the moves made)
Game theory traditionally formalises these elements to varying degrees of com-
plexity (see for instance the game theoretic study on the Mafia by (Smith and Varese,
2001), and on Rawlsian distributive justice (Swope et al., 2008). Here the intention
is to provide an exploratory rather than a predictive model of the situation, so math-
ematical modelling is not applied. Stripped of formalism, the method of analysis has
considerable similarity to Lyotard’s discussion of language games (Lyotard, 1984),
Actor-Network Theory studies (Latour, 1993; Law, 1992), Bourdieu’s cultural models
(Bourdieu, 1990) and “thick description” styles of anthropology (Geertz, 2005). As
some of these approaches also do, the study presumes a structural set of relations
between parts of the game, as the figure 8.2 illustrates.
Outcomes
Given the debate concerns a rivalry between two different formats, the game produces
four possible outcomes:
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Figure 8.2: Model of Standardisation Game
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1. Pro-ODF. The ODF standard eventually eclipses OOXML as the dominant
document format, and Microsoft is coerced into compliance with ODF—or risk
market share diminution.
2. Pro-OOXML. OOXML is established as a de facto, and eventually, de jure
standard, and ODF falls into obscurity, or at best occupies a niche market
position.
3. Neutral—Both. Both ODF and OOXML become widely accepted as document
formats. Organisations are then faced with important policy and procurement
decisions.
4. Neutral—Neither. Neither ODF nor OOXML receive much adoption, due to
some kind of paradigm shift in technology. For example HTML, already the
standard for web documents, is extended to support the kind of constructs re-
quired in the office software market (Google Docs is perhaps the most advanced
example of an office software suite using HTML).
Several comments can be made about this description of outcomes:
• In the event that the outcome favours at most one of the formats—in other
words, one of the outcomes 1, 2 or 4 eventuates—the question of commensura-
bility between the formats is, for all practical purposes, irrelevant. In the event
that both formats achieve some measure of success, as in outcome 3, commen-
surability remains an abiding problem in both the technical and sociological
dimensions explored here.
• Each of these outcomes has its proponents, but not always in clear-cut form.
For example, various government positions seem to indicate support for the
Pro-ODF position, but on balance their position would be better characterised
as Neutral—Both.
Rules
The game is governed by three kinds of rules: those regulating the ISO standards
process, those regulating the behaviour of particular players, and those artificially
induced by the game situation itself.
ISO Rules
The ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee (JTC1) oversees standards relating to In-
formation Technology75, and was responsible for handling the ratification of OOXML.
A series of directives stipulate how the JTC1 prepares, adopts and maintains inter-
national standards generally. These directives cover:
75ISO/IEC (2004).
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• The JTC1 organisation (includes various groups: Subcommittees (SC) and
Working Groups (WG)) itself;
• Membership types (includes Participating, Observing and Liaison Members)—
members must be “National Bodies”, usually national standards bodies, such




• Voting procedures and appeals;
• Preparation and adoption of standards (includes “Normal Processing” and “Fast-
Track Processing”—the latter can hasten adoption for “existing standards” rat-
ified by other standards bodies);
• Other administrative details and annexes76.
In addition, the general process for standards approval under the Fast-Track process
is:
1. A standards organisation (such as Ecma) submits an existing standard to the
ISO/IEC JTC1.
2. A Subcommittee (such as SC34) is set up to process the standard.
3. An individual is nominated as the Project Editor.
4. National Bodies review the proposed standard over a 30 day period, and submit
comments related to “perceived contradictions with other standards or approved
projects of JTC1, ISO or IEC”.
5. The JTC1 Secretariat assesses any such contradictions, and may respond with
a set of dispositions to the National Bodies.
6. The National Bodies must vote on the standard within another five month
period. Two-thirds of the Participating Members must approve the standard,
and no more than one quarter of the National Bodies must disapprove.
7. If the standard is not approved, a Ballot Resolution Meeting (BRM) is sched-
uled, and convenor appointed. Further dispositions may be submitted in repones
to National Body comments attending their vote.
8. If the resolution meeting is unsuccessful, National Bodies are required to sub-
mit a second and final vote, after which the standard is either approved or
disapproved.
76ISO/IEC (2004).
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9. If approved, the JTC1 assumes responsibility for the standard’s ongoing main-
tenance77.
Player Rules
Different players must obey rules particular to their types. For instance, public com-
panies are obligated to obey various corporate codes of conduct, as well as of course
state, national and international laws, while simultaneously delivering returns to their
shareholders; governments are obligated to acts in their constituents’ interests; stan-
dards organisations ought obey rules stipulated in organisational regulations, charters
and directives; and individuals and consultancies are frequently beholden to employers
and contractors who pay them.
Game-Specific Rules
The game itself introduces particular rules. These can be stated as follows (key game-
theoretic terms are emphasised):
1. There is no independent arbiter of success in the game. At best various metrics
(market share, revenue, total number of users / licenses, number of countries
adopting one or another standard, as well as various non-economic metrics) can
be used as indicative measures.
2. The game has more than two players. In game theoretic terms, it is an n-person
game.
3. It is possible to have more than one “winner”, and even apparently contradictory
outcomes (i.e. both OOXML and ODF can experience increased adoption over
the course of the game). In other words, the game is not necessarily zero sum.
4. As a corollary of the above rule, pay-offs are not symmetric—one player’s loss
is not necessarily another’s reciprocal gain.
5. Players have imperfect information.
6. The game can be cooperative or non-cooperative at different phases—that is,
players may choose to share or withhold information from other players.
7. The game has both simultaneous and sequential aspects. For example, the ISO
process clearly requires a strict ordering of events; but company press releases,
blog posts and the like are not contingent upon other moves being made.
8. Player alignment can naturally change through the course of the game. National
Bodies can change votes; companies and individuals can switch allegiances. A
corollary of this is that mixed strategies are permitted—i.e. a player can adopt
different strategies contingent upon other moves made in the game.
77ISO/IEC (2004).
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Players
As might be expected, the list of players in a debate of global proportions is large.
Table 8.10 lists only the key ones here. Included below is a statement regarding the
apparent desired outcome for each of the players. This is at best indicative, and is
further complicated by, in several cases, the changing positions and dynamic strategies
adopted by different players over the period under consideration.
Stakes and Pay-offs
The main stakes and pay-offs of the game are:
• Economic—protection or increase of market share, revenue and profit in soft-
ware licenses and service provision; reduction costs of document creation and
management; opportunities for consultancy and employment relating to docu-
ment management; increased advertising revenue due to public interest in the
controversy.
• Political—satisfaction of constituents’ needs for long-term document retention;
persuasion of governments and industry bodies regarding format standardisa-
tion; influence on policy; reduction of anti-competitive corporate practices.
• Legal—avoidance of potential anti-competitive legislation; compliance with gov-
ernmental policies concerning document formats; concern over copyright and
patent infringement.
• Social—improved compliance of documents with accessibility guidelines and
policies; reduction of “digital divide” through promotion of open document for-
mats (with available open source software for reading and writing documents);
increased credibility, public profile, publicity and recognition through participa-
tion in the controversy.
• Technical—improved interoperability with other systems; greater critical re-
view through transparency of formats; backward compatibility with legacy doc-
uments; improved performance; accessibility support; product innovation.
In practice these motivations are often mixed, undisclosed, or, where evident,
seemingly contradictory. Table 8.11 lists the stakes or pay-offs of five kinds of “play-
ers” in the standardisation game above: corporations, governments, standards bodies,
aMicrosoft’s own position is somewhat ambivalent—in certain contexts highlighting the deficiencies
of ODF relative to OOXML, while elsewhere arguing that both format can and should co-exist. See
further discussion below.
bIt should be noted that unlike ISO, which is comprised of government members, OASIS, ECMA
and W3C are consortia bodies, with membership including individuals and organisations. It is not
unusual for companies to be members of more than one such group—for example, Microsoft is a
member of all four standards bodies.
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Table 8.10: Key Players
Name Type Desired Outcome







EU Government Pro-ODF / Neutral—
Both
National Governments Government Mixed





































The Burton Group Consultancy Pro-OOXML
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community and advocacy groups, and consultants, as well as those of two other less
identifiable and amorphous groups: the media, and individual commentators.
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In addition there are specific pay-offs which can tied to particular players. In
the case of economic pay-offs, this is most noticeable for the corporations involved in
the game. Table 8.12 indicates the financial concerns of the major companies, and
in particular the available figures for market share, revenues, profits and number of
end-users of office software. All of the following companies are US public companies;
financial results have been obtained via their respective SEC filings as of the 28th of
February 2008.
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The stakes for other parties should not be ignored. In particular governments
have increasingly proposed policy documents, roadmaps and reports recommending
interoperable document frameworks. Fore example, IDABC (Interoperable Delivery of
European eGovernment Services to public Administrations, Businesses and Citizens),
a branch of the European Commission, commissioned the influential Valoris report
advocating ODF adoption in 2003 (Valoris, 2003). In 2004, it followed up by issuing
the European Interoperability Framework for Pan-European eGovernment Services,






• Use of Open Standards
• Access the benefits of Open Source Software
• Use of Multilateral Solutions78
Similar statements of principles can be found in numerous government and pan-
government interoperability reports endorsing open standards79. Nor are governments
at a local level unaware of the patent cost benefits of adopting open source software
and open standards. A total cost of ownership analysis by the Government of Delhi
demonstrated a cost saving of $5.3 million USD over five years in migrating from
Microsoft Office to OpenOffice—with additional savings to be gained in simplifying
software procurement and deployment processes80. These examples are merely rep-
resentative of the vast, complex and highly lucrative global public-sector market for
which document software vendors vie for tenders. To be sure, the private sector has
equivalent commercial appeal—but national governments are not merely passive con-
sumers of technology product; they also define the regulatory environment in which
vendors operate. Their key role as ISO National Body voting members moreover ul-
timately determines the outcome for this game, and thus have tremendous influence
over the pay-offs for the corporate players.
78IDABC (2004).
79Open ePolicy Group (2005); RSA Government IT Officers Council (2007); Australian Government
Information Management Office (2005).
80Dass et al. (2006).
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The Game Environment
The controversy itself has been played across the globe, in a range of both online
and offline arenas. The ISO ratification process has been conducted under usual
ISO guidelines, which stipulate confidentiality, and thus a significant dimension of
the debate has been unavailable for analysis. However, this controversy shows to an
extraordinary degree the extent to which corporate strategy is now played out across a
host of online avenues—corporate and private websites, press releases, analyst reports,
blogs, Wikipedia entries, media outlets, mailing lists and online forums, white papers,
academic articles, as well as official specifications, responses, updates, memoranda
and corrections from the standards committees themselves. Collectively these texts,
released into the public domain, form a kind of rich, intertextual web through which
the shifting motivations, concerns and moves of the various players can be at least
dimly discerned. The number of players and the volume of documents collated in a
relatively short time are sizeable, as the following examples indicate:
• The ISO process itself involves 40 member countries, with 120 individuals. Each
are entitled to offer comment on proposed standards; in this particular case,
many chose to do so. The formal submission for OOXML raised a total of
3,522 comments in response; even Microsoft employees were “impressed” (Lai,
E., 2007).
• The OpenDocument Format is now in the draft stages of its 3rd specification
(version 1.2)—around 920 pages.
• The Office Open XML specification dwarves this, however—it consists of 6,000
pages. Suggested revisions, responding to comments from the National Bodies
participating in the ISO process, stand at another 2,300 pages.
• There are at least two dozen separate blogs following the debate, authored in
the main by employees of Microsoft, Sun and IBM, dedicated to the question of
document formats. Many are updated several times a week; many more blogs
comment on the controversy more irregularly.
• The OpenDocument Format mailing list (there is no equivalent list for OOXML)
generates on average 4 messages per day (OpenDocument Fellowship, 2008),
which have tended to spike in relation to significant events in the course over
the debate.
• Although no stranger to controversy on other topics, Wikipedia articles on ODF
and OOXML have been the subject of substantial criticism over editorial bias.
Edit history pages show considerable activity over a sustained period.
• Online technology forums and websites are common avenues for commentary.
The website Slashdot regularly receives 100-200 comments to any story related
to OOXML (orlando, 2008).
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As a side note, apart from the fecund and perhaps daunting scope of the debate
from the point of view of sociology, these sorts of figures indicate the complexities
facing various players of the modern standardisation game. It is hard to imagine even
a decade ago any comparable debate being conducted in similar time-frames, with
similar scope and stakes, and with a similar volume of documentation to decipher.
Regardless of position—whether as a corporate strategist, government policy maker,
community advocate, media commentator, software engineer or indeed academic—
the volume of documentation is vast. The Internet of course makes the proliferation
of public domain documentation possible, but it also introduces new social environ-
mental problems to those playing the game of standardisation. The dilemma can
be roughly summarised as: how does one respond to what is always be a situation
of incomplete information, knowing that other players have incomplete yet different
information, that may nevertheless be of strategic benefit? It is not enough to know
“as much as possible” in order to play the game effectively; players must also have
the right kind of knowledge—of the document specifications themselves, of the com-
plex workings of standards bodies, of the political dynamics between nations, of the
economic allegiances of companies and individuals, and of course, of the latest “state
of play”, delivered in electronic piece-meal increments throughout the working day.
An ideal player in this environment is thus a curious kind of polymath—technically
literate, politically astute, attuned to a host of cultural considerations, an assiduous
and relentless researcher, capable of both broad overviews and microscopic analysis,
and yet, in some cases, a ruthless opponent and zealot believer in the desired outcome.
The document format standards debate, conducted at such speed and engaging a myr-
iad of sources, demonstrates just how a global yet strangely disembodied and virtual
environment requires the mobilisation of new skills, new sensitivities and perhaps a
new subjectivity from its actors.
Finally, there is also an intriguing self-referential dimension to the debate—for
where else, other than in the form of electronic documents, is the debate hosted? In-
deed the proliferation of document forms, evident in the media analysed here—wikis,
blogs, forums, email, forum comments, news articles, financial filings, statistical sur-
veys, academic papers, whitepapers, reports and specifications, all readily accessible
online—themselves are testimony to the centrality of the electronic document form
in modern discourse, and the importance of standards for accessibility, debate and
analysis.
Standardisation in Motion
The introduction to the document format controversy concluded with Microsoft’s re-
sponse to the challenge of the OpenDocument Format (and its implementations, most
noticeably OpenOffice)—the launch of a rival standard, Office Open XML, ushered
through the ECMA consortium. Here the story picks up where that section left off,
with a more detailed account of the specific events leading up and including the final
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decision by the ISO standards group on the fate of OOXML. The account begins
with the submission by ECMA of the OOXML specification to ISO on the 20th of
December, 2006, and ends with the second ISO ballot vote in March, 2008 (after the
first failed in September 2007).
The ECMA International group, having previously approved the Office Open
XML specification within its own member group, submitted the specification to the
ISO/IEC Joint Technical Committee (JTC) 1 on December 20, 2006. The JTC1
comprises 41 Participating Members, a subset of the total number of ISO National
Bodies. The submission was placed under the Fast-Track program, designed for rapid
approval of existing standards, under the name of ISO/IEC DIS (Draft International
Standard) 29500. An initial review period was conducted over the subsequent 30
days, during which time “perceived contradictions” to the proposal can be made by
ISO members. ECMA responded to these comments on February 28, 200781, which
was followed by a five month “letter ballot” leading up to a vote on September 2nd,
2007. The ISO regulations require a) that no less than 66.6% of the national bodies
involved in the JTC itself approve the standard and b) that no more than 25% of the
total national bodies disapprove (vote abstention is permitted)82. The vote results,
published in early September 2007, registered 53% of the 41 members participating
in the JTC approved, while 26% of the 104 ISO members disapproved83. This nar-
row failure led to an announcement by ISO that a Ballot Resolution Meeting (BRM)
would be conducted at the ISO headquarters in Geneva, Switzerland, between the
25th and 29th of February, 2008, with the final ballot on OOXML to be held 30 days
later on the 29th of March84. The BRM is designed for the standard submitter to
respond to comments with possible amendments, and for the National Bodies then to
vote again on whether the amendments are sufficient to pass the standard.
In addition to the negative vote result, a total of 3,522 comments were raised by
the National Body members. The Ecma Technical Committee (TC45), alongside the
ISO Project Editor, were tasked with formulating a series of “proposed dispositions”—
responses—to these comments. Both comments and dispositions were not subject to
public scrutiny, according to ISO directives. Their character can be inferred from a
Ecma press release, which outlines several substantive objections, and recommended
amendments to the OOXML proposal to incorporate them85. These recommendations
are not binding upon the specification86; however they do provide ISO members with
suggested mechanisms for resolving objections at the BRM, in the hope of securing
the required number of approval votes.
The major events of the standardisation period can be summarised as follows:
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• January 19, 2007—Deadline for National Bodies to submit “perceived contra-
dictions”.
• February 29, 2007—Ecma International responds to National Body comments;
triggers five month ballot.
• September 2, 2007—OOXML narrowly failed to gain approval; National Bodies
submit comments with vote.
• January 14, 2008—Ecma International responds to 3,522 comments (reduced to
1,100 after elimination of duplicates) with “proposed dispositions”.
• February 25-9, 2008—Ballot Resolution Meeting (BRM). JTC1 members meet
in Geneva to attempt resolving the ballot with the aid of the dispositions.
• March 29, 2008—Final vote on OOXML.
The apparent calm of the august and bureaucratic ISO procedures belies the tur-
bulent undercurrents which swept through both the voting arrangements and subse-
quent preparation for the Ballot Resolution Meeting. During the vote itself, numerous
reports surfaced suggesting that Microsoft played a significant, and sometimes insid-
ious role in the deliberations of many national bodies. In Portugal, one participant
published transcripts—not independently verified—of discussions within the techni-
cal committee preparing its vote. The transcripts has elements of high farce: there is
a prolonged conversation about lack of chairs for Sun and IBM representatives; the
author himself has problem being heard within a small group of 25 participants; he
complains that the committee is stacked with Microsoft affiliates; and finally, in ex-
asperation, suggests if the ODF and OOXML formats are not interoperable, perhaps
a third standard should be created. . . 87 The complaint of branch stacking occurs
elsewhere: in Sweden, Microsoft partners were introduced at the eleventh hour into
the voting group, a breach of voting regulations severe enough to warrant Sweden’s
vote being recorded as an enforced abstention88. Further reports were filed in blogs,
open letters and the press outlining purported voting irregularities in Denmark89,
Italy90, Malaysia91, the Philippines92, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, and
the US93. Another complaint was the ambiguous composition of the National Bodies
themselves—although generally represented by standards bodies developed by na-
tional governments, they are frequently populated by experts employed by large tech-
nology companies, which include industry stalwarts like Microsoft and IBM. Hence
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members, as much as against the standard submitters. The claims of infiltration and
corruption are as yet uncorroborated, although the EU has recently been considering
taking Microsoft to court on the basis of the allegations of intrusion into ISO com-
mittees94—to add to two other current cases of anti-trust litigation95. Soon after the
vote, two studies (published online and not peer-reviewed) attempted to demonstrate
a significant correlation between, respectively, levels of corruption and GDP, and ap-
proval votes from ISO members—in other words, more corrupt and poorer countries
were more likely to approve OOXML in the ISO ballot96. Such studies, however
uncorroborated or patronising, contributed to a perception of significant Microsoft
intervention—through economic or other incentives—in those countries’ voting pro-
cedures.
Many other complaints surfaced around the submission, both during and af-
ter the voting process. Many National Bodies complained about the volume of
documentation—6,000 pages of specification, 3,500 comments lodged by the vot-
ing ISO members, followed by another 2,000 pages of amendments in response to
the comments—and the dubious merit of using the “Fast Track” process for such
a voluminous standard97. Since the initial 30-day review period, considerable at-
tention focussed on whether OOXML was in fact duplicating the existing ISO/IEC
26300 standard—the ODF format98. Concerns were also raised over the naming of
the specification itself—variously called “Office Open XML” (OOXML) and “Open
XML”, advocates of OpenDocument Format suggested these were intended to con-
fuse non-specialists, particularly since the largest implementation of ODF had long
since—since 2002—been named OpenOffice99. The ECMA group’s legitimacy as a
standards body was called also into question—co-authors of the OOXML specifica-
tion appeared to include only two non-corporate entities, the British Library, and the
Library of Congress—and seemed to be little more than an arm’s length vehicle for
the promotion of Microsoft’s fiscal interests100. Rumours of Ecma voting membership
costing $57K USD reinforced the impression of a closed group of companies “rubber-
stamping” each other’s standards, rather than subjecting them to due diligence and
scrutiny101.
More indirectly, Microsoft had been accused of both surreptitiously and overtly
distorting discussion of OOXML. In January 2007 Rick Jelliffe, a prominent author
and developer of XML technologies, was contracted by Microsoft to “provide more
balance on Wikipedia concerning ODF/OOXML”102. In spite of offering a nuanced
defence of his position, a furour immediately erupted—188 comments were posted
94Forelle (2007).
95European Union - Directorate General Communication (2008).
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in response to his blog post announcing his acceptance—over the subversion of the
(always idealised) independence of Wikipedia content. In a further twist, Standards
Australia invited Jelliffe to the Ballot Resolution Meeting a year later103, raising yet
further suspicion104. At time of writing, the OOXML Wikipedia entry includes at
least 50 discussion entries, the majority concerning various authorial biases around
serial edits, corrections and amendments to the article. The following is a short
fragment:
“There is significant criticism to OOXML that is currently not mentioned
in the article. There is a single person, User:HAl, that repeatedly removes
edits (not even rephrasing them) that he believes are critical to OOXML
. . . Simosx 18:33, 2 August 2007 (UTC)
HAI: your name appears frequently in edit wars [debates over Wikipedia
entries] and your edits have an indisputable POV [point of view] favouring
Microsoft. To avoid having formal complaints tabled against you, please
disclose your interest, stake, and/or association with OOXML, its develop-
ers, and Microsoft. It is important that we understand why you are rewrit-
ing the article in Microsoft’s favour so that we can end these edit wars
. . . DominusSuus —Preceding unsigned comment added by 99.234.66.219
(talk) 07:26, 4 February 2008 (UTC)
Bla bla. In this case it is not hard to have to reedit the article in favour of
Micrsoft [sic] because a lot of edits are made by member with for instance
affiliations with the FFII and other organizations that oppose OOXML
. . . It would be a whole lot better if the opponents of OOXML and OOXML
standardization stayed away from wikipedia trying to influence opinion on
the article. hAl (talk) 10:40, 4 February 2008 (UTC)” (Wikipedia, 2008a)
Claims of surreptitious distorting of online content were voiced through other
channels. Criticisms were leveled at anonymous so-called “trolling” (posting spurious
canned defences or attacks) in response to any negative commentary on technology
blogs and forums like slashdot.org. In a similar vein, a discussion on the ODF mailing
list suggested Microsoft had paid for the term “Open Document” on the Google search
engine—designed to confuse searches for OpenDocument Format105 (in 2008, searches
of the term “Open Document”, not just the phrase “open document”, both presented
a sponsored link for “Open XML”106.
Claims of distortion were also levied at Microsoft around perceived attempts to
purchase good press in IT journals and reports. A report released early in 2008 by
103Jelliffe (2008).
104NoOOXML (2008).
105Barrionuevo et al. (2008).
106Google (2008b).
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the Burton Group advocated use of OOXML over ODF:
Any organization . . . using Microsoft Office applications should plan to
exploit OOXML . . .
ODF is insufficient for complex real-world enterprise requirements, and
it is indirectly controlled by Sun Microsystems, despite also being an ISO
standard . . . for now ODF should be seen as more of an anti-Microsoft
political statement than an objective technology selection107.
Once this report was released, the ODF Alliance quickly issued a rebuttal, com-
plaining both of a number of technical inaccuracies, and of the timing of the pub-
lication, so soon before the ISO delegates were due to meet to vote in the Ballot
Resolution Meeting in 2008108. This triggered several rounds of call-and-response
from various bloggers from both camps, including an insinuation that one of the re-
port’s authors, Peter O’Kelly, stood to benefit through indirect remunerations via
appearances at Microsoft trade shows109. This in turn provoked an angry reaction
from O’Kelly, stating that together the authors had interviewed a range of companies
in compiling the report, and specifically had refused corrections by Microsoft in order
not to impugn their neutrality110.
In a further move, Novell—an early supporter of ODF—appeared to have been
enticed into an equivocal position on formats by Microsoft. It had begun developing
an open source converter of ODF documents to OOXML, which implied a significant
compromise had been made to the collective goals of a single document standard.
This raised the ire of open source advocates, already concerned about the announce-
ment in November 2006 that Microsoft and Novell had entered into a broad-ranging
agreement involving technical, legal and marketing co-operation (as part of this agree-
ment, Microsoft had pledged $450 million to be spent on Novell sales, licenses and
marketing over five years, and Novell agreed to drop litigation over patent infringe-
ment relating to their WordPerfect product111). This demonstrates the changing
dynamics of the game—minor players can re-align their positions if new pay-offs are
introduced. Microsoft had previously had experience at side-stepping anti-trust ac-
cusations by propping up its competition financially, when it invested $150 million
USD in Apple112.
In part to counter the effect of negative perception and press, Microsoft also
engaged several of its senior staff to author active blogs on OOXML. This vehicle
supplied a far more personal, direct and efficient means of influencing debate than
conventional press releases. Met with counter-posts from employees at IBM and Sun,
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and a large number of open source and open standard individual advocates, the “blo-
gosphere” provided an effective channel for all parties to disseminate both information
and opinion. Moreover the personalised nature of the medium enabled Microsoft—
arguably—to sidestep some of the stigma associated with its prior public relations
campaigns of “technology evangelism” (described in the historical background sec-
tion above), by engaging directly with its critics.
Finally, in a series of announcements and updates leading up to the BRM, Mi-
crosoft endeavoured to bolster its credentials on the question of openness. In late
2006, it released the “Open Specification Promise”, an undertaking “not to assert
any Microsoft Necessary Claims” against the development and use of implementation
of “Covered Specifications”113. OOXML was listed as one of the specifications to be
effectively released from patent rights. This was followed by the release of Microsoft
Office binary formats under the same promise in early 2008114. Six days later, and just
four days before the BRM was due to convene, a high-powered delegation including the
CEO, Steve Ballmer, senior vice-president and general counsel Brad Smith, and Chief
Software Architect, Ray Ozzie, announced an astonishing series of “principles” and
“actions” to promote interoperability and openness115. These included the release—
unprecedented for the company—of 30,000 pages of previously closely held technical
product documentation. Response was immediate, and tended—predictably—to eu-
logise or decry the announcement. Critics were inclined to praise the content of
the announcement, but treat the timing with suspicion—see Updegrove for a useful
summary of responses116. But in conjunction with the OOXML itself, unquestion-
ably the release of this volume of documentation represented an attempt at least to
demonstrate a marked shift from the culture of secrecy and hostility which pervaded
the company in previous decade. The presentation itself included the following in-
sightful remark from Ray Ozzie, which points to structural conditions in the software
industry—rather than individual corporate caprice—for why product differentiation
precedes format standardisation:
When a new type of product or technology is introduced, vendors tend to
focus first and foremost on little more than whether or not their product
satisfies an immediate customer need, and in these early stage products
innovation tends to trump interoperability, data portability, or any such
concerns. But as users put more and more of their data into these prod-
ucts, a new set of issues emerge . . . Issues such as document preservation
and portability have become vital concerns for customers. Furthermore,
as a direct byproduct of the Internet’s ubiquity, virtually every system and
product nowadays has become interconnected in some way to most every-
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a vital concern117.
Interestingly, Andy Updegrove, a Boston-based lawyer advocating for ODF, ar-
gued along much the same lines but for the opposing cause: in his view, standardisa-
tion was similarly a consequence of gradual industry maturation118.
Just as Microsoft galvanised the many parts of its formidable public relations
machine, defenders of the Open Document format had been equally indefatigable in
making the opposing case. Throughout the period under consideration, the ODF
mailing list witnessed average traffic of four emails a day—rising in intensity around
key events like the ISO ballot result itself. There are several dozen blogs and websites
dedicated to commenting upon OOXML and related issues; these link not only to one
another, but also frequently with blogs maintained by Microsoft employees. Several
of these are deliberately incendiary in name—BoycottNovell, NoOOXML, OOXML
Hoaxes—and range from closely detailed technical argument through to extravagant
conspiracy theories. In equal measure, ODF proponents engaged in active editing
of both OOXML and ODF Wikipedia pages, as well as offering significant counter-
commentary on Microsoft employee blogs, forums, and elsewhere.
One curious aspect of the entire controversy is the willingness of individuals and
advocacy groups to applaud two other large US corporations—Sun Microsystems and
IBM—in their endorsements, promotion and funding of ongoing ODF development.
One cynical view from Europe however saw the debate as little more than standard
corporate intrigue and posturing—an unexceptional side-effect of capitalist agonistic
tendencies, played out on a multi-national stage by US companies predominantly
located in California and Seattle. They concluded their review with:
Some content themselves with shrugging their shoulders and saying “let’s
leave the wolves to eat among themselves ”119.
Another interesting aspect to the debate were the company personnel involved;
while tonally, the comments are frequently bitter and personal, they are somewhat
localised to program managers rather than CEO’s or other executives. This can
perhaps be explained due to the fact that the very same companies also co-operate
and partner in other areas, epitomised in the modern neologism of “co-opetition”.
To that extent, the use of blogging and other informal techniques represent a more
risk-adverse strategy than litigation, polemic press releases and CEO-level speeches
(which have been common in other IT industry skirmishes120). Nevertheless, and
discounting the enormous financial results Microsoft continued to draw from sales
of its Microsoft Office product, IBM and Sun seemed to have comfortably won the
public relations battle during the ratification debate—to the extent that many of
117Microsoft Corporation (2008a).
118Updegrove (2007b).
119Gouarne´ (2007) [my translation]
120United States District Court (2002).
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the Microsoft public manoeuvres have been considerably defensive. In the lead-up
to the Ballot Resolution Meeting in early 2008, Brian Jones, a program manager
in Microsoft’s Office division complained that Rob Weir, an employee of IBM and
co-chair on the OASIS ODF Technical Committee, had been flown to various ISO
national body groups in an attempt to lobby against OOXML121. Gray Knowlton, a
Group Product Manager in the same division, went further, and analysed each of Rob
Weir’s posts on OOXML, concluding that out of 134 posts, “94 of those posts have a
central anti-Open XML and/or anti-Microsoft theme”122. That, in Microsoft’s view,
IBM—not Sun, nor any other parties—seemed to be coordinating the obstruction
of the OOXML standardisation process was made clear in an article in the popular
technology magazine, ZDNet. Provocatively entitled Microsoft: IBM masterminded
OOXML failure, it quotes several senior Microsoft employees in a telling series of
statements:
While criticism of Microsoft’s efforts to promote the standard has come
from a variety of quarters, Microsoft’s senior director of XML technology,
Jean Paoli, accused IBM of masterminding the attack.
“Let’s be very clear,” Paoli said. “It has been fostered by a single
company — IBM. If it was not for IBM, it would have been business as
usual for this standard.” . . .
Microsoft claims its competitor has since opted for more covert tactics
to influence the ISO vote.
Nicos Tsilas, senior director of interoperability and IP policy at Mi-
crosoft, said that IBM and the likes of the Free Software Foundation have
been lobbying governments to mandate the rival OpenDocument Format
(ODF) standard to the exclusion of any other format.
“They have made this a religious and highly political debate,” Tsilas
said. “They are doing this because it is advancing their business model.
Over 50 percent of IBM’s revenues come from consulting services.” . . .
“IBM have asked governments to have an open-source, exclusive pur-
chasing policy,” Tsilas said. “Our competitors have targeted this one prod-
uct — mandating one document format over others to harm Microsoft’s
profit stream.”
“It’s a new way to compete,” Tsilas said. “They are using government
intervention as a way to compete. It’s competing through regulation,
because you couldn’t compete technically.”123
This fed further claims that Microsoft was simply buying good press, since the
author of this article disclosed he was flown from Australia to Redmond at Microsoft’s
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So there. Here you have another bias article that was composed after a
seemingly-free trip to Redmond, WA where Microsoft partners delivered
grossly-biased talks124.
Another Microsoft blogger, Steve McGibbon, elsewhere pointed to the strategic
use Sun makes of standards as a means of achieving commercial goals:
Interesting May 2006 article on IEC’s website that I haven’t seen before
in which Michelle Aden, Sun’s “Standards Strategy Ambassador for the
Chief Technologists’s [sic] Office” explains how standards are:-
. . . a “strategic weapon” in her company’s arsenal. “Those
who prepare standards,” she explains, “have a competitive ad-
vantage because their ideas are being standardized.”125
The involvement of Sun Microsystems and IBM has not been without critique
from other quarters either. A small advocacy group by the name of the Open Docu-
ment Foundation, comprising of three individuals based in the United States, had in
the formative years of ODF been loud supporters of the standard. In mid-2007 the
group—while still retaining its name—announced publicly it no longer supported the
OpenDocument Format, claiming it had been co-opted for purely commercial ends
by Sun Microsystems. Instead the group advocated yet another standard, the Com-
pound Document Format (CDF), put forward by the W3C. At the time of writing,
CDF remains a format predominantly designed for use on small devices such as mo-
bile phones—no major office software package currently provides support for it. Thus
the decision by the Open Document Foundation appeared considerably eccentric, and
led in turn to a long series of heated exchanges on the ODF mailing list. Eventually
the Open Document Foundation group decided to disband, foregoing the name since
this would lead only to greater confusion. Nevertheless its participants, in their var-
ious blogs, remained sceptical of Sun’s active steerage of the ODF format as much
as of Microsoft’s promotion of OOXML, and instead continued to advocate various
hybridised forms of HTML as the superior alternative to both formats—an example
of active militancy for an overall outcome to the controversy of Neutral—Neither.
In late 2007 a separate debate flared up on the ODF mailing list, this time con-
cerning efforts by a former Novell employee, Jody Goldberg, to support OOXML
documents in the open source Gnumeric program (affiliated with Gnome, a popular
desktop environment for the Linux operating system). Seen as undermining the spirit
of open source and open standards generally, and the ODF particularly, Goldberg and
the Gnome Foundation Director, Jeff Waugh, defended their position regarding the
need to ensure interoperability with Microsoft Office for their users. The discussion
ended with a stalemate, which suggested at least a lack of willingness on the part of
124Schestowitz (2008a).
125McGibbon (2008a).
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ODF advocates to appreciate the pragmatic aims of other open source groups, who
were willing to accept the interim Neutral—Both predicament.
In the final lead up to the Ballot Resolution Meeting, the OpenForum Europe—
another loose affiliation of companies and individuals—had been accused both by
Microsoft and by the BRM convenor, Alan Brown, of holding a rival conference coin-
ciding with the BRM itself, and operating in the same convention centre in Geneva126.
This second event has been viewed as an intentional disruption to the BRM, staged
for political purposes to confuse and provoke the BRM delegates—all the more so
when it became clear that keynote addresses were to be delivered by noted opponents
of OOXML, and that significant representatives from Google (Vint Cerf—a celebrated
pioneer of the Internet) and IBM (Bob Sutor, another vocal critic of OOXML) would
also be present. In the words of Alan Brown:
It seems the OpenForum Europe is organising a meeting to coincide with
the BRM: same time, same venue. It’s not clear from the announcement
what time of day this seminar is scheduled to take place, though an invi-
tation is issued to BRM attendees. I will be disappointed if those involved
in this event expect BRM delegates abandon their work in session to at-
tend this meeting, as that can only diminish legitimate participation in
this important ballot resolution process127.
Hence at least two notable “moves” can be identified in the lead-up to the deci-
sive end-game of the controversy: Microsoft announcing a major new company-wide
change towards interoperability and openness just prior to the BRM; and Google and
IBM helping to organise a disruptive coinciding event. But before turning to the out-
come, it is worth examining an intriguing facet of the debate which revolves around
the very question of commensurability itself.
“Harmonisation or Unification”—the Sub-game of Commensurability
One of the major bones of contention in the controversy is the need for a second
standard at all (see in particular the comments of twelve National Bodies in the com-
ments to the 30-day review, along with the Ecma response128). The ISO guidelines
specifically rule out having two standards with significant overlapping areas—which
naturally ODF and OOXML exhibit. Microsoft have claimed the need for OOXML
on the basis that the ODF misses out substantial portions of what a Microsoft Office
document needs to capture—the Burton report also corroborates this argument. The
question then arises: to what extent can the ODF be extended to support these por-
tions, without requiring an entirely new format? In the jargon of document formats,
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feasible; OOXML proponents suggest that it is exceedingly difficult. Assessment of
the commensurability of the formats is therefore a point of distinction between the
two factions: if they are commensurable, then only one of the formats deserves to
be standardised (with ODF being the fortuitous incumbent according to ISO rules);
if they are incommensurable, there is sufficient justification for both to be adopted
(clearly Microsoft’s position).
Put in stark terms, the argument for two document standards emphasises the
different goals of each standard. In part the argument puts in extremis the case
made more contingently in this study—there can be significant and irreconciliable
underlying differences between two formal knowledge or information schemas, at least
for given situations and purposes. From the Ecma Response Document, quoted by
Brian Jones:
First, while both formats share the high-level goal, to represent docu-
ments, presentations, and spreadsheets in XML, their low-level goals dif-
fer fundamentally. OpenXML is designed to represent the existing corpus
of documents faithfully, even if that means preserving idiosyncrasies that
one might not choose given the luxury of starting from a clean slate. In
the ODF design, compatibility with and preservation of existing Office
documents were not goals. Each set of goals is valuable; sacrificing either
at the expense of the other may not be in the best interest of users.
Second, the resulting differences are not merely variances in scope that
could be resolved by adding capabilities to one or the other. They are
structural and architectural in nature. Where functionality overlaps, the
corresponding elements nonetheless differ in precise meaning, usage, capa-
bilities, options, and interaction with other elements. Even more impor-
tantly, the corresponding elements do not exist in isolation, but are com-
ponents of whole document models, with different rules and constraints
. . . The resulting variations are not merely cosmetic. They compound to
create qualitative disparities that, although perfectly acceptable for much
of the user base, can be significant for organizations that require high
fidelity in layout, content, or editability129.
The question of harmonisation is thus one for further detailed analysis, and out-
of-scope for OOXML itself:
Harmonization would require functional changes to two International Stan-
dards and would fall under the JTC 1 procedures for new work within
SC34 and could be done in the future130.
The argument for a single standard states that regardless of purposes and goals,
having two standards is simply contradictory and confusing for the majority of docu-
129Jones (2008a).
130Jones (2008a).
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ment users. Why not then have the necessary features of OOXML brought back into
ODF as extensions of some sort? A frequently quoted maxim of this line of thought is
provided by Tim Bray, an author of the original XML specification, a Sun employee,
and as of early January 2008 a member of the Canadian Technical Committee on
OOXML :
I still think OOXML is totally bogus; ECMA shouldn’t have gone near
it and neither should ISO. The world does not need two ways to say
“This paragraph is in 12-point Arial with 1.2em leading and ragged-right
justification”. As I argued in 2005, if you want to capture MS-Office-
specific semantics (not a bad thing in principle) the right way to do it is
a namespaced layer on top of ODF131.
This position is echoed by Rob Weir from IBM:
A look at OpenOffice and Microsoft Office shows a huge degree of func-
tional overlap. Harmonization starts from looking at this functional overlap—
and there is a significant, perhaps 90%+ area where they do overlap—and
expresses the functional overlap identically, using the same xml schema. In
other words, harmonization identifies the commonalities at the functional
level and finds a common representation for that commonality132.
In principle the difference between these two positions is one of degree rather than
kind—the “unification” argument states the overlap between the formats is sufficient
for them to be unified; the “harmonization” argument states the overlap is enough to
permit translation, but differing overall design goals and architectural models cause
irreconciliable semantic differences133. But the distinction is more subtle. On the one
hand the Ecma response is that the two formats differ markedly in technical features—
they are technically incommensurable—while in a societal sense there is no contra-
diction in their co-existence—they are socially commensurable. On the other hand,
critics of this response argue the formats themselves are technically commensurable—
the missing features of OOXML can be added on as an overlay to ODF—but socially
incommensurable—that it is indeed contradictory, as several National Body objec-
tions suggested, to maintain two substantially overlapping standards. In this view,
whatever the technical differences they ought to be coerced into a common document
model. Moreover, any support for two standards so closely aligned in function is a
ruse—the Neutral—Both position is a convenient diplomatic stance from which to
militate for the Pro-OOXML outcome134. So the very views on the question of com-
mensurability stand in juxtaposition—split down two different dimensions—and this
difference itself begs to be included into any commensurability assessment.
131Bray (2008a).
132Weir (2008b).
133Hamilton (2008); Gray (2008).
134Jones (2008c).
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In early 2008, a German DIN (German Institute for Standardisation) Working
Group group was set up to respond to this dilemma135. A brief and substantially
incomplete draft report was issued in March 2008, highlighting specific features of
the two formats and indicating whether these features were translatable on a scale
of “High”, “Medium” or “Low”136. At time of writing, there no updates to this
report—no doubt due to the fact that as suggested earlier, a systematic review of
harmonisation between the two formats is a significant undertaking in itself. From
the point of view of reaching a voting results, suffice to say advocates on both sides
found plenty of encouragement for their position from timely publication of the report.
8.2.4 End-Game? BRM and the Final Vote Result
Over the course of 2008, the controversy did not so much end as peter out—although
not without some surprising twists. The final BRM vote failed to provide a clear-cut
result—with both sides calling victory. In a frenetic 4 day session, from the 25th to
the 28th of February, the Ballot Resolution Meeting attempted to sift through an
overwhelming number of revisions and comments on the original proposal137. The
majority of these—over 80%—were necessarily ignored or cursorily dealt with, to
the dismay of many attendees and commentators138. The outcome of the meeting
was a further 30-day voting period, in which members could agree or disagree with
the revisions to the OOXML proposal—effectively, a successful vote on the revisions
would overturn the previously unsuccessful vote on the proposal itself. Blogging and
mailing list activity spiked over the month of March, as speculation mounted over the
direction ISO voting members would take.
By the 30th of March, a number of previously dissenting votes were now agreed
to the revisions, ushering in DIS 29500 as a new ISO standard. On April the 2nd,
the ISO committee issued a press release tersely announcing the approval: “ISO/IEC
DIS 29500, Information technology—Office Open XML file formats, has received the
necessary number of votes for approval as an ISO/IEC International Standard”139. As
the press release further noted, under ISO regulations at least 2/3 of the participating
national body votes were positive in favour of the standard, while no more than 25%
of the total national body votes were negative (the actual numbers were 75% positive,
and 14% negative, respectively)140. Microsoft had issued a self-congratulatory press
release a day earlier—ironically, on April Fool’s Day—and shortly after, numerous
bloggers active in the lead-up to the vote were busy dissecting the results141. In the
months that followed, four countries (Brazil, India, South Africa, Venezuela) appealed
the decision, on varied grounds:
135Deutsches Institut fu¨r Normung (2007).
136Deutsches Institut fu¨r Normung (2008).
137Hogarth (2008).
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• Failure of the proposal to address contradictions.
• Failure of the proposal to meet ISO guidelines and directives.
• Failure of ISO to publish BRM decisions and other documents.
• Failure of ISO to protect the voting process from interference by multinational
corporations.
• Failure of ISO to deal with the contradiction of approving a very sizeable spec-
ification within the scope of the fast-track process.
Confidential details of the objections—and the internal recommendations to the
ISO Technical Management Board by the CEO’s of ISO and IEC respectively to ignore
the objections—were obtained independently by Pamela Jones (author of the Groklaw
blog)142 and Andy Updegrove (author of the Consortium.info blog) in early July143.
While revealing, these objections did not result in further action being taken—the
appeals were quietly rejected by yet another round of voting in mid August144.
Finally, in November 2008 the complete and amended ISO/IEC 29500:2008 spec-
ification was published and made freely available145. The set of four documents com-
prising the first version of the standard ran at 7,234 pages, not including associated
technical electronic inserts. As of April 2009, no software—including any edition of
Microsoft Office—yet supports the ISO standard, though Microsoft have announced
the next edition (Office 14) will be compliant146.
The same press release, issued in May 2008, makes a far more remarkable ad-
mission, in the context of the then-recent victory of OOXML—that an update the
current edition of Microsoft Office would add support for OpenDocument Format.
Couched within general language of “expanding the range of document formats”, this
announcement has led to the perplexing situation that ODF—not OOXML, at least
in its ISO-ratified form—is supported by the current flagship product of its apparent
arch nemesis147. Of course, a variant of OOXML, notably more promiscuous over
the course of 2008 and 2009 by its “.docx” file extension, remains the default format
of Microsoft Office. Nonetheless, this and a series of related moves by the corporate
giant—to become a member of the OASIS ODF Technical Committee148, to fund
Apache, a loose consortium devoted to open source software, to extend its Open
Specification Promise to include software developed under a GNU Public License
(GPL)149, and to contribute to and release a number of open source projects—at the








149Microsoft Corporation (2008e); Jones (2008e).
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of the document formats narrative. It suggests also that both sides of the controversy
had made substantial progress. Microsoft finally saw its rival format standardised; Sun
and other competitors witnessed, at least at face value, a more conciliatory opponent,
now working through many of the same channels towards document interoperability.
The actual outcomes are of course more difficult to decipher. One Microsoft
blogger noted in relation to the support for ODF, “[OpenXML & ODF] never was
a zero sum game—it was always about customers winning”150. A more adequate
characterisation of the controversy would point to a more complex series of stakes
and pay-offs. Certainly the ISO organisation itself has had to defend itself against a
highly public and critical campaign—a series of press releases, and a long interview
with the CEO, Alan Bryden, in June 2008, tried to arrest what amounted to a public
relations disaster for an organisation which publishes more than 100 standards ev-
ery month151. Collaborators of the ODF standard now—to pick up on a metaphor
quoted earlier—have to worry about wolves in sheep’s clothing working side-by-side
at the specification drafting table. Microsoft itself has invested enormous resources
in the complex process of authoring, distributing, marketing and implementing a vast
specification which is unlikely ever to see large scale uptake by any products other
than its own in the foreseeable future. And customers—governments, companies
and individuals alike, the supposed beneficiaries of the entire process—also need to
contend with what is at least a vexing choice between two largely overlapping ISO
document format standards. Moreover new technological avenues continue to emerge:
the growth of online collaboration tools such as blogs, wikis, Google Docs and Zoho
Office are making, in some market segments at least, the office software suite increas-
ingly redundant—a point emphasised by the Co-Chair of the OASIS ODF Technical
Committee, Rob Weir152. In the rolling dialectical movements of late capitalism—
towards both standardisation and differentiation, growth and recession, boom and
bust cycles, all massively accelerated in and by the technological domain—no end
but ever increasing displacements and relocations of the game take place. By early
2009, this could already be witnessed by the new directions taken by once-strident
and vocal bloggers—either silenced completely, or focussed on new causes—, the rapid
diminution of traffic on the ODF mailing list, and the substantially lower coverage on
technology news sites153.
As convenor of the BRM, Alex Brown, expressed it, with perhaps a hint of regret:
2008 has been an exciting year for document format standards. 2009 will,




153The number of messages on the ODF mailing list in the first half of 2008 was 772; in the second
half the number dropped to 107 (OpenDocument Fellowship, 2008). Similarly Google Trends
showed a large decline in searches and news articles for both “ODF” and “OOXML” after March
2008 (Google, 2009)
154Brown (2008b).
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Signs of the “boring”, maturing process of document format standardisation can be
seen in a host of technical tests and discussions around technical points of concordance
and divergence between ODF and OOXML. Nevertheless the seismic cultural shifts
underpinning the two standards remain close to the surface, at least for those tasked
with planning document management policy and infrastructure.
The following sections summarise the findings in relation to the dimensions of com-
mensurability teased out in the narrative, and provide suggestions on how these might
influence planning and decision making around document policies in some common
scenarios.
Findings—Social Dimensions of Commensurability
Strategies
In the course of the controversy, both sides had been accused of various moves in
pursuit of their desired outcomes. The moves can be distilled into distinct strategies—
the means by which in which the players attempt to manipulate the outcome towards
their own greatest pay-off, within the environment and according to the rules of the
game. These are summarised here. The veracity of the claims are not assessed—it
is sufficient that they have been made publicly, and therefore represent the strategies
employed at the very least from the standpoint of the other players.
Microsoft is reported to have:
• Manipulated ISO national body meetings;
• Manipulated indirect channels, such as Wikipedia, online forums and blog com-
mentary;
• Instigated a campaign involving both traditional forms of documentation—press
releases, trade shows and developer documentation—and an active blogging
strategy;
• Financially endorsed several consultancy and press reports which showed OOXML
in a positive light;
• Supplied unnecessarily vast amounts of often dense technical information, re-
quiring responses within short time-frames;
• Orchestrated under-hand arrangements with OpenDocument Format propo-
nents, such as Novell;
• Employed similar and obfuscating terms, designed to confuse non-specialists;
• Purchased sponsored links in search engines related to OpenDocument Format
terms;
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• Pushed the OOXML specification through an industry consortium with little
non-corporate involvement;
• Provided ambiguous legal assurances, as yet untested in court;
• Inflated the technical differences between the two formats;
• Deflated the social cost of maintaining two standards.
Meanwhile the ODF camp is reported to have:
• Developed blogs, websites and papers criticising OOXML (while not always
discussing ODF);
• Lobbied ISO national bodies and other government organisations against OOXML;
• Ceded control of the ODF standard to two large corporate organisations (Sun
and IBM);
• Manipulated the standardisation process as a means of furthering corporate
objectives;
• Edited Wikipedia entries on OOXML in a biased way;
• Appealed to Microsoft conspiracy theories and stereotypes (at the extreme fringe
of the debate);
• Ignored the need to support the de facto standard represented by Microsoft
Office documents;
• Attempt to suppress and isolate other open source groups seeking to support
OOXML;
• Promoted unjustified legal scaremongering;
• Disrupted the BRM by holding a rival event at the same time and location;
• Deflated the technical differences between the two formats;
• Inflated the social cost of maintaining two standards.
Figure 8.3 depicts broadly the lines of influence by which various players attempt
to influence the outcome. Blue indicates Pro-ODF ; red indicates Pro-OOXML; purple
indicates Neutral—Both; yellow indicates Neutral—Neither and green indicates mixed
positions—that is, strategies changed over the course of the controversy. Bubble size
shows approximate significance of the player in the context of the game.
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Figure 8.3: Players in the Game
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The analysis of the social facets of the controversy highlight several dimensions of
incommensurability. Identification of players and their respective pay-offs demon-
strates that many pursue contradictory interests. At the most obvious level, the
different business models of Microsoft and its corporate competitors—software licens-
ing revenue versus advertising, hardware and service revenue—mean that in the area
of document formats these companies find themselves diametrically opposed. De-
spite not competing directly in this market, Microsoft competes with each of these
companies in other markets. Consequently the ability to unhinge one of Microsoft’s
key profit centres is of immense strategic value in the broader corporate struggle.
Sun, IBM and Google have nothing to lose from the promulgation of open source
office software, since they derive negligible sales in the market in any case. Microsoft,
on the contrary, derives enormous revenue and profits from sales of Microsoft Of-
fice. Thus a clear difference can be identified in the degree to which the format in
question is linked to software sales revenue155. Of course Sun, IBM and Google’s
position more clearly align—despite Microsoft’s recent efforts—with open source and
open standards advocates. The positive publicity provided by such advocacy is of
considerable strategic value in the marketplace, all the more since Microsoft is fre-
quently vilified in the same media circles. A second dimension is therefore the degree
to which the format is aligned with the open source software (OSS) movement. This
establishes a further effect of encouraging greater distribution of design input in stan-
dards development—despite some complaints in this area, the ODF specification has
a broader base of participants than OOXML. Public forums such as the ODF mailing
list, coupled with the distinctly uncontroversial progress of ODF through the ISO
process, suggests a greater degree of transparency and public involvement in the for-
mat development process. This also suggests a range of types of interests motivating
the development, rather than purely economic interests (which themselves might be
multiple and overlapping).
On the other hand, the centralised design of OOXML is arguably warranted by
one of its key design goals—supporting backward compatibility with the large corpus
of existing Microsoft Office documents. Backed by the market dominant vendor of
office document software, OOXML is also poised to be the de facto standard. In the
world of de jure standards, however, ODF is the incumbent, having been unequivocally
voted an ISO standard in 2006. This suggests that OOXML is pragmatically oriented
towards the existing corpus of documents; ODF is by comparison an idealisation of
the document format (subject to future uptake). On the question of commensurability
(referred to within the debate as “harmonisation”), ODF proponents have advocated
unification of the formats, while arguing at the same time it is contradictory to
maintain two largely overlapping standards. OOXML proponents have argued exactly
the opposite way—for technical incommensurability, and social commensurability.
The scope and scale of the debate has attracted immense publicity—ironically, this
155Here, and further below, use of suggested dimensional distinctions are italicised.
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has benefitted both formats and their respective parties. In this—and perhaps only
in this—instance, the consequences have been a win-win for at least the corporate
players on all sides. However, the standardisation of OOXML has done much to
raise the profile of ODF, while much of the publicity directed towards the Ecma
group and Microsoft has been distinctly negative. Despite Microsoft’s arduous efforts,
apparent abuses of the ISO process have raised both ethical and legal concerns over
the company’s conduct. Warranted or otherwise, this stigmatisation extends even
to its assurances not to press claims over particular specifications under intellectual
copyright.
Meanwhile the level of documentation and industry support are important consid-
erations for organisations looking to draft policy, procure software and services, and
plan projects. Again, the controversy has clarified notable areas of obscurity in both
formats. As noted earlier, the documentation around OOXML has been voluminous;
its emergence has also highlighted missing parts of ODF, currently being addressed in
new drafts of the standard. Equally the publicity around the debate has encouraged
other software companies to announce support for one or both of the formats.
These factors are listed below, with the same ratings as used in the technical anal-
ysis above. Like the technical factors, the factors here are not necessarily independent
or strictly mutually disjunctive.
ODF OOXML
Format linked to software revenue? Low High
Aligned with OSS movement? High Low
Distributed design? High Low
Transparent, with public involvement? Medium Low
Backwards-compatible? Low High
Represents range of interests? High Low
Incumbent de facto standard? High Medium
Incumbent de jure standard? High Medium
Pragmatic (versus idealistic)? Medium High
Rated technically commensurable? High Low
Rated socially commensurable? Low High
Positive publicity? High Medium
Ethical perception? Medium Low
Legal perception? High Medium
Documentation? Medium High
Industry support? High High
8.3 Conclusions: Assessing Commensurability
This analysis has demonstrated that employment of a framework which considers both
technological and sociological dimensions is useful for considering commensurability
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of ontologies—or in the terms employed in this chapter, the harmonisation of docu-
ment formats. It is by no means exhaustive—new amendments to either standard,
or in the broader market, could easily force a correction to the conclusions arrived
at here. From the limited and selective technological analysis, it was evident that
across eight criteria—self-containment, abstraction, prescriptiveness, verbosity, ref-
erentiality, multiple methods, and classification—substantial differences were to be
found in the two formats. After a sociological analysis of the recent controversy sur-
rounding the standardisation of OOXML, a further sixteen factors were found which
highlighted the different positions of the formats and its proponents. These reinforce
the technical factors, and to some extent help explain them—when, for example, a
market incumbent attempts to promote a second rival standard to consolidate its
position while reacting to a number of economic, political and legal pressures, it
might logically endeavour to ensure that harmonisation is difficult, that its specifi-
cations are rich, prescriptive, complex, highly abstract, and support earlier forms of
its formats while providing a path for further change and innovation. Conversely,
ODF, which witnessed greater community involvement while attempting to disrupt
the market incumbent’s dominant position, focussed on a simpler, more flexible doc-
ument model, made use of existing standards and is more homogeneous with related
document standards like HTML and DocBook. As a consequence though, it has suf-
fered from perceptions of under-specification (in the case of formulas particularly),
accessibility issues, and lack of compatibility with the overwhelming majority of office
documents—those produced by Microsoft Office itself. Irrespective of differences, the
publication of formats through the standardisation process appears on the whole to
be of major benefit to consumers, both in increasing choice and promoting document
interoperability—one of the major purposes of standardisation (Moore, 1998).
What use can be made of these findings? Here are three simple scenarios:
1. Policy formulation. A mid-size organisation reviews its document manage-
ment policies, with a view to enhancing interoperability with partner, customer,
supplier and government agency organisations. It finds that other organisations
use both ODF and OOXML formats; reckoning on its limited resources and
considerable technical incommensurability between the two formats, it decides
upon a policy to support both at a policy level, while recommending continued
use of Microsoft Office due to the de facto market leading position of the vendor,
and its own in-house expertise and training. It also has several accessibility re-
quirements which seem adequately fulfilled by the OOXML format, and a large
body of documents it is in no rush to convert to a less pervasive standard. It
uses a redacted form of the commensurability model in its evaluation.
2. Software provisioning. A government department seeking to renew its ex-
isting office productivity licenses issues a tender for provision of software and
associated support services. Although it has a large corpus of existing docu-
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ments, it is prepared to undertake a one-time format translation, subject to
cost and feasibility. It plans to develop in-house software for mining document
data, so the technical aspects of the format are significant. Other important
decision-making factors include the simplicity of the format, the degree of non-
commercial participation in its development, and its use of existing public stan-
dards. After applying the commensurability framework, it elects to standardise
on ODF, and chooses a vendor to supply the software and provide associated
technical support services. Although the translation proves to be costly, abso-
lute formatting fidelity is not required—the key content is preserved, and the
department also feels it can have greater input into the format’s future direc-
tion through participation in the OASIS Technical Committee. Despite the
efforts of OOXML to achieve standardisation, the apparent manipulations of
the process by its principal sponsor make the department wary about the level
of involvement it could expect.
3. Software development. A small software development company is building an
open source content management system, and wishes to support existing stan-
dardised formats. It is essentially agnostic about which formats it supports—it
has no particular vendor allegiances. However, it is particularly interested in
extracting metadata from documents. After applying the commensurability
model, it sees that support for ODF is easier, and moreover its “open source”
ethos more closely aligned with the company’s own position. On the other hand,
it is aware of the large corpus of existing Microsoft Office documents among its
potential customers. After looking at the overlapping areas, it decides to firstly
support the DublinCore standard, since this is both simple, and (with minor dif-
ferences) supported by both formats. Thereafter it plans to implement the ODF
metadata, followed by OOXML metadata. The company recognises the disso-
nances between the formats, and develops its own “interoperability” schema to
support both sets of metadata. Based upon the commensurability analysis, it
can develop a suitably scoped project plan, and deliver support for standards
in a suitable time-frame.
These scenarios all highlight the role of context in assessing commensurability—
there is always at least a tripartite relation in its determination. There are the two
ontologies, or in this case document formats, and the third party seeking to make use
of them. A proper exploration of context is out of the scope of this discussion, but as
these scenarios make clear, different contexts necessarily apply different dimensional
criteria, different weightings to those criteria, and different degrees of methodolog-
ical rigour in the evaluation of the criteria. The case study presented here could
be, against different requirements, either too exacting or too cursory; nevertheless it
demonstrates, in addressing both technical and sociological dimensions of commen-
surability, one manner in which the framework might be applied.
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At the outset of this study I suggested that, although not dealing with Semantic
Web ontologies directly, this analysis was justifiable on the grounds that it followed
a debate with immense publicity, far more than typically attends the austere world
of standards development. Outside of these pragmatic grounds, it provides a very
concrete case study of just how non-technical, extrinsic factors can work to determine
the technical specifications themselves. The manner in which the game has played
out—part indeed of a much larger and ongoing contestation between rival compa-
nies, between the corporate and public sectors, between advocates of open source
and intellectual property protection, between, even, nation states and geopolitical
regions—demonstrates an aspect of structural determination inherent in market com-
petition. This case study provides a fragmentary insight, then, into the modern
dialectical relationship between standardisation and differentiation characteristic of
the contradictory impulses of late capitalism. The evangelical tone of many of the
participants on either side of the debate are far from accidental—it harkens back
to the sociological diagnostics of modernity developed by Durkheim and Weber a
century ago, which sought to underline the strong religious elements that pervade
secular markets and societies (Durkheim, 2001; Weber, 2001). The language of game
theory, introduced here to unfold the complex character of the debate, is useful for
getting a grip on the tensions which reverberate within competing world views; but
its premise of ends-driven rationalising agents ought not occlude the role of macro-
economic and political structures in generating pay-offs for both standardisation and
differentiation—as commentators on both sides noted. The technical and sociological
dimensions of commensurability teased out here stand as parts to a whole—the world
in which both demands and limits to commensurability arise. No model or frame-
work will be entirely adequate to that world, but does serve an explicating function
for the practical tasks of framing policy, scoping projects and measuring effort. In
the case of documents—small but prolific slices of the world used to record human
happenings—such tasks are inevitable, and heuristic methods of evaluation therefore
highly desirable.
The next chapter moves on from case studies to a more direct examination of the
framework itself. The examination consists of a pilot test, where the framework is
operationalised in software form, and given to a small sample group of researchers
to evaluate. The chapter presents a discussion of the software and the evaluation, in
order to see what happens when other users try to make sense of the framework.
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Chapter 9
Framework in Practice
The process of “closure” ultimately adapts a product to a socially recog-
nized demand and thereby fixes its definition. Closure produces a “black
box,” an artifact that is no longer called into question but is taken for
granted. Before closure is achieved, it is obvious that social interests are
at stake in the design process. But once the black box is closed, its social
origins are quickly forgotten (Feenberg, 2002, p. 11).
The preceding case studies have demonstrated different applications of the commensu-
rability framework developed back in Chapters 4 and 51. The formal knowledge case
study reviewed different approaches to knowledge representation in the emergence of
information systems in the latter decades of the twentieth century; the upper-level
ontology case study examined recent efforts to improve on the kinds of foundational
existential categories discussed since Aristotle; while the document formats case study
took a close look at the both the technical detail and sociological background of two
rival document standards. Each of these cases demonstrates the application of the
commensurability framework across different fields, working with different sources,
with various refinements and adjustments along the way. In each case, though, there
is a strong chance of confirmation bias, since the author of the framework is also the
subject responsible for validating the framework. An open question towards the end
of the study, then, is whether the framework can be operationalised and made use-
ful for other researchers and analysts faced with comparable scenarios. This chapter
explores that question through an evaluation of the framework itself.
The approach adopted here uses a software system to externalise and opera-
tionalise the framework—to place it in a form which others could apply to schema or
ontology matching scenarios. In keeping with the aims of the previous case studies,
this study is also exploratory. Several different software systems were developed and
used in different ways to see whether the framework could be made intelligible, and
practically useful, to others. This chapter documents the development and evaluation
1Sections of this chapter were published in the proceedings of the Ontology Matching workshop of
the International Semantic Web Conference, 2006 (Magee, 2006), and in the January 2010 issue of
the peer-reviewed Electronic Journal of Knowledge Management (Magee, 2010).
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of these systems. The results of two systems are then presented, followed by some
concluding remarks.
9.1 SOMET—Shared Ontology Matching Environ-
menT
Early in the process of trying to operationalise the framework in software form, a
system called “SOMET” (Shared Ontology Matching EnvironmenT) was developed.
The main purpose of the system was to facilitate collaborative ontology matching; in
an early design of the current method, this kind of collaboration was to have made
evident some of the difficulties of alignment and to locate areas of incommensurability.
The system allowed users to create semantic web ontologies and associated constructs—
classes, properties, restrictions and individuals—in an online environment. In this
respect it is similar to common desktop ontology design applications, like Prote´ge´
(Gennari et al., 2003) and SWOOP (Kalyanpur et al., 2006). It was also designed
to permit limited matching of classes, through a drag-and-drop interface. Beyond
this, users could also annotate ontologies, using OWL 1.0 annotation conventions,
with a pre-defined set of properties loaded into the system. These properties were
termed “semantic axes”, and were intended to correlate to the different dimensions of
the framework presented in Chapter 5. In turn, values ascribed to these annotations
could be used in evaluating the commensurability of two ontologies, using a simple
set of graphs plotting the values.
This system was presented at a poster session at the International Semantic Web
Conference held in Athens, Georgia, 2006, and was further trialled by Common
Ground Publishing, one of the industry organisations involved in the ARC project
of which this study formed a part. The presentation was published in the proceed-
ings of the conference, while the company used the tool to migrate a large existing
XML schema of publishing terms into an OWL ontology format, using some scripts
developed expressly for that purpose.
A formal pilot was planned, the purpose of which was to see whether the tool would
assist users looking to compare and contrast two ontologies in a matching scenario.
The pilot was not undertaken due to several reasons:
• The framework on which the system was substantially under-developed. As the
case studies were developed, it became clear that a simple set of variables or
dimensions was necessary but insufficient. In particular, the role of methodol-
ogy came to occupy a more central position in the framework. The SOMET
system provided a formal means for assigning valuations to variables, but no
instructions or guidelines for how these valuations might be derived.
• In the course of conducting the case studies, the framework was generalised
to a number of formal structures (relational databases and XML schemas, in
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particular). Ontologies became the paradigmatic rather than sole case to which
the framework could be applied.
• Finally it became clear that the effort required to build and maintain a sys-
tem for actually constructing new ontologies was counter-productive, given the
ultimate aim was to build a system to implement a framework for comparing
existing knowledge systems. Far more time went into fixing bugs and adding
features—tasks which were clearly ancillary to this aim. Given other systems
(like the Prote´ge´ and SWOOP systems mentioned above) already did a far supe-
rior job with regard to these features, I thought it preferable to focus on another
system, this time designed just around the framework itself—with the idea that
Prote´ge´ or other ontology development tools could be used as part of an overall
commensurability assessment.
9.2 Schema Profiling Toolkit
9.2.1 Background
In place of SOMET, in 2008 I began work on another system, the Schema Profiling
Toolkit—the term “schema” being preferred to “ontology” or “system”, as it would
have greater resonance with some users of the software unfamiliar with the Semantic
Web. The purpose of this system was to focus exclusively on the framework ap-
paratus described in Chapter 5. By this stage, the framework apparatus had been
applied, and also refined, through the subsequent case studies. What became partic-
ularly apparent during that process was the need both to accommodate an explicit
declaration and treatment of the issue of methodology—how particular valuations of
ontologies were arrived at, and how they could be justified—and also to allow con-
siderable flexibility around the particular methodology used. In the working through
of the case studies, it became clear that different sources—the ontologies themselves,
historical documents, contemporary online discussions, auxiliary data such as finan-
cial filings and legal records, and so on—as well as different ways of engaging with
those sources—quantitative or qualitative, “hard” metric counts or “soft” interpretive
work—could yield valuable clues about the commensurability of ontologies. It also
became apparent that the toolkit needed to provide as much support as possible for
the framework, in terms of user interface design, hints, labels and documentation.
Users of the toolkit needed to acquaint themselves with three areas: the technolo-
gies of ontologies and schemas; the methods of social science investigation; and the
vocabulary and aims of the framework itself. While the first two of these might be
presupposed in varying degrees, no-one would be a priori familiar with the frame-
work, and so one of the key challenges became the design of the software interface, in
order that the framework could be applied as naturalistically as possible, given the
backgrounds of hypothetical users. In practice, this challenge would only partially be
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met.
Since the requirements of the toolkit could at best loosely framed in an exploratory
sense, it needed to be built in an iterative fashion—first building a general scaffold-
ing around the concepts put forward in Chapter 5, then filling in gaps, gradually
re-working process workflows and form design, and adding documentation and so on
as the toolkit grew. During an intensive construction process, in late 2008 and early
2009, I presented the toolkit to several pilot testers, who provided informal feedback
around what areas were clear, and what areas remained obscure or difficult to use.
Early in 2009, I became aware that refinement of the user interface was a potentially
endless task—often feedback from even the handful of early users was contradictory,
and within the scope of the exercise for which the software was developed, it would
be difficult for the toolkit to be “all things to all people”. Moreover the project was
suffering from a familiar IT problem of “scope creep”, as more and more features and
documentation needed to be added to capture the complexities of the evolving frame-
work, and to document these features for an uninitiated user group. This proved
counter-productive in several respects. One of the motivations behind the frame-
work was to reduce the time required to assess the scope of an ontology alignment
task. One of the corresponding goals for the software, therefore, was that it would
instrumentalise this aim as a kind of “agile” method, which could be quickly applied
at the start of a project. However, as the documentation developed, it proved very
difficult to provide clear instructions on how, for example, to interpret the different
assumptions voiced on a mailing list without writing, effectively, an abridged guide to
content analysis. Similar problems existed in the development of the software itself.
One of the features I added was the ability to “tag” sources, to associate sources with
a particular viewpoint or dimension of an ontology. But moving further down this
line, while making the tool more powerful, would eventually lead to the development
of more complex data analysis features—again, well outside the scope of the current
system and its aims.
A consequence of the recognition of these difficulties was to reduce both the scope
of the toolkit, and of the claims made about its evaluation. Since the toolkit is
an online application, initially I had intended to invite members of various mailing
lists, including the Semantic Web mailing list, to participate in its evaluation. The
purpose would have been to conduct a modestly-sized anonymous study of blended
quantitative and qualitative responses of the toolkit, after an initial introduction and
a specified period for completion of a particular ontology alignment exercise. A pilot,
conducted through a local group of researchers recruited by “snow-balling”, was to
provide some initial feedback, after which refinements to the toolkit would have been
made, and then a general invitation sent out. In practice, the pilot provided both a
reasonable set of responses in itself (with various caveats, described further below),
and also alerted me to some of the difficulties with involving a larger cohort (also
described below). Consequently, I have treated the pilot as, instead, the main findings
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of this part of the study, and have used those findings in an exploratory rather than
confirmatory sense. A broader investigation of the utility of the software, and the
underlying framework, now comprises a subject for further work.
The remainder of the chapter describe the toolkit, the process and results of its
evaluation, and a subsequent discussion.
9.2.2 Outline of the Toolkit
The toolkit is an effort to embed into a processable form the framework presented in
Chapter 5—it aims to make it possible for others to apply the framework practically
to some ontology alignment or matching scenario.
Uses and Aims of the Toolkit
The following excerpts, taken from the “Introduction” to the toolkit, summarise its
aims and uses:
What is the Schema Profiling Toolkit? The Schema Profiling Toolkit is a
tool which helps people assess how well information schemas or ontologies
fit together. It does this by providing support for profiling the underlying
perspectives of schemas. The tool also provides a minimal methodology
framework, for defining and answering a set of questions which construct
the profile.
The software is designed to be used in the context of a particular
project—where there is some schema-related task to be performed, such
as the integration of two data sources. In this context, the software can be
useful in planning and scoping the amount of work involved in integrating
the sources. It can also be used to check on the results of concept or
data mapping activities—to ensure intangible or implicit features of the
schemas are retained . . .
Why has the Toolkit been developed? Information schemas are usually
developed to model information in a particular domain—for example, ge-
ological objects, business processes or social organisations. This works
well when people just need to access information from a single schema—
but they also often want to search, combine, move or consolidate data
from more than one schema. Because different schemas—developed by
different people in different places and times—will often have overlapping
or related concepts, this introduces well-known problems of system in-
tegration. Usually working out which concepts are related between two
schemas is a time-consuming and error-prone task. The results of this
work is typically some form of mapping from one schema to another. To
help engineers with this task, several approaches have been developed
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to automate—or at least partially automate—mapping concepts between
schemas.
This problem is difficult enough within organisations—but on a global
network like the World Wide Web, it becomes immense. The Semantic
Web is a major effort, developed by the World Wide Web Consortium, to
provide standards for defining information schemas for the web. In this
context, schemas are called ”ontologies”, and are developed in a formal
language called OWL (Web Ontology Language). A specialised area of
research, ontology matching or alignment, has been examining ways of
developing automatic mappings between ontologies. These typically pro-
duces algorithms which exploit specific relationships between the concepts
of ontologies.
Sometimes though information schemas cannot simply be related in
a concept-for-concept-like fashion. Like any other human-made product,
an information schema is produced in a particular social or cultural con-
text. The schema represents the assumptions, motivations and beliefs—
the perspective—of a particular culture. These are not necessarily explicit
in the schema itself—and are not therefore discoverable by algorithms.
Yet they can be very important in determining whether two schemas fit
together—whether they are commensurable. In a global environment, such
extrinsic social factors—political, economic, cultural and legal—frequently
need to be taken into account. They have major impacts on the costs, time
and feasibility of projects.
The Schema Profiling Toolkit presents an overall framework, a basic
methodology and a default set of dimensions for describing the perspec-
tives of schemas, as a complement to the kinds of schema or ontology
matching algorithms discusses above. It is designed to be used before or
during some data integration, merging, migration or reporting project, to
support better estimates of the scope of the project—in cases where the
commensurability of schemas is in question.
Main Elements of the Toolkit
In line with the framework presented in Chapter 5, the toolkit consists of the following
main elements:
• Project Description: A means for describing a project in which two ontologies
or schemas compared. The description can be in general prose, or broken up
into separate fields for specifying the purpose, background context, stakeholders
and other project variables.
• Dimension Taxonomy : A two-tiered taxonomy of dimensions for describing on-
tologies. The first, more general tier of dimensions are applied qualitatively, in
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the form of open-ended textual descriptions, while the second, more specific tier
of dimensions are applied quantitatively—as a simple score out of 10. A default
set of dimensions, similar to those outlined in Chapter 5, is installed for each
new project (these are listed in appendix C.1).
However, users can add, modify, remove and weight first (grouping) and second
(individual) tiered dimensions. Assigned weights are used in the generation of
weighted average quantitative commensurability results, as part of the more
general reporting mechanism. The algorithm for computing these results was
presented in Chapter 5.
• Schema Profiles: A “profile” of a schema or ontology consists of some generic
fields—the name, web reference or URL (if available) and a description—as well
as a set of qualitative and quantitative values corresponding to the dimensions
described above. These collective values ought to aim to capture the general
cultural perspective of the schema, in the sense discussed in Chapter 5. To-
gether, they form the basis for an assessment of the commensurability of two or
more schemas.
If the schema profile describes an ontology represented in RDF/OWL format,
and which is available on a valid URL, the toolkit attempts to parse the ontol-
ogy to provide a series of metrics to help with assigning values to dimensions.
For example, one of the default dimensions is whether an ontology uses predom-
inantly classes or properties. The toolkit tries to generate counts of the number
of classes and properties, and their respective ratio automatically. However, it
does not automatically set any dimension values—this requires the input of the
user of the system, who needs to calibrate the values relative to other schemas
being profiled.
• Data Sources: An area for adding data sources (documents, web pages, financial
records, interview transcripts or other sources of evidence), which describe the
background conditions under which an ontology is developed and used. Indi-
vidual sources can be added, modified, removed and tagged—associated with a
particular schema or relevant theme. The sources are used to build the schema
profiles.
• Commensurability Report : A reporting mechanism for assessing the commensu-
rability of two schemas, based on the completed profiles. The report included
results of both the qualitative assessment of dimension groups and the quanti-
tative assessment of individual dimension values, based on the weighted average
algorithm presented in Chapter 5. That algorithm is extended in two respects
in the software implementation, which are outlined below.
• Feedback Mechanism: An evaluation form for users to evaluate the framework,
the software and associated documentation.
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The process of defining these elements was not clear cut. Initial drafts of the
framework itself were revised substantially in the course of developing the previous
case studies, and in the construction of the toolkit itself, as it became clear that
a number of tacit assumptions needed to be teased out for the framework to be
intuitive to researchers and practitioners in different fields. The “micro-iterations” of
the toolkit also fed into the “macro-iterations” of the framework—and consequently,
of the over-arching argument of the study—as a whole. Four specific adjustments
were made to the framework weighted average algorithm presented in Chapter 5 for
measuring commensurability:
• The software allowed only first tier (grouping) dimensions to capture qualitative
judgments. While second tier (individual) dimensions could have notes accom-
panying quantitative assessments, the number and fine-grained nature of these
dimensions suggested qualitative values would unnecessarily clutter the final re-
porting mechanism. Also, restricting qualitative judgments to just high-level
categories such as “process” or “perspective” seemed more in keeping with the
actual process I myself had undertaken in the case studies.
• The software introduced a separate dimension type, for dimensions describing
the relationship between two schemas (the document formats case, where both
schemas were developed with full knowledge, and largely in opposition to one
another, demonstrated the need for this separate conceptual distinction). Since
these dimensions do not apply to a single, but rather to a pair of schemas, it is
the direct value instead of the difference between two values which is included
in the algorithm for these dimensions.
• The software allowed dimension group as well as individual weights—it appeared
more relevant to be able to adjust weightings at both a coarse and fine-grained
level.
• Four different commensurability algorithm results were presented, with differing
treatment of dimension weights: an unweighted average, an average weighted
with just the grouping dimension weights, an average weighted with just the
individual dimension weights, and an average incorporating both group and
individual dimension weights. These allowed participants to review and, if nec-
essary, calibrate the effects of the weights.
These refinements were integrated over several iterations of the software, in part to
reflect the experience of the case studies, and in part to make the use and evaluation
of the software more manageable from the point of view of users who had not been
exposed to the framework before.
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Toolkit Methodology
The methodology component of the framework was designed to guide an analyst
in assigning values to the dimensions and developing an evaluation report on the
commensurability of ontologies. It applies a redacted form of online discourse analysis
(Schneider and Foot, 2004).
These elements were subsequently stitched into a workflow with a series of steps or
tasks. The steps are not “lock-step”, in that any step may be done in any order, and
also performed reiteratively. However, their basic organisation suggests a relatively
linear process. The steps, and associated descriptions, are to:
1. Configure the project—describe the project in terms of its purpose, constraints,
resources and stakeholders;
2. Modify the dimensions—weight the default dimension set, and optionally, add
and remove dimensions from the set;
3. Describe method and sources—locate background documentary or other kinds of
evidence which can be used to develop profiles of the ontologies, and optionally,
code the sources in terms of relevant user-defined categories. For example,
a source may indicate that a particular ontology is a well-defined and well-
supported standard, but excludes users from involvement in the development
process;
4. Profile the schemas—evaluate the schemas in terms of the qualitative and quan-
titative dimensions constructed in step 2, and using the sources added in step
3;
5. Develop an analysis—analyse the commensurability of the profiles produced in
step 4. The analysis may consider questions like potential scoping estimates for
ontology alignment, specific problem areas and possible solutions;
6. Construct a commensurability report—brings together all of the preceding ele-
ments into a report, which can be used for further evaluation and dissemination.
Appendix C.2 shows a series of screen-shots of the software, depicting in particular
the project definition, schema profiling and reporting screens.
Toolkit Guide
A set of web pages were developed to accompany the software. These pages include:
• An Introduction to the toolkit, which summarises its uses and aims;
• A Plain Language Statement outlining what the research project is about, who
is involved, what is expected of users of the system, associated risks, benefits
and rights, and what happens with the research results;
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• Instructions on how to use the toolkit and complete the evaluation;
• A discussion of methodology—how to discover, interpret and analyse data sources
within the context of the toolkit. In practice this discussion is a highly condensed
introduction to online content analysis;
• An overview of the default taxonomy of dimensions, with a brief description of
each of the first tier or grouping dimensions;
• A basic introduction to the Semantic Web.
The documentation was made available through links in the software, and parts
of the documentation are also embedded inline, alongside specific features.
Technical Architecture
The toolkit was developed in the Ruby on Rails web application framework, using the
Postgres relational database management system for data storage. To make use of
available Semantic Web Java libraries for parsing and generating metrics for ontolo-
gies, the framework was deployed on JRuby 1.1.5, rather than on the conventional C-
based Ruby interpreter. The OWLAPI Horridge et al. (2007) and Pellet 2.0 reasoner
(Clark & Parsia, 2009) libraries were used for parsing and checking the consistency
of ontologies.
9.2.3 Evaluating the Software
A pilot test of the software was conducted with a hand-selected participant sample,
predominantly made up of researchers in the social science and computer science dis-
ciplines. It was conducted with 13 participants, recruited from RMIT University and
several other research organisations. The participants were selected because they had
some background with data integration, Semantic Web and ontology matching tech-
nologies, or alternatively, because they were familiar with the social science research
methods presented in the toolkit.
In the pilot participants were invited to review a sample project comparing two
commonly used tutorial ontologies, the Pizza (Rector et al., 2004) and Wine (Noy
and McGuinness, 2001) ontologies. The project presented a scenario in which these
ontologies need to be merged into a knowledge base of a new restaurant point-of-
sale system. A very basic form of discourse analysis had been conducted into the
background literature describing the cultural perspectives of these ontologies, and a
quantitative evaluation against the default dimension set was also supplied. Finally
a finished commensurability report was presented.
Participants were asked to browse both the interim steps and the completed report,
and then to complete an evaluation survey. The survey consisted of a series of closed
Likert scale and open-ended questions, designed to elicit feedback on the utility, ease
of use and relevance of the following elements:
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Table 9.1: Software Attitudinal Scales
Area No. of items
The default dimension set 4 items
The methodology 4 items
The commensurability analysis 4 items
The software system 4 items
Overall 5 items
• Dimension model—the default dimensions used to measure the schemas;
• Methodology—the process of profiling the schemas;
• Reporting mechanism—the final analysis of commensurability;
• Software system—the implementation of the framework;
• Overall framework—how well the parts integrate into the whole.
Quantitative Results
The participants were asked to respond to a total of 24 Likert items. Three of these
related to degrees of familiarity with, respectively, data integration, Semantic Web and
ontology matching technologies—collectively these items form the scale of familiarity
with relevant technologies. The remaining 21 items related to the following attitudinal
scales:
All of the items were rated from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”, and
coded 1 to 5 accordingly. As the summary statistics in Appendix C.2 show, responses
to items were generally favourable, with median values of 4 (“Agree”) for 81% and
mode values of 4 for 71% of the attitudinal scales. χ-square tests were also conducted
on each of the items, with 90% of items significant at the p > 0.05 level and 57%
significant at the p > 0.01 level. These results suggest the toolkit rated well, and
would be useful for helping users translate and integrate schemas and ontologies in
practical environments, and for assessing commensurability generally.
Qualitative Results
In addition, participants were asked open-ended questions about how the model,
methodology, report and analysis, software and overall toolkit could be improved.
They were also invited to add further comments. Nine out of the thirteen participants
offered some kind of written feedback. Although this feedback was varied, the results
suggested a more complex and critical picture than did the quantitative responses. A
common criticism focussed on the lack of explanation of how and why the system could
be applied in practice, especially in relation to the model and default dimensions. In
the words of one participant:
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The model and its supporting documentation seem extremely easy to use
and clear if someone already understands the “why” of doing this sort of
comparison. If the tool were intended for professionals doing data inte-
gration projects on the ground (rather than people involved directly in
more formal discussions of ontologies), it would probably need more up-
front discussion of how the tool can be used in more everyday professional
practice.
The same participant suggested a “walk-through” case study might help orient
users through the use of the model and methodology in an applied setting. These
comments were echoed in various forms by six other participants. A related com-
plaint, voiced by several participants, was the difficulty and lack of clarity around the
application of the model to the example scenario:
Participant A: How to make things simple would be of great importance
to the use of the model
Participant B: I was confused as to what the model actually does also;
how the values/weights are used.
Participant G: The default model captures a vast array of possible dimen-
sions on which to compare ontologies but perhaps only a few are actually
important for any particular project.
Two participants also suggested simplifying or reorganising the dimensions:
Participant D: Some of the heads for qualitative commentary could be
consolidated—there are perhaps too many, and more scope could be given
to users to create their own heads.
Participant F: One improvement might be to break up the default model
into several ‘brackets’ that might be more or less suited to different kinds
of mapping challenges
Participants also found the methodology instructions too broad:
Participant C: A specific case that ties into the specific example provided,
would help “lay” users visualise how they might arrive at the point where
they would develop a specific methodology and fill out other components
of the tool, so that it would be easier to recognise what I think is a
very practical, useful and intuitive environment for foreseeing potential
complexities in a project.
Participant F: The process of gathering background information to the
mapping work is a little hazy . . . it might be possible to be far more direc-
tive and specific about the work that needs to done to prior to commencing
the weighting against the default model.
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Participant G: The methodology is too broad and lacks focus.
Finally, three participants also suggested a reduction in, or reorganisation of, the
number of dimension groups would be helpful. One participant objected to the general
approach of the toolkit on more theoretical grounds. Expanding on this feedback
in offline discussion, the participant viewed the problem of commensurability as one
requiring agreement between ontological commitments at a higher level of abstraction.
Echoing some of the more explicit comments on commensurability in Chapters 7 and
8, their view was that frameworks such as this could only help with “after the fact”
reconciliation of schemas; what was required was a priori agreement before schemas
and ontologies are designed and built.
In spite of these reservations, general feedback about the overall toolkit and frame-
work were positive:
Participant C: The underlying conceptual framework and toolkit seem like
they would be quite useful in professional practice
Participant D: Nevertheless, scaffolds like this are very helpful
Participant F: Your default model grounds the work of mapping in con-
crete ways and this I think is a great invention.
Participant H: Conceptually fascinating—and I can see how the questions
posed in the process of designing a project could act as a point of dialogue
between different components of a project team
9.2.4 Discussion
Although the quantitative results generally confirmed the utility of the toolkit, the
qualitative feedback indicated the need for providing a clearer explanation of the
purpose of the system, and specifically of how it could be applied in practice. Only one
of the respondents indicated any specific improvements to the model, methodology,
report or software design, indicating that amendments to the system can to a large
extent be handled by improving the documentation—both in the associated guide,
and through various hints and inline help. Overall, both forms of feedback indicated
that the toolkit would be useful in improving understanding and accuracy of schema
matching projects, although the results were less conclusive whether it would help
lower time and cost components.
Some of the qualitative criticisms can be addressed through more specific docu-
mentation and user interface improvements. Others suggest that both the dimension
model and methodology need to be tailored to practical scenarios. This could be
achieved by developing “templated” models and associated activities for specific use
cases, perhaps on a vertical industry basis or by identification of particular business
“patterns” for ontology comparison and alignment. After these criticisms have been
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addressed, it is expected that further evaluations of the framework will be conducted
via a series of case studies on organisations involved in real-world ontology matching.
There were several limitations of the study, which are consist with its treatment as
an exploratory pilot. The participants were non-randomly selected, using a “snowball”
technique where existing participants recommended other possible candidates. The
sample size was small, and participants were encouraged, due both to time constraints
and the “beta” status of the toolkit, to review an existing sample project, rather than
to create their own. This meant the toolkit was reviewed against a decidedly artificial,
rather than “real-world”, scenario.
While a more extended research survey had been planned, with a larger and ran-
dom sample, the revisions to the system required for this were deemed out of scope.
As it stands, or even with small cosmetic changes, evaluations of the system would
likely elicit similar responses. The time commitment required to develop a compre-
hensive project description, set of salient dimensions, schema profiles and subsequent
evaluation proved quite substantial—certainly more than hoped for at the outset of
the project. Even through a local research network, participants had to be actively
encouraged to complete the evaluation. Finding participants at a further remove will-
ing to engage in this kind of evaluation would therefore be difficult. Indeed, what
started as a kind of prompted survey turned into an exercise more closely related to a
formal software testing process, even within the scope of the pilot project. The pro-
cess also required considerably greater engagement from the participant group than
had been anticipated.
In place of an extended survey, it is possible that various other approaches would
be more useful. A workshop scenario, in which participants are provided a verbal
overview of the research and demonstration of the toolkit, would provide a clearer
introduction, and allow for the possibility of interactive feedback, questions and an-
swers. Unfortunately I ran out of time to conduct an exercise of this sort, although
this may be a option for further work in the future.
A further epistemological limitation with the application of the toolkit is that it
tends to represent the perspectives underpinning schemas and ontologies as “point-
in-time” phenomena. In practice, as the document format case study made clear,
both perspectives and the conditions in which they arise shift frequently. Within a
project context, in which estimates and planning activities are forecast, such point-
in-time analysis is often still useful. But to capture this shift in the present toolkit
would require an ability to move from static, point-in-time to dynamic, longitudinal
profiles, which would capture the evolving qualities of schemas—and relationships
between those schemas—over time. Given the number of dimensions introduced here,
capturing this information would pose a problem of complex information capture,
analysis and visualisation.
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9.3 Pilot Study Summary
The two software approaches explored here—an ontology editing environment and
the schema profiling toolkit—both represent various ways the framework can applied
by other users. The first approach failed sufficiently to capture the complexity of
the framework; the second approach proved to be useful in at least demonstrating the
framework could be operationalised in software form—a process which in turn clarified
some of the assumptions and constructs of the framework itself. However, in turn it
failed to capture potential dynamic, longitudinal aspect of ontology commensurability.
For an external analyst considering ontology alignment for a particular purpose, a
static point-in-time assessment is nevertheless useful, arguably much more so when
some of the other criticisms and limitations have been addressed. Similarly, the pilot
made evident some of the difficulties of rendering a complex framework in software
form; feedback indicated both further work on the usability of the system itself,
and other methods of presenting it to users, would be helpful in overcoming these
difficulties.
Importantly though, the software pilot has demonstrated that the framework can
be successfully understood and applied by others—and so provides some confirmatory
evidence of its utility beyond the case studies presented here. The next and final
chapter considers the combined evidence of these studies against the initial aims and
questions, and the subsequent elaboration of the framework, in summarising and
concluding the work as a whole.
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Chapter 10
Conclusion
Concepts that have proven useful in ordering things easily achieve such
authority over us that we forget their earthly origins and accept them
as unalterable givens. Thus they come to be stamped as “necessities of
thought,” “a priori givens,” etc. The path of scientific progress is often
made impassable for a long time by such errors. Therefore it is by no means
an idle game if we become practiced in analyzing long-held commonplace
concepts and showing the circumstances on which their justification and
usefulness depend, and how they have grown up, individually, out of the
givens of experience. Thus their excessive authority will be broken. They
will be removed if they cannot be properly legitimated, corrected if their
correlation with given things be far too superfluous, or replaced if a new
system can be established that we prefer for whatever reason (Howard,
2005, p. 35, quoting Albert Einstein, ‘Obituary for Ernst Mach’, 1916).
The concluding chapter reviews the argumentative arc the study has plotted: from its
early framing of a question, through its detour in the literature review, the methodol-
ogy and the theoretical approach, to its eventual elaboration of an answer, in the form
of a framework and its application in a series of case studies. It then summarises the
findings of the study, discusses some of its limitations, suggests areas of further work,
and ends with several tentative implications which can be drawn from the findings.
One of the key conceptual tensions prominent throughout the study is that be-
tween semantic standardisation—where common arrangements of concepts and terms
are used to describe a particular field or domain—and differentiation—where new
emergent arrangements, tacitly or otherwise, oppose those already in play. It is this
dialectical social exchange which, as much as anything else, could be said to provoke
the question of commensurability between knowledge systems. At one extreme, a
completely standardised ontology would indicate that, however fortuitously arrived
at, its underlying conceptual scheme could be universalised beyond the point of fur-
ther argument and conflict. At the other, a solipsistic conception of a system would
suggest that its conceptualisation is irretrievably private, with only the semblance of
semantic exchange taking place. Neither conception seems adequate to everyday ex-
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perience, nor to the specialised social transactions which formalise our concepts into
computer-manipulable information artefacts. Rather, meaningful semantic acts are
performed within a broad marketplace, one which includes all manner of dialogue,
ideas, conceptions, assertions, interdictions and questions. Semantic Web ontologies,
however much they adhere to methodological and mathematical rigour, nevertheless
only occupy more refined, exclusive real estate within this general communicative
commerce, compared to the “messy retail business”, as Brandom puts it, of everyday
vernacular information exchanges. They remain tokens of exchange, symbols of value,
expressions of epistemic capital alongside their natural language counterparts.
Retaining this analogy, one way of stating the guiding question of the study is
whether it is possible to measure the degree to which the conceptual entailments in-
herent in knowledge systems are mutually exchangeable. Use of quantitative monetary
metaphors can become strained, however, suggesting the schemes can be measured
against some underlying common conceptual currency. That is in a sense to repeat the
ambitions of a universalist semantics, displaced to a yet further conceptual scheme
which acts as the measuring stick for the others. While an important part of the
study resides upon just such a scheme, articulated as a framework and subsidiary
set of dimensions, I have emphasised that the framework can only be considered in
situ, in a practical, situational context. To shift metaphors, the framework adopted
here is more by a way of a lightweight scaffolding rather than a finished construction,
something to be erected, repositioned and refashioned pragmatically as the context
for comparing conceptualisations demands.
Considerable academic research has sought to improve the performance and pre-
cision and recall rates of ontology matching algorithms. Dozens of publications each
year exploit various properties of ontologies, seeking ways to automate the gener-
ation of conceptual matches between them. Automation is an important goal for
large-scale ontology alignment; two ontologies containing 1,000 concept items each
can produce a total of 1,000,000 candidate translations. Algorithms which limit these
matches, even partially, clearly minimise the problem space for human agents. Util-
ising another of the central conceptual distinctions of the study, I have characterised
algorithmic approaches as semantically atomistic—that is, meaning is implicitly re-
ducible to atomistic concepts, rather than the holistic conceptual scheme to which
those concepts belong. Translatability between ontologies or schemas is, under this
conception, directly deducible from the number of individual concept matches.
This study has argued, on the other hand, for a more holistic conception of the
degree of translatability between formal systems. Effectively, it has answered in the
affirmative to the central research question: that such a conception can be useful
in guiding any alignment exercise. Use of this conception in practice involves both
“hard” technical comparison and some of the “soft” features more common to natural
language translation, where context (both intra- and inter-textual), idiom, ambiguity
and even the “aura of the text” have important roles to play. Attention to these fea-
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tures has practical advantages—it alerts the analyst to issues of scope, time, quality
and accuracy which are otherwise invisible to purely algorithmic approaches. Equally,
it directs attention to the situational context conditions in which the translation it-
self takes place. In some cases, purely algorithmic results may be sufficient; in others,
human intervention is needed, precisely because the “texts” here—knowledge sys-
tems, such as ontologies or schemas—are insufficient in themselves to make evident
the epistemic differences which underpin them. In short, some of the familiar ques-
tions of discourse interrogation—who has authored the text, how and why has it been
developed, how has it been received and used, what sorts of implicit beliefs is the
text committed to—are, in these cases, equally applicable to the problem of ontol-
ogy alignment. In this study, such questions have been formalised into yet another
schema, which forms a key component of the commensurability framework presented
in Chapter 5, and is further applied in Chapters 6 through to 9.
The remainder of this chapter summarises the argumentative arc the study has
plotted in response to the guiding research questions. It then outlines the findings
and limitations of the research, along with suggestions for further work. The chapter
concludes with a brief discussion of both the theoretical implications and practical
import of the research.
10.1 Trajectory of the Study
The guiding research question for the study has been:
Is the concept of “commensurability”—describing how electronic knowl-
edge systems compare across a range of both sociological and technological
dimensions—useful in guiding the alignment of these systems?
Several further subsidiary questions were also asked in the Introduction:
What sort of theoretical apparatus can be used to describe the commen-
surability of ontologies?
What kind of general purpose framework might be developed for evaluat-
ing the commensurability of ontologies?
How can the usefulness of the framework be assessed?
Can the framework be applied to current cases of knowledge system com-
mensurability?
Can the framework be implemented as a software system, and used by
others?
The response to the main question is “yes”—the notion of commensurability, sup-
ported by a framework for assessing it, can be useful in alignment scenarios. The
304 CHAPTER 10. CONCLUSION
study has been structured around the argument for this response, and in the process
has aimed to answer the subsidiary questions as well.
The first three chapters—the Introduction, Literature Review and Methodology—
supplied the background for the main research question. The Introduction framed
the question, providing an introduction to the Semantic Web and ontologies, outlining
recent schema and ontology efforts, and raising the problem of commensurability. The
central research questions of the study were then posed, and the structure of argument
was summarised. Chapter 2—the Literature Review—provided a broad critical survey
of literature from a range of disciplines which intersect around the idea of conceptual
schemes. Work in fields as diverse as philosophy, computer science, anthropology,
linguistics, social and cognitive sciences provide different but interrelated models.
Some of these models were then further explored in Chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 3,
meanwhile, outlined how the study mounts a theoretical framework for describing the
commensurability of conceptual schemes, and how it uses various empirical studies to
apply the framework. The question of how the usefulness of the framework can be
assessed was also discussed here, along with trade-offs and limitations of the selected
research methods. Together these introductory chapters provided the conceptual
scaffolding for how the main and subsidiary research questions are responded to in
the remainder of the argument.
In response to the first three subsidiary research questions above, Chapters 4 and
5 described the commensurability framework. Chapter 4, seeking to develop a theo-
retical foundation for the framework, explored the work of several recent thinkers in
philosophy, sociology and cognitive science. It began with an analysis of the work of
Kuhn, Foucault and Quine, who constitute important landmarks in what can very
broadly be described as conceptual “structuralism”. Through different analytic lenses,
each of these authors presents meaning not as primarily a correspondence between
verbal proposition and actual fact, but as instead reliant upon a coherent network of
propositions, touching reality only at its edges. Several perspicuous critiques of these
structuralist standpoints, voiced by Davidson and Derrida, were then put forward, fol-
lowed by an interlude on a more contemporary debate of the so-called “science wars”
by Hacking. Finally, a “rehabilitated” structuralist take on conceptual schemes was
articulated through the more recent work of Habermas, Brandom and Gardenfors.
Together these theoretical orientations help describe the different dimensions of con-
ceptual schemes—as explicit representations in the form of technical products such as
ontologies; as cognitive structures of mind; and as reflections of cultural and commu-
nicative practices. By drawing out these dimensions as qualitative and quantitative
features which can be compared and contrasted, the basic theoretical ground-work
was laid for the framework which then followed.
Chapter 5 then presented the framework itself, comprising a model of a commen-
surability scenario, a series of dimensions for evaluating ontologies and schemas, an
outline of a methodological approach to conducting the evaluations, and a quantifica-
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tion of the notion of commensurability. This chapter presented the major claim of the
study—that a general purpose framework can indeed be usefully deployed in prac-
tical ontology and matching scenarios, to realise better assessments of scope, time,
cost and quality. The choice of default dimensions was justified here, in part with
reference to the theoretical background discussed in Chapter 4. In particular, these
dimensions were designed to describe those technical, cognitive, linguistic and social
features most salient to the production and use of knowledge systems.
Chapters 6 to 9 demonstrated empirical evidence for this claim, and also aimed to
answer the last two of the subsidiary research questions—whether the framework can
be applied to actual cases of knowledge systems, and whether it can implemented in a
software system and used by others. Chapters 6 to 8 presented a series of case studies.
The first of these compared two prominent formal knowledge systems—relational
databases and Semantic Web ontologies—providing in the process a schematic map
of their development over the twentieth century. Key similarities and distinctions
were analysed and discussed in the concluding sections of the study.
The second of the studies examined so-called “upper-level” ontologies. These are
explicitly designed to cover abstract or foundational entities which, once specified, can
be re-used by other ontologies. Not only would such conceptual re-use clarify what is
meant by concepts such as Space, Time, Process, Object and other abstract concepts
in those other ontologies, it would facilitate greater interoperability between them.
The proliferation of upper-level ontologies in the past decade has led new questions of
alignment and commensurability, in turn, to be asked of those upper-level ontologies
themselves. This study reviewed five such ontologies which have been published,
all within academic environments (though often involving some level of industry and
government involvement too). Through an analysis both of the ontologies themselves,
and available background publications and discussions, a series of distinctions were
defined; against these distinctions the assumptions of these ontologies can be both
made explicit, and further distinguished from one another. The subsequent analysis
then developed several commensurability assessments of the ontologies against some
hypothetical scenarios.
The third of the case studies covered a recent controversy over the standardisa-
tion of two document formats, OpenDocument Format (ODF) and Open Office XML
(OOXML). This study sought to analyse both the technical specifications of the for-
mats themselves, and the broader context in which they have been developed and
used. The simplistic portrayal—that ODF is promoted by an “open source” commu-
nity, while OOXML is motivated by corporate interests—was shown to dissolve into
a more complex picture of shifting actor interests: individual consultants, advocates
and spokespersons, competing standards bodies, internecine corporate rivalry and
even some level of geopolitical governmental positioning. One result of this analysis
was the recognition of the need for commensurability to be sensitised to the contex-
tual conditions in which the alignment of knowledge systems takes place—different
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emphases across different dimensional criteria show markedly different levels of con-
cordance or conflict.
Chapter 9 externalised the framework into a software system, which was then pre-
sented to other users to evaluate. A small pilot test was conducted across a dozen
participants, and some initial feedback, both quantitative and qualitative, on the util-
ity of the framework was collected and analysed. The feedback suggested considerable
further work needed to be done for the system to provide greater direction to would-
be users, making it easier to apply while simultaneously retaining the merits of the
framework—its degree of abstraction and general purpose application. It also sug-
gested that parts of the framework—particular dimensions and perhaps more directed
methods and sources—could be distilled and simplified for use in specific situations.
10.2 Summary of Findings
The research has shown, most importantly, that a holistic orientation towards the
problem of ontology alignment can be a useful supplement and corrective to what has
been characterised as the atomistic approaches of ontology matching algorithms. The
brief historical review of the differences between relational database and Semantic
Web ontologies demonstrated that what at first sight appear to be mere syntactic
technical differences can mask important ontological and epistemological distinctions.
The survey of upper-level ontologies, where important aspects of philosophical and
cultural orientation might be expected to be made more explicit in the ontologies
themselves, showed that significant latent assumptions still could be found to moti-
vate the selection and organisation of concepts. The analysis of the document format
controversy laid bare a series of political, economic, legal and cultural factors coor-
dinating the otherwise insular process of document standardisation. The innovation
of the approach adopted here is not in the use of background assumptions per se;
after all, most human expert translations between formal systems use background
knowledge of this kind in an informal and heuristic way. Rather, the approach here is
formalised and systematised in what I claim is a novel way. This makes the discovery
of background assumptions relatively replicable, comparable and explicit, applicable
to different domains, amenable to different kinds of systems and data sources, and
scalable to more or less formal contexts. By seeking to describe knowledge repre-
sentations against a range of dimensions—technical, linguistic, cognitive, social—the
framework also portrays a semantic spectrum against which different granularities of
meaning can be considered, from atomic symbolic concepts through to holistic cultural
and social conceptual schemes. This helps an analyst involved in an alignment activity
consider aspects of translation usually ignored by purely atomistic approaches.
At the same time, several qualifications have been issued in order to insulate treat-
ment of the framework from criticism that it is a dogmatic answer to the question
of commensurability. Firstly, commensurability is not posed here in metaphysical
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terms—it is not an inexorable feature of two ontologies (any more than it is for two
languages). It is rather an analytic and evaluative determination made in a specific
situational context. The framework is geared towards making and justifying such
evaluations, relative always to the conditions and goals of that context. Hence, any
quantitative or qualitative commensurability value derived through use of the frame-
work ought not be abstracted out of this context—though, as with any estimation, it
can be referenced alongside these contextual attributes. Secondly, the framework is
intentionally open-ended in terms of which dimensions are used to profile ontologies;
how these dimensions are rated; and what kinds of methods, sources and interpretive
frames are used in the extraction of background assumptions about the ontologies.
This gain in flexibility is at the expense of some further complexity and lack of epis-
temic validity—but seems adequate to the aims of the framework as a heuristic,
guiding tool-kit aimed at practitioners. Thirdly, as some users of the software ex-
plained, the value of the framework may be more in the process of “making explicit”
tacit assumptions, than the final evaluative result. In particular, being able to show
evidence of particular decisions of translatability can be very useful in many project
planning and scoping scenarios.
10.3 Limitations
One significant theoretical limitation relates to the epistemological claim about com-
mensurability. Throughout the study I have argued commensurability is a relative,
interpretative judgement bestowed upon systems of knowledge—an analytic rather
than an ontological category. Unlike Kuhnian or Whorfian incommensurability, then,
which posits lack of translatability as intrinsic to the paradigms or languages under
consideration, the term here could be used in an adjectival sense—“commensurable
for. . . ” or “incommensurable with regard to. . . ”. Nonetheless, the structural motif
which is written through the theorisation of conceptual schemes avoids the descent
into semantic atomism, which does away with schematisation entirely. For, treated
pragmatically rather than platonically, always with regard to the contextual condi-
tions of an interpretive assessment, coarse grained commensurability of knowledge
systems can usefully capture qualities of conceptual translation which fine-grained
concept-by-concept matching cannot. However, the obvious implication is that com-
mensurability conclusions are heavily relativised, by both situational context and the
interpretive “bent” of the analyst. Practically, this makes assessments of commensu-
rability less re-useable, weakening the appeal of the framework beyond the immediate
scope of a translation requirement or project. One response to this line of critique is
that the framework nevertheless makes for a more explicit, systematic and construc-
tive appraisal than pure intuitive assessments might otherwise do. As the case studies
demonstrate, together the model, dimensional criteria and methodological suggestions
provide, then, a strong evidentiary basis for those interpretive conclusions.
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A subsidiary concern relates to the method of composition of the framework.
Chapters 2 and 4, in particular, spend considerable time reviewing existing literature
on ontologies and related disciplinary areas, in order to compose a model and series
of dimensions as part of the framework. The result is accordingly deliberately syn-
cretic, combining a mix of suggestive inputs from philosophy, linguistics, cognitive and
computer sciences, and various strains of sociological research. It might be argued
that such a synthesis glosses over important disciplinary and perspectival areas of in-
commensurability itself—thereby undermining its own overt argumentative position.
Such an approach could be deemed a strength as much as weakness; it can, more-
over, be justified on purely pragmatic grounds—to ignore findings from some of these
complementary areas of research is to miss important heuristic hints when developing
assessments of commensurability. Consequently, the synthesis of different approaches,
orientations and methods makes the resulting framework more generalisable, robust
and reusable.
If the study then rests its case at least in part on practical grounds, it is equally
important to acknowledge some important limitations in the empirical evidence pre-
sented. Firstly, the semantic web is itself a nascent information technology platform,
in spite of increasing academic and industry attention. This has made selecting mul-
tiple ontologies in the same or related domains difficult. Only one of the three case
studies examines ontologies, and this is clearly insufficient as a basis to extend to the
general case. I have justified the other case studies on grounds that the commensura-
bility of ontologies is an exemplary case of the more general problem of translatabil-
ity and interoperability of knowledge systems—incorporating database and mark-up
schemas and formats. As more ontologies are published and used, it ought to be
easier to develop further studies of this sort, to refine the framework for systems and
languages of different levels of expressivity.
Secondly, in spite of the avowed aim to develop an easily applicable, lightweight
framework, the case studies themselves clearly take time, effort and some domain
knowledge to design and undertake. For many practical projects, it is unlikely that
studies of the sort conducted here will be feasible. There is clearly a trade-off between
the sophistication and depth of the commensurability assessments, and the cost, time
and resources required to generate them. Similar tensions can be found between
the intention to construct a generalisable model which can be applied meaningfully
to specific contexts. As it stands, the framework may suffer from being overly for-
malised and abstract; further work would be needed to examine whether the proposed
dimensions and methods, in particular, could be “sliced and diced” to suit situational
conditions without loss of coherence.
Thirdly—and related to the previous limitations — as the software pilot showed,
it was difficult to communicate what exactly should be done with the framework.
Despite the fact that the software attempted to operationalise the framework in a
relatively linear form, participants in the pilot were unclear exactly what they were
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supposed to do with the myriad of options: to set up ontologies for comparison; to
configure dimensions; to add data sources; to develop a matrix of dimensions; and
finally, to view the resulting report. Clearly some of these difficulties related to extrin-
sic factors of the software user interface design, framework nomenclature, familiarity
of the participants with ontologies, and the method used to execute the pilot—a gen-
tler introduction to the aims of the software may have given users a better sense of
what they were looking for. However, further work is certainly needed to ascertain
the extent to which these difficulties related to intrinsic limitations of the frame-
work itself. Unfortunately, the issue of lack of significant expertise in ontology design
and modelling—an issue related to the relatively nascent state of the Semantic Web
discussed above—makes finding suitable candidates for undertaking further testing
difficult at this time. Anecdotally, where I have presented some of the content of the
study around the framework and case studies in workshops and seminars, substantial
time tends to be consumed in presenting “fundamentals” about the Semantic Web and
ontologies themselves. It is therefore more likely to find suitable areas of application
in more traditional areas of system and data integration.
10.4 Further work
Several indications of the need for further work are mentioned in the Limitations
section above: in particular the need to apply the framework to “real-world” data
integration scenarios, ideally involving other domains covered by available ontolo-
gies, and possibly using cut-down variations. In spite of the limitations above, the
case study findings in particular do suggest the framework has successfully passed a
preliminary “speculative” stage of theorisation and research application. To evalu-
ate how the framework could move from this stage to one of industrial application
requires, principally, further studies moving along different methodological lines to
those adopted to date.
One approach would be a series of controlled workshop environments, conducted
with students or practitioners working with databases, schemas and ontologies. In this
context, the framework could be presented as an assisting guide to problems of data
translation. Participants’ engagement with the framework would ideally be monitored
longitudinally, with periodic refinements being reincorporated back into the frame-
work. Under this approach, participants’ feedback would not only evaluate but posi-
tively revise the framework. A variety of more granular methods—interviews, surveys,
structured and unstructured observation techniques—could be incorporated within an
overarching workshop format. More perspicuous quantitative measures could also be
drafted, to assess benefits obtained from applying the framework in terms of direct
metrics like time, cost and resource usage in projects. Equally, consultation with
participants could serve to improve the quantitative and qualitative reporting aspects
of the framework, possibly in conjunction with revisions to the software system pre-
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sented in Chapter 9. Moreover the framework would benefit from integration into
existing software and data project management approaches and methodologies. Var-
ious forms of “agile” design and implementation approaches have gained popularity
in the past decade; conceivably, the application of a framework like this throughout
a project’s life-cycle could improve the error-fraught aspects of project scoping and
estimation—concerns typically fore-grounded in these approaches.
While the situational context in which commensurability is assessed has featured
prominently, relatively little has been said about what kinds of context might exist,
and the corresponding impact this might have on such assessments. Again, further
empirical evidence, in the form of surveys and observation, might yield a useful tax-
onomy of alignment scenarios along these lines. Similar to the knowledge system
dimensions, a series of variables could be formulated to model the context itself,
which in turn could be used to refine further quantitative commensurability results.
The following distinctions are indicative of the directions such work could potentially
undertake:
• Whether the alignment is relatively minimal—(few concept need to be common)
or maximal (most concepts must be common)
• Whether the alignment needs to be precise (with high confidence level thresh-
olds) or can afford to be vague (low confidence levels are tolerable)
• What level of effort is permitted, a priori, or required, a posteriori, for the
translation
Since situational dynamics vary considerably, a flexible—and extensible—taxonomy
would be required in any event, much as has been suggested within the framework
outlined here.
10.5 Conclusions
The introduction to this study referred to Foucault’s pronouncement of the “great
tables” designed in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The legacy of this his-
torical taxonomic impulse, for ordering things in classificatory hierarchies, grids and
lattices, is the now-mundane promiscuity of organisational technologies in all facets
of life. Human actors are engaged everywhere in electronic classificatory practices: as
“knowledge workers” and collaborators, as consumers and purveyors of aesthetic and
cultural taste, as socially engaged citizens and friends, and through a variety of other
roles. The Semantic Web represents the most ambitious program yet for organising
global information into a “web of data”, where all knowledge would be reducible to
interconnected factual assertions, represented as triples and conceptually coordinated
through ontologies. Such a program is far from being realised yet, in part due to the
incommensurability of the systems which would organise and house these assertions.
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A clear implication of the analysis conducted here is that the hyperbole surrounding
technological approaches to semantics needs to be tempered by suitable recognition of
both the potentials and limits of communicative meaning within social and cultural
spheres of human engagement. The holistic orientation advocated here, along with the
derivative framework and case studies, aim at a more realistic assessment of whether
and how knowledge systems can be integrated. This realism, arguably, will be mani-
fested in pluralised, locally integrated and fragmentary “semantic webs”—at best, in
partial accommodations of the visionary dream of interconnected and homogenised
information services.
The study has suggested commensurability is a structural and irreducible fea-
ture of conceptual translation, independent—or at least isolatable—from judgements
about either the utopic or dystopic potentials of the Semantic Web. The case for
assessing commensurability has been put forward on pragmatic grounds; yet it is also
worth acknowledging that the question of commensurability has an implied ethical
dimension. Either end of the commensurability spectrum represents a certain kind of
nightmarish scenario—either a totalising conformity to a singular conceptualisation,
or entropy into a series of private and incommunicable understandings. Different
modulating social forces, engaged in a dialectical interplay over cultural conceptual
schemes and knowledge representations, thus act as an unintended ethical regulat-
ing device between these twin “steady states” of semantic conformity or solipsism.
Endeavouring to assess commensurability between knowledge systems also implies a
certain ethics of technology—adopting a “principle of charity”, as Davidson puts it
in a different context, in trying to understand the motives, interests and perspectives
of the cultures responsible for them. As partial, in turn, as these understandings
themselves are likely to be, they represent ethically as well as pragmatically justified
acts oriented towards the coordination of meaning between knowledge systems.
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A.2 Conceptual Distinctions between the Ontolo-
gies
Note: Forward slash characters (/) are used to indicate subsumption conceptual re-
lations, square brackets ([]) indicate sibling classes, and pipe characters (|) indicate
a sequence of two or more classes ([A|B] means that A and B share the same parent
class, and both are suitable candidates for the concept in question).
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A.3 Word Frequency Analysis Details
Table A.2: Word Frequency Analysis
Rank SemWeb Ontolog
Word Frequency Word Frequency
1 rdf 35104 ontology 28507
2 web 35042 community 22013
3 semantic 25767 shared 17448
4 university 18017 leave 14464
5 data 15991 time 11591
6 owl 15902 ontologies 10759
7 information 13291 different 9311
8 ontology 11245 language 8907
9 papers 8798 web 8857
10 resource 8769 logic 8614
11 workshop 8692 knowledge 8448
12 uri 8571 semantic 8328
13 knowledge 7667 people 8054
14 research 7587 work 8008
15 systems 7230 information 8000
16 example 7120 way 7903
17 conference 7011 set 7894
18 people 6426 pat 7831
19 ontologies 6147 john 7705
20 xml 6138 point 7249
21 applications 6138 model 7235
22 usa 6095 subject 6972
23 class 5816 things 6898
24 new 5600 theory 6882
25 work 5593 family 6751
26 different 5548 world 6718
27 html 5545 say 6655
28 semantics 5093 make 6562
29 way 5058 example 6535
30 services 4782 need 6502
31 foaf 4765 data 6490
32 technology 4751 systems 6402
33 submission 4680 two 6309
34 uk 4625 context 5886
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Table A.2: Word Frequency Analysis
Rank SemWeb Ontolog
Word Frequency Word Frequency
35 type 4588 semantics 5784
36 list 4572 system 5711
37 rdfs 4545 being 5634
38 name 4500 first 5547
39 make 4493 know 5545
40 subject 4448 peter 5543
41 need 4401 color 5452
42 language 4394 terms 5439
43 paper 4361 new 5293
44 know 4341 formal 5242
45 technologies 4341 open 5222
46 want 4293 part 5115
47 time 4292 something 5073
48 international 4252 meaning 5053
49 uris 4244 common 5021
50 things 4224 owl 4863
51 two 4209 discussion 4646
52 first 4174 original 4639
53 content 4123 list 4637
54 thing 4080 concepts 4572
55 something 4035 problem 4506
56 application 4010 thing 4505
57 description 3980 agree 4497
58 open 3957 join 4474
59 world 3911 possible 4468
60 management 3875 class 4456
61 property 3873 call 4444
62 say 3841 bounces 4421
63 business 3830 sense 4371
64 model 3700 sent 4365
65 software 3686 real 4345
66 sparql 3605 each 4344
67 service 3596 session 4336
68 germany 3555 another 4334
69 case 3464 true 4278
70 document 3454 business 4191
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Table A.2: Word Frequency Analysis
Rank SemWeb Ontolog
Word Frequency Word Frequency
71 being 3446 standards 4175
72 system 3434 process 4147
73 problem 3417 useful 4124
74 point 3407 project 4117
75 tools 3406 number 4075
76 computer 3353 mean 4004
77 science 3285 want 3976
78 user 3217 level 3944
79 page 3213 fact 3904
80 set 3199 rdf 3871
81 context 3186 why 3818
82 submissions 3178 question 3793
83 query 3153 find 3778
84 original 3100 word 3634
85 following 3082 case 3633
86 reasoning 3080 since 3592
87 available 3071 human 3584
88 important 3050 person 3565
89 th 2960 type 3562
90 group 2954 without 3558
91 project 2953 regards 3529
92 person 2930 concept 3519
93 part 2918 rather 3517
94 really 2917 view 3504
95 question 2902 order 3501
96 each 2899 take 3499
97 languages 2897 still 3487
98 domain 2882 axioms 3479
99 find 2881 logical 3436
100 social 2820 standard 3425
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A.4 Summary of Ontolog Forum discussion, April
and June, 2007
Preliminaries
The thread begins in April 2007, with a forwarded request by Paola Di Maio for
participation to a conference on “Ontologies for Emergency Management”1. After
several further messages in April, under the title “Disaster Management ontology
BOF in Delft”, the thread is taken up again in early June.
Early on in the renewed conversation, the question of multiple ontologies in dif-
ferent contexts is raised by Sean Barker:
That is, I don’t think that ”event” can be represented by a single ontology,
and that it should be represented by a set of factor ontologies (for scale,
cause and actor) for which there is some measure of agreement. Further,
that what should be codified is the upper ontology, such that the ontology
can be extended by subclassing for the local situation—for example, the
upper ontology class ”wild animal incident” might be subclassed in Africa
to ”Elephant rampage”, but that is not a code we would use in the UK2.
This initiates further discussion on the question of multiple ontologies. Bill An-
dersen offers the following advice:
If you have some entity or entities E that can’t be represented by a single
ontology and which you will represent using ”factor” ontologies, then one
of these must be the case:
1) The factor ontologies are inconsistent when combined, in which case
there’s not much point in talking about E in the first place except in the
sense the representation so made could be read by humans (for which we
already have great natural languages).
2) The factor ontologies are not inconsistent when combine, in which case
could you clear up what you meant by ”I don’t think that ”event” can be
represented by a single ontology”, since clearly in this case they can be so
used3.
On the same day, John Sowa responds with an exploration of further possibilities:
Those are two important points, but they don’t exhaust all the options.
There are many cases where the ontologies happen to have some features
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could be eliminated by redefining some of the terms. There are also many
cases where the same thing is viewed at different levels of granularity or
from different perspectives. Any inconsistencies caused by such methods
could also be eliminated, in principle.
However, the job of eliminating every one of the inconsistencies that could
arise could take an enormous amount of effort. Instead of striving for a
global consistency of everything, it might be better to adopt methods that
don’t require global consistency4.
To which Waclaw Kusnierczyk replies with a request for clarification:
The discussion would certainly be made clearer if one could support the
claims with a simple example; e.g., two ontologies that taken together are
inconsistent, which cannot be reduced to a single consistent ontology, and
which both are necessary to cover the needs for all involved in modeling
the domain. (01)
As in mathematics, illustrative examples help in understanding dry the-
ories. I sympathize with Bill, and would like to see a counterexample to
what he says5.
And Barry Smith—one of the BFO authors—replies with a link to a paper he
has authored, which offers an example of “ontological pluralism”—a standpoint for
supporting multiple incompatible ontologies (in both the philosophical and technical
senses), which are nevertheless equally “contrained by realism” (Grenon and Smith,
2008).
Perspectives on the “Continuant—Occurrent” Distinction
At this stage the discussion is re-labelled as “Two ontologies that are inconsistent but
both needed”, and another 160 messages follow in June before the discussion peters
out towards the end of June. The question of disaster management with which the
thread began is left long behind in intriguing, lengthy debate which follows. I will pick
out quotes which seem to exemplify the different positions which proponents adopt.
The first response, from Pat Hayes, seeks to dismantle the very idea of “onto-
logical pluralism”—an idea which is also central to the epistemological take of BFO
and DOLCE ontologies. In a long post, Hayes begins with a rejoinder to the effect
pluralism can be done away with:
These two ‘irreconcilable’ ontologies ARE reconcilable, if one does things
right. The basic error is to assume that what a philosopher means by
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He continues with the claim that the occurrent/continuant distintion is less onto-
logical than terminological:
... the continuant/occurrent distinction is basically a distinction between
*how we use names* when talking about spatiotemporal entities. It should
not be seen as a fundamental ontological distinction: it is merely a lin-
guistic distinction between modes of expression7.
That is, the distinction between viewing things as existing either in time, in a
three-dimensional space, or through time, in a four-dimensional spacetime, is seman-
tically useful but not ontologically necessary :
To the extent that they fit with ontological intuitions, and with linguistic
usage, they are useful and important. But one can admit all that, and
even include them as categories in a formal framework, without requiring
that they constitute a rigid taxonomy, so that every physical thing MUST
be in exactly one of the two categories and as a matter of logical necessity
CANNOT be in both8.
In passing, Hayes also makes reference to the BFO and DOLCE ontologies:
I know that your framework and Dolce both use it, and are both used
by real people in real settings. But that in itself is not evidence that a
similar but simpler framework which does not have this distinction in it
might not be even more use9.
Smith, in reply, does not follow up on the substance of the debate, offering a terse
pragmatic defence. Sowa, responding in turn, with a criticism of blind pragmatism:
“I have serious concerns about taking informal terminologies and dressing them up
with formal axioms”10.
This message is followed by further series between Smith and Hayes. The benefit
of the abstract distinction is argued for Smith on increasingly pragmatic grounds—at
one stage he claims:
[Pat Hayes] >Fine. But then the question arises as to whether your onto-
logical >framework, which requires this distinction, is of more use than a
>similar one which does not. (013)
I think we need to test this empirically. So far we are winning—the GO
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This part of the thread ends in a kind of violent agreement about the potential
translatability of continuants and occurrents:
[Pat Hayes]>I don’t think that [the translation between continuant/occurrent
entities and spatiotemporal processes] will be much of a problem, most of
the time. >Translating from c/o to spatiotemporal is really not much
more than >judicious deletion. Translating in the other direction will re-
quire >some pattern-recognition to ’see’ c- and o-type formulations, and
>maybe in some cases splitting a concept into a continuant and its >life-
time (which are identified in spatiotemporal). >>I would say, in passing,
that my views on this issue have been >informed in large part by trying
to create useful interoperation >between a number of different ontologies.
I agree with Pat. Indeed I could embrace the views expressed in these last
two paragraphs verbatim12.
A new correspondent, Don Conklin, summarises the state of the debate to date,
in an exasperated tone:
OK, this has been an interesting thread. I’ve come to agree with the notion
that at some point, occurrents and continuants merge. Amen. I suppose
at the sub atomic level, everything pretty much looks like an occurrent
and at the level of the universe an awful lot of things look like continuants.
Down here in the trenches, trying to explain such matters to the ”normal”
folks who are the users of the ontologies I build is not a productive use of
time for me. I will count on Pat and company being able to manage the
translation if and (hopefully) when needed13.
Diversions
The discussion then precedes down a differnt path, and title, “Probabilistic Ontolo-
gies”, in which Kathryn Laskey argues for the introduction of a “fuzzy” logic for
representing degrees of certitude14.
A separate track off the main line of argument, titled “Ontology-building vs Data
Modelling”, examines the distinction between “ontologies” and “data models”—a
more familiar artefact of information engineering15.
Both discussions are interesting in picking up issues raised in the previous case
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Metaphysical Dilemmas
The main thread resumes with a new debate, branching off the discussion of continu-
ants and occurrents, about the role of metaphysics in ontology engineering. On June
16, Chris Partridge attempts to broaden the discussion:
At one level we have a debate about what the continuant-occurrent dis-
tinction is. I would like to suggest that it may be useful to step back...
It seems to me that these choices are metaphysical, in the sense that no
amount of empirical data can decide the issue...
It seems to me that one of the roles of the top ontology is to clarify
what [metaphysical] choices have been made. Deciding on what choices to
make (and on what basis to make the choices) is probably the first step
in building the top ontology16.
After some initial concern over the vague, allusory connotations of the term “meta-
physics”, Hayes suggests such general speculative philosophy is overly emphasised
among ontology engineers:
... there is a dangerous tendency, which others in these lists have noted,
for philosophical writings to be treated with a kind of uncritical awe by
non-philosophers, so that they—the texts—are treated with a reverence
that they do not deserve...
One should never forget that most philosophers work not by doing any-
thing empirical or even by talking to people who do anything empirical,
but by reading and criticizing what other philosophers have written. The
result can be rather in-bred, and indeed is often so remote from the ac-
tual world that it is hard to even make any sensible connection between
the concerns of a good deal of philosophy (including metaphysics) and
anything in the real world at all...
On the whole, I suggest, it is probably better to re-do ones own meta-
physics from scratch than to try to read through the history of philosophy
and sort out the very small fraction that may be relevant17.
Laskey replies that this “DIY” approach is implausible:
It is not possible to re-do from scratch. One always starts with what one
has absorbed from the surrounding culture. (Laskey, 2007b)
Hayes acknowledges the role of metaphysics in ontology development, but suggests
science-derived intuition is a more useful grounding for foundational ontological ax-
ioms (Hayes, 2007d). Laskey agrees this can be useful starting point, with the caveat
of “for all practical purposes” (Laskey, 2007c).
16Partridge (2007a).
17Hayes (2007c).
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Partridge takes up the challenge to rebutt the argument about metaphysical re-
dundancy, by parodying Hayes’ words in relation to logic:
For example, there is a dangerous tendency, which (unfortunately) others
in these lists have not noted, for logical writings to be treated with a kind
of uncritical awe by non-logicians, so that they—the texts—are treated
with a reverence that they do not deserve. One should never forget that
most logicians work not by doing anything empirical or even by talking
to people who do anything empirical, but by reading and criticizing what
other logicians have written. The result can be rather in-bred, and indeed
is often so remote from the actual world that it is hard to even make any
sensible connection between the concerns of a good deal of logic (including
FOL) and anything in the real world at all. (05)
On the whole, I suggest, it is probably better to re-do ones own logic from
scratch than to try to read through the history of logic (not sure why one
should need to read the history) and sort out the very small fraction that
may be relevant18.
The post is concluded with a recognition of the difficulty of engaging with “meta-
physical” texts, but suggests intuition leads to more dangerous naivety:
If this is a moan about the intellectual effort it takes to get useful stuff out
of the philosophy texts—I can see your point. But your proposed solution
seems to me to make the situation worse19.
Sowa follows this with a quote and a comment:
“Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” (05)
With respect to logic, the same ideas have been learned and forgotten
repeatedly throughout the past 50 years of AI and computer science. Un-
fortunately, each reinvention has usually been worse than the one that was
forgotten20.
Hayes responds by suggesting that science and logic—unlike metaphysics—can be
measured by progess:
The difference now is that logic *has* become a field in which technical
progress (mathematical rather than scientific, but progress for all that)
has been made... There are no universally accepted results, no ’normal




A.4. SUMMARY OF ONTOLOG FORUM DISCUSSION 333
different field from ours, but related). There are only rival opinions, ar-
guments and points of view: some of them most persuasive and the result
of very deep thinking, but opinions nevertheless21.
Partridge notes some argumentative slippage here—from an “empirical” to “con-
sensual” foundations. Philosophical inquiry cannot ground ontological engineering
precisely because it is “pre-paradigmatic”, according to Hayes:
Where to start: So your criterion has moved from empirical (including
science both hard and soft) to a discipline at a Kuhnian paradigm stage,
where there is a community that accepts the ’normal’ paradigm. This, of
course, now excludes the soft sciences such as economics and sociology,
which are pre-paradigm. But maybe you are happy about this. (Are you
about to construct your own?) I would suggest a criterion of pragmat-
ics, if it works, is more appropriate. Also, philosophy is often regarded
as dealing with pre-paradigm, pre-empirical matters—when they become
more tractable, they become science—as natural philosophy became nat-
ural science22.
Hayes concurs:
OK, then logic is now ’science’, and philosophy still isn’t. Which really
was my only point23.
Concluding Remarks
For all intensive purposes, conversation drifts into different terrain at this point. A
new participant, Peter Brown, questions the value of the debate:
Could someone sum up where this thread is going? Or is it just a philo-
sophical stroll in the park (or Platonic cave, I’m not sure what...)? Frankly,
apart from a partially illuminating Philosophy 101, has anything actually
been said that advances the cause of ontological research and practice? If
so, someone care to draw some conclusions?24
Both Partridge and Hayes offer some defence—but no conclusions. Partridge
offers:
Perhaps I can explain my motivation.
My work in ontological engineering focuses on ontologies for largish busi-
ness operational systems. In these, it is extremely useful to have a se-
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found that for this it is useful/essential to have a good(ish) top ontology.
I have found that much of what exists in this top ontology is formal and
metaphysical—and that a rudimentary understanding of metaphysics is
useful/essential in devising and (at the beginning) using the top ontology.
Pat’s original (I think, mischievous) comment about adopting a DIY ap-
proach seems to me a recipe for disaster for this kind of work—hence my
response. I was attempting to point out what I saw as some inconsistencies
in his rationalisation of his position and clarifying it—so that, hopefully,
a useful/essential approach was not dismissed out of hand25.
Hayes’ response:
It was worded in a barbed way, but I did (and do) mean it sincerely. But
perhaps it can be misunderstood. Applied to Chris’ application area, I
did not mean to imply that every user in a large organization should in-
vent their own metaphysics. I entirely agree that semantic consistency
across large and varied datasets is valuable, perhaps essential. Someone
has to provide a means to maintain this consistency, probably, in the cur-
rent state of the art, by designing and publishing a common ontological
framework and teaching people how to use it. My point was directed at
the person to whom falls this responsibility, of designing and maintaining
the central ontology. Should they feel that they need to study (or consult
someone who has studied) metaphysics or philosophy before starting on
this enterprise, or should they rather focus on making the ontology reflect
the needs of their organization or community, and make up the ’meta-
physics’ as they go along, as much as seems necessary? I meant to suggest
the latter26.
Sowa does conclude with some reconciliatory remarks on the value of engaging
both philosophical and scientific modes of inquiry:
Although I have a high regard for some philosophy, I certainly do not
genuflect to most of 20th century analytic philosophy, about which I would
apply Mark Twain’s remark about economics: ”A philosopher’s guess is
liable to be as good as anybody else’s.”
I did, however, learn a lot from those philosophers—not their conclusions,
but how to do the analysis from more appropriate assumptions...
I would consider any source as a place to look for ideas, but any ideas,
new or old, must be tested against observation and experiment. The
new medicines derived from ancient Chinese practice are good examples:
25Partridge (2007d).
26Hayes (2007g).
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They’re worth testing. Many of them fail the test, but some of them prove
to be very effective27.
27Sowa (2007d).
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Figure B.1: The Sample Document in OpenOffice
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Figure B.2: The Sample Document in Microsoft Word





The following images depict screen shots of various parts of the Schema Profiling
Toolkit, presented in Chapter 9.
C.1 Default Dimensions














Describes features inherent in
the schema itself: whether it
contains a relatively small or
large number of entities, whether
it uses predominantly classes or
properties.
341
342 APPENDIX C. FRAMEWORK IN PRACTICE











Describes the relationship of the
schema to things in the world: is
it accurate? is it simple, intu-
itive, coherent, complete or oth-





Describes the subject matter of
the schema (in general terms): is
the subject matter concrete or
abstract; predominantly spatial





Describes the general manner in
which the schema is written: is it
light-hearted or serious in tone?
does it mandate, or it is fairly
open-ended and flexible? Is it
speculative and suggestive or is
it dogmatic about the terms it
uses?
Process • Lowly—Highly Representative
of Users
• Distributed — Central Design
• Transparent — Closed Process
• Informal — Formal Decision
Making
• Harmonious — Conflictual
Design Process
• Implicit — Explicit
Assumptions
• Ad Hoc — Rigorous Design
Method
Describes how the schema has
been developed: is it developed
centrally (within an organisation
for example), or in a distributed
way? is the process open and
transparent, and is a rigorous or
ad hoc design method employed?
are users well-represented in the
design process? are the un-
derlying assumptions behind the
schema explicit?
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Practice • Small — Large Community
• Low — Highly Active
Community
• Declining — Increasing
Adoption Rate
• Backwards Incompatible —
Compatible
• De Facto Standardisation
• De Jure Standardisation
• Low or High Industry Support
• Low or High Availability of
Documentation
• Low or High Levels of
Satisfaction
• Recently published or mature
Describes how schema is used in
practice: does it have a small or
large community? is the commu-
nity active, and is it increasing
or declining? is the schema stan-
dardised in practice (de facto)
or/and formally (de jure)? is
there substantial support and
documentation for the schema?
is the schema mature, and is
it broadly backwards-compatible
with previous versions?















• Low—High Legal Motivation
• Low—High Environmental
Motivation
Describes why the schema exists,
in terms of various kinds of moti-
vation: is it motivated by social,
economic, political, technological
or other kinds of reasons?
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Perspective • Every-day — Scientific
• Pragmatic — Idealistic
• Academic — Applied
• Grounded — Speculative
• Dependent — Independent
Describes the general orienta-
tion or perspective adopted by
the schema: does it attempt
to describe things in everyday
or in scientific terms? is it
pragmatic (grounded in current
practical experience) or idealistic
(promoting a new theory or clas-
sification, as yet untested)? is it
heavily reliant upon viewpoints
adopted in other schemas from
which it is derived, or is it rel-
atively independent?
Relationship • Degree of conceptual overlap
in domains







Describe the relationships be-
tween two or more schemas: do
they overlap significantly? are
they aware of one another (ei-
ther explicitly—through explicit
references—or implicitly)? are
they competitive? are they mu-
tually consistent? are their over-
all perspectives commensurable?
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C.2 Survey Results
Table C.2: Survey Results
Item Count Min Max Median Mode Chi-square
I am familiar with general data
integration problems, technolo-
gies and approaches.
13 1 5 4 4 0.122
I am familiar with the Semantic
Web and associated technologies
(XML, RDF, OWL, SPARQL,
etc.).
13 1 5 3 2 0.337
I am familiar with ontology
matching concepts and ap-
proaches.
13 1 5 3 2 0.337
I found the model understand-
able and clear.
13 2 5 4 4 0.001
I found the model useful in the
context of this project.
13 3 5 4 4 0.000
I think the model would useful
for other projects.
13 2 5 4 4 0.085
I needed to modify the model
to capture relevant dimensions
(variables, properties) of the
schemas I am comparing *.
13 2 3 3 3 0.000
I found the methodology clear,
understandable and easy to ap-
ply.
13 2 5 4 4 0.001
I found the metholodology com-
plex and confusing *.
13 1 4 3 2 0.040
I found the methodology useful
for this project.
13 3 5 4 3 0.028
I think the methodology would
be useful for other projects.
13 1 5 4 4 0.174
I found the analysis clear and un-
derstandable.
13 2 5 4 4 0.004
I found the analysis complex and
confusing *.
13 1 4 2 2 0.040
I found the analysis useful for
this project.
13 3 5 4 4 0.003
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Table C.2: Survey Results
Item Count Min Max Median Mode Chi-square
I think the analysis would be use-
ful for other projects.
13 2 5 4 4 0.004
I found the software intuitive and
easy to use.
13 2 5 3 3 0.009
I found the software well docu-
mented.
13 2 5 4 4 0.040
I found the software useful for
this project.
13 3 5 4 4 0.003
I think the software would be
useful for other projects.
13 2 5 4 4 0.028
I think use of the toolkit would
improve understanding of data
schemas and ontologies.
13 3 5 4 4 0.000
I think the toolkit (and the as-
sociated conceptual framework)
would be useful for data integra-
tion projects.
13 3 5 4 4 0.013
I think the toolkit would help re-
duce the time involved in data in-
tegration projects.
13 3 5 3 3 0.000
I think the toolkit would help re-
duce the costs of data integration
projects.
13 3 5 4 3 0.006
I think the toolkit would help im-
prove the accuracy of data inte-
gration projects.
13 3 5 4 4 0.013
* Indicates negatively-oriented items.
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C.3 Schema Profiling Software
The following screen shots show the major steps in the evaluation process.
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Figure C.1: Schema Profiling Software—Browsing Projects
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Figure C.2: Schema Profiling Software—Setting up the Project
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Figure C.3: Schema Profiling Software—Modifying the Dimensions
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Figure C.4: Schema Profiling Software—Describing Method and Sources
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Figure C.5: Schema Profiling Software—Profiling Schemas
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Figure C.6: Schema Profiling Software—Constructing the Matrix
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Figure C.7: Schema Profiling Software—Developing an Analysis
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Figure C.8: Schema Profiling Software—Project Report
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Figure C.9: Schema Profiling Software—Project Information
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Figure C.10: Schema Profiling Software—Qualitative Comparison
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Figure C.11: Schema Profiling Software—Dimension Data Values
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Figure C.12: Schema Profiling Software—Schema Comparison
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Figure C.13: Schema Profiling Software—Overall Commensurability Ratings
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Figure C.14: Schema Profiling Software—Submitting Feedback
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